UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1586
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
GARY S. GILBERG,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Selya, Cyr and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Gary C. Crossen, with whom Toni G. Wolfman, Mark D. Rosen, Cindy
M. Lott and Foley, Hoag & Eliot were on brief for appellant.
Wan J. Kim, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Donald K.
Stern, United States Attorney, Mark D. Seltzer, Acting Director, New
England Bank Fraud Task Force, and James P. Gillis, Trial Attorney,
New England Bank Fraud Task Force, were on brief for appellee.
January 31, 1996
CYR, Circuit Judge. Defendant Gary S. Gilberg chal-
CYR, Circuit Judge.
lenges several district court rulings relating to his trial and
sentencing for conspiring to make, and making, false statements
to financial institutions in order to procure mortgage loan
financing, see 18 U.S.C. 371 & 1014. We affirm all but the
restitutionary sentence.
I
I
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
During the 1980s, after borrowing almost $5 million
which he agreed to repay from future condominium sale proceeds,
Gilberg launched Chancery Court, a forty-unit condominium project
in Lynn, Massachusetts. Condominium sales did not proceed apace,
however, and Gilberg decided to lure prospective buyers by
promising to obtain 100% mortgage financing for them, obviating
the need for down payments. To this end, Gilberg would inflate
the purchase price stated on the sales agreement which he submit-
ted to the bank in support of the buyer's mortgage loan applica-
tion. A so-called "amended" sales agreement, containing the true
purchase price, would be retained in Gilberg's private files, and
the buyer was told not to mention the "amendment" to the bank.
On other occasions, Gilberg provided prospective buyers with
second mortgage financing, which he concealed from the first-
mortgage lenders by instructing his attorney not to record the
second mortgages, or to record them late. Gilberg attended each
loan closing, personally signing HUD-1 settlement statements
which he knew to contain false information. These means enabled
2
Gilberg to sell thirty-seven condominium units, which were
financed through various banks.
In August 1993, Gilberg was indicted in one count for
conspiring to make false statements on twenty-one loan applica-
tions to three FDIC-insured financial institutions, see 18 U.S.C.
371, and in thirteen counts for making false statements to
FDIC-insured institutions, see id. 1014. Several condominium
buyers, as well as Gilberg's attorney, testified that Gilberg
originated and orchestrated the scheme. The jury convicted on
all counts and the district court sentenced Gilberg to thirty-six
months' imprisonment and ordered $3,635,000 in restitution.
II
II
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Related Rulings
A. The Trial Related Rulings
1. "Good faith" Jury Instruction
1. "Good faith" Jury Instruction
Gilberg first contends that the final jury instruction
misdefined the mens rea element in 18 U.S.C. 1014, which
criminalizes "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report .
. . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . .
any [FDIC-insured bank] . . . upon any application, advance, . .
. commitment, or loan." (Emphasis added.) Gilberg argues that
section 1014 affords a "good faith" defense where the defendant
knew the statement or report contained false information but
acted without the "bad" purpose to influence the bank's actions.
He proffered evidence that he knew and believed, at the time of
the various loan applications, that the prevailing banking
3
practice was to approve or disapprove applications based solely
on the appraised value of the real property securing the loan,
rather than on whether the real estate sale itself involved price
"discounts" or secondary mortgage financing. Thus, Gilberg
argues, the district court hobbled his defense by instructing the
jury that "a defendant does not act in good faith even if he
honestly holds a particular opinion or belief and, yet, knowingly
makes false and fraudulent statements or misrepresentations."
Gilberg concededly raised no objection to the jury
instruction. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51. Consequently, we review
for plain error, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), and may reverse only
if (i) the final jury instruction constituted error (ii) which
was or should have been "obvious" in the sense that the governing
law was clearly settled to the contrary, and (iii) appellant
proves that the error resulted in "prejudice," or in other words,
that it affected his substantial rights. See United States v.
Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993)). Even if these three
criteria are met, however, we do not "notice the error unless it
caused `a miscarriage of justice' or [seriously] undermined `the
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id.
(citations omitted).
Though the statutory interpretation posited by Gilberg
is dubious at best, cf., e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 919 F.2d
109, 112 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The requisite intent [under 1014] is
the intent to influence an action, and nothing more."), we do not
4
reach the merits. Gilberg cites to no authority let alone to
a controlling United States Supreme Court or First Circuit
decision clearly holding that the "good faith" instruction
given below contained an erroneous statement of the mens rea
requirement under section 1014. See Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777
("At a minimum, the Court of Appeals cannot correct an error
pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current
law.") (emphasis added).1 Hence, any error in the challenged
instruction was neither "obvious," nor cognizable under Criminal
Rule 52(b).
2. Motion in Limine
2. Motion in Limine
Gilberg next assigns error in the district court order
precluding evidence that the defrauded banks had relied exclu-
sively on property appraisals in determining whether to approve
loan applications, and not on the apparent absence of "discounts"
and second mortgage financing. He claims that this ruling
prejudiced him because the excluded evidence would have bolstered
his "good faith" defense. See supra Section II.A.1.2
1Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and Cheek
v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), are inapposite. Even if
Gilberg's interpretation of the "purpose" clause in 1014 were
correct, he cannot seriously contend that the one clear mens rea
element in 1014 "knowingly" communicating false statements
does not criminalize conduct a normal person readily would
recognize as culpable.
2We do not understand Gilberg to argue that the excluded
evidence was relevant to the discredited "complicity" defense,
namely, that any bank officials' knowing participation in the
scheme would exonerate Gilberg under 1014. See United States
v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting complic-
ity defense, and noting that the "[t]he savings and loan's
awareness of the fraud is not relevant, for its existence is not
5
Once again we review for plain error, since Gilberg
first raised this claim on appeal. See Hurley, 63 F.3d at 9. As
there was no plain error in rejecting the "good faith" defense
instruction, a fortiori there can have been no plain error in
excluding evidence offered in support. Furthermore, given
Gilberg's concession that a representative sampling of this "good
faith" evidence was admitted at trial, he has failed to demon-
strate "prejudice." Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1778 (noting that,
unlike Rule 52(a), Rule 52(b) provides that "the defendant rather
than the Government . . . bears the burden of persuasion with
respect to prejudice") (emphasis added).
B. The Sentencing Rulings
B. The Sentencing Rulings
1. Amount of Loss (U.S.S.G. 2F1.1)
1. Amount of Loss (U.S.S.G. 2F1.1)
Gilberg contends that the district court committed
three errors in calculating the amount of loss under the then-
applicable version of U.S.S.G. 2F1.1, and that the combined
effect of its miscalculations ballooned the total loss from $1-2
million to the $2-5 million range, which in turn led the court to
make a ten-level (rather than a nine-level) upward adjustment in
inconsistent with the intent to influence which a violator of
1014 must possess"). Nor do we understand Gilberg to argue for
the similarly discredited "lack of reliance" defense, namely,
that his purpose to influence was immaterial because the banks
did not, in the end, actually rely on his false statements in
approving the loan applications. See United States v. Norberg,
612 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) (expressly rejecting such a de-
fense).
6
his base offense level of six.3
First, Gilberg argues that the loss calculation should
not have included $726,637 in accrued mortgage loan interest.
See U.S.S.G. 2F1.1, comment. (n.7) (excluding from the loss
calculation the "interest the victim could have earned"); United
States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 1994). But the
settled law in this circuit is to the contrary. See United
States v. Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that accrued finance charges on credit cards are not lost "oppor-
tunity costs," and may be included in amount of loss) (citing
United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 471 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Gilberg's attempt to distinguish Goodchild is unavailing. As the
Goodchild panel's citation to Lowder and other authority makes
clear, we have found no principled difference between interest
earned on a credit card (a/k/a "finance charges") and interest
earned on other types of loans. See Hurley, 63 F.3d at 9 (noting
that newly-constituted panels are bound by a prior panel decision
on point). Since it was proper to include the $726,637 in
interest as part of the loss, the other loss calculation errors
raised on appeal need not be addressed because the unimpeachable
loss totalled no less than $2,669,065, well within the $2-5
million range necessary to trigger a ten-level upward adjustment.
3Although normally a loss determination under U.S.S.G.
2F1.1 is fact-based and subject to clear error review, see United
States v. Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 1994), Gilberg
challenges the district court's interpretation of a sentencing
guideline. Therefore, review is de novo. See id.; see also
United States v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 221 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1322 (1995).
7
2. The "Role in Offense" Enhancement
2. The "Role in Offense" Enhancement
Gilberg challenges the four-level upward adjustment
based on his role in the offense, see U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, contend-
ing that the government improperly singled him out for prosecu-
tion by cutting deals with the real "leaders" of the Chancery
Court scheme his attorney and a business partner. Second, he
complains that the district court failed to make express findings
of fact regarding the comparative responsibilities of the partic-
ipants in the scheme. We review for "clear error," see United
States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 1991), mindful
that "battles over a defendant's [role in the offense] . . . will
almost always be won or lost in the district court," United
States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1995). Gilberg's
case is no exception.
Gilberg concedes that the evidence could support a
rational inference that he orchestrated the criminal conduct
alleged in the indictment. The evidence disclosed that he was a
sophisticated real estate developer who supplied false purchase
prices to his attorney, instructed his attorney and prospective
buyers to conceal his false statements, and secreted the documen-
tation containing the actual terms. Gilberg cites no authority
nor is there any for the proposition that a sentencing
court must compare the responsibilities of all participants
before imposing a U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 enhancement against a defen-
dant. Moreover, in crediting the evidence that Gilberg played
8
the pivotal role in the initial success of the Chancery Court
scheme, the district court implicitly found that Gilberg was an
"organizer," regardless of the precise roles played by each
cohort. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, comment. (n.4) (noting that an
offense may involve "more than one person who qualifies as a
leader or organizer"); United States v. Tejeda-Beltran, 50 F.3d
105, 111-13 (1st Cir. 1995) ("We hold that retention of control
over other participants, although sometimes relevant to an
inquiry into the status of a putative organizer, is not an
essential attribute of organizer status."); cf. U.S.S.G. 3B1.1,
comment. (n.2) (authorizing upward departure for "management
responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a
criminal organization," even though defendant neither led nor
supervised any other participant). 3. The Victim and Wit-
3. The Victim and Wit-
ness Protection Act
ness Protection Act
Finally, Gilberg claims that the restitutionary sen-
tence overstates victim loss because the class of "victims" is
too broad. He points out that the sentencing court ordered
restitution in connection with all thirty-one loans, whereas the
indictment charged him in relation to only twenty-one loans.
The government concedes that the last criminal conduct
involving Gilberg took place no later than June 1990. The Victim
and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. 3663-3664
(1990), governs restitution in criminal cases. See, e.g., United
States v. DeSalvo, 41 F.3d 505, 511 (9th Cir. 1994). In June
1990, the VWPA provided that the district court in sentencing
9
"a defendant convicted of an offense" may order "restitution
to any victim of such offense." 18 U.S.C. 3579(a)(1)(1982)
(emphasis added); see 18 U.S.C. 3579-3780 (1987), amended by
18 U.S.C. 3663-3664 (1990). In Hughey v. United States, 495
U.S. 411 (1990), the defendant had been charged, in multiple
counts, with theft and unauthorized use of credit cards, offenses
which caused victim losses totaling $90,431. Although Hughey
pled guilty to but one count of unauthorized use of a single
credit card, which caused $10,412 in victim loss, id. at 414, the
district court ordered $90,431 in restitution. Reversing, the
Supreme Court held that "the language and structure of the [VWPA]
make plain Congress' intent to authorize an award of restitution
only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the
basis of the offense of conviction." Id. at 413, 422 n.5.
Effective November 29, 1990, Congress broadened the
VWPA definition of "victim," see Pub. L. No. 101-647, 2509, 104
Stat. 4789, 4863, 4931 (Nov. 29, 1990) (Crime Control Act of
1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(2)), thereby effectively
overruling Hughey in part. Section 3663(a)(2) now provides that
"a victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity means any person
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course
of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(2)
(emphasis added). See generally United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d
1190, 1200 (1st Cir. 1994).
The district court ordered Gilberg to make restitution
10
to banks other than the three FDIC-insured banks involved in the
twenty-one insured loans which formed the entire basis for the
conspiracy and the substantive counts upon which Gilberg was
convicted. The parties agree that, under the 1987 version of the
VWPA as interpreted in Hughey, the restitution order imposed on
Gilberg would be improper, and that "approximately $2 million"
would be the maximum permissible "victim loss" calculation.
The government nonetheless contends that the district
court order complies with the 1990 VWPA. See Hughey, 495 U.S. at
413 n.1 (normally, the VWPA version in effect at sentencing
controls). Gilberg responds that such a retroactive application
of section 3663(a)(2) to his pre-November 1990 criminal conduct
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, 9,
cl. 3. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430-31 (1987); see
also United States v. Newman, 49 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1995);
United States v. Cronin, 990 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1993).
Normally, we review restitution orders only for "abuse
of discretion." See United States v. Benjamin, 30 F.3d 196, 198
(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 617 (1st
Cir. 1993). Although a timely challenge to a retroactive appli-
cation of the 1990 VWPA amendments would present a question of
law subject to plenary review, see, e.g., United States v.
Guthrie, 64 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995); DeSalvo, 41 F.3d at
511; United States v. Meacham, 27 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1994),
Gilberg concedes that he did not object at sentencing. Accord-
ingly, we review only for plain error. See United States v.
11
Tutiven, 40 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1391 (1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 938 F.2d 319, 321 (1st
Cir. 1991). As the Rule 52(b) "plain error" test announced in
Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1776-79, applies to sentencing errors, see
Benjamin, 30 F.3d at 197; supra Section II.A.1, we apply the
Olano "plain error" criteria to the forfeited "victim loss"
calculation claim asserted by Gilberg on appeal.4
a) "Error"
a) "Error"
The first Olano criterion that there be "error,"
Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777 is readily met here. Retroactive
application of VWPA 3663(a)(2) would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause, since it would "make[] more burdensome the punishment for
[Gilberg's] crime[s], after [their] commission . . . ." Dobbert
v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 585 (1st Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 58 (1992). As an order of restitution
is part of the criminal sentence, we reject the suggestion that
the November 1990 VWPA amendments may be applied against Gilberg.
See, e.g., United States v. Jewett, 978 F.2d 248, 252-53 (6th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting retroactivity argument); see also United
States v. Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 1995) (same);
DeSalvo, 41 F.3d at 515 (same).
4Given the concession by the government that application of
Hughey would result in a $1.6 million reduction in the restitu-
tion order, we conclude that Gilberg has shouldered his burden on
the third Olano factor "prejudice." See supra Section II.A.1.
We therefore confine our "plain error" analysis to the three
remaining Olano factors (i.e., error, "obviousness," and "mani-
fest miscarriage of justice").
12
b) Obviousness of Error
b) Obviousness of Error
The government argues that retroactive application of
the 1990 VWPA amendments would not constitute "obvious" error,
see Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777, because this court had yet to
weigh in on the retroactivity question by the time Gilberg was
sentenced, and other courts of appeals were divided. Compare
Jewett, 978 F.2d at 252-53, with United States v. Rice, 954 F.2d
40 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Arnold, 947 F.2d 1236 (5th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam). We disagree.
The Rice and Arnold cases are factually and legally
inapposite to the present context. The retroactivity issue in
Rice ultimately turned on a different 1990 VWPA amendment not
implicated in our case which provided that "[t]he court may
also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed
to by the parties in a plea agreement." 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(3)
(emphasis added). The plea agreement in Rice expressly provided
for restitution both to victims of the dismissed counts and
victims of uncharged criminal conduct, Rice, 954 F.2d at 41-42,
and the plea predated both the 1990 VWPA amendments and Hughey.
Thus, settled Second Circuit precedent supported the expansive
victim loss calculation agreed to by Rice. Id. at 44. The
Second Circuit rejected Rice's ex post facto argument because (1)
Rice must have relied on the more onerous Second Circuit case
law, rather than on Hughey, when he agreed to the broad restitu-
tion commitment adopted in the plea agreement; and (2) section
3663(a)(3) did not retroactively "enhance the punishment for an
13
offense" but "merely provided that a specified type of plea
agreement could be enforced from that point on." Id.
The Fifth Circuit employed the same analysis in Arnold,
947 F.2d at 1238 n.2, noting that section 3663(a)(3) was not
retroactive but "applied prospectively to validate Arnold's
[earlier] plea agreement." The government cites no apposite
circuit court authority holding that section 3663(a)(2) applies
retroactively to pre-November 1990 criminal conduct.
As the government correctly notes, we have yet to
address this precise question. In Cronin, 990 F.2d at 663, the
government did not contend that section 3663(a)(2) should be
applied retroactively to pre-November 1990 conduct, urging
instead that Hughey is distinguishable from cases involving
convictions for "offense[s]" like mail fraud which require,
as an essential element, proof of a broader "scheme to defraud."
See id. at 666; see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1341. Given the
inherent breadth of the "offense" of conviction in Cronin, the
government argued that VWPA restitution was not limited to losses
caused by the particular mailings designated in the individual
counts upon which the defendant was convicted, but included all
victim losses occasioned by the larger fraud "scheme." Noting a
circuit split on the issue, we sided with the majority rule, and
concluded that Hughey barred the broader restitution order.
Cronin, 990 F.2d at 666; see also Newman, 49 F.3d at 11 (applying
Cronin pronouncement to wire fraud conviction).
The implicit concessions of nonretroactivity in Cronin
14
and Newman apparently stemmed from the government's acknowl-
edgement that retroactive application of section 3663(a)(2) would
have had no colorable basis in the decisional law construing the
Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 11 n.14 (noting that, "[a]s the
offenses occurred in 1989 and early 1990, Newman is subject to
the restitution statute as it stood prior to amendment in Novem-
ber of 1990"). Further, had this court been satisfied that the
1990 VWPA amendments were readily amenable to retroactive appli-
cation in Cronin and Newman, we could have affirmed those restit-
utionary sentences on that alternative ground. See United States
v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1008 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1995) (No. 95-619) (appel-
late court may affirm district court on any ground supported by
record); cf. also Jewett, 978 F.2d at 252 (finding that Hughey
precluded broad restitution order, before addressing VWPA retro-
activity question, even though the latter issue had not been
addressed by parties). Based on the clear language of the 1987
VWPA and the unanimous circuit precedents rejecting the govern-
ment's retroactivity claim, see supra Section II.B.3.a, we hold
that the error in this case satisfied the "obviousness" test
announced in Olano.5 See United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 24
5It is noteworthy that the Olano Court explicitly reserved
decision on whether an error that becomes clear after trial, but
prior to review by the court of appeals, may be considered
"obvious." Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777. ("At a minimum, the Court
of Appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless
the error is obvious under current law."). As in Olano, we need
not resolve this question because we have found, given the
unanimous case law, that it was already "obvious" at the time of
sentencing that Gilberg should not be held responsible under the
15
n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that a circuit split may rule out a
finding that forfeited error was "obvious," even if First Circuit
has not weighed in on issue).
c) "Miscarriage of Justice"
c) "Miscarriage of Justice"
Although Olano entrusts remediation of plain error to
the sound discretion of the reviewing court, the courts of
appeals "should not" exercise their discretion unless a forfeited
error results in "`a miscarriage of justice,' or "`seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judi-
cial proceedings.'" Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1776 (citations omit-
ted).
In all events, the VWPA expressly limits restitutionary
relief to "victims of [the] offense [of conviction]." 18 U.S.C.
3662(a)(1) (emphasis added). A federal court has no inherent
authority to order restitution in a criminal case; it may do so
only as expressly provided by statute. DeSalvo, 41 F.3d at 511.
We have noted that when the district court fundamentally departs
from "obvious" sentencing principles, "the situation corresponds
mutatis mutandis to one in which a forfeited error may have
caused the conviction of an innocent person, the other rubric
under which a plain and prejudicial error should be noticed on
appeal." United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1312 (1st Cir.)
(citing Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1779) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 378 (1994). Given the particular circum-
1987 VWPA for losses occasioned victims of offenses with which he
was not charged, nor held retroactively responsible under the
1990 VWPA amendments. See supra Section II.B.3(a), (b).
16
stances of this case, and the substantial $1.6 million reduction
in restitution portended by Hughey's application, we find plain
error warranting vacatur of the restitutionary sentence in this
case.6 The restitution award is reduced to $2,107,406.00,
comprising the total estimated loss on the twenty-one mortgage
loans designated in the indictment.7
The sentence is modified to require restitution in the
amount of $2,107,406. The district court judgment is affirmed,
as modified.
6Gilberg's remaining challenges to the restitution order do
not meet the "plain error" standard. First, he argues that the
district court erroneously assessed the loss occasioned the
lenders by using the price the lender received on resale follow-
ing foreclosure, rather than the foreclosure price bid by the
lender. This issue has not yet been addressed in the First
Circuit. The circuit court decisions cited by Gilberg are
inapposite, simply holding that the sentencing court should be
wary of basing restitution on the resale price where the lender
acquired real estate at foreclosure but does not resell for
years. See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902, 914 (5th
Cir. 1994) (six years). Here, however, there is no evidence that
Gilberg's victims held the property for such extended periods
following foreclosure. Consequently, any error in the victim
loss calculation, or the standard employed, has not been shown to
be "obvious."
Second, Gilberg contends that the district court failed to
make explicit findings on his ability to pay restitution. See 18
U.S.C. 3664(a). Nevertheless, we have held that such findings
need not be explicit. See Newman, 49 F.3d at 10 (citing Savoie,
985 F.2d at 618). Moreover, the district court supportably found
that Gilberg's earning potential would enable him to meet his
considerable restitutionary obligations in the future. Id. at
10-11.
7Since loss calculations under U.S.S.G. 2F1.1 are based on
criteria different from the VWPA victim