United States v. David Lee Woodard

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-10290 October 18, 2004
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK

D.C. Docket No. 03-14038-CR-KMM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID LEE WOODARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida
_________________________

(October 18, 2004)

Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

David Lee Woodard appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e).
Woodard contends (1) the magistrate judge lacked the authority under the Federal

Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, (FMA) to accept his guilty plea and adjudicate

him guilty of a felony; and (2) even if the FMA authorized such actions, the

delegation of these duties to a magistrate judge would violate the principles of

Article III of the United States Constitution. We join the six other circuits that

have addressed these issues and hold there was no error, statutory or

constitutional, in the magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and

adjudicating him guilty.

I. BACKGROUND

Woodard was charged in a one-count indictment for being a felon in

possession of a firearm on or about July 11, 2003. Woodard signed a plea

agreement, and the magistrate judge conducted a change of plea hearing, as well as

a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy. At the change of plea hearing,

the magistrate judge stated to Woodard, “You understand that I am a United States

Magistrate Judge. I am not a District Judge. Do you understand that?” After

Woodard affirmatively replied “Yes, sir, Your Honor,” the magistrate judge

further explained, “Do you understand that you do not have to consent. You can

hold off, and you have the right to have [the district judge] hear your change of

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plea. Do you understand that?” Once more, Woodard replied, “Yes, sir, Your

Honor.”

The magistrate judge then proceeded to the change of plea colloquy. After

determining that Woodard was competent and a factual basis existed for the guilty

plea, the magistrate judge accepted Woodard’s guilty plea as follows: “The plea is,

therefore, accepted by me, and the defendant is now adjudged guilty of that

offense.”

Woodard’s sentencing hearing was conducted by the district judge. After

sentencing Woodard for the felon in possession of a firearm count, the district

judge stated: “Now that sentence has been imposed, does the Defendant or his

counsel object to the Court’s finding of fact or to the manner in which sentence

was pronounced?” Woodard neither objected to the sentence imposed nor the

prior plea colloquy conducted by the magistrate judge.

Woodard contends that even though he expressly consented to the

magistrate judge conducting the Rule 11 colloquy, the magistrate judge had no

authority to accept his guilty plea and adjudicate him guilty of a felony. Woodard

challenges the magistrate judge’s authority to perform such actions on both

statutory and constitutional grounds.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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 Woodard neither objected to the plea proceedings conducted by the

magistrate judge nor subsequently moved to withdraw his plea at his sentencing

hearing; therefore, we review the statutory and constitutional issues raised in his

appeal for plain error. See United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“Because [the defendant] made no objection to the magistrate judge’s

conducting of voir dire, we review the district court’s delegation of jury selection

to the magistrate judge only for plain error.”); see also United States v. Acevedo,

285 F.3d 1010, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting constitutional issues not raised

in the district court are subject to plain error review). The four-prong test to

establish plain error is: (1) there must have been an error; (2) the error must have

been plain; (3) the error must have seriously affected substantial rights; and (4) the

error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the judicial proceedings. Acevedo, 285 F.3d at 1012.

III. DISCUSSION

This Court has never addressed the issue of whether a magistrate judge has

the authority to accept a defendant’s guilty plea and adjudicate him guilty. In

addressing this issue, we will first consider whether the magistrate judge had the

statutory authority under the FMA to perform such actions. Second, we will

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consider whether delegating these duties to a magistrate judge offends the

principles of Article III of the Constitution.

We join every circuit to have examined these issues, and hold (1) the FMA

authorizes a magistrate judge, with the defendant’s consent, to conduct Rule 11

proceedings, and (2) the statutory grant is not an impermissible usurpation of

Article III powers. See, e.g., United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 285–90 (4th

Cir. 2003); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1118–22 (9th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 794–96 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.

Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 264–69 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d

1247, 1249–52 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632–34

(2d Cir. 1994).1

A. Statutory Challenge

The FMA regulates the authority and jurisdiction of magistrate judges. See

28 U.S.C. § 636; see also Maragh, 174 F.3d at 1204. The FMA explicitly names

certain duties and functions which magistrate judges can perform. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). In addition to these enumerated duties, the FMA also

includes a “catchall provision” that states magistrate judges “may be assigned such

additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the

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Woodard fails to identify, and we have not found, any circuit court holding to the contrary.

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United States.” Id. § 636(b)(3). The authority to conduct Rule 11 proceedings

and to take guilty pleas is not among the FMA’s enumerated duties; therefore,

whether magistrate judges can perform such actions must be analyzed under the

“additional duties” clause of § 636(b)(3).

Although we have not addressed this issue directly, both the United States

Supreme Court and our Court have considered the analogous issue of whether the

“additional duties” clause authorized magistrate judges to conduct voir dire in

criminal proceedings. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 111 S. Ct. 2661

(1991); Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202. In Peretz, the Supreme Court noted any

“additional duties performed pursuant to [§ 636(b)(3)] reasonably should bear

some relation to the specified duties that the statute assigned to magistrates.” 501

U.S. at 930, 111 S. Ct. at 2666 (internal quotation omitted). The Court found that

the defendant’s consent “makes the crucial difference” in determining whether or

not an additional duty resembles one of the FMA’s enumerated duties. Id. at 933,

111 S. Ct. at 2667. The Court explained that under the FMA, magistrate judges

can be delegated more extensive powers when the parties have consented. Id.

In addition, we have explained, “[t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of

section 636(b)(3) establishes the presence or absence of consent as the crucial

factor in determining what duties the section encompasses.” Maragh, 174 F.3d at

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1204; see also id. at 1205 (holding “consent is of paramount importance” in

determining the duties the district court could delegate to a magistrate judge). In

Maragh, we recognized the Supreme Court’s holding that “as long as a defendant

consented, a magistrate judge rather than an Article III judge could conduct voir

dire in a felony case under section 636(b)(3).” Id. at 1205 (citing Peretz, 501 U.S.

at 934–36, 111 S. Ct. at 2668–69).

In this case, Woodard expressly consented to the magistrate judge

conducting his plea colloquy. At the change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge

explicitly explained that he was a magistrate judge and not a district judge, and

that Woodard had the right to “hold off” and have the district judge hear his

change of plea. Woodard stated that he understood. Moreover, at the sentencing

hearing conducted by the district judge, Woodard neither objected to the sentence

imposed nor to the prior plea colloquy conducted by the magistrate judge.

Nonetheless, Woodard argues the enumerated duties in the FMA “pale in

comparison with [the] gravity and importance of accepting a guilty plea and

adjudicating an individual guilty of a felony.” Several of our sister circuits have

rejected this argument. See, e.g., Osborne, 345 F.3d at 286–88; Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d at 1119–21; Dees, 125 F.3d at 264–66; Williams, 23 F.3d at 632–33.

Conducting a plea colloquy “is a highly structured event that follows a familiar

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script and is governed by the specific terms of Rule 11.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at

1120. “[T]he comprehensive provisions of Rule 11 . . . carefully explain what a

court must inquire about, what it should advise a defendant and what it should

determine before accepting a plea.” Williams, 23 F.3d at 632 (citing Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11).

As our sister circuits have noted, conducting a plea colloquy, while

important, is “less complex” than several of the duties the FMA expressly

authorizes magistrate judges to perform. Williams, 23 F.3d at 632–33; see also

Osborne, 345 F.3d at 286–88; Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1119–21; Dees, 125 F.3d

at 264–66. For example, the FMA permits magistrate judges to conduct entire

civil and misdemeanor trials if the parties have consented. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3),

(c)(1). The FMA also specifically permits magistrate judges to hear and determine

pretrial matters, to conduct evidentiary hearings, and to submit to the district court

proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. Id.

§ 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). Determining the voluntariness of an out-of-court

statement—an evidentiary question which magistrate judges can perform—“is

remarkably similar to the inquiry into the voluntariness of a guilty plea that

underlies the Rule 11 proceeding.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1120.

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 Like our sister circuits, we find that conducting a Rule 11 proceeding is

comparable to the FMA’s enumerated duties. Therefore, we join our sister circuits

in similarly holding that a magistrate judge has the authority under the “additional

duties” clause of FMA to conduct Rule 11 proceedings when the defendant

consents.

B. Constitutional Challenge

In Peretz, the Supreme Court explained that the defendant’s consent was

critical to the constitutional analysis as well. 501 U.S. at 932–40, 111 S. Ct. at

2667–71. The Court considered two potential constitutional constraints on the

delegation of duties to magistrate judges. First, the Court considered whether a

delegation of duty violates the defendant’s personal right to demand the presence

of an Article III judge at critical phases of the trial. Id. at 936–37, 111 S. Ct. at

2669. The Court explained that like other personal rights of criminal defendants,

this right could be waived. Id.; see also Maragh, 174 F.3d at 1206 (“In order for a

magistrate judge to conduct jury voir dire in a felony criminal proceeding, a

defendant must give consent, or in other words, a defendant must waive the right

to have an Article III judge conduct voir dire.”). In this case, Woodard explicitly

consented to the magistrate judge conducting his Rule 11 colloquy. Woodard now

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concedes that this consent constituted a valid waiver of his right to have the

district judge perform the Rule 11 colloquy.

The second constitutional constraint considered by the Supreme Court in

Peretz was whether delegating certain duties to magistrate judges would offend

the structural protections provided by Article III. 501 U.S. at 937–39, 111 S. Ct.

at 2669–71. The Court assumed such structural protections were not subject to

waiver. Id. at 937, 111 S. Ct. at 2669. Here, Woodard bases his constitutional

challenge on this structural argument. Woodard asserts that even if we found the

magistrate judge was authorized under the FMA to accept his guilty plea and

adjudicate him guilty of a felony, the statutory grant would constitute a structural

error in violation of Article III, because the Article I Legislature, through the

FMA, would have impermissibly usurped the express powers of Article III judges.

Like the statutory challenge, every circuit to have considered this

constitutional argument has rejected it and held that the statutory grant is not an

impermissible usurpation of Article III powers. See, e.g., Osborne, 345 F.3d at

288–90; Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1118–22; Torres, 258 F.3d at 794–96; Dees,

125 F.3d at 266–69; Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1250–52; Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.

In rejecting the structural argument, our sister circuits have relied on the

Supreme Court’s holding in Peretz. In Peretz, the Court held the structural

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protections of Article III are not jeopardized when magistrate judges conduct voir

dire because district judges still exert ultimate control over magistrate judges. The

Court explained that because district judges have supervisory power over

magistrate judges, “there is no danger that use of the magistrate involves a

congressional attemp[t] to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the

purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.” 501 U.S. at 937, 111 S. Ct. at

2669–70 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).

The Supreme Court also noted that the availability of de novo review by

district judges removes the fear that Article III powers are being impermissibly

usurped when duties are delegated to magistrate judges. Id. at 939, 111 S. Ct. at

2670–71. District judges do not actually have to exercise de novo review of

magistrate judges’ decisions, however, unless an objection is made. The Court

explained that “to the extent de novo review is required to satisfy Article III

concerns, it need not be exercised unless requested by the parties.” Id. It is “the

availability of [de novo] review, upon request by the parties, rather than a required

performance thereof, that safeguard[s] the integrity of the federal judiciary.”

Osborne, 345 F.3d at 289 (emphasis added).

In his reply brief, Woodard tries to draw a distinction between our sister

circuits’ cases and his case by claiming that “in just about all of those cases,” the

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magistrate judge prepared a report and recommendation to be reviewed by the

district judge and the district judge actually accepted the defendant’s guilty plea.

In Woodard’s case, on the other hand, the magistrate judge accepted his guilty

plea. We note the decisions reveal a lack of uniformity in the language used by

magistrate judges.2 However, the critical factor in all of the decisions was that a

district court, as a matter of law, retained the ability to review the Rule 11 hearing

if requested. See Osborne, 345 F.3d at 289 n.8; see also Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at

1121 (“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review,

de novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as

correct.”); Dees, 125 F.3d at 268 n.7 (“Even though the Magistrates Act does not

expressly provide for de novo review of plea proceedings, the only constitutional

requirement is that it be available if the parties so request.”); Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at

1251 (“Absent an objection or request for review by the defendant, the district

court was not required to engage in any more formal review of the plea

proceeding.”).

2
Compare Torres, 258 F.3d at 793 (report and recommendation), and Dees, 125 F.3d at 263
(magistrate judge “recommended” district court accept the defendant’s plea), with Osborne, 345 F.3d
at 283 (magistrate judge “accept[ed]” the guilty plea but also advised defendant that district court
retained power to accept or reject guilty plea), and Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1249 (magistrate judge
“accepted” the guilty plea).

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 In this case, Woodard did not request that the district court review the Rule

11 hearing. During sentencing, the district court explicitly asked if there were any

objections “to the Court’s finding of fact or to the manner in which sentence was

pronounced.” Contrary to Woodard’s claims, the magistrate judge did not

appropriate the district court’s ultimate decision-making authority. Rather,

Woodard failed to either request a review of the Rule 11 hearing or object to the

magistrate judge’s actions. Like our sister circuits, we hold that delegating the

authority to conduct Rule 11 proceedings to magistrate judges does not offend the

principles of Article III.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, there was no plain error, statutory or constitutional, with the

magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him guilty.

AFFIRMED.

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