F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 27, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-4111
MARK JAMES GARNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:03-CR-320-DKW)
Richard P. Mauro, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Defendant-Appellant.
Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, District of Utah, and Kevin L. Sundwall,
Assistant United States Attorney, District of Utah, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HENRY , MCCONNELL, and HARTZ , Circuit Judges. *
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Mark James Garner
entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm after conviction of a
felony, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In this appeal, he argues that
because South Salt Lake City police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
him, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We are not
persuaded by Mr. Garner’s arguments and therefore affirm the district court’s
decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Around 5:00 p.m. on April 11, 2003, the South Salt Lake City Police
Department received information that a man had been seen in a field near an
apartment complex for several hours, unconscious in a half-sitting, half-slumped-
over position. Rec. vol. II, at 5 (Tr. of Oct. 23, 2003 Hr’g). Officer Tyrone
Boyd proceeded to the apartment complex, arriving at approximately the same
time as the municipal fire department. He found Mr. Garner lying in a field on
the north side of the complex.
As Officer Boyd approached, Mr. Garner began to walk away. Mr. Garner
turned a corner around a building but was stopped by a stone wall. Officer Boyd
told Mr. Garner to come back and sit down so that the fire department personnel
-2-
could examine him. Mr. Garner complied but, according to Officer Boyd, he
appeared nervous, “always looking around [and] saying everything was cool and
[that] he didn’t want any trouble” and moving his hands in and out of his pockets.
Id. at 8.
After fire department personnel examined Mr. Garner, he began to walk
away. Officer Boyd told him to sit back down because he was not done with him
yet. He then asked Mr. Garner his name and his date of birth, and Mr. Garner
provided the information.
About this time, Officer Robert Ransdell arrived. Officer Boyd informed
Officer Ransdell that Mr. Garner appeared nervous. Officer Ransdell instructed
Officer Boyd to ask the dispatcher to determine whether Mr. Garner had any
outstanding warrants.
Officer Ransdell then approached Mr. Garner. Like Officer Boyd, he
noticed that Mr. Garner appeared nervous and was moving his hands in and out of
his pockets. Officer Ransdell asked Mr. Garner to keep his hands in view and
then inquired why Mr. Garner was at the apartment complex and why he was so
nervous. Mr. Garner responded that he did not know why he was there and that
he had passed out. Officer Ransdell then asked whether Mr. Garner had been
taking drugs. Mr. Garner replied that he had “smoked some dope prior that day”
and that he had “some warrants.” Id. at 44.
-3-
At that point, Officer Boyd informed Officer Ransdell of the results of his
background check: Mr. Garner did have some outstanding warrants. Officer
Ransdell told Mr. Garner, “you’ve got some warrants, no big deal,” id. at 45, but
also indicated that he would be detained until the officers could determine the
substance of those warrants. Officer Ransdell directed Mr. Garner to turn around
and put his hands behind his back.
At that point, Mr. Garner began to comply but then ran away. The officers,
along with fire department personnel, chased and tackled him. Mr. Garner fought
with the officers, but they managed to place him in handcuffs. A search of Mr.
Garner’s pants pockets revealed a handgun and burglary tools.
After the government charged Mr. Garner with possession of a firearm after
a felony conviction, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Mr. Garner moved to
suppress the evidence found by the officers. In support of his motion to suppress,
Mr. Garner first argued that Officer Boyd lacked the necessary reasonable
suspicion to support the initial detention. He also argued that, once the fire
department completed its examination, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
continue the detention.
After hearing testimony from Officers Boyd and Ransdell, the district court
rejected both arguments. As to the initial detention, the court reasoned that
Officer Boyd’s observation of Mr. Garner sitting in the field, combined with Mr.
