United States v. Echegollen-Barrueta

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT



                                   No. 97-40861



                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                            Plaintiff-Appellee,


                                        VERSUS


                 JOSE JESUS ECHEGOLLÉN-BARRUETA,
a/k/a Chucho, a/k/a Ricardo Gonzalez-Giron, a/k/a Jesus Arriaga,
a/k/a Jose Castellanos-Mujica, a/k/a Ricardo Gonzalez, a/k/a Jose
Luis Martinez-Sanchez, a/k/a Jose Luis Martinez, a/k/a Jose Enrique
Castellanos,

                                                        Defendant-Appellant.



           Appeals from the United States District Court
                 for the Southern District of Texas


                                 November 10, 1999
Before EMILIO      M.    GARZA    and   PARKER,   Circuit    Judges   and   COBB,
District Judge.*
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

      Appellant,    Jose     Jesus      Echegollén-Barrueta      (“Echegollén”)

appeals the sentence arising from his guilty plea to conspiracy to

launder money in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(b)(B)(I) and


  *
   Federal Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.

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conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five

kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.                We vacate

Appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Echegollén’s third superseding indictment charged five counts

of drug, conspiracy and related money-laundering offenses, as well

as one count of criminal forfeiture.        Two co-defendants were named

in the two conspiracy counts and in the forfeiture count.

      Echegollén pleaded guilty to the two conspiracy counts and

acquiesced in the forfeitures pursuant to a written plea agreement.

In exchange for Echegollén’s guilty plea, the Government agreed to

dismiss the remaining counts, and to recommend a three-level

reduction in guideline level for acceptance of responsibility, a

three-level increase for his supervisory role in the offense and a

sentence at the lower end of the guideline range.                  The parties

stipulated to a statement of facts, which set out Echegollén’s

involvement in extensive international money-laundering on behalf

of large-scale Mexican cocaine dealers.             Echegollén agreed to

cooperate with law enforcement in exchange for a possible later

sentence reduction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).

      After    the   Pre-Sentence      Investigation      Report    (PSI)   and

objections were filed, the probation office filed an addendum to

the PSI alleging that Echegollén had attempted to escape from jail

by   bribing   a   guard.   In   the    addendum,   the    probation    office

recomputed the guideline range, withdrawing its recommendation of

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the    three-level       downward       adjustment      for     acceptance       of

responsibility, and recommending an upward adjustment of two levels

for obstruction of justice.            As a result, Echegollén’s guideline

range changed from offense level 38, with a sentencing range of

235-293 months, to offense level 43, with a sentence of life in

prison.

      On June 30, 1997, the case was called for sentencing.                    The

district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the obstruction

allegation, rejected Echegollén’s version of the facts (that he was

trying to ensnare a corrupt guard to fulfill his agreement to

cooperate with the government), and sentenced Echegollén to life in

prison without parole.

                       ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY

      Echegollén      argues    that   the   prosecutor     breached    the   plea

agreement by failing to recommend a three-level downward adjustment

in the guideline range for acceptance of responsibility and a

sentence   of   235    months    in    prison.    In    fact,   the    Government

recommended the agreed-on acceptance of responsibility adjustment.

The prosecutor’s silence on the question after the court ruled that

Echegollén had obstructed justice is not a breach of the agreement.

      Echegollén also contends that the district court erred in

denying the three-level acceptance of responsibility adjustment.

“The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a

defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.               For this reason, the

determination    of     the    sentencing    judge     is   entitled    to    great

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deference    on   review.”     U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL    §   3E1.1,

comment. (n.5)(1995).        At the sentencing hearing, in response to

Echegollén    urging    his     entitlement       to    an   acceptance    of

responsibility adjustment, the district court stated that “once you

find obstruction of justice, you cannot give that three points [for

acceptance of responsibility].” Echegollén then cited the district

court to an exception to that general rule found in § 3E1.1,

comment. (n.4), which allows adjustments under both § 3C1.1,

obstruction of justice and § 3E1.1, acceptance of responsibility in

“extraordinary     cases.”       The   district    court’s    rejection    of

Echegollén’s position that his was such a case was not error.

                                 DEPARTURE

     Echegollén contends that the district court erred in denying

his motion for downward departure because he did not appreciate the

scope of his authority to depart downward.             Echegollén’s argument

assumes that the district court’s comments made in the context of

ruling on a co-defendant’s request for departure formed the basis

for the denial of departure in Echegollén’s case.            That assumption

is not supported by the record.        We therefore find no error in the

district court’s denial of Echegollén’s motion for departure.

                         DENIAL OF ALLOCUTION

     Echegollén contends that he was denied his right of allocution

at sentencing as provided in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32,

and his right to the assistance of counsel, when the district court

imposed a life sentence without having first afforded either him or

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his counsel the opportunity to speak in mitigation of punishment.

     “Before imposing sentence, the court must . . . address the

defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to

make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of

sentence[.]” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c)(3)(C).            This court reviews de

novo whether a district court complied with Rule 32(c)(3)(C).               See

United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1998).                  The

rule envisions a personal colloquy between the sentencing judge and

the defendant.      See id.   The sentencing court “should leave no room

for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation

to speak prior to sentencing.”              United States v. Washington, 44

F.3d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir. 1995)(citing Green v. United States, 365

U.S. 301, 305 (1961)).             In this circuit, the district court’s

failure to comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(C) is not subject to Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 52's harmless or plain error provision.

See Myers, 150 F.3d at 462-64.              Consequently, we do not concern

ourselves    with   the   parties’     arguments   concerning   Echegollén’s

failure to object to the Rule 32 violations at trial and the

potential for a different outcome on remand after the district

court hears allocution.

     The Government contends that the district court afforded

Echegollén    the    right    of    allocution    in   compliance   with   Rule

32(c)(3)(C). After the evidentiary hearing on Echegollén’s alleged

escape attempt, the district court found that Echegollén “did in


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fact, from the evidence before me, engage[] in obstruction of

justice.”   Then, personally addressing Echegollén, the district

court asked, “Do you have anything to say to me before I decide

what to do in your case?”   Echegollén, who had not testified at the

hearing on the obstruction issue, responded by arguing that he had

not attempted to escape.    The district court replied, “You see, I

have not found that to be a fact, sir.    I have no evidence to that

effect, you understand.     Do you have anything else to say to me?”

Echegollén spoke once again about his role in the alleged escape.

The court then advised Echegollén that his “problem” was not the

alleged escape, but “that to which you admitted and pled guilty

earlier.”   The court went on to discuss the forfeiture, then to

impose sentence.   Echegollén did not speak again.

     The question presented by this case is whether Rule 32 is

violated when the district court personally addresses a defendant,

arguably in compliance with Rule 32's requirements, asking twice

whether he has “anything to say,” but the defendant’s answers

demonstrate that he may have misunderstood the question, believing

that he was being asked to address a factual issue before the court

instead of being given an opportunity for allocution.    “Even where

the judge satisfies the specifics of Rule 32, we must still assure

ourselves that the compliance was not merely in form.”        United

States v. Sparrow, 673 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir. 1982).     “To comply

with Rule 32, it is not enough that the sentencing court addresses


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a defendant on a particular issue, affords counsel the right to

speak,   or   hears    the     defendant’s   specific    objections     to   the

presentence report.”         Myers, 150 F.3d at 462 n.3 (citing United

States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)).              “[T]he

court, the prosecutor, and the defendant must at the very least

interact in a manner that shows clearly and convincingly that the

defendant knew he had a right to speak on any subject of his

choosing prior to the imposition of sentence.”            Id. at 462 (quoting

De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 129).         We find, based on this chiaroscuro

record,1 that the trial judge did not communicate unequivocally to

Echegollén his right to allocution.          We must therefore vacate the

sentence and remand for re-sentencing.

      Echegollén      argues    that,   compounding     this   error,   defense

counsel was not invited to speak on his behalf prior to sentencing.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(B) provides that before

imposing sentence, the court must “afford defendant’s counsel an

opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant[.]” The government

suggests that the district court satisfied its obligation under

Rule 32(c)(3)(B) when its asked, “Anything else before the court

that would touch upon the sentencing matter?”            The Government also

urges that the argument concerning acceptance of responsibility



  1
   An extraordinarily apt descriptive term, used by Judge Selya in
De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 127, to highlight the recurring problem
encountered by appellate courts in determining from a cold record
what actually happened in the courtroom.

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made    by   Echegollén’s    counsel       after   sentence   was   pronounced

satisfies Rule 32(c)(3)(B). Echegollén answers that the referenced

query came in the middle of the court’s disposition of the hearing

on whether there was obstruction of justice and can only be

understood as inquiring whether or not there were other guideline

objections or similar issues remaining to be resolved and that the

post-sentencing discussion did not cure the error.

       Our consideration of this issue is somewhat complicated by the

fact that no objection based on denial of counsel’s opportunity to

speak in mitigation of sentence was made in the district court by

either the Government2 or the defendant.              This Circuit has not

addressed whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52's plain

error   standard   applies    to    Rule    32(c)(3)(B)   errors.     Because

reversal is mandated on the basis of the Rule 32(c)(3)(C) error, we

decline to reach the closer question of whether Echegollén is

entitled to reversal on an Rule 32(c)(3)(B) error to which he

failed to object.

                                   CONCLUSION

       Based on the foregoing, we vacate Echegollén’s sentence and


  2
   The Government has both an obligation and an interest in
insuring that a guilty plea proceeding complies with all
constitutional and statutory requirements. See generally, United
States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228, 1231 (“The United States
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.”)(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935).

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remand for re-sentencing.

     VACATED and REMANDED.




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