UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 93-1797
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
EDDIE FRANKLIN DOUGLAS, EDD C. DOUGLAS,
ALTONIO O'SHEA DOUGLAS, ELBERT DOUGLAS, JR.,
JAMES WELDON CAMPBELL, BURVON KING, ORPHEUS HILL,
ARTHUR JACKSON DOUGLAS, CHAUNCEY MOSLEY,
CYNTHIA TAMPLIN, WESLEY JAMES WILSON, MARY JANE FIKE,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
May 7, 1996
Before DAVIS and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and BUNTON1, District
Judge.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Appellants were convicted of participating in a conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine) in Fort
Worth. The conspiracy distributed approximately five kilograms of
crack cocaine each week for eighteen months during 1991-92. A
twenty-count indictment was returned against twenty-four
District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
defendants. Of these, seventeen were tried in a consolidated
trial. After a seven week trial, twelve were convicted of at least
one count and now present grounds of error in this appeal. (The
counts of conviction and sentences of each appellant are set out in
chart form in Appendix A to this opinion.)
II. The Batson2 challenge
a. Factual background
All seventeen defendants were African-American. Of the 147
persons on the venire panel, four were African-American. One
African-American was moved from the back of the panel to the front
to place her within "striking range," with the agreement of the
prosecutor. Prior to voir dire, Appellants orally moved to quash
the panel, contending that African-Americans were underrepresented.
The district court denied the motion but allowed as timely written
motions on the same grounds. Two African-Americans served on the
petit jury finally selected.
Defense counsel asked during voir dire if the venire members
would "have a concern" if an all white jury was selected in this
case. Williams, an African-American venireman said, "Yes, based on
the practice of the U.S. Justice System." Although no follow-up
questions were put to Williams, the prosecutor struck him.
Appellants made a Batson motion, alleging that the prosecution's
peremptory strike against Williams was racially motivated. The
district court found that a prima facie case of discrimination had
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d
69 (1986).
2
been made and asked the prosecutor to respond by articulating its
reasons for striking Williams. The prosecutor stated that Williams
had been struck because he
expressed concerns about past practices of the government
-- of the U.S. Judicial System. Your honor, we felt that
that would increase the burden of proof on the government
that would start us off--while not a legal strike, but it
would start us off in a position with that particular
juror where we might have a greater burden of proof or
that he might look at our system whereas most of the
prosecuting group is not a minority, that that was a
permissible peremptory challenge that we felt that he
would not serve as good as others.
The main thing, Your honor, were his comments
concerning the judicial system. We want jurors that have
faith in and are -- the greater faith, the better as far
as the government is concerned, in the judicial system.
The district court found the reason credible and race-neutral.
b. Standard of review
The trial court's decision on the ultimate question of
discriminatory intent is a finding of fact which is accorded great
deference on appeal. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111
S. Ct. 1859, 1868, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991).
c. Was the Government's articulated reason race neutral?
The Government's explanation must be facially valid. "Unless
a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral."
Purkett v. Elem, ___U.S.___, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d
834 (1995). The requirement that the reason be legitimate does not
mean that it be persuasive or even plausible, but that it does not
deny equal protection. Id. Appellants do not argue that the
articulated reason was not credible. Rather, they argue that it
was not race-neutral because the prosecutor projected a general
3
distrust of the justice system by African-Americans on an African-
American juror who voiced concern about past problems with the U.S.
justice system. The distinction drawn by Appellants between past
concern and present concern is not self-evident in Williams'
answer, quoted above, and adds no strength to their argument.
Appellants rely primarily on United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d
820 (9th Cir. 1992), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the
prosecutor's articulated reason for striking an African-American
venire member was inadequate under Batson. The prosecutor
explained that he struck the individual because she was poor and
lived in a poor, violent area of Los Angeles where residents are
anesthetized to violence and probably believe police "pick on"
African-American people. The defendant established that the
correlation between residence in that area of town and being
African-American was very high and that the prosecutor's reason was
a "surrogate for racial bias." The court held that the reason was
not race-neutral because it was a generic reason and a group-based
presumption that a poor African-American person could not fairly
try an African-American defendant. As in this case, two African-
Americans served on Bishop's jury.
Appellants contend that the prosecutor's reason was a generic
reason, a group-based presumption, and a surrogate for racial bias.
The Government responds that a group-based presumption or bias was
not projected onto Williams because he personally articulated his
distrust of the U.S. justice system. In support of the trial
court's findings, the Government also points out that the
4
prosecutor agreed to allow one African-American venire member to be
moved to the front of the panel and that two African-Americans
served on the petit jury. Additionally, the Government used some
strikes on whites.
Appellants next assert that a white venire member, identified
as Juror Number 4, articulated concerns similar to Williams' and
was not struck by the prosecutor. That argument is specious
because she was excused prior to the Government's exercise of
peremptory challenges.
Finally, Appellants argue that Wilson's articulated concern is
precisely the concern voiced in Batson: "Selection procedures that
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Batson, 476
U.S. at 87, 106 S. Ct. at 1718. Their logic does not persuade us.
Batson does not forbid striking a juror who holds a particular
opinion about the U.S. justice system. Rather, it forbids striking
jurors based on their race.
Under the "great deference" standard of review, the district
court's decision must stand. Even though we find Bishop's
reasoning persuasive, it is easily distinguishable from this case
because Williams' stated concern about the justice system removes
the specter of generic reason or group based presumption. The
prosecutor struck Williams because of a personal attitude expressed
during voir dire, not because he assumed, based on race, that
Williams held that attitude.
5
SELECTION OF THE VENIRE PANEL
Appellants complain that the district court erred in denying
their motion to quash the venire panel for violation of the fair
cross section requirement, their constitutional right to equal
protection, the Jury Selection Act, and the Jury Plan for the
Northern District of Texas.
a. Fair cross section argument
In order to prove a fair cross section violation,
the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2)
that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community;
and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668, 58 L. Ed.
2d 579 (1979). The district court held that Appellants failed to
establish the second prong of a prima facie fair cross section
violation because the evidence adduced at the hearing showed that
African-Americans have been fairly and reasonably represented on
venires in the Fort Worth division. Appellants presented evidence
that the African-American population in the Fort Worth division is
approximately 10.4%. That figure, which represents the percentage
of African-Americans in the gross population of the division, is
irrelevant for Sixth Amendment purposes, however, because the
pertinent inquiry is the pool of African-Americans in the district
who are eligible to serve as jurors. United States v. Brummitt,
665 F.2d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977, 102
S. Ct. 2244, 72 L. Ed. 852 (1982). Instead of the 10.4% figure,
6
the district court relied on Appellants' evidence that in a
sampling done by the Administrative Office, 10% of the eligible
jurors were African-American. During the thirteen month period
preceding the venire selection for this case, 7.66% of persons
summoned to serve were African-American. The district court held
that the resulting 2.34% disparity was within the permissible
parameters, relying on United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a 5.45% underrepresentation falls
within the limits set forth by the Supreme Court and this Circuit),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832, 102 S. Ct. 72, 74 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1982).
Appellants' argument on appeal cites a string of conflicting,
and often irrelevant, statistics. For example, African-Americans
comprised 22.7% of the population in Fort Worth, Texas in 1980.
The trial was in 1993, the Fort Worth division comprises more area
than the city of Fort Worth, and raw population is not the same as
eligible jurors. In short, 22.7% is meaningless. Appellants offer
no argument challenging the district court's reliance on the 10%
and 7.66% figures, even citing those same statistics in their brief
along with the other numbers. The district court's finding that
Appellants failed to make out a prima facie case of fair cross
section violation was not in error.
b. Equal Protection
An opportunity for discrimination in the operation of the jury
selection system, coupled with a lesser degree of under-
7
representation,3 may establish a prima facie case of equal
protection violation. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
630, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972). The district
court found, based on no significant opportunity to discriminate
and an insubstantial degree of underrepresentation, that Appellants
had not made out a prima facie case of equal protection violation.
The district court went on to hold that even assuming a prima facie
case had been demonstrated, it was rebutted by evidence showing
that no discrimination occurred in the selection of this venire.
The jury clerk started with 200 names, randomly selected by a
computer. Twenty-six people were summoned that were not on the
original list of 200. Appellants imply that they were selected
non-randomly, at the discretion of the jury clerk. The record
shows that these twenty-six jurors had been selected randomly for
previous service but had been granted postponements. Of the 226
jurors, sixty-one were excused or postponed and 165 were summoned
for this venire; 145 showed up, along with two other jurors that
had not received notices that they were excused. The jury clerk
then called the twenty absent jurors, and the next day four
additional jurors from the list of 165 summoned jurors showed up.
One of these four jurors was African-American.
Appellants complain about both the summoning of twenty-six
members who were postponed from previous panels and the jury
clerk's phone calls to absent jurors. Appellants contend that
That is, lesser than that required in a fair cross section
claim.
8
there was opportunity for discrimination because the clerk could
have looked up the race of the jurors and chosen not to contact
African-Americans, and that the equal protection clause requires
some check on this opportunity. The Government responds that the
long-standing policies of the court, including summoning postponed
jurors and telephoning absent jurors, only insures that more of the
jurors randomly selected actually appear to serve and does not skew
the randomness of the panel.
Appellants are correct that the clerk could violate the
court's policies, look up the race of certain jurors and
selectively contact postponed or absent jurors. But the court's
policy is to call every absent juror, and Appellants' evidence did
not show that the jury clerk violated that policy. In fact, the
process flushed out an additional African-American juror. Equal
protection requires guards against arbitrary power in selecting
venires. It does not require policing of the clerk's office
employees to determine if they are violating court policies.
Appellants' argument that the policy itself is discriminatory
because African-Americans are less likely than whites to be
available by phone during business hours was not supported by any
evidence and is not so self-evident that the district court could
have accepted it as a fact, without evidence. We find no error in
the district court's ruling on equal protection.
c. Jury Selection Act/Jury Plan.
Appellants argue that the jury clerk's actions violated the
Northern District of Texas' Jury Plan and the Jury Selection and
9
Service Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 1861-78 ("the Act"). In the event
of an unanticipated shortage of jurors, the Jury Plan requires the
marshal to summon additional jurors selected at random from the
qualified jury wheel. The Act provides that
the court may require the marshal to summon . . . jurors
selected at random from the voter registration lists,
lists of actual voters, or other lists specified in the
plan, in a manner ordered by the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1866(f). Technical violations of the Act must
constitute "substantial failure to comply" in order for Appellants
to prevail on this issue. United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608,
611 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 865, 98 S. Ct. 199, 54 L.
Ed. 2d 140 (1977). Substantial failure has been defined as that
which affects the "random nature or objectivity of the selection
process." Id. at 612.
The district court found that the practice of telephoning
already properly and randomly selected non-appearing jurors was in
compliance with the Jury Plan and did not make out a substantial
violation of the Act. Appellants cite Kennedy for the proposition
that the jury clerk's action in telephoning jurors in this case has
been forbidden by the Fifth Circuit because it "introduces a
significant element of nonrandomization into the selection process
that not only technically violates, but substantially departs from
the Act's requirements." Id. Although the language is accurately
quoted, the practice condemned by the Kennedy opinion is the use of
volunteer jurors rather than the practice of contacting them by
phone. Id. at 611.
Neither the contacting of absent jurors by phone nor the use
10
of "postponed" jurors "introduces a significant element of
nonrandomization into the selection process." Id. at 612.
Further, appellants have advanced no convincing argument for the
proposition that the procedures used in this case violated the
local Jury Plan. We therefore find no error in the district
court's holding that the procedures complained of violated neither
the Jury Selection Act, nor the Jury Plan.
DENIAL OF MOTION TO SEVER
Appellants contend that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Appellants' motion to sever Appellants'
trials. We review the denial of a motion for severance for abuse
of discretion. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S. Ct.
933, 939, 122 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1993).
Appellants filed a motion to sever the trial based upon a
concern about prejudicial overflow they believed would occur when
seventeen defendants, many with the last name Douglas, were tried
together in a seven week trial. Each appellant was indicted on
fewer than all counts, and many were indicted only on the
conspiracy count. In addition to overflow, Appellants were
concerned about juror confusion.
Appellants have identified no specific prejudice. The
district court instructed the jury to consider each count and each
defendant separately. It appears that the jury followed that
instruction, convicting some defendants of all charges, convicting
some defendants of some of the counts and acquitting others
entirely. Given the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse
11
of discretion in the district court's denial of Appellants' motion
to sever.
THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE RULE
Eddie Franklin Douglas moved to suppress evidence seized from
287 Morgan Road because he alleged that the officers violated the
"knock and announce" rule, 18 U.S.C. § 3109. In his motion to
suppress, Eddie Franklin Douglas alleged that the officers
conducting the search stormed the residence, breaking down a gate
and beating on the front door in an effort to break it open. He
further alleged that Eddie Franklin Douglas interrupted their
efforts to break down the door to the house when he opened the door
to see what the beating noise was. The video tape of the search,
admitted into evidence, shows the officers breaking down a gate,
attaching a chain to the burglar bars on the door, attempting to
pull those bars off with a police vehicle, and then attempting to
force the door open. Eddie Franklin Douglas opened the kitchen
door and was ordered at gunpoint to unlock the burglar bars on the
door. The motion to suppress alleged that the police did not knock
and announce and that there was no exigency or refusal of
admittance that permitted the destructive entry.
The district court, finding that the video tape of the search
supported the facts set out in the motion to suppress, assumed that
Eddie Franklin Douglas's version of the facts was true. However,
the district court denied the motion, finding that the officers
complied with § 3109, as Eddies Franklin Douglas opened the door
before it was broken down by government agents. This Court reviews
12
such a factual determination for clear error. United States v.
Ponce, 8 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1993).
The Government contends that there was no violation of § 3109.
Alternatively, the Government argues that exigent circumstances
excused the officers from complying with the statute, in that they
believed Douglas was armed and dangerous and that he might destroy
evidence such as drugs or records.
Section 3109 provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything
therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of
his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or
when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him
in the execution of the warrant.
An officer's failure to "knock and announce" when executing a
search warrant is relevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry as well. Wilson v. Arkansas, ___U.S.___, 115 S. Ct. 1914,
131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995). Under both the Fourth Amendment and the
"knock and announce" statute, defendants bear the initial burden of
establishing that an unannounced entry actually occurred. United
States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 344 (5th Cir. 1990). If this
showing is made, it becomes the Government's burden to justify the
search. Id.; United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 972 (E.D.
Tex. 1995). The rule requiring an officer to knock and announce
serves several fundamental interests, including "(1) protecting law
enforcement officers and household occupants from potential
violence; (2) preventing the unnecessary destruction of private
property; and (3) protecting people from unnecessary intrusion into
their private activities." United States v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d
13
906, 909 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 114 S. Ct. 160, 126
L. Ed. 2d 120 (1993).
The question presented in this case is whether the officers'
actions, prior to the time Douglas came to the door and they
"announced" their identity and mission to him, amounted to
"breaking open" the house. The Government cites United States v.
Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other
grounds, United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990),
to support its position that an uncompleted attempt to break open
an outer door of a house is not a violation of § 3109. In Grier,
the officers attacked the outer door of a house with a sledgehammer
without first knocking and identifying themselves and asking for
admittance. The noise alerted the people inside the house, who
went to the door and admitted the officers. The Seventh Circuit
held that because the door was not broken down and the officers
were admitted to the premises by the occupants, there was no
violation of § 3109. We agree. Here, the officers did not break
open any outer or inner door of the house prior to being admitted.
Regardless of how reprehensible we find the gratuitous destruction
of property, the trial court's holding that Eddie Franklin Douglas
opened the door before the officers entered the house is not
clearly erroneous. It follows that there was no violation of §
3109. For that reason, we need not reach the question of whether
or not exigent circumstances existed that would have justified the
officers' violation of § 3109 in this case.
14
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EDDIE FRANKLIN DOUGLAS'S STATEMENT
Eddie Franklin Douglas moved to suppress the statements he
made to officers during the search of the Morgan Road residence,
arguing that he was in custody, he was not given Miranda4 warnings,
he did not waive his rights and that the officers continued
questioning him after he invoked his right to counsel. According
to the officers, Douglas did not invoke his right to counsel before
he made the statements. Douglas responded to brief questioning by
two of the officers and also made stray statements to at least one
other officer during the search. The district court denied the
motion, finding that Douglas was not in custody and that he did not
request a lawyer. This Court reviews the district court's factual
determinations for clear error. United States v. Restrepo, 994
F.2d 173, 183 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the question of whether
Miranda's guarantees have been impermissibly denied to a criminal
defendant is a matter of constitutional law, meriting de novo
review. United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 834, 111 S. Ct. 101, 112 L. Ed. 2d 72
(1990).
The crux of the issue is whether Douglas was subjected to
custodial interrogation. If so, the statements must be suppressed
on the basis of Miranda, and it will not be necessary to determine
the factual question of whether he adequately invoked his right to
counsel and so came within the purview of Edwards v. Arizona, 451
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
15
U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981) and Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489
(1990).
The parties do not dispute that Douglas was not under formal
arrest. In United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 306, 102 L. Ed. 2d 325
(1988), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, set out the test for
determining whether a particular set of facts amounts to custodial
interrogation in the absence of formal arrest:
The meaning of custody has been refined so the ultimate
inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with formal arrest. The Supreme Court has also explained
that the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in
the suspect's position would have understood the
situation. A suspect is therefore in custody for Miranda
purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have
understood the situation to constitute a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree which the law
associates with formal arrest.
Id. at 596 (quotations and citations omitted).
Bengivenga involved a ninety second pre-arrest interrogation
at a routine citizenship checkpoint. In upholding the district
court's denial of a motion to suppress statements made during that
interrogation, the Fifth Circuit focused on four factors. First,
the court noted the short period of interrogation, recognizing that
brief stops mitigate against a belief that an arrest has occurred.
Id. at 598. This Court has expressed concerns that detentions
which last more than an hour "raise considerable suspicion," but
declined to draw a bright line rule that an hour-long delay
constitutes a per se custodial interrogation. United States v.
16
Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 124 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1990). Second, the
Bengivenga Court reasoned that the interrogation took place in a
public environment that would not lead a reasonable person to
believe that he was under formal arrest. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at
599-600. Third, an encounter limited to one or two law enforcement
officers mitigates the target's sense of vulnerability. Id. at 598.
Fourth, the Court noted that a "fixed checkpoint" interrogation,
such as immigration screening, decreases the fear a reasonable
person would otherwise experience. Id. at 599. The Court went on
to distinguish an investigative stop, which requires no Miranda
warnings, from an arrest. A suspect seized in accord with the
Fourth Amendment may be briefly questioned and, if justified,
frisked for weapons. Id. Thus detention and questioning do not
necessarily amount to custodial interrogation. Id.
During the search, Douglas was not handcuffed and he was free
to wander around the grounds outside of his house. One officer
testified that he told Douglas that he could leave, and that they
wanted him to leave because he was "kind of in the way" of the
officers who were executing the search warrant. Another officer
testified that when Douglas asked if he could leave, the officer
told Douglas he "preferred" that Douglas stay around to go over the
property sheet at the end of the search. Another officer told
Douglas that he was not under arrest unless there were guns in the
house and he was a felon. In response, Douglas told the officers
that there were guns in the house, although they had already
discovered one gun, and Douglas later told another officer that he
17
had a felony record. A local law enforcement officer present
during the search testified that he and one of his detectives were
asked to stay out under the car port with Douglas and some of his
family members, which he did. Testimony revealed that on two
occasions during the search Douglas entered the residence and
during those times he was escorted by officers. In addition,
Douglas argues that the fact that the officers pointed their guns
at him during the first few minutes of the search and the violence
with which the officers entered the residence added to the coercive
atmosphere and the perception that he was not free to go.
Applying the first Bengivenga factor, we must determine the
length of the detention. Douglas was clearly detained initially,
but gave no statements that he now seeks to suppress during that
time. The two actual interrogations, which occurred later in the
day, lasted a few minutes each. Nevertheless, the search went on
for several hours, with Douglas in the presence of various officers
during most of that time. However, given the testimony that
Douglas was told that he could go, the length of time it took the
officers to complete the search does not weigh against the
Government. Rather, the actual interrogation -- lasting less than
fifteen minutes altogether -- appears to qualify as a brief
detention.
The second factor, the location of the search, weighs in favor
of the Government's position because questioning in one's own home
in the presence of other family members is less coercive than
questioning in a station house or other official location.
18
Under the third factor, the number of officers involved must
be considered. Testimony set the number of officers involved in
the search at fifty. However, most of those officers had no
contact with Douglas. He made statements to two different officers
in response to questioning, and talked for several hours "about old
times" with a local law enforcement officer whom he had known for
more than twenty years while they were standing out under the
carport. He had minimal contact with several of the other officers
throughout the day. Under these circumstances, the number of
officers involved weighs equally for both sides.
Fourth, we must compare the circumstances of the execution of
a search warrant to that of an immigration checkpoint. This factor
weighs in favor of Douglas, as a neutral, reasonable person would
feel more fear when his home is raided by armed law officers at
sunrise than if he was stopped at an immigration checkpoint.
With factors one and two favoring the Government, factor two
being neutral and factor four weighing in favor of Douglas, we are
not able to say that the district court erred in finding that the
circumstances surrounding the statements did not amount to
custodial interrogation.
The trial court's finding that Douglas did not invoke his
right to counsel is also supported by the record. Douglas refers
us to the video tape of the search which was admitted into
evidence. Neither the video tape nor the testimony concerning the
search bears out Douglas's factual assertion that he invoked his
right to counsel during the search. It follows that the district
19
court did not err in denying his motion to suppress.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR COCAINE BASE
Appellants complain that the guidelines for cocaine base
violate their rights to due process of law, equal protection and
the Eighth Amendment. Appellants also claim that a downward
departure was warranted. This Court has rejected attacks on the
crack/powder discrepancies in the sentencing guidelines. United
States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574 (5th Cir.) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 529,
130 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1994); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64,
65 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting an equal protection argument); United
States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a
due process challenge), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S. Ct.
887, (1992).
Departures are appropriate only in the unusual case, where,
although the guideline, by its terms, applies, the particular facts
of the case differ from the heartland of cases considered by the
commission. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt. A, § 4(b). Appellants have
advanced no theory which would distinguish their cases from the
"heartland" on crack offenses. We find no merit in Appellants'
attacks on the cocaine base sentencing guidelines.
OTHER SENTENCING ISSUES
a. Standard of review
A district court need only be convinced by a preponderance of
the evidence to make fact findings pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines. United States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 570 (5th Cir.
20
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S. Ct. 1164, 107 L. Ed. 2d
1067 (1990). This Court accepts the findings of fact of the
district court unless they are clearly erroneous and gives due
deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to
the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Information relied on to
determine the size of a drug conspiracy need have only "sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." U.S.S.G.
§ 6A1.3, p.s. The district court may rely on information contained
in a presentence report if it has the required minimum indicium of
reliability; a defendant has the burden to show that any such
information is materially untrue. United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d
197, 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 917, 112 S. Ct. 322,
116 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1991).
b. Arthur Jackson Douglas ("Arthur")
A Government informant ("Brown") approached Arthur about
selling some automobile tire rims to Arthur. No drugs were
discussed at this meeting. Later, Brown met with "Joe Boy" Douglas
and discussed buying some cocaine from Joe Boy and getting a price
break if he threw in the tire rims Arthur wanted. Arthur was not
present at this meeting. Later Brown met with Arthur and Kenneth
Evans. At that meeting, Brown negotiated the price, including the
tire rims, of powder cocaine to be purchased from Evans. Later,
Evans and Brown met, without Arthur, and Brown purchased a bag of
drugs that he discovered later contained crack cocaine instead of
powder. Both Brown and an FBI agent testified that up until the
actual purchase everyone thought the deal was for the sale of
21
powder cocaine.
Arthur's PSR suggested that Arthur was responsible for the
entire amount of the "reasonably foreseeable jointly undertaken
criminal activity, to the extent of more than 15 kilograms of
cocaine base." The district court rejected that suggestion and
held Arthur responsible for only the single transaction in which he
personally participated. However, the district court sentenced
Arthur based on the guidelines for crack. Arthur argues on appeal,
as he did at sentencing, that he should have been sentenced on the
basis of the powder cocaine guidelines. That would have reduced
his offense level from 30 to 14. We agree. The record bears out
Arthur's contention that there is no evidence to support the fact
finding that he agreed, participated in, or could have reasonably
foreseen that the transaction would involve crack instead of
powder.
c. All other sentencing issues.
The other Appellants raise different permutations of
challenges to the factual findings of the district court at
sentencing. None of them merits discussion, as they are wholly
without merit.
18 U.S.C. 924(c) CONVICTIONS
Edd C. Douglas, Wesley James Wilson, Altonio O'Shea Douglas,
Cynthia Tamplin and Eddie Franklin Douglas contend that the
evidence is not sufficient to sustain their convictions for
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in light of Bailey v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). We
22
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, making all reasonable inferences and credibility
choices in favor of the verdict. United States v. Vasquez, 953
F.2d 176, 181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 946, 112 S.Ct.
2288, 119 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1992). In 1992, the Fifth Circuit held
that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) merely requires evidence that the firearm
was available to provide protection to the defendant in connection
with his engagement in drug trafficking. United States v. Ivy, 973
F.2d 1184, 1189 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113
S.Ct. 1826, 123 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1993). However, the Supreme Court
recently held that conviction for use of a firearm under § 924(c)
requires evidence sufficient to show active employment of a firearm
by a defendant. Bailey v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct.
501, 506, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995).
a. Count 3
Wesley James Wilson and Edd C. Douglas were convicted under
Count 3 in connection with the seizure of a gun from a vehicle in
a mall parking lot. According to one of the officers' testimony,
Wilson, Edd C. Douglas, Darion Mosley, and Charles Harris were
arrested in a reverse sting conducted by undercover officers.
Harris and Mosley were in a brown truck with a man named Rolando;
Harris was driving. Wilson was driving a brown Camaro and Edd C.
Douglas was driving a blue truck. When officers moved in, Wilson
attempted to flee in the Camaro. He was stopped before he could
exit the parking lot. The officer making the arrest saw a gun in
plain view as he pulled Wilson from his car. The gun was on the
23
floorboard on the driver's side of the Camaro. In addition, Harris
testified that Mosley told him that Wilson had the gun. We find no
evidence in the record that Edd C. Douglas, who was in a different
vehicle, actually knew that Wilson had the gun. The Government
argued at trial that Wilson and Douglas both possessed the weapon
on the floorboard of Wilson's vehicle and therefore "used" the
weapon within the meaning of 924(c).
Section 924(c) requires the imposition of criminal penalties
if the defendant, "during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm." The
Supreme Court in Bailey noted that "[h]ad Congress intended
possession alone to trigger liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily
could have so provided. This obvious conclusion is supported by
the frequent use of the term "possess" in gun-crime statutes to
describe prohibited gun-related conduct." Id. at 506. The Supreme
Court also rejected the suggestion that "use" encompassed the
scenario where an offender conceals a gun nearby to be at the ready
for an imminent confrontation. Id. at 508. Congress knew how to
draft a statute to reach a firearm that was intended to be used,
see e.g., § 924(d)(1), but did not employ that language in § 924(c)
either. Bailey concluded that the Government must show something
beyond mere possession, to establish "use" for the purposes of the
statute." Id. at 506.
Based on the proof offered in this case, we find the evidence
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that Wilson and Edd C.
Douglas used the firearm during and in relation to a drug
24
trafficking crime.
The indictment charged Wilson and Edd C. Douglas with using
and carrying the weapon. It follows that we should determine what
the Government must show, beyond mere possession, to establish
"carrying" for the purposes of the statute.
We must start with the "ordinary or natural" meaning of the
word carry. Id. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343
(1981) defines carry as "to move while supporting (as in a vehicle
or in one's hands or arms): move an appreciable distance without
dragging: sustain as a burden or load and bring along to another
place." The Supreme Court hypothesized as an example in Bailey
that an offender who keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout
a drug transaction has violated the "carrying" portion of § 924(c).
Bailey at 507. In placing a gun under the driver's seat of a car,
then driving the car to another location, one has carried the gun
according to Webster's definition. This, in our view, satisfies §
924(c)'s carrying requirement. See United States v. Riascos-
Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996)(When a defendant is
transporting a firearm in his vehicle in connection with a drug
offense and when that firearm is within his reach, the evidence is
sufficient to support the "carrying" requirement under § 924(c)).
In this case, Wilson was driving the car with the gun within reach,
to attend and later flee from an aborted drug transaction.
Further, Edd C. Douglas could be held responsible for the acts that
Wilson, a member of the conspiracy, took in pursuance of their
unlawful scheme. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 6 S.
25
Ct. 1180 (1946).
In sum, we find the evidence insufficient to support a jury
finding of "use," but sufficient to support a jury finding of
carrying. However, because the jury may have rendered a guilty
verdict on this count because of the liberal, pre-Bailey
instructions on what constituted "use" of a firearm, we must
reverse and remand the case. The government may retry Count 3 on
the "carrying" theory only.
b. Count 6
The government concedes that the convictions under Count 6
against Edd C. Douglas and Cynthia Tamplin must be reversed and
their sentences vacated. We agree and remand these Appellants'
cases for resentencing on the remaining counts of conviction.
c. Count 12
An undercover officer testified that, after he purchased crack
from defendant Altonio Douglas and another man, the two displayed
firearms as they drove away to obtain more crack to sell to him.
This leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show
that Altonio Douglas "carried" a firearm. We nevertheless vacate
the conviction because it may have been predicated on the pre-
Bailey instruction on "use" of a firearm. Again, the government
has the option of retrying Count 12.
d. Count 17
The government concedes that Eddie Franklin Douglas' § 924(c)
conviction based on discovery of weapons in his home should be
vacated. In view of Douglas' sentence of life imprisonment without
26
parole, there is no need to remand his case for resentencing.
ADMISSION OF PAPERS FOUND DURING SEARCH
The trial court admitted into evidence, over Appellants'
objections, exhibits consisting of scraps of paper, envelopes,
business cards, notebook pages, and a paper sack, each containing
names, numbers, dollar amounts, and dates which the Government
contended were records of drug transactions. The exhibits were
seized in searches of various residences and the She Ice Disco.
Appellants contend on appeal, as they did below, that the exhibits
were hearsay and deprived Appellants of their Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights. The trial court held that some of the
exhibits were not hearsay, and that others were hearsay but were
admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) as coconspirator
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We review trial court's
admissions of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1229 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2038 (1991).
Appellants argue that the writings were unauthenticated
hearsay. The authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims. Such evidence can include circumstantial
evidence, the document's own distinctive characteristics and the
circumstances surrounding its discovery. United States v. Arce,
997 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1993). A statement is admissible
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) when it is offered against a party
and is a statement by a co-conspirator made during and in
27
furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. El-Zoubi, 993 F.2d
442, 446 (5th Cir. 1993). The Government contends that the
exhibits complained of met both of these requirements.
King particularly complains of the admission of a paper sack
containing money with the word "Chocolate" on it. One of the
codefendants testified that when he left proceeds of drug sales at
Douglas' home, one of the conspirators would count the money and
put his name on a sack. There was also testimony that "Chocolate"
was King's alias. Another exhibit, M9, was identified through
testimony as a record of a drug transaction kept by one of the
women who kept records for Eddie Franklin Douglas. Admission of
the "Chocolate" sack was not an abuse of discretion, as it met both
the authentication and 801(d)(2)(E) requirements. Appellants'
other complaints are not specific enough to identify the admission
of any other exhibit that would amount to an abuse of discretion,
and we have found none in the record.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HILL'S STATEMENT
Following a hearing, the district court denied Hill's motion
to suppress a statement he made to officers after his arrest. At
the hearing, the officers testified that Hill was advised of his
Miranda rights orally and in writing, and the officers signed a
form attesting to that fact. Later, prior to his statement, he was
again advised of his rights, and this time he signed the form.
Hill claimed at the hearing that he was not advised of his
rights and because the officers signed the form before he signed
it, the procedure was tainted and therefore "outrageous," an
28
"attempt at subterfuge," and raises doubts as to the voluntariness
of his statement. He further claims that his statement lacked
voluntariness because of the circumstances surrounding the taking
of his statement -- including the fact that he was 19 years old, he
was arrested at his house at 7:00 a.m. when he had just awakened
with a hangover, and he had no prior experience with law
enforcement. Hill also claimed that he was taken to the FBI office
and told that he would not be released until he gave a statement.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based
on live testimony at a suppression hearing, the trial court's
factual findings must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. United
States v. Maldonado, 735 F. 2d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1984). Given the
conflicting testimony, the court's credibility determinations and
fact findings are not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM all of Appellants'
convictions and sentences with the exception of the convictions
under § 924(c) of Eddie Franklin Douglas, Cynthia Tamplin, Altonio
O'Shea Douglas, Wesley James Wilson and Edd C. Douglas, which we
REVERSE. Counts 3 and 12 are remanded for new trial. The sentences
imposed on Edd C. Douglas and Cynthia Tamplin are vacated, and
remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts of conviction.
Further, we VACATE Arthur Franklin Douglas's sentence and REMAND
his case for resentencing.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.
29
LUCIUS D. BUNTON, III, District Judge, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that Eddie Franklin Douglas was
not "in custody" when he made statements regarding the presence of firearms in his residence during
the January 28, 1992, search. The Fifth Amendment provides an accused the right against
compulsory self-incrimination. Miranda warnings are the prophylactic "measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected." U.S. v. Smith, 7 F.3d 1164, 1170 (5th Cir.
1993) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)). Although there is no precise
admonition that must be given a criminal defendant, our system of criminal justice requires that an
accused be given Miranda warnings, or their functional equivalent before any custodial interrogation.5
A custodial interrogation results when a person is formally arrested or has a significant restraint
imposed on his or her freedom of movement. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)(per
curiam). Douglas had not been formally arrested at the time he made the incriminating statements.
Thus, the focus of the inquiry is whether the officers that executed the search warrant created an
environment where Douglas' perception of his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree
associated with a formal arrest.
When determining whether the restraint on an individual's movement rises to the level
associated with a formal arrest, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood the situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
This reasonable person is one that is "neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive
nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances." United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593,
596 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc). The awareness that the officers have probable cause to arrest or
realizing that one has become the "focal point" of an investigation is relevant to the custody analysis
when such awareness would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he was not free to leave. Id.
Miranda warnings are not rights, in and of themselves,
protected by the Constitution. However, the utter failure to
notify an accused of his rights enunciated in Miranda may lead to
a violation of a right protected by the Constitution (e.g.,
compulsory self-incrimination).
30
at 597 n.16.
Several other factors are appropriate to consider when applying the "reasonable person test."
First, the length of the detention is relevant for determining whether a reasonable person would
believe that his freedom is restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Bengivenga, 845
F.2d at 598. A stop that is temporary and brief, such as a traffic stop, would not induce the
reasonable person to the believe that he or she would be subjected to a significant restraint of his or
her freedom of movement.
Second, the location of the detention and interrogation is pertinent. Id. Whether the
questioning occurs in a public rather than private place mitigates the fear that a reasonable person
may have of police overbearance or abuse. See id. The fact that the detention occurs under the
scrutiny of other citizens reduces the individual's perception of the degree of restraint. Also relevant
to this inquiry is the police presence --or the number of officers involved. One or two police officers'
presence reduces a person's sense of vulnerability whereas a greater number increases a person's
apprehension. See id. (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438).
And finally, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention and interrogation
which tend to add or subtract from the subjective fear or surprise that a reasonable person would
experience is pertinent. See id. at 599. I recognize that for the safety of both the agents, occupants
and to prevent the destruction of evidence, surprise is an essential element in executing a search
warrant of this kind. However, the manner in which this search warrant was executed served to
increase the surprise and perceived threat of police overbearance and abuse. This impacts on the
apprehension a reasonable person would feel during questioning by Federal Agents and whether or
not that person would believe that he or she was free to leave.
Applying these factors t o the case at bar, I believe that Eddie Franklin Douglas was "in
custody" at the time he made the statements concerning the existence of firearms in the house, and
that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to deny Douglas' Motion to Suppress.
I. Probable Cause to Arrest or Knowledge that
Individual is Focal Point of Investigation
31
At the time Douglas responded to the officer's questions about the firearms, Douglas knew
that he was an ex-felon and that he had guns in the house. Hence, when Special Agent David
McIntosh told Douglas that he would be arrested if he was a felon and had weapons in the house,
Douglas knew that he was not free to leave. See ROA Vol. 36 at 43, 48. A reasonable person,
knowing that the police have ample cause to arrest him and that he is the "focal point" of the
investigation would not feel free to leave. This was Douglas' situation. Furthermore, the fact that
the agents knew that Douglas was a felon combined with Douglas' statement that there were weapons
in the house raises the inference that the officers treated Douglas as they would treat a person that
they had probable cause to arrest (i.e., the agents would not have allowed the individual to leave).6
II. Length of Detention
The search warrant was executed at 7:30 a.m. Douglas was eventually arrested and first
Mirandized between 3 and 4 p.m. when the United States Attorney made the decision to detain
Douglas. ROA Vol. 36 at 68. The Government argues that Douglas was not in custody during this
time. However, several Special Agents testified that it is the F.B.I.'s policy and practice to detain an
individual until the United States Attorney makes the decision to permanently detain a person if he
The F.B.I.'s affidavit for search warrant states "EDDIE FRANKLIN DOUGLAS has felony
narcotics convictions in 1973 and 1979. He is on Texas state parole for Life [sic]." Tr. at 622. Aff.
of G. Maberry at 14. Similarly, Special Agent L. Steve Powell testified that before the Special
Weapons and Tactics Team executed the search warrant, agents "had been informed that Mr. Eddie
Douglas would be in that residence and that, previously, he had been convicted of an assault and an
attempt to kill a police officer." ROA Vol. 36 at 9-10. Powell further stated that "we were also
aware o f the fact that more recently he had been arrested for being an ex-felon in possessio of a
n
firearm." Id. at 10.
Special Agent Carlos Ortiz also testified that he was aware that Douglas was a convicted felon
before he entered the residence at the time of the search. Id. at 35.
Special Agent David McIntosh testified that he knew Douglas had a felony record when he
told Douglas that he would be arrested if he had a record or if you "got [sic] an illegal weapon." Id.
at 48-50. In fact, McIntosh stated that every agent participating in the search had been advised that
Douglas was a convicted felon. Id. at 49.
One of the interrogating officers even testified that he understood that asking Douglas
questions about his relationship or control over the premises were questions that could be
incriminating. Id. at 60. Although aware of the incriminating nature that Douglas' answers could
possess, the agent still did not Mirandize Douglas. Id. at 76.
32
has a felony conviction and is found in possession of a firearm. 7
During the search, a Mansfield, Texas police officer was assigned to stay with Douglas and
the family members. ROA Vol. 36 at 76. When Douglas needed to go to the bathroom later in the
day, he was escorted into the residence by two officers. Id. Likewise, when Douglas asked if he was
free to leave, Agent McIntosh related to Douglas that he preferred that he remain. Id. at 53. Given
this mass of evidence, I conclude that Douglas' length of detention lasted from 7:30 a.m. to the time
of his arrest between 3 and 4 p.m.
III. Location of Detention
The search and subsequent detention was not carried out under the scrutiny of other citizens.
During the suppression hearing, testimony indicated that the Agents blocked the entrances and exits
to the neighborhood where the residence was located. Id. at 78. Law enforcement personnel were
the only ones that witnessed the treatment afforded to Douglas. Furthermore, between twenty and
fifty agents clothed in black body armor, masks, helmets, combat boots and armed with semi-
automatic rifles and handguns executed the search warrant and remained at the residence during a
portion of the search after the residence was secured. Needless to say, the police presence was
significantly greater than that associated with a routine traffic stop and was not witnessed by other
citizens as are brief stops at fixed border checkpoi nts. In fact, the only persons that were around
Douglas during the majority of the search were Federal Law Enforcement Agents. The number of
officers which were present during the period numbered between twenty and fifty. This police
presence was significant and served to increase Douglas' perception of restraint on his freedom of
movement.
Similarly, the interrogation at issue occurred at Douglas' residence was not in the nature of
Special Agent Ortiz testified that he would have maintained control over Do uglas until the
United States Attorney made the decision to arrest him because Ortiz knew that Douglas was a
convicted felon, and he also knew that firearms had been found in the residence. See ROA Vol. 36
at 39.
Special Agent Mike Morgan testified that it is the F.B.I.'s normal procedure to detain a person
who they believe to be a convicted felon and in possession of a firearm until the United States
Attorney determines what action to take. See ROA Vol. 36 at 68.
33
a brief investigatory visit as when an officer drops by to inquire into a neighbor's complaint. Hence,
the fact that the interrogation occurred in Douglas' residence is of little consequence in mitigating his
fear of police overbearance or abuse.
IV. Other Factors Creating a Subjective Fear
Likewise, a reasonable person, after witnessing federal agents dressed in tactical gear,
crashing through the electronic gate across the driveway, attempting to rip the burglar bars off the
residence with a tactical vehicle and exploding concussion devices in the yard would have felt that
the restraint on his freedom of movement was to the degree that is associated with a formal arrest.
When Douglas was initially brought out of the house, he was unclothed from the waist down.
The agents forced him onto the driveway facedown and kept him there at gunpoint for several
minutes. The agents did not cover Douglas' naked body, nor allow him to have clothing for a period
of time which was significant under the circumstances. Being unclothed, face down on the driveway
and held at gunpoint in front of both male and female federal agents would certainly increase a
reasonable person's subjective fear and is a degree of restraint associated with a formal arrest.
In light of the specific facts surrounding the execution of this search warrant, I believe that
the trial court erred in failing to suppress Douglas' statements centering on the existence of weapons
in his residence. Because the agents' custodial interrogation of Defendant violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and some of the guns were the fruit of the poisonous
tree, I would also suppress the guns that were found as the result of Douglas's statements and vacate
Douglas' conviction on Count 18 (Felon in Possession of a Firearm). I dissent with my colleagues
on this issue, but concur with the remainder of the majority's opinion.
34
APPENDIX A -- 93-1797
NAME COUNTS OF CONVICTION SENTENCE
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Eddie Franklin Douglas 1. Conspiracy Life w/out parole
17. Firearm during drug offense Life - concurrent
18. Felon in possession of firearm 5 years - consecutive
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Mary Jane Fike 1. Conspiracy 1 2 1 m o n t h s
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Cynthia Tamplin 1. Conspiracy 324 months
(aka She Ice) 5. Possess controlled substance 5 years consecutive
6. Firearm during drug offense
19. Maintaining place to manufacture
and distribute a controlled substance
20. Felon in possession of a firearm
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Altonio O'Shea Douglas 1. Conspiracy life
(aka Tony) 11. Possess controlled substance 5 years consecutive
12. Firearm during drug offense
__________________________________________________________________________________________
James Weldon Campbell 1. Conspiracy 3 6 0 m o n t h s
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Arthur Jackson Douglas 1. Conspiracy 168 months
7. Specific sale
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Orpheus Hill 1. Conspiracy 240 months
(aka "O")
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Burvon King 1. Conspiracy life
(aka Chocolate)
__________________________________________________________________________________________
NAME COUNTS OF CONVICTION S E N T E N C E
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chauncey Mosley 1. Conspiracy 3 6 0 m o n t h s
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Wesley James Wilson 1. Conspiracy life
(aka Wes) 2. Possess controlled substance 5 years,
3. Firearm during drug offense c o n s e c u t i v e
4. Money laundering
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Elbert Douglas, Jr. 1. Conspiracy life
(aka Jr.)
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Edd C. Douglas 1. Conspiracy l i f e , p l u s
(aka E.C.) 2. Possess controlled substance 25 consecutive years
3 & 6. Firearm during drug offense
4. Money laundering
5. Possess cocaine
8. Possess cocaine
19. Maintain a place to manufacture
and distribute a controlled sub.
20. Felon in possession of a firearm