F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 3 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-3061
JULIO N. CASTORENA-JAIME, (D.C. No. 00-40061-01-SAC)
(D. Kansas)
Defendant - Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-3067
ALMA R. TREJO, (D.C. No. 00-40061-02-SAC)
(D. Kansas)
Defendant - Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-3079
RAMONA ALVAREZ, (D.C. No. 00-40061-03-SAC)
(D. Kansas)
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. Nos. 00-40061-01-SAC, 00-40061-02-SAC, & 00-40061-03-SAC)
Anthony W. Mattivi, Assistant United States Attorney (James E. Flory, United States
Attorney, and Nancy Landis Caplinger, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief)
Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, and Marilyn M. Trubey, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant Julio Castorena-Jaime.
Edward M. Collazo, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant Alma R. Trejo.
Kevin J. Cook of Manzanares & Associates (F. G. Manzanares of Manzanares &
Associates on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant Ramona Alvarez.
Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.*
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
A Kansas highway patrol trooper stopped a vehicle driven by Defendant Alma R.
Trejo for speeding. Defendants Julio Castorena-Jaime and Ramona Alvarez were
passengers in the vehicle. After issuing a warning, the trooper noticed a brick-like bundle
wrapped in tape on the rear floorboard of the vehicle. The trooper seized and searched
the bundle, which contained cocaine. The trooper subsequently arrested Trejo, Castorena,
and Alvarez.
A federal grand jury charged Defendants in a single-count indictment with
possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of Appeal
Nos. 01-3061 and 01-3067. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. These two
cases therefore are ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Castorena entered a conditional guilty plea, but reserved the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. The district court
sentenced Castorena to 46 months imprisonment. Trejo and Alvarez proceeded to trial.
The jury found both Trejo and Alvarez guilty as charged. The district court sentenced
Trejo and Alvarez each to 78 months imprisonment. All three Defendants now appeal.
Because Defendants’ convictions arise out of the same factual occurrence, and Trejo and
Alvarez raise the same issue on appeal, we address these appeals together.
Castorena raises only one issue on appeal: whether the trooper illegally seized and
searched the bundle in the car. Trejo raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the district
court committed plain error by not sua sponte suppressing her statements allegedly
obtained in violation of Miranda; and (2) whether the district court erred by denying
Defendants’ Batson objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of an African-
American juror. Alvarez joins in Trejo’s Batson issue, and raises three additional issues
on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in quashing the subpoena of co-defendant
Castorena; (2) whether the district court erred by admitting the cocaine into evidence after
officials repackaged it; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict her. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
I.
On May 16, 2000, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper John Rule was patrolling
Interstate 70 when he observed a grey Buick traveling in the opposite direction. Using
3
radar, he measured the Buick’s speed at eighty miles per hour in a seventy-mile-per-hour
zone. Turning around in the median, Trooper Rule caught up with the car and noticed it
was missing a side mirror. Based on these traffic violations, he activated his emergency
lights and pulled over the car. The activation of his lights triggered a video camera and
recording equipment in Trooper Rule’s patrol vehicle which recorded the traffic stop.1
Trooper Rule approached the car and saw two women sitting in the front seat, and
a man lying down in the back seat. Speaking English, Trooper Rule explained the reasons
for the traffic stop, and asked the driver for her license, registration, and proof of
insurance. In response, the driver provided a Minnesota title in her name and a California
driver’s license identifying her as Alma Trejo. Trooper Rule observed the driver’s
demeanor was overly nervous for a typical traffic stop. Her hands were visibly shaking,
and she made very little eye contact with him. Trooper Rule checked the license and title
and handed them back to Trejo. He returned to his patrol car where he wrote a warning
citation.
When he re-approached the vehicle to deliver the warning citation, Trooper Rule
observed the man in the back seat sitting upright. Trooper Rule handed Trejo the warning
citation and said “just a warning, no money.” As was his practice while approaching or
standing next to a stopped vehicle, Trooper Rule visibly checked the vehicle for evidence
1
The Kansas Highway Patrol erased the beginning of this videotape during the
copying process. Thus, the videotape shows the traffic stop only from the time Trooper
Rule re-approaches the vehicle to hand Trejo the warning citation.
4
of any other criminal activity and stayed alert to each occupant’s movements. Trooper
Rule immediately noticed through the driver’s side rear window a bundle laying on the
floor behind the driver’s seat. The bundle was approximately five to six inches wide, four
to six inches tall, and approximately two inches thick. It was wrapped heavily in tape.
Based on his training and experience, Trooper Rule immediately recognized from the
bundle’s wrapping and size that it was either illegal drugs or currency related to drug
trafficking. Trooper Rule testified that during traffic stops he has seen “hundreds” of
packages of similar size and wrapping. In his experience, these packages usually
contained illegal drugs, and if not drugs, then currency involved in drug trafficking.
Speaking principally to the man in the back seat, later identified as Castorena,
Trooper Rule pointed toward the bundle and asked “What do you have there in the back
seat?” Defendants responded to Trooper Rule’s question, but they cannot be heard on the
videotape over background traffic noise. Trooper Rule testified that he observed
Castorena trying to cover the bundle with trash on the floor of the vehicle. Trooper Rule
again pointed towards the back seat and said, “No, the brick down there.” The videotape
captures Castorena moving in his seat, while Trooper Rule continues to point saying,
“That thing right there.” Trooper Rule finally extended his hand through the driver’s
window and pointed to the floor saying, “That, hand it to me.” Castorena then gave
Trooper Rule the bundle.
As he began inspecting the bundle, Trooper Rule asked, “What do you have here?”
5
Although Trejo’s response is inaudible on the videotape, Trooper Rule testified that she
responded that she did not know. Trooper Rule then asked, “May I open it?” Trejo’s
response again is inaudible, but Trooper Rule testified that Trejo responded affirmatively.
Trooper Rule placed the bundle on top of the car, and using a knife from his pocket, he
cut into the bundle. He found a white powdery substance that he testified smelled like
cocaine.
Trooper Rule then instructed Defendants to turn off the vehicle and step out with
their hands up. Castorena exited through the rear passenger door, and Trooper Rule told
Castorena to lie down in the ditch. Trooper Rule testified that while he was dealing with
Castorena, he noticed that the passenger, later identified as Alvarez, appeared to be
putting something into or pulling something out of her pants. Trooper Rule can be heard
on the videotape saying, “Ma’am, don’t be shoving stuff down your pants.” The
videotape shows Trooper Rule approach Alvarez’s side of the vehicle, and shows Alvarez
exit the car. Alvarez lifted up her shirt and pulled her pants away from her waist to show
Trooper Rule that she did not place any objects in her pants. Trooper Rule then told the
female occupants to exit the car and lie down in the ditch.
Trooper Rule went to his patrol car and radioed for assistance. The audio portion
of the videotape indicates Trooper Rule returned to the ditch and handcuffed Defendants.
One of the female Defendants says something inaudible to which Trooper Rule responds
with the questions, “Got more on you, huh ma’am!” and “How much are you out?” The
6
videotape again only captures inaudible responses from Defendants. Trooper Rule then
directed one of the handcuffed female Defendants to sit down in the front seat of his
patrol car, and began searching the back seat of the stopped car. When the female did not
obey, Trooper Rule stopped his search and placed one female Defendant in his patrol car,
and the other into the stopped car.2 Trooper Rule then continued his search. Besides the
bundle on the back seat floor, Trooper Rule found two bundles in Castorena’s pants, and
three more bundles in a black purse located on the passenger-side front floor board.3
II.
Castorena appeals the district court’s denial of a suppression motion. In reviewing
the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. De la Cruz-Tapia, 162 F.3d 1275, 1277
(10th Cir. 1998). We accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id. “‘[A] finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to
2
The record is unclear as to which Defendant, Alvarez or Trejo, Trooper Rule
placed in the patrol vehicle, and which he placed in the stopped vehicle.
3
Trooper Rule questioned Castorena at the scene prior to giving Castorena any
Miranda warnings. During this questioning, Trooper Rule turned off the audio recording
on the videotape. After a few minutes of questioning, Trooper Rule turned the audio
portion back on. Trooper Rule read Miranda warnings to Castorena in English. At the
conclusion of the recitation of rights, Trooper Rule asked, “Do you understand all of
that?” Castorena nodded his head slightly and made a response that is inaudible on the
videotape. Trooper Rule then continued to question Castorena. Trooper Rule asked
Castorena whether the cocaine was his, and Castorena said “yes.” The district court
suppressed Castorena’s statements, both pre- and post-Miranda. The Government does
not cross-appeal the district court’s suppression of these statements.
7
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The ultimate
determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law we
review de novo. De la Cruz-Tapia, 162 F.3d at 1277.
A.
Castorena first argues the district court erred by concluding Trooper Rule properly
seized the bundle from the vehicle under the plain view doctrine. Although the Fourth
Amendment generally requires officers conduct searches and seizures pursuant to a
warrant, officers may seize evidence in “plain view” without a warrant. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). A warrantless seizure of evidence is sustainable if
(1) the police officer was lawfully located in a place from which to plainly view the item;
(2) the officer had a lawful right of access to the item; and (3) it was immediately
apparent that the seized item was incriminating on its face. United States v. Sanchez, 89
F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1996). Castorena concedes Trooper Rule was lawfully
positioned when he saw the bundle in plain view, and that he had a lawful right of access
to the bundle. Castorena challenges only whether the bundle’s incriminating nature was
immediately apparent.
An item’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent if “the officer had probable
cause to believe the object was contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id.; see also Arizona
8
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (requiring officer to have probable cause to seize
under plain view doctrine). A seizing officer need not “know” or have an “unduly high
degree of certainty” as to the incriminatory character of the evidence under the plain view
doctrine. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983). All that is required is a “practical,
nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved.” Id. at 742 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
We agree with the district court that the bundle’s incriminating nature was
immediately apparent. The record reflects that Trooper Rule has undergone extensive
criminal interdiction training, and has participated in over 150 large drug seizures.
Trooper Rule testified that the bundle he observed in this case was similar in size and
packaging to bundles seized in other drug seizures in which he has been involved. He
further testified he has not seen a similarly taped bundle of this size that did not contain
either drugs or drug trafficking proceeds. Viewing the videotape, Trooper Rule’s
instantaneous reaction upon seeing the bundle shows he immediately recognized its
incriminating nature. As the district court noted, Defendants’ inability to explain the
package, and Castorena’s “fumbling efforts” to conceal the bundle under trash on the
floor board heightened Trooper Rule’s suspicions about the bundle’s contents.
Castorena argues that in other cases involving opaque containers, the officers had
additional evidence beyond the mere appearance of the container to hint at the container’s
contents or to suggest the suspect was engaged in narcotics trafficking. We have no
9
difficulty affirming the district court’s finding that the bundle’s appearance, viewed
through Trooper Rule’s experienced eye in the context presented in this case, gave him
probable cause to suspect the bundle contained contraband or evidence of criminal
activity. Trooper Rule’s inability to see through the opaque tape around the bundle is “all
but irrelevant: the distinctive character of the [container] itself spoke volumes as to its
contents–particularly to the trained eye of the officer.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 743 (finding
seizure lawful where officer observed defendant drop a narcotic-filled balloon).
Castorena’s effort to liken his case to United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107 (1st Cir.
1995), is equally unavailing. In Doe, airport security officials seized blocks wrapped in
opaque tape that were hidden in a closed box. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
then pierced the tape to test the substance within the blocks. The First Circuit held
unconstitutional the DEA’s warrantless search of the taped blocks’ contents. Doe stands
for the proposition that the DEA impermissibly opened, and therefore searched, the
package’s contents without a warrant. Id. at 113. Doe assumed, without deciding, that
the officer’s seizure of the taped packages during an administrative airport security check
was permissible under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 110. Hence, Doe does not suggest
that seizing the container in the first place based on its plain view appearance was
impermissible. As stated by the Doe court, “Although probable cause, as well as exigent
circumstances, may support the warrantless seizure of an enclosed opaque container, the
same probable-cause showing is not necessarily sufficient to justify its subsequent
10
warrantless search.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). Thus, Doe was
concerned with warrantless searches of opaque containers, and not seizures under the
plain view doctrine.
B.
Castorena next contends that even if Trooper Rule permissibly seized the bundle,
his subsequent warrantless search of the bundle was unconstitutional. The district court
ruled the search was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, or alternatively, because Trejo consented to the search.4 We need not
address the automobile exception’s applicability, because we affirm the district court’s
finding that Trejo consented to the search. Castorena’s only challenge to the district
court’s holding that Trejo consented to the search is to attack Trooper Rule’s credibility.
Trejo’s response to Trooper Rule’s request for permission to open the package is
inaudible on the videotape. Castorena argues we should not believe Trooper Rule’s
testimony concerning Trejo’s consent. “The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be
given evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence fall within the
province of the district court.” United States v. Long, 176 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir.
1999). The district court found Trejo consented to the search. Based upon our review of
the record, this finding is not clearly erroneous. Because we find the seizure and
4
Doe does not assist Castorena in his argument that Trooper Rule’s warrantless
search was unconstitutional. Unlike the agents in Doe, Trooper Rule’s search falls within
at least one exception to the warrant requirement, consent.
11
subsequent search constitutional, we affirm the district court’s denial of Castorena’s
suppression motion.
III.
Trejo argues the district court erred by allowing into evidence her post-arrest
statement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Trejo concedes she
did not preserve this issue through objection or motion below. We therefore review this
claim for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under plain error review, Trejo must
demonstrate that (1) the district court erred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected
her substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 574 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
At the station house, Trooper Rule questioned Trejo and Alvarez together.
Trooper Rule advised Defendants of their Miranda rights in English. Trooper Rule
testified that “one of the sisters,” i.e., Alvarez or Trejo, said she did not understand.5 At
that point, Trooper Rule asked “the other sister” to translate the Miranda warning into
Spanish. Trooper Rule admitted he had no way of knowing what was said. After the
interpretation, Trooper Rule asked Trejo whether she understood her rights, and Trejo
5
Trooper Rule testified he could not remember whether Trejo or Alvarez said she
did not understand the Miranda warnings, but both Defendants stated they understood
their rights. He testified further, however, that he specifically recalled Trejo making the
statement that she knew the packages were in the vehicle, but did not know what was in
them. He testified Alvarez claimed she did not know anything about the packages.
12
said yes. Trejo then admitted she knew the packages were in the car, but did not know
what was in them. Trejo’s statement was admitted at trial.
Trejo now argues the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte suppressing her
statements as involuntary. Trejo asserts she did not understand the English Miranda
warnings, and the Government cannot meet its burden of showing Alvarez gave Trejo
adequate Miranda warnings in Spanish. The Government responds that Trejo actually
understood English, as demonstrated by her immediate and proper responses to Trooper
Rule’s commands and questions as seen on the videotape. Additionally, the Government
argues that although having a fellow detainee translate is not preferred, the practice is not
completely prohibited. The Government contends Trejo received adequate warnings in
her native tongue, and indicated she understood her rights.
Ultimately, the parties disagree over the factual question of whether Trejo
understood English, or alternatively whether she received proper Miranda warnings in
Spanish. Factual issues such as the claimed inability to understand English, or whether
Defendant understood her Miranda rights, are questions of fact which underlie the legal
question of whether Defendant’s waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary. See
Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000). “This court has held repeatedly
that factual disputes not brought to the attention of the court do not rise to the level of
plain error.” United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
United States v. Yarnell, 129 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also United States
13
v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[F]actual disputes do not rise to the level
of plain error.”). We cannot say the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte
suppressing Trejo’s statements where the factual dispute over Trejo’s understanding of
her Miranda warnings was never brought to the district court’s attention for resolution.
We take this opportunity, however, to caution the Government’s law enforcement
agents about using co-detainees, particularly co-defendants, to interpret Miranda
warnings to a criminal defendant. See United States v. Villegas, 928 F.2d 512, 518 (2d
Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is undesirable to have a co-defendant read Miranda rights.”). A co-
defendant has a strong incentive to incriminate the person for whom they are translating.
See United States v. Caba, 955 F.2d 182, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1992) (detainee has strong
incentive to lie where his assistance in procuring a confession may win him leniency).
This is particularly so in the case of co-defendants, who stand to gain by shifting the
blame to another. Id. We urge police officers to cease using co-defendants as interpreters
in the future to avoid possible reversible error.
IV.
Defendants Trejo and Alvarez jointly assert the prosecutor violated Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by using a peremptory challenge to strike an African-
American juror from the panel. In reviewing the district court’s disposition of a Batson
claim, we review de novo whether the striking party’s proffered explanation is race
14
neutral. United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994). We review for
clear error the district court’s finding of whether the striking party had discriminatory
intent. United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994). “[T]he trial court’s
decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of
the sort accorded great deference on appeal.” Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579 (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
A party’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror based on the juror’s
race violates the United States Constitution. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Neither the
prosecutor nor the defendant may use their peremptory strikes to exclude from the jury
panel members of specific racial groups on the basis of the juror’s race. Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). A defendant who objects to the prosecutor’s strike of
a juror need not be of the same race as the juror to state a valid Batson objection. Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415-16 (1991).6
In Batson, the Supreme Court set forth a three-step procedure for resolving
objections to peremptory challenges. First, the objector must make a prima facie showing
that the peremptory challenge is based on race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-97. If the objector
meets this burden, the party striking the juror must articulate a race-neutral explanation
6
Defendants complain the prosecutor erroneously informed the district court that
Defendants had to be the same race as the struck juror to raise a Batson challenge. The
prosecutor misstated the law on this point before the district court, however, the record
does not reflect that the district court relied on the prosecutor’s statement of the law in
making its ruling.
15
for striking the juror. Id. at 97. If the court finds the striking party’s reason is race
neutral, the court must determine whether the objecting party has shown purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 98. The party objecting to the use of the peremptory challenge
carries the ultimate burden of persuasion. Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d
847, 854 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)).
Defendants argue the district court failed to properly apply the Batson three-step
procedure, and that the district court was confused about which party bore the burden of
persuasion at each step. Although the colloquy between court and counsel on this point
was less than clear, the district court ultimately followed Batson’s three-step procedure.
First, Defendants objected that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse Mrs.
Foster. Defense counsel identified Mrs. Foster as a member of a minority race, African-
American, and stated that because no apparent reason existed for the challenge, the
inference was that the Government excused her on the basis of her race. Although the
district court initially found Defendants did not state a prima facie objection, the court
went on to analyze steps two and three of the Batson inquiry. Thus, we may assume
Defendants established a prima facie Batson showing. Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579 (Once the
prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation, and the district court rules on the ultimate
question of discriminatory intent, “‘the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had
made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’”) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 359 (1991)).
16
At step two of the Batson inquiry, the prosecutor offered the race-neutral
explanation that he struck Mrs. Foster because she was nervous and distracted, and
because she might be inattentive due to concerns about her work situation.7 Defendants
concede that juror inattentiveness during voir dire is a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a
peremptory strike under Batson. Davis, 40 F.3d at 1077; United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d
904, 913 (10th Cir. 1993). Distraction caused by employment concerns and nervousness
are also factors unrelated to a juror’s race. See Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013,
1019 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A neutral explanation means an explanation based on something
besides the race of the juror.”); Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579 (“[U]nless a discriminatory intent
is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral.”); see also United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding
district court’s rejection of Batson challenge where prosecutor struck juror because of a
“gut feeling” based in part on the extremely nervous and hesitant way the juror answered
voir dire questions); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489 (7th Cir. 1990)
7
The first day of jury selection, Mrs. Foster, along with five other jurors from the
jury pool, expressed concern about serving on the jury due to other conflicts. Mrs. Foster
indicated she might be unable to make arrangements for someone to cover her work
duties. By the next day of jury selection, however, Mrs. Foster indicated she had made
arrangements for her work to be covered and would like to serve. The prosecutor did not
question Mrs. Foster during voir dire. Defendants questioned Mrs. Foster and she
indicated that her employment concerns would not interfere with her service on the jury.
During defense questioning on voir dire, Mrs. Foster hesitated in response to a question.
When defense counsel asked Mrs. Foster what was wrong, Mrs. Foster stated, “Nothing,
I’m just a little nervous.”
17
(noting that jury selection may be influenced by “‘intuitive assumptions that are not fairly
quantifiable’”) (quoting United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Thus, the prosecutor met his burden under step two of the Batson analysis by articulating
race-neutral explanations for striking Mrs. Foster.
Defendants contend, however, the district court erred at the third Batson step by
failing to make any findings on the record regarding Mrs. Foster’s alleged nervousness,
inattentiveness, or level of distraction, and by finding the prosecutor’s explanation was
not pretextual. From the bench, the district court stated simply that Defendants’ challenge
was overruled, and that Mrs. Foster was excused. During a later session in chambers, the
district court stated:
I want to further put on the record that as to the Batson challenge, the
court finds and does find now that there wasn’t a basis for the – for the
Batson challenge made by defense counsel . . . . The court listened to the
government’s reason and found that that reason was appropriate . . . .
The court did not, however, make any specific findings on the record that Mrs. Foster was
nervous or inattentive, or that the court found the prosecutor credible.
Although we affirm the district court’s ruling, we encourage district courts to make
explicit factual findings on the record when ruling on Batson challenges. “Specifically, . .
. a district court should state whether it finds the proffered reason for a challenged strike
to be facially race neutral or inherently discriminatory and why it chooses to credit or
discredit the given explanation.” United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1994).
A district court’s clearly articulated findings assist our appellate review of the court’s
18
Batson ruling, and “ensure[] that the trial court has indeed made the crucial credibility
determination that is afforded such great respect on appeal.” Id. We have previously
cautioned that–
[d]etermining who is and is not attentive requires subjective judgments that
are particularly susceptible to the kind of abuse prohibited by Batson. . . .
[A] prosecutor’s explanation of challenges on the grounds of inattentiveness
deserves careful scrutiny by the district court, and special care by counsel
to fully develop the record concerning the specific behavior by venire
members motivating counsel to make a peremptory challenge based on
inattentiveness.
Johnson, 4 F.3d at 913.
Notwithstanding the district court’s failure to make express findings on the record
in the present case, the district court’s ultimate conclusion on discriminatory intent was
not clearly erroneous. Mrs. Foster initially expressed reservations about serving on the
jury. Although she later made arrangements to accommodate her employment issues and
indicated she would like to serve, the prosecutor still may have harbored concerns about
whether Mrs. Foster’s work situation would distract her.8 As to Mrs. Foster’s alleged
8
Defendants contend the prosecutor did not exercise peremptory challenges to
excuse any of the other similarly situated jurors who approached the bench the first day
of jury selection with potential jury service problems. See United States v. Johnson, 941
F.2d 1102, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (considering Government’s peremptory strike of non-
minority juror with similar characteristics as struck minority juror to support finding of no
pretext); United States v. Jenkins, 52 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Pretext can be
shown by evidence that non-stricken white panel members share the characteristics of a
stricken minority panel member.”). We have reviewed the record and note that the
Government never waived a peremptory challenge as to these jurors. Three of the five
similarly situated jurors were excused for cause by the district court before either side had
an opportunity to peremptorily strike the juror. Another juror remained in the jury pool,
19
nervousness, Mrs. Foster herself stated she was nervous. No other juror stated on the
record that he or she was nervous, nor did counsel or the court comment on any other
juror’s nervousness. The district court’s ruling indicates it implicitly found the prosecutor
credible. The “trial court’s findings on the issue of discriminatory intent largely turn on
an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility.” Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1579. “[E]valuation of
the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a
trial judge’s province.’” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 428 (1985)). “[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
369 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Giving due deference to the district court’s
opportunity to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility, the district court believed the
prosecutor’s legitimate explanations for striking the juror, and that ruling is not clearly
erroneous. See Johnson, 4 F.3d at 913 (“The district court is in the best position to
observe the demeanor and credibility of the prosecutor and the witness.”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).9
never having been called to the jury panel. The prosecutor could have excused only one
juror besides Mrs. Foster who initially approached the bench with concerns about serving
on the jury. The prosecutor could have used his first peremptory challenge to excuse this
juror, but chose to excuse another juror instead. By the time the Government had another
opportunity to peremptorily strike the juror, Defendants had already excused her. No
juror who initially approached the bench with concerns the first day of jury selection
remained on the jury.
9
As evidence of alleged pretext, Defendants argue the prosecutor’s treatment of
other minorities on the jury panel demonstrates his explanations were pretextual.
20
V.
Defendant Alvarez next argues the district court erred in quashing the subpoena
issued to co-defendant Castorena. We review the district court’s rulings on subpoenas for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 378 (10th Cir. 1986).
Prior to trial, Castorena apparently communicated with co-defendant Trejo,
indicating he was going to take full responsibility for the cocaine. Trejo and Alvarez thus
sought to subpoena Castorena to appear at trial. Castorena filed a motion to quash the
subpoena on grounds that he was going to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to avoid
compelled self-incrimination. The district court directed Alvarez and Trejo to prepare a
list of questions they intended to ask Castorena. In response to the questions, Castorena
filed an affidavit stating that he would decline to answer all questions, except his name,
Specifically, Defendants note the Government used its first peremptory challenge to
excuse juror Beck, who stated his father was Hispanic. Because Defendants did not
object to this strike, we have no explanation for the prosecutor’s strike. Any attempt to
discern the prosecutor’s reason for striking Beck would be pure speculation at this point.
We note, however, that juror Rivera, who was Hispanic, remained on the jury, despite the
prosecutor still having peremptory challenges available to remove minority jurors, if that
was his intention. See United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“[A]lthough the mere presence of members of a certain race on the final jury does not
automatically negate a Batson violation, . . . it can be a relevant factor, particularly when
the prosecution had the opportunity to strike them.”). Additionally, Defendants assert the
prosecutor questioned juror Rivera differently than he questioned other jurors, by asking
Rivera whether he would feel sorry for the Defendant or the Government. During voir
dire, the prosecutor’s modus operandi was to ask one juror a question or two, and then ask
the entire panel if they agreed or disagreed with the juror’s answer. Rivera was treated no
differently, and the prosecutor asked the entire panel about sympathy towards either party.
The prosecutor did not single out Rivera for hostile treatment.
21
on Fifth Amendment grounds. At the time of the subpoena, Castorena had entered a
conditional guilty plea, and was awaiting sentencing. Alvarez contends the district court
should have compelled Castorena to take the stand in front of the jury, and then
determine, as to each question, whether Castorena’s answer to the particular question
would subject Castorena to possible self incrimination.
The district court decides in the first instance whether a witness’ silence is
justified. United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1984). The court should
order a witness invoking his Fifth Amendment rights to answer questions “‘only if it is
“perfectly clear” that the witness is mistaken and the answers “cannot possibly” tend to
incriminate. In making this determination the judge must liberally construe the privilege
in favor of the right it was intended to secure.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Nunez, 668
F.2d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 1981)). A defendant facing impending sentencing legitimately
may fear incurring additional criminal liability through compelled testimony. See United
States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the Fifth
Amendment continues to protect Defendant during sentencing because such testimony
could subject him to further criminal liability).10 Castorena was awaiting sentencing at
the time he was under subpoena. Further, Castorena had entered a conditional guilty plea.
10
See also United States v. Dago, 33 F.3d 63, 1994 WL 387836, at *6 (10th Cir.
1994) (unpublished) (“A defendant confronting impending sentencing may have a
reasonable basis to fear incurring additional criminal liability if forced to testify.”) (citing
United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1161 (5th Cir. 1992)).
22
If Castorena prevailed on appeal, his testimony at his co-defendants’ trial certainly would
have incriminated him.
Alvarez argues the jury was entitled to observe Castorena’s “non-verbal
communications” on the witness stand. Defendants do not, however, have the right to
force a witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury. Hart, 729 F.2d
at 670.11 “‘[T]he jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness
to exercise his constitutional privilege whether those inferences be favorable to the
prosecution or the defense.’” Nunez, 668 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Bowles v. United States,
439 F.2d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to allow Defendants to compel Castorena to appear before the jury simply to
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
VI.
Alvarez next argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting into
evidence the repackaged cocaine. We review the district court’s ruling admitting
evidence for an abuse of discretion if an objection is timely made, but if no objection is
made, for plain error. United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001).
The six bundles Trooper Rule seized from the car were packaged originally in
11
See also United States v. Quary, 188 F.3d 520, 1999 WL 546999, at *7 n.8
(10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (“We note that Quary would not have been permitted to
force the witness to take the stand just to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege with
respect to individual questions.”) (citing Hart, 729 F.2d at 670).
23
opaque tape. The Government introduced into evidence, without objection, photographs
of the bundles in their original condition as exhibits one through five. Alvarez objected
when the Government attempted to introduce into evidence exhibits eleven through
fourteen. Exhibits eleven, twelve, and thirteen were clear bags, each containing two
bundles’ worth of cocaine. Exhibit fourteen was the packing material in which the
bundles were originally wrapped. Before the district court, Alvarez objected to the
admission of these exhibits, alleging the Government had not established a chain of
custody because of the cocaine’s altered appearance. On appeal, Alvarez argues the
district court should have refused to admit the cocaine because its prejudicial value
significantly outweighed its probative value. Alvarez argues that because this case is
largely about her knowledge and participation, allowing the Government to present the
cocaine in clear bags, and in larger units than originally found, unfairly prejudiced her
by suggesting the cocaine was in plain view. Even if we liberally construe Alvarez’s
objection below to include a prejudice argument, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the cocaine into evidence.
Contrary to Alvarez’s assertions, the jury was fully informed about the cocaine’s
original appearance and about how the cocaine and packaging came to look like exhibits
eleven through fourteen. The Government presented the jury with exhibits one through
five which depicted the bundles as they appeared at the scene of the traffic stop. Drug
Enforcement Agency Special Agent Jeffrey Kratowicz then testified that the bundles were
24
sent to a lab for testing, and came back unwrapped and repackaged as they appeared in
exhibits eleven through thirteen. The Government also presented exhibit fourteen, which
Kratowicz identified as the original packaging material around the cocaine. Thus, the
Government made clear to the jury that exhibits eleven through thirteen did not reflect the
original appearance of the cocaine, and that the Government had modified the packaging.
We have previously held that even where the Government lost the container in
which the narcotics were originally discovered, the narcotics themselves were still
admissible. See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532-33 (10th Cir. 1989)
(cocaine admissible even though police lost the brown paper bag in which the cocaine
was originally found); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1381 (10th Cir. 1984)
(cocaine admissible even though police lost the cardboard box drugs were contained in
where defendant argued the cardboard box would corroborate his claim he was unaware
of the box’s contents). Here, the police did not completely destroy or lose the wrappings.
Further, the Government presented the jury with evidence of the cocaine’s appearance
both before and after the alteration. The Government’s failure to produce the cocaine in
its original appearance goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See
United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000) (deficiencies in chain
of custody go to weight of evidence); Cardenas, 864 F.2d at1532 (so long as the
evidence’s relevant features remain unaltered, it is admissible). “‘[T]he jury evaluates the
defects and, based on its evaluation, may accept or disregard the evidence.’” Humphrey,
25
208 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1531). The district court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting exhibits eleven through fourteen into evidence.
VII.
Finally, Alvarez argues the evidence was insufficient to convict her of possession
with intent to distribute. We review sufficiency of evidence claims de novo. United
States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001). Evidence is sufficient to support
a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
1247. In reviewing the evidence, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider
witness credibility, as that duty is delegated exclusively to the jury. United States v.
Sanders, 240 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001).
To establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the Government must prove
Alvarez (1) possessed a controlled substance; (2) knew she possessed a controlled
substance; and (3) intended to distribute the controlled substance. United States v. Dozal,
173 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 1999). Possession may be actual or constructive. United
States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997). In this case, the Government relied
on the theory of constructive possession to show Alvarez jointly possessed the cocaine
with her co-defendants. To prove constructive possession, the Government must show
that Defendant knowingly held “ownership, dominion or control” over the object and
premises where the contraband was found. United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 869 (10th
26
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Constructive possession may be
established by circumstantial evidence and may be joint among several individuals.”
United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). In joint occupancy cases where the Government seeks to prove
constructive possession through circumstantial evidence, the Government “must present
evidence to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the . . .
contraband.” United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
Alvarez’s mere presence in the car with the cocaine is insufficient to prove this
nexus. Jones, 44 F.3d at 865. The jury, however, received additional evidence
connecting Alvarez to the cocaine. Alvarez and her companions were in a lengthy cross-
country trip from California to Minnesota. The jury could reasonably infer that Alvarez
had seen and discussed the packages in her companion’s pants and in the black bag in the
front seat. Trooper Rule found the black bag containing three bundles of cocaine on the
floorboard at Alvarez’s feet. The police located numerous purses in the car, but only two
purses contained any items. Trooper Rule found the first purse, which contained papers
belonging to Trejo, in the trunk. Trooper Rule discovered the second purse, the black bag
containing the cocaine, at Alvarez’s feet. Although Trooper Rule did not find identifying
documents in the black bag, he discovered Alvarez’s identification documents in an
address book located inside the car’s passenger compartment. During the arrest, Trooper
27
Rule saw Alvarez making furtive movements in the general area of the black bag while he
was handcuffing Castorena. The jury could reasonably infer that the two women in the
car each had a purse, that the black bag was Alvarez’s because the other purse was clearly
Trejo’s, and that when Trooper Rule thought Alvarez was putting something into her
pants, she was actually removing her identifying documents from the black bag. Finally,
Alvarez made conflicting and incriminating statements. At first, Alvarez denied any
knowledge concerning the bundles. Later, during booking, Alvarez spontaneously stated
to agents that she told her lawyer she knew the packages were in the vehicle, but did not
know what was in them. A reasonable jury could find from this evidence that Alvarez
knowingly possessed the cocaine with intent to distribute.
AFFIRMED.
28
United States v. Castoreno-Jaime
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2002-04-03
Citations: 285 F.3d 916
Copy Citations