F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
DEC 11 2002
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 02-4012
v.
RUSSELL GALLEGOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:99-CR-49-01-W)
Stephen R. McCaughey, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant - Appellant.
Richard D. McKelvie, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Warner, United
States Attorney, on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Russell Gallegos entered a conditional guilty plea to
one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of carrying or possessing a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In
so doing, Mr. Gallegos reserved his right to appeal the district court’s order
denying in part and granting in part his motion to suppress evidence obtained
from a search of his residence, a safe deposit box, and two storage sheds. The
magistrate judge to whom the case was referred recommended that the motion be
granted as to evidence seized pursuant to the search of one storage shed, but
denied as to all the other evidence seized. The district court overruled objections
and adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.
On appeal, Mr. Gallegos argues that: (1) the search warrant for his
residence was unsupported by probable cause; (2) the officers executing the
warrant violated the “knock and announce” rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3109; (3) the
officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing items not identified therein;
(4) the consent to search given by Mr. Gallegos’ co-defendant was invalid
because it was the product of coercion; and that (5) the fruits of the foregoing
illegalities were not rendered admissible under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
reverse.
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Background
On February 2, 1999, agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
obtained a search warrant authorizing the search of Mr. Gallegos’ home, which he
shared with his young son and his codefendant, Sandra Rawlinson. The terms of
the warrant provided that it could be executed at any time, day or night. Two days
later, the agents met with several officers from the Drug Enforcement Agency and
the Department of Public Safety to discuss the specifics of how the warrant
should be executed. At this meeting the officers decided to execute the warrant
on February 5, 1999 at 4:00 a.m. The officers also discussed the physical layout
of the residence, which revealed that the bedrooms in the home were located on
the second floor. The officers assigned the task of actually knocking on the front
door were instructed to forcibly enter the residence if, in their estimation, an
“adequate amount of time” had elapsed with no response from the occupants. II
R. 25. No specific instructions were given as to what constituted an “adequate”
amount of time.
The following morning, approximately 23 officers met at a remote location
and drove to the target neighborhood, parking approximately one-half block from
Mr. Gallegos’ residence. The agent in charge of the operation testified that as he
approached the residence he observed no lights on in the house and that it was
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dark outside. II R. 28, 30-31. 1 At approximately 4:00 a.m. a member of the
entry team began knocking loudly on the front door as the agent in charge yelled
“police[,] FBI, search warrant.” II R. 10, 11. The agent testified that after
waiting approximately five to ten seconds, the entry team began attempting to
breach the door with a battering ram. He further testified that as he yelled, he
observed no response from within the residence.
After gaining access through the front door, the entry team split into two
groups to secure the first and second floors of the residence. The officers
assigned to secure the second floor encountered Mr. Gallegos exiting the
northeast upstairs bedroom with a loaded nine-millimeter handgun, which he
dropped at the direction of the officers. The officers thereafter secured the
residence, and Mr. Gallegos and Ms. Rawlinson were taken into custody.
Discussion
Mr. Gallegos claims that the law enforcement officers involved in the
execution of the warrant (“the officers”) violated the “knock and announce” rule
of 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Specifically, Mr. Gallegos alleges that even if the officers
properly announced their presence and purpose, he lacked sufficient time to either
1
Another agent testified that he could not recall any lights being on in
the residence before they executed the warrant. II R. 34.
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grant or refuse entry to the officers. We hold that the officers failed to comply
with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and that any evidence obtained during
the ensuing search must therefore be suppressed. In light of this holding, we need
not address Mr. Gallegos’ alternative claims.
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error, its conclusions of law de novo, and view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v.
Maden, 64 F.3d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has held that
the “knock and announce” principle embodied in § 3109 “forms a part of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 929 (1995). Consequently, we review the district court’s legal
conclusion that the officers complied with § 3109 de novo, and the factual
determinations underlying that conclusion for clear error. See United States v.
Granville, 222 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing de novo the district
court’s “legal conclusion that the knock and announce statute was complied
with.”); United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
“[t]his Court reviews de novo the district court’s legal conclusion regarding the
suppression of evidence for a knock-and-announce violation); cf. Maden, 64 F.3d
at 1508 (holding that the question of whether exigent circumstances existed
excusing compliance with § 3109 is reviewed de novo).
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The “knock and announce” rule, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109, provides that
a law enforcement officer may:
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part
of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when
necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution
of a warrant.