-4-
Garner’s nervous and evasive behavior, provided reasonable suspicion to warrant
detaining Mr. Garner to investigate a possible public intoxication offense and to
determine whether Mr. Garner was suffering from some medical problem. The
court further concluded that even after the fire department personnel completed
their examination, “Officer Boyd had a continuing and remaining need to assess
[Mr. Garner’s] condition to determine whether he was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol . . . and to assess whether [Mr. Garner] was a danger to himself
or others.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 21, at 10 (Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, filed Jan. 8, 2004). Thus, according to the
district court, the officers did not violate Mr. Garner’s Fourth Amendment rights,
and suppression of the evidence discovered in his pockets was not justified.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Garner now argues that Officer Boyd lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain him. He notes that the Officer Boyd acted on an anonymous tip and
observes that, before allowing police officers to detain a suspect, the courts have
usually required some kind of corroboration of the information provided by the
tip. As in the district court proceedings, Mr. Garner also argues that Officers
Boyd and Ransdell lacked the reasonable suspicion required to continue the
detention once fire department personnel finished the physical examination.
-5-
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v.
Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004). The ultimate question of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion that we review
de novo. Id.
A. The Initial Detention
We begin our inquiry with the initial contact between the police officers
and Mr. Garner—Officer Boyd’s directing Mr. Garner to come back and sit down
so that the fire department personnel could examine him. Although Mr. Garner
argues that Officer Boyd then lacked any evidence that a crime had been
committed, that argument does not fully describe the role in which Officer Boyd
was acting.
This court has recognized that “‘[e]ncounters are initiated by the police for
a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to the desire to
prosecute for crime.’” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir.
1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)); see also id. (stating that
“those aspects of police function that relate to minimizing the likelihood of
disorder . . . are equal in their importance to the police function in identifying
-6-
and punishing wrongdoers”) (quoting 1 ABA S TANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL J USTICE
§ 1-1.1(c), at 18 (2d ed. 1986)). The Supreme Court has deemed these
responsibilities “community caretaking functions” and has observed that they are
“totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 441 (1973).
In some circumstances, a police officer who is exercising these functions
may properly detain a person. King, 990 F.2d at 1561. For example, in King, we
concluded that a police officer’s brief detention of a motorist to advise him of
hazardous conditions created by an accident and to direct him to stop honking his
horn constituted a proper exercise of the community caretaking function
“regardless of whether [the defendant’s] actions violated any traffic laws.” Id.
Like an investigative detention for law enforcement purposes, such a
community caretaking detention must be based upon “‘specific and articulable
facts which . . . reasonably warrant [an] intrusion’ into the individual’s liberty.”
Id. at 1560 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Additionally, the government’s
interest must outweigh the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary
governmental interference. Id. Finally, the detention must last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate its purpose, and its scope must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Once
-7-
the officer has completed the inquiry necessary to satisfy the purpose of the initial
detention, he or she must allow the person to proceed unless the officer has a
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14
F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994).
We acknowledge that some statements in our subsequent cases appear
inconsistent with the application of the community caretaking doctrine in King.
For example, in United States v. Bute , 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994), we
stated that “the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable only in cases involving automobile searches.” We agreed with the
Seventh Circuit that “the plain import from the language of [ Cady ] is that the
Supreme Court did not intend to create a broad exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement to apply whenever the police are acting in an
‘investigative,’ rather than a ‘criminal’ function’” and that “[the Supreme] Court
intended to confine the holding to the automobile exception and to foreclose an
expansive construction of the decision allowing warrantless searches of private
homes or businesses.” Id. (quoting United States v. Pichany , 687 F.2d 204, 209
(7th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, we rejected the government’s argument that the
search of an industrial building based on an officer’s suspicion of burglary and
vandalism was justified under the community caretaking doctrine.
-8-
In several other decisions, we have cited Bute for the proposition that “the
community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is applicable only in
cases involving automobile searches.” See United States v. Maddox , 388 F.3d
1356, 1366 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the government’s argument that the
community caretaking doctrine supported the detention of a defendant who had
reached under the seat of a pick-up truck as he pulled up to a residence where
officers were serving a search warrant), cert. denied , 125 S. Ct. 1689 (2005);
United States v. Thomson , 354 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting the
government’s concession that the community caretaking doctrine was inapplicable
to a case in which officers had responded to reports of the defendant’s threatening
remarks to coworkers and had opened a canvas bag after the defendant stated that
the bag contained a gun). But see Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs , 114 F.3d
1024, 1029 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that police officers properly detained
a citizen pursuant to the community caretaking function when they observed “a
distraught [man] on a public sidewalk in the middle of the night [who] [n]ot only
smell[ed] of alcohol, but . . . was crying and walking down the street with his
hands over his face”).
Nevertheless, for several reasons these statements do not foreclose the
officers’ exercise of the community caretaking function here. First, Bute
involved the search of a building, not, as here, the brief detention of a citizen
-9-
reasonably believed by the officers to be at risk to himself. Additionally, in
Maddox and Thomson , the police officers were acting in their investigative
capacity; there is no indication that in effecting the detentions at issue, they acted
for some purpose “ wholly unrelated to the desire to prosecute for crime.” Terry,
392 U.S. at 13. Moreover, neither Bute nor Maddox nor Thomson cites King , and
our application of the community caretaking doctrine in the earlier case thus
remains the law of the circuit. See Rogers v. United States , 281 F.3d 1108, 1116
(10th Cir. 2002) (observing that “earlier decisions prevail in the case of an
intra-circuit conflict”).
Here, upon review of the record, we conclude that Officer Boyd was
exercising a community caretaking function when he directed Mr. Garner to
return so that the fire department could examine him. Cf. Gallegos , 114 F.3d at
1029 n.4 (concluding that police officers properly detained a citizen pursuant to
the community caretaking function when they observed him on a public sidewalk
in the middle of the night smelling of alcohol, crying, and holding his hands over
his face); United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(concluding that officers properly detained a defendant for his own safety and the
safety of others after observing him standing in the middle of the road at night,
dressed in dark clothes, and apparently intoxicated). Moreover, Officer Boyd’s
directive was based on “specific and articulable facts . . . reasonably warrant[ing]
-10-
that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In particular, Officer Boyd had received a
report of “an man down, said to be unconscious in a half sitting, half slumped
over position for several hours.” Rec. vol. II, at 5. When he arrived at the scene,
Officer Boyd found Mr. Garner, and he thus had reasonable grounds to conclude
that Mr. Garner might be in need of medical assistance.
Officer Boyd also had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Garner may have
violated the criminal law. See Gallegos, 114 F.3d at 1029 n.4 (concluding that
police officers’ “initial stop . . . was valid under both an investigatory and
noninvestigatory rationale”). A Utah statute provides that:
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the
influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any
substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to
a degree that the person may endanger himself or another,
in a public place or in a private place where he
unreasonably disturbs other persons.
U TAH C ODE A NN . § 76-9-701(1). The report of an unconscious man in the field
outside the apartment complex, combined with Officer Boyd’s discovery of Mr.
Garner, provided the officer with grounds to briefly detain him to investigate a
possible public intoxication offense.
We are not persuaded by Mr. Garner’s argument that the anonymity of the
person who called the police invalidates the initial detention. To be sure, as a
general rule, when police officers investigate the possible commission of a crime,
“something more than an anonymous tip of illegal activity is required to provide
-11-
reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.
2002); see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000) (holding that “an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun,” “without more,” did not establish
reasonable suspicion). That “something more” may be corroboration of
information provided by the tip. See id. at 270 (stating that “there are situations
in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop’”)
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)). However, when the only
information corroborated is readily available and does not itself indicate that a
crime has been committed, reasonable suspicion may be lacking. See United
States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[a]lmost
anyone can describe the residents of, and vehicles at, a particular home without
having any special knowledge of what goes on inside the home”).
Nevertheless, the decisions upon which Mr. Garner relies in challenging the
anonymous source are distinguishable. Unlike the anonymous tips in those cases,
the tip here did not assert that Mr. Garner was engaging in some hidden criminal
activity. See e.g., J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (describing the issue as whether “the
tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity”) (emphasis added); cf. 4
W AYNE R. L A F AVE , S EARCH AND S EIZURE § 9.5(h), at 571 (4th ed. 2004) (stating
that “the central issue [in this line of cases] is whether the informant’s
-12-
information is so reliable and complete that it makes past, present, or pending
criminal conduct sufficiently likely to justify a stopping of the designated person
for investigation”). Thus, when the officers personally observed a man in the
field near the apartment complex, they confirmed the key information that they
had received from the anonymous source. Because that source had not purported
to describe any hidden criminal activities, no further investigation was necessary
to adequately corroborate the tip so that Officer Boyd could briefly detain Mr.
Garner.
Similarly, the fact that Officer Boyd could not confirm all the information
offered by the anonymous source (e.g., how long Mr. Garner had been in the field
and whether he had been unconscious) is not dispositive. To establish reasonable
suspicion, not every detail of an anonymous tip must be verified. See White, 496
U.S. at 331.
We further conclude that the government’s interest in community
caretaking outweighed Mr. Garner’s interest in being free from arbitrary
interference. The anonymous source had reported that Mr. Garner had remained
in the field for several hours and appeared unconscious. In light of that
observation, Mr. Garner might well have needed medical assistance, and the
government had a substantial interest in protecting him. See Rideau, 969 F.2d at
1574 (noting that police officers “have long served the public welfare by
-13-
removing intoxicated people from the public streets, where they pose a hazard to
themselves and others”). In contrast, the intrusion upon Mr. Garner’s liberty was
not extensive. Officer Boyd merely told Mr. Garner to return to the spot from
where he had come so that fire department personnel could conduct a brief
physical examination.
Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Boyd’s initial seizure of Mr. Garner
comported with the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Continuing Detention
Mr. Garner also challenges Officer Boyd’s actions after the fire department
personnel completed their medical examination. As we have noted, when Mr.
Garner attempted to walk away for a second time, Officer Boyd told him to sit
back down because the police were not done with him yet. Mr. Garner argues that
the officers had no grounds upon which to continue to detain him.
We disagree. As the fire department examined Mr. Garner, Officer Boyd
had an opportunity to make further observations. He noted that Mr. Garner
appeared “really nervous” and that he was moving his hands in and out of his
pockets. Rec. vol. II, at 8. Moreover, even though the fire department concluded
the examination and apparently found no emergency medical problems, Officer
Boyd had reason to believe that Mr. Garner might still have been intoxicated or
-14-
constituted a danger to himself or others and that Mr. Garner may have violated
the Utah public intoxication statute. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125
(2002) (concluding that even though “the conduct justifying [a] stop was
ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation[,]” the officers could
“detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity”); Rideau, 969 F.2d at 1574-75
(concluding that an apparently intoxicated suspect’s nervous behavior and
backing away from police officers warranted extending the detention).
Moreover, the continuing detention of Mr. Garner was reasonable in scope.
Although Mr. Garner maintains that Officer Boyd’s request for identification was
unduly intrusive, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]n identity request has an
immediate relation to the Terry stop’s purpose, rationale, and practical demands.”
See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 124 S. Ct.
2451, 2459 (2004). Officer Boyd’s asking Mr. Garner his name was thus
reasonable. In light of the information that Mr. Garner had been sitting and lying
in the field for several hours (which suggested that he might be a risk to himself
or others and that he might have violated the Utah public intoxication statute),
Mr. Garner’s continuing nervous behavior, and his moving his hands in and out of
his pockets, the subsequent questioning by Officers Boyd and Ransdell was also
reasonably related to the purposes of the detention.
-15-
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision denying Mr.
Garner’s motion to suppress.
-16-
United States v. Garner
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-07-27
Citations: 416 F.3d 1208
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion