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United States v. Cavera

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date filed: 2007-10-11
Citations: 505 F.3d 216
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     05-4591(L)
     U.S.A. v. Cavera



 1                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 2                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
 3
 4                                   _______________
 5
 6                                  August Term, 2005
 7
 8            (Argued May 16, 2006               Decided October 11, 2007)
 9
10                      Docket Nos. 05-4591-cr(L), 05-5210-cr(CON)
11
12                                   _______________
13
14                              United States of America,
15
16                                               Appellee,
17
18                                          v.
19
20                  Gerard Cavera, aka Gerry Lake and Peter Abbadessa,
21
22                                               Defendants-Appellants.
23
24                                   _______________
25
26   Before:
27                          CARDAMONE, CALABRESI, and POOLER,
28                                   Circuit Judges.
29
30                                   _______________
31
32        Defendant Gerard Cavera appeals from the judgment entered
33   August 23, 2005 in the United States District Court for the
34   Eastern District of New York (Sifton, J.), convicting him, upon
35   his guilty plea, of conspiring to deal in and transport firearms
36   in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Cavera was sentenced to 24
37   months imprisonment, 3 years supervised release, a $60,000 fine,
38   and a $100 special assessment. Defendant challenges his
39   sentence, alleging the district court erred by imposing a
40   sentence above the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of
41   12 to 18 months and in refusing to grant him a downward departure
42   on the basis of his wife's illness. He also requests that the
43   case be remanded to a different sentencing judge.
44
45             Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
46
47                                   _______________
 1                            _______________
 2
 3   JEFFREY A. RABIN, Brooklyn, New York (Law Office of Jeffrey A.
 4        Rabin, Brooklyn, New York, of counsel), for Defendant-
 5        Appellant Gerard Cavera, aka Gerry Lake.
 6
 7   TARYN A. MERKL, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, New
 8        York (Roslynn R. Mauskopf, United States Attorney, David C.
 9        James, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of
10        New York, Brooklyn, New York, of counsel), for Appellee
11        United States of America.
12
13                            _______________
14
15   Daniel A. Hochheiser, Hochheiser & Hochheiser, LLP, New York, New
16        York, filed a brief Amicus Curiae for the United States
17        District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
1    CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

2         This appeal prompts us to write further on the subject of

3    federal criminal sentencing in the aftermath of United States v.

4    Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).1   All agree that Booker removed the

5    mandatory teeth of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

6    (Guidelines) by rendering them advisory, and that Justice

7    Breyer's remedy opinion put some bite back into the Guidelines by

8    requiring courts when sentencing defendants to "consider" them.
9    See id. at 259-60.   We, like our sister circuits, are still

10   putting flesh on the skeleton issue of what it means to consider

11   the Guidelines, and -- as we address specifically in this case --

12   when and under what circumstances a district court may impose a

13   non-Guidelines sentence.

14        Defendant Gerard Cavera (defendant) appeals the August 23,

15   2005 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

16   District of New York (Sifton, J.) following his conviction on a

17   guilty plea to one count of conspiring to deal in and transport
18   firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.   Although the

19   recommended Guidelines range for Cavera's offense was 12 to 18

20   months imprisonment and a fine of $3,000 to $30,000, the district

21   court imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of 24 months




     1
        Our initial opinion in this case, issued on June 6, 2007,
     prompted comments from several members of the Court. In an
     effort to address the concerns they expressed, the panel decided
     to withdraw the earlier filed majority opinion along with the
     concurring opinion and issue this new opinion in their place.

                                      2
1    imprisonment, three years supervised release, a $60,000 fine, and

2    a special assessment of $100.

3         On appeal Cavera maintains, and the government agrees, that

4    the district court committed legal error by considering the

5    population density of New York City in imposing a non-Guidelines

6    sentence.   We appointed amicus curiae counsel to brief the

7    position taken by the district court because both parties agreed

8    that the district court sentence was imposed in error.    Amicus
9    counsel's exposition of the issues was helpful to us, and we note

10   his commendable candor in advising the Court that his extensive

11   research unearthed scant judicial authority supporting the

12   district court's sentence.   Cavera also contends on this appeal

13   that the district court erred by refusing him a downward

14   departure based on his wife's medical condition and urges the

15   case be remanded to a different district court judge for

16   resentencing.

17        Under the circumstances of this case, the district court's
18   reliance on the simple fact of population density to impose a

19   non-Guidelines sentence constituted legal error and rendered

20   defendant's sentence unreasonable.     We must therefore vacate and

21   remand the case for resentencing, although we see no reason to

22   remand it to a different sentencing judge.    Finally, the district

23   court's refusal to grant Cavera a downward departure for family

24   circumstances is not appealable.




                                        3
1                              FACTS AND BACKGROUND

2                      A.    Cavera's Personal Background

3         Cavera is over 70 years old and an army veteran.     After

4    discharge from military service, he operated an auto garage

5    during the 1970s and 1980s.      He retired from auto repair work in

6    1986 and eight years later went into the contracting business.

7    With a net worth of over one million dollars, Cavera is married

8    and has five adult children who live in New York State.     He and
9    his wife have health problems.      He has been diagnosed with gout

10   and Type II diabetes.     His wife was diagnosed with breast cancer

11   in 1994.    In 1995 and 1999 she suffered heart attacks and

12   continues to suffer from substantial heart problems.     In 2003 her

13   breast cancer returned and she underwent a mastectomy.

14                              B.   Cavera's Crime

15        On April 8, 2004, two of Cavera's co-defendants, Peter

16   Abbadessa and Anthony Lucania, along with a government

17   confidential witness, traveled to Florida where Cavera lives when
18   away from New York.     The confidential witness gave Lucania

19   $11,500 for the purchase of firearms.      The FBI then surveilled

20   Abbadessa and Lucania as they met with Cavera at his home.      While

21   there Cavera gave Abbadessa and Lucania two boxes containing 16

22   firearms.   After the sale, Abbadessa and Lucania returned to New

23   York with the confidential witness.

24        On June 23, 2004, a grand jury returned an 11 count

25   indictment charging Cavera with various violations of federal gun

26   trafficking laws.      On November 24, 2004, defendant plead guilty

                                         4
1    to one count of conspiring to deal in and transport firearms in

2    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.

3                           C.   Cavera's Sentencing

4         At sentencing the district court calculated the Guidelines

5    range for Cavera's offense to be 12 to 18 months and a fine of

6    $3,000 to $30,000.   However, the court decided to impose a non-

7    Guidelines sentence of 24 months imprisonment, 3 years supervised

8    release, a $60,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment.      In a 21-
9    page opinion, the sentencing court explained its rationale for

10   imposing a greater non-Guidelines sentence.       Looking at factor

11   (a)(2) of 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which directs the court to consider,

12   inter alia, the seriousness of the offense and the need for

13   deterrence, it reasoned that gun trafficking in an urban

14   environment like New York City requires heavier sentences.

15   United States v. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-96 (E.D.N.Y.

16   2005).   The district judge also denied a downward departure for

17   family circumstances noting that Cavera has ample financial
18   resources and five adult children to care for his ill wife.       Id.

19   at 292-93.   From the resulting judgment of conviction, Cavera

20   timely appealed.

21                                 DISCUSSION

22                           I   Standard of Review

23        We review both Guidelines and non-Guidelines sentences for

24   reasonableness.    United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 131

25   (2d Cir. 2006).    The reasonableness standard entails two

26   elements:    procedural reasonableness and substantive

                                        5
1    reasonableness.    Id. at 131-32.    To determine procedural

2    reasonableness we examine three factors:     whether the district

3    court properly (a) identified the Guidelines range supported by

4    the facts found by the sentencing court, (b) treated the

5    Guidelines as advisory, and (c) considered the Guidelines

6    together with the other factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

7    Id.   Substantive reasonableness depends on whether the "length of

8    the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors outlined in 18
9    U.S.C. § 3553(a)."     Id. at 132.

10         Even post-Booker, we continue to review a district court's

11   interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact

12   for clear error.     See United States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 162

13   (2d Cir. 2006).    We may review a refusal to downwardly depart

14   only if the sentencing court misapprehended its authority to

15   depart "or the sentence was otherwise illegal."      United States v.

16   Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).        We

17   observe finally that although under our post-Booker
18   reasonableness regime we "have declined to adopt per se rules,

19   opting instead to fashion a mosaic of reasonableness through

20   case-by-case adjudication," on appeal we view "as inherently

21   suspect a non-Guidelines sentence that rests primarily upon

22   factors that are not unique or personal to a particular

23   defendant."   Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133 (emphasis added).




                                          6
1                 II The Non-Guidelines Sentence Based on
2             Population Density Is Unreasonable in this Case
3
4         Both Cavera and the government assert the district court's

5    non-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.

6                              A.   In General

7         The crux of the district court's argument for Cavera's

8    above-Guidelines sentence is its belief that trafficking firearms

9    in urban environments threatens greater harm than trafficking in
10   less densely populated places.   In explaining Cavera's sentence,

11   the district court makes no reference to any characteristic

12   particular to the defendant or his crime, but relies entirely on

13   circumstances common to all defendants charged with gun

14   trafficking in New York and similar large cities.    In so doing,

15   the court seems to devise and employ a formula requiring the

16   length of sentences for gun trafficking to rise or fall with the

17   population density of the locality where the weapons are expected

18   to end up.2

19        We emphasize our concern that the district court's
20   demographics-based approach to sentencing runs contrary to one of

21   the primary purposes of the Guidelines:     to diminish unwarranted

22   sentencing disparity.   Prior to the passage of the Guidelines,

23   Congress was troubled by studies showing disparate sentences

24   imposed on federal defendants who had committed similar crimes.


     2
        This does not mean that a court may never consider
     characteristics of the locality in which the weapons are expected
     to end up in deciding the seriousness of a particular defendant's
     crime and especially in determining what is necessary properly to
     deter that defendant. See infra note 3.

                                      7
1    To deal with this problem, Congress enacted the Guidelines,

2    bringing nationwide uniformity to federal criminal sentences.

3    See Booker, 543 U.S. at 250 ("Congress' basic statutory goal [is]

4    a system that diminishes sentencing disparity . . . .");

5    Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133-34 ("Disparate sentences prompted the

6    passage of the Sentencing Reform Act and remain its principal

7    concern."); United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir.

8    2006).   Put differently, the Guidelines aim to eliminate
9    disparities in sentences meted out by different district courts

10   to defendants who commit similar offenses.   Thus, under the

11   Guidelines, a defendant who commits crime "x" in Chicago will be

12   punished, all other things being equal, similarly to a defendant

13   who commits crime "x" in Savannah.    Indeed one of the § 3553(a)

14   factors -- factor (a)(6) -- provides that in determining the

15   particular sentence of a defendant, the court shall consider the

16   "need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants

17   with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
18   conduct."   18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

19        With the above in mind, it seems plain that the district

20   court's formulaic approach threatens to undermine a primary

21   purpose of the Guidelines.   The trial court's reasoning would

22   result in a return to disparate sentences across districts where

23   courts fashion sentences, not on facts unique to defendants'

24   conduct or circumstances, but solely on the urban or rural

25   character of each court's geographic jurisdiction.   As the

26   government correctly points out, were we to take this reasoning

                                      8
1    to its logical conclusion, manifold crimes that take place in

2    urban areas would be subject to a presumption of a higher non-

3    Guidelines sentence; and, conversely, crimes committed in rural

4    and less populated areas would be subject to a presumption of a

5    lower non-Guidelines sentence.

6         Hence, we proceed with caution to review the district

7    court's account for Cavera's sentence.

 8        B.   Critique of the Support Cited by the District Court
 9                             For Its Decision
10
11                         1.   Fast-Track Programs

12        The trial court believes the congressionally authorized

13   "fast-track" programs lend support to its approach.     See Lucania,

14   379 F. Supp. 2d at 297.    Fast-track programs, which offer a

15   defendant a reduced sentence in exchange for a waiver of certain

16   rights, started in districts along the southwest border of the

17   United States where a high incidence of illegal re-entry cases

18   severely strained local resources.    The programs were authorized

19   by Congress in § 401(m)(B) of the Prosecutorial Remedies and
20   Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of

21   2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).     See generally

22   Mejia, 461 F.3d at 160-61 (discussing history and regulation of

23   the various fast-track programs).     The district court insists

24   that any disparity resulting from its consideration of New York

25   City characteristics is "at least as well justified as the

26   disparity created by these fast-track programs."     Lucania, 379 F.

27   Supp. 2d at 297.


                                       9
1         We do not think the existence or congressional sanction of

2    the fast-track programs is helpful to the district court's

3    position.   Since the date of the decision below we have explained

4    that any disparity resulting from these programs is not

5    unwarranted.     See Mejia, 461 F.3d at 163 ("Congress expressly

6    approved of fast-track programs without mandating them; Congress

7    thus necessarily decided that they do not create the unwarranted

8    sentencing disparities that it prohibited in Section
9    3553(a)(6).").    The participation of Congress in the

10   establishment and regulation of fast-track programs sharply

11   distinguishes such programs from the approach taken by the

12   district court.    While fast-track programs forsake uniformity to

13   obtain other benefits, congressional participation ensures that

14   other goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, including transparency,

15   are preserved.     See Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and

16   Transparency in Sentencing:    Reflections on the New Early

17   Disposition Departure, 27 Hamline L. Rev. 357, 360-65, 373 (2004)
18   (noting benefits of localization, but emphasizing need for formal

19   localization mechanisms within the Guidelines to promote

20   transparency in the incorporation of local factors in

21   sentencing).

22        More fundamentally, Congress and, by proper delegation, the

23   Sentencing Commission act appropriately when they assess the

24   societal costs and benefits of punishing a category of crimes

25   prosecuted in different districts in a uniform fashion.      A

26   federal court acting unilaterally is generally not in a position

                                       10
1    similarly to assess societal costs and benefits.    Moreover, as

2    the Supreme Court has made clear, "[i]n our system, so far at

3    least as concerns the federal powers, defining crimes and fixing

4    penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions."    United

5    States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948); see United States v.

6    Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 356 (2d Cir. 2006).

7                          2.    Section 3553(a)(2)

8         We recognize that the district court rooted its non-
9    Guidelines sentence in a § 3553(a) factor, namely subsection

10   (a)(2), which provides that in crafting a sentence the court

11   should impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the

12   offense and the need for deterrence.    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).    We

13   do not mean to suggest that the consideration of sentencing

14   disparity under factor (a)(6) trumps or should be given more

15   weight than considerations under factor (a)(2).     See Florez, 447

16   F.3d at 158 (noting that the weight to be given any § 3553(a)

17   factor is committed to the discretion of the sentencing court and
18   beyond appellate review).    Rather, we hold simply that the

19   district court erred in its analysis under factor (a)(2) by

20   sentencing Cavera on the basis of a policy judgment concerning

21   the gravity of firearms smuggling into a heavily populated area,

22   like New York City, rather than on circumstances particular to

23   the individual defendant and his crime, see Rattoballi, 452 F.3d

24   at 133.   The district court's approach effectively defines a

25   separate crime -- gun trafficking in urban environments -- and

26   fixes an above-Guidelines penalty for that crime.

                                       11
1         We have cautioned the district courts against misapplying

2    their sentencing authority to make policy decisions relating to

3    an entire class of offenses.    See United States v. Trupin, 475

4    F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Sentencing policy is for Congress

5    and the Sentencing Commission, not judges."); United States v.

6    Sung Soo Park, 461 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[P]olicy

7    determinations concerning the relative severity of punishments

8    for particular types of offenses continue to be left to
9    Congress."); cf. United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 218 (2d

10   Cir. 2001) (holding, before Booker, that departures must be based

11   on individual circumstances of defendant's case rather than on

12   general rules). Recently, we outlined the statutory basis for the

13   distinction drawn between sentences applicable to categories of

14   crimes and those properly tailored by a district judge

15             This distinction between policy decisions as
16             embedded in the Guidelines and judicial
17             decisions as imposed on a case-by-case basis
18             is at work in the language of
19             § 3553(a). . . . In § 3553(a)(2), the
20             district court is instructed to consider "the
21             need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
22             seriousness of the offense," while in
23             § 3553(a)(4), the district court is
24             instructed to consider the sentencing range
25             for "the applicable category of offenses"
26             (emphasis added) as set forth in the
27             Guidelines. The differing language between
28             § 3553(a)(2) and § 3553(a)(4) reflects the
29             difference between one particular defendant's
30             crime and the large genre of offenses into
31             which it falls. Indeed, [the difference]
32             clearly indicates the Sentencing Commission
33             and the district courts have two different
34             roles with respect to the Guidelines.
35
36   Castillo, 460 F.3d at 355-56.


                                      12
1         We acknowledge the courts have not drawn a neat line

2    separating proper judicial consideration of a defendant and his

3    crime from impermissible policy judgment concerning a genre of

4    offenses, and examples may be found that blur the distinction.

5    But the logic underlying Cavera's sentence presents no such

6    challenge.   The district court does not purport to establish that

7    Cavera's crime was itself more harmful, but only that his crime

8    falls within a category of offenses (gun crimes in densely
9    populated areas) that the district court viewed as more serious,

10   on average, than gun crimes in less urban communities.    That the

11   district court improperly injected its policy views into Cavera's

12   sentence is clear to us, not because its rationale applies to

13   other offenses in the stated genre, but because its rationale

14   depends on characteristics of that genre to determine the gravity

15   of this defendant's crime.

16        In sum, the district court based Cavera's sentence on its

17   own public policy determination and, even though post-Booker
18   courts enjoy greater discretion in sentencing, "a district court

19   cannot import its own philosophy of sentencing if it is

20   inconsistent with the § 3553(a) factors."    Rattoballi, 452 F.3d

21   at 132.

22                3.   The District Court's Factual Argument

23        The district court's weak support for its assessment of the

24   harmfulness of Cavera's crime cements our view that it resorted

25   to policy preferences in imposing the sentence.   Although the

26   court's central factual argument -- that injury to innocent

                                      13
1    bystanders is more probable in crowded environments -- is sound

2    in theory, its application to New York City is unduly

3    speculative.   The City's five boroughs contain many densely

4    populated areas where the district court's reasoning might apply,

5    but they are also home to quieter neighborhoods, like Rockaway

6    Point in Queens and suburban areas of Staten Island, where it

7    would not apply.   New York City is simply too large and varied a

8    community to draw meaningful conclusions as to the potential
9    impact of stray bullets that may someday originate from a

10   trafficked firearm.

11           III    Rationale for Vacating Sentence in This Case

12        We do not decide that consideration by a sentencing court of

13   population density or similar community-based factors is

14   impermissible in all cases.    See United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d

15   233, 238 (2d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that "the special impact of

16   the offense in a particular geographical community" could be

17   relevant to sentencing).3   Nonetheless, the preceding discussion


     3
        For example, § 3553(a)(2)(B) requires a sentencing court to
     consider what sentence is necessary "to afford adequate
     deterrence." If a community has very strict gun laws, and it was
     demonstrated that the prices of illegal guns were higher there
     than in communities with laxer gun laws and that, as a result of
     the higher prices, the profits from trafficking in such guns were
     also higher, then it might be that penalties might also have to
     be greater to achieve the same level of deterrence. The district
     court adverted to stringent gun laws in New York. But nothing in
     the record demonstrated that these gun laws made the business
     more profitable for gun-runners. And some commentators have
     suggested that high prices may exist in tight control cities for
     reasons that do not implicate higher profits. See Philip J. Cook
     & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic
     and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 Ariz.
     L. Rev. 277, 297 (2001). Under the circumstances, we do not

                                      14
1    suggests the circumstances under which a district court can base

2    a sentence on such factors in a manner that is both compatible

3    with the § 3553(a) factors and in keeping with its judicial role

4    will arise infrequently.

5         A heavy measure of caution is suggested also by several pre-

6    Booker decisions of our sister circuits.    See United States v.

7    Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494, 1498-99 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing

8    sentence where district court considered local standards as to
9    what constituted a "significant" amount of cocaine); United

10   States v. Thomas, 906 F.2d 323, 327-28 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting

11   sentence based on degree of violence in city and state where

12   offense was committed); United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d

13   347, 351-53 (1st Cir. 1989) (reversing upward departure based on

14   high incidence of crime and insufficient law enforcement in

15   specific location and community standards); see also United

16   States v. Hadaway, 998 F.2d 917, 920-21 (11th Cir. 1993)

17   (rejecting downward departure based on finding that many local
18   residents committed the crime in question and would perceive

19   sentence as too high, while allowing judges to consider community

20   factors in sentencing within Guidelines).   Each of these cases

21   held that a sentencing court could not depart from the Guidelines

22   on the basis of community-specific considerations.

23        These courts expressed concern that allowing departures

24   based on such considerations would undermine the congressional


     believe that an appropriate basis for a higher sentence was
     established in the instant case.

                                    15
1    goal of reducing sentencing disparity.   See, e.g., Aguilar-Pena,

2    887 F.2d at 352-53 (stating that any regime where equally

3    blameworthy criminal received different sentences depending on

4    where crime occurred would foster the wide variations Congress

5    sought to eliminate).   The decisions emphasized in addition that

6    departures should be based on case-specific considerations rather

7    than generalized disagreements with the Guidelines' treatment of

8    whole categories of offenses.    See, e.g., Hadaway, 998 F.2d at
9    921 ("Downward departures based on community standards . . .

10   would apply generally to every violation of a specific federal

11   statute by any person in a particular community."); Barbontin,

12   907 F.2d at 1499 (noting that judicial dissatisfaction, "no

13   matter how steeped in real-world wisdom," is an untenable ground

14   for departures).   We share each of these concerns and find them

15   pertinent today as before Booker.

16        Of course, we have recognized that, after Booker, "the

17   Guidelines limitations on the use of factors to permit departures
18   are no more binding on sentencing judges than the calculated

19   Guidelines ranges themselves."   Jones v. United States, 460 F.3d

20   191, 194 (2d Cir. 2006).   Accordingly, district judges are

21   afforded wide latitude to impose non-Guidelines sentences based

22   on case-specific applications of the § 3553(a) factors.    For

23   example, in Jones, the district court had imposed a non-

24   Guidelines sentence that was 50 percent below the bottom of the

25   Guidelines range based on the judge's "gut feeling" about the

26   defendant and findings on his personal circumstances.     Id.    In

                                      16
1    affirming the sentence we observed that a district judge may

2    consider the defendant's background together with the judge's

3    "own sense of what is a fair and just sentence under all the

4    circumstances," thereby fulfilling his or her "historic role."

5    Id. at 195-96.

6         Read together, our cases addressing sentences outside the

7    Guidelines range make clear that Booker requires the district

8    courts to tailor sentences to reflect an application of the
9    § 3553(a) factors.    See, e.g., id.; United States v. Crosby, 397

10   F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasizing our expectation that

11   post-Booker sentences will achieve more "individualized

12   justice").   But such individualized sentencing does not authorize

13   a district court to inject into sentencing decisions its policy

14   preferences with respect to the category of offense in question

15   or the kind of community in which it is perpetrated, see, e.g.,

16   Castillo, 460 F.3d at 357 ("[N]othing in Booker suggests that it

17   is the task of district court judges to pronounce broad policy
18   choices rather than specific sentences based on the specific

19   facts of a case.").

20        Cavera's sentence is procedurally and substantively

21   unreasonable.    The district court committed procedural error by

22   relying on its own policy judgment concerning all gun trafficking

23   offenses in New York and comparable cities in fixing Cavera's

24   sentence.    See Castillo, 460 F.3d at 354 ("[T]he question . . .

25   is whether the . . . imposition of a sentence that rejected the

26   100:1 ratio purely on generalized policy grounds . . . satisfies

                                      17
1    [the] standard of procedural reasonableness.").      As the resulting

2    non-Guidelines sentence has not been explained by reference to

3    any properly considered § 3553(a) factor, we also deem Cavera's

4    sentence substantively unreasonable.      Cf. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at

5    134 ("A non-Guidelines sentence that a district court imposes in

6    reliance on factors incompatible with the Commission's policy

7    statements may be deemed substantively unreasonable in the

8    absence of persuasive explanation as to why the sentence actually
9    comports with the § 3553(a) factors.").

10        Because we hold that the district court's reliance on

11   improper factors renders Cavera's sentence unreasonable, we do

12   not address his contention that the district court erred by

13   failing to afford him adequate notice of its intent to impose an

14   enhanced non-Guidelines sentence.

15                   IV   Cavera's Other Arguments Rejected

16        We turn now to the other two errors raised by defendant with

17   regard to his sentence, both of which are without merit.
18                  A.    Refusal to Grant Downward Departure

19        We may not review Cavera's challenge to the district court's

20   refusal to grant a downward departure because the record suggests

21   neither that the district court misapprehended its authority to

22   depart nor that it imposed an illegal sentence.       See Stinson, 465

23   F.3d at 114.

24                           B.   Remand to Same Judge

25        Cavera next argues that should he prevail on appeal, the

26   case should be remanded to a different judge.       We grant such

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1    remands only in the rarest instances.     Even when a judge has

2    erroneous views or made incorrect findings, resentencing before a

3    different judge is appropriate only when the judge's fairness is

4    seriously in doubt.   United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782

5    n.9 (2d Cir. 1987).   With the exception of personal bias, we

6    examine the following three principal factors to determine if a

7    case should be remanded to a different judge:    whether (1) "the

8    original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have
9    substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind

10   previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous

11   or based on evidence that must be rejected," (2) "reassignment is

12   advisable to preserve the appearance of justice," and (3)

13   "reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of

14   proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness."

15   United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2006).

16   With these factors in mind, we decline to remand to a different

17   judge.   There is no suggestion that the district judge is biased,
18   would ignore our instructions on remand, would have difficulty

19   putting out of his mind his previously expressed views or

20   findings determined to be erroneous, or would be otherwise unfair

21   in resentencing Cavera.   We therefore remand this case to the

22   same district court judge.

23                                CONCLUSION

24        For the foregoing reasons we vacate Cavera's non-Guidelines

25   sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing in



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1   accordance with this opinion.   We affirm the district court's

2   refusal to grant Cavera a downward departure.




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