(emphasis added). Although the statute has existed in its current form only since
the late 1940s, the origins of the rule it declares have been traced to the “earliest
days” of our common-law history. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-07
(1958) (tracing origins of the “knock and announce” rule to recorded 15th century
precedent). Furthermore, in United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383 (10th
Cir. 1986), we observed that the purpose of § 3109 is to decrease the potential for
violence, protect the privacy rights of individuals, and avoid the unnecessary
destruction of property. In elaborating on these purposes, the Supreme Court has
held that the privacy interests advanced by the rule include: (1) permitting
individuals to comply with the law by peaceably permitting officers to enter their
homes; (2) avoiding the unnecessary destruction of property that attends a forcible
entry; and (3) providing an opportunity for occupants to “prepare themselves” for
entry by law enforcement officers by, for example, “pull[ing] on clothes or
get[ting] out of bed.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997).
The importance of the “knock and announce” rule is further evidenced by
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its express incorporation into our modern-day Fourth Amendment doctrine, see
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, and the significant consequences attending its violation:
suppression of all evidence that is seized in a subsequent search as derivative
evidence. See, e.g., Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968);
Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 383. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described § 3109 as
codifying a rule that is “deeply rooted in our heritage and [that] should not be
given grudging application.” Miller, 357 U.S. at 313.
The starting point of our analysis must be the language of the statute. As
noted above, § 3109 permits law enforcement officers to forcibly enter a
residence, if after announcing their presence and purpose, the officers are refused
entry. The first prong of the rule requires officers to announce their presence and
purpose before breaking into an individual’s home. Although Mr. Gallegos
contends that there is at least a question as to whether the officers complied with
this requirement, we hold that the district court’s factual finding that the officers
announced their presence and purpose before entering is not clearly erroneous.
We also agree with the district court that no exigent circumstances attended the
search of the Gallegos residence. The question, therefore, becomes whether an
objectively reasonable officer would believe that he was refused admittance based
on the facts and circumstances known to him at the time of entry.
It is by now well-established that an occupant of a home need not
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affirmatively refuse admittance to trigger the right of the police to enter by force.
United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1993). On the contrary, the
refusal may be “constructive” or “reasonably inferred” from the circumstances.
Id. (quoting United States v. Bonner, 874 F.2d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). In
United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96 (10th Cir. 1996), we held that a constructive
refusal occurs, giving police the right to enter by force, where “the occupants do
not admit the officers within a reasonable period of time.” Id. at 98 (citing
Knapp, 1 F.3d at 1031).
At least where there are no exigent circumstances justifying a shorter
interval, the central inquiry in conducting this determination is whether an
objectively reasonable officer would believe that occupants of the residence had a
reasonable opportunity to voluntarily admit the officer, thereby supporting a
conclusion that the occupants refused admittance. See Granville, 222 F.3d at
1218 (holding that officers violated § 3109 because the delay did not provide
defendant with “reasonable opportunity to ascertain who was at the door and to
respond to [the officer’s] request for admittance.”); Richards, 520 U.S. at 393
(noting that one purpose of the “knock and announce” rule is to permit
individuals an opportunity to comply with the law). Furthermore, it is clear that
“the amount of time that officers must wait after knocking and announcing
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.” United States v.
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Jenkins, 175 F.3d, 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999); cf. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394
(stating that “in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to
determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified
dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.”). “[A] bright-line rule for
determining how much time is enough is inappropriate.” Jenkins, 175 F.3d at
1213.
We hold that under the circumstances known to the officers here—the time
of day that the warrant was executed, the absence of any indication of activity
within the house, and the known upstairs location of the bedroom—no objectively
reasonable officer would believe that Mr. Gallegos refused admittance within five
to ten seconds.
Significantly, even without considering these three factors, we note that the
five to ten second interval in this case pushes the limits of what we have held to
be reasonable in previous “knock and announce” cases. Significantly, our survey
of cases in this circuit has not revealed a single case upholding an interval of less
than ten seconds in the absence of exigent circumstances, and our review of cases
from other circuits has yielded similar results. See, e.g. Granville, 222 F.3d at
1218 (noting that the shortest wait the Ninth Circuit has upheld is ten seconds,
and that “[u]sually, the wait is much longer.”).
Moreover, in Jenkins, we stated that an “across the board” ten-second
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waiting period policy “clearly would violate the knock-and-announce standard”
because
compliance with the knock-and-announce component of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry must be evaluated on a fact-
dependent, case-by-case basis. Without some additional evidence
regarding, for example, the size of the house, the presence of guns,
or other exigent circumstances, officers frequently may be unable to
justify a waiting period as short as ten seconds. In light of these
considerations, a policy requiring officers to wait ten seconds in
every case would not comport with existing Supreme Court and
circuit precedent.
Jenkins, 175 F.3d at 1214 (emphasis added). The import of our comments in
Jenkins is clear. Although a ten-second delay can, under some circumstances,
satisfy the demands of § 3109, the consideration of relevant additional factors
may very well compel a contrary holding.
The first such factor we address in determining whether the delay here was
reasonable under § 3109 is the time of day that the warrant was executed. We
have held that when a warrant is executed in the middle of the day, “the amount
of time the officers need to wait before entering is generally reduced.” Jenkins,
175 F.3d at 1215. If the warrant in this case was executed at a time when “most
people are awake and engaged in everyday activities,” Id. (quoting United States
v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 1998)), this would be a very different case.
Here, the officers executed the warrant at 4:00 a.m. Absent indications of
activity in the home at that hour, a mere five to ten second wait will rarely if ever
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provide a sufficient amount of time. See generally, Jenkins, 175 F.3d at 1214-15
(expressing grave concerns about alleged ten-second police department policy,
given the testimony of two experienced officers indicating that occupants very
rarely reach the door before the officers break it down). There were no such
indications here–it was dark outside and there were no lights on in the house.
Furthermore, our review of the record has revealed no evidence suggesting that
the officers had any specific indication that any of the home’s occupants may
have been up and about at that time. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the
conclusion that Mr. Gallegos was asleep when the officers announced their
presence. 2 No objectively reasonable officer would expect most individuals to
arise, get dressed, proceed to the front door, and admit the officers within such a
short time frame. See Granville, 222 F.3d at 1218 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
five-second delay was insufficient to satisfy § 3109, where the warrant was
“executed early in the morning when it was likely the occupants of the
[apartment] would be asleep.”).
Moreover, the physical characteristics of the Gallegos residence are
2
We note that even if Mr. Gallegos was not in fact asleep at the time
that the warrant was executed, such would make little difference in our resolution
of this case. In assessing the reasonableness of the waiting period preceding a
forcible entry, what matters is the information known to the officers immediately
prior to the entry, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, not what
turned out to be the case after the fact.
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relevant to our determination. As previously noted, the officers were aware that
the bedrooms in the Gallegos residence were located on the second floor.
Factors such as the early hour and lack of illuminated lights in the house justify
an inference that Mr. Gallegos was in his bedroom at the time the warrant was
executed. Obviously, where there is reason to believe that the occupants of a
home are in an upstairs bedroom, the length of time needed to reach the front
door will generally be longer than if the occupants are present, for example, in a
room on the ground floor adjacent to the front door. The fact that the bedrooms
of the residence were located on the second floor, when viewed together with the
factors discussed above, demonstrates the unreasonableness of construing a five
to ten second delay as a refusal to admit the officers.
In light of the foregoing, we simply cannot conclude an objectively
reasonable officer would believe that Mr. Gallegos “refused admittance” under
§ 3109, thereby justifying the forced entry in this action. However, the
government argues that our prior cases establish the reasonableness of the
interval here, and that the “useless gesture” exception to the “knock and
announce” rule applies on the facts of this case. We disagree.
The government relies heavily on United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026
(10th Cir. 1993). In Knapp, officers executing a search warrant waited “ten to
twelve seconds” after knocking and announcing their presence before breaking
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down Mr. Knapp’s door. Id. at 1030. The undisputed evidence in that case
revealed that the officers were aware that Mr. Knapp was an amputee who
utilized a wooden prosthesis, id. at 1030, n.1, that they believed no exigent
circumstances attended the search of his residence, id. at 1030, and that they
observed lights on in his home and therefore suspected that he was there at the
time. Id. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s denial of Mr. Knapp’s
motion to suppress, holding that:
Under the facts of this case, we hold the district court’s determination
that the agents waited a reasonable period of time was not clearly
erroneous. Mr. Knapp gave no indication that he intended to
voluntarily permit the officers to enter the residence. It was plausible
for the officers to conclude that they were affirmatively refused entry
after a ten to twelve second interval without a verbal or physical
response. We therefore hold that the district court’s denial of the
motion to suppress . . . was not clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1031.
The government contends that if the ten to twelve second delay in Knapp
was reasonable, the same conclusion must obtain here in light of the “nearly
identical” time lapse, and the fact that, unlike Mr. Gallegos, Mr. Knapp had a
known physical impairment that affected his mobility. Aplee. Br. at 11-12.
However, after a careful comparison of these cases, we are satisfied that Knapp
does not control the disposition of this case.
First, we note that the usefulness of our decision in Knapp is limited in
light of the fact that the court there reviewed for clear error the district court’s
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finding that the officers waited a reasonable amount of time before forcibly
entering Mr. Knapp’s home. Knapp, 1 F.3d at 1031. Although the determination
of which standard of review applies in this context may have been a closer
question at the time of our decision in Knapp, we believe that at least since the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wilson v. Arkansas, it is clear that the de novo
standard of review constitutes the proper standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of the interval preceding a forced entry under § 3109.
In Wilson, decided nearly two years after Knapp, the Supreme Court held
for the first time that the “‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.
Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the determination of whether a search is
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law we review de
novo. See, e.g., Jenkins,175 F.3d at 1212. Because the propriety of a forcible
entry in this context depends on whether the time period preceding the entry was
“reasonable,” and because such a determination forms a part of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, we believe that the de novo
standard of review constitutes the proper standard in this context. 3
3
Obviously, the decision of whether the de novo or clearly erroneous
standard applies can have a substantial impact on the resolution of a particular
case given the “significant” differences between the two standards. See Ocelot
Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988); see also
Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
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Moreover, even if the standard of review in Knapp was not in question,
Knapp would not control. Knapp does not indicate the time of day that the
warrant was executed, the physical layout of the residence, or the defendant’s
probable location within the residence. Moreover, unlike in the current action,
interior lights were on in Knapp suggesting the possibility that the defendant was
awake and present in the home, and could have at least verbally responded to the
officers within the ten to twelve second interval preceding their entry.
The government also argues that because Mr. Gallegos had armed himself
by the time the officers had ascended the stairs, Mr. Gallegos had no intention of
granting entry to the officers. Relying on United States v. McGee, 280 F.3d 803
(7th Cir. 2002), the government argues that a wait longer than five to ten seconds
would have been a “useless gesture.” In McGee, officers stationed at the rear of
the target residence observed the defendant exit through the back door just after
the officers at the front door announced their presence. Id. at 805. After a ten-
second wait, the officers at the front door forcibly entered the home. Id. The
defendant argued that the evidence obtained should have been suppressed on the
ground that the duration of the interval preceding the entry was unreasonably
U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (describing the clearly erroneous standard as “significantly
deferential.”); Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (holding
that “no form of appellate deference is acceptable” under the de novo standard.).
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short. Id. On appeal, the court held that a further wait would have been a
“useless gesture” in light of the defendant’s unavailability to answer the door,
and that any “precipitous entry” was therefore harmless. Id. at 807.
The government contends that the rationale of McGee is applicable here.
We disagree. We would be more inclined towards the result in McGee had the
officers actually observed Mr. Gallegos arm himself prior to their entry, 4 or if
they had witnessed him flee the home after announcing their presence at his front
door. See, e.g., Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 384 (holding that officers did not violate §
3109 where officers stationed at defendant’s bedroom window observed figure
fleeing the room upon announcement of officers at front door). These obvious
and critical distinctions persuade us that McGee is not applicable. Here, the
officers had absolutely no indication, prior to entering the residence, that Mr.
Gallegos did not intend to voluntarily admit the officers. It is axiomatic that
information acquired after an unreasonable search or seizure should not influence
either the scope of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights or the determination
into whether those rights were violated. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28,
29 (1927) (“A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made
4
We do not agree that such an observation would constitute conclusive
proof that Mr. Gallegos intended to refuse admittance. However, if the officers
had in fact observed him arm himself prior to their entry, we could not say that
such an inference would be unreasonable.
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lawful by what it brings to light . . . .”); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1948) (“[A] search is not to be made legal by what it turns up.”).
Accordingly, facts discovered subsequent to the forcible entry cannot
justify an unreasonably short waiting period on the grounds that to wait longer
would have been useless. See United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 551 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that in evaluating whether exigent circumstances justified a three
to five second delay before entering the defendant’s residence, “facts that
became known only after entry, i.e., that the inhabitants were awake, cannot
justify the decision to force entry.”). Consequently, we hold that the fact that
Mr. Gallegos had armed himself, a fact which the officers discovered only after
they had entered his home, does not justify the application of the “useless
gesture” doctrine in the instant action.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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United States v. Gallegos
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2002-12-11
Citations: 314 F.3d 456
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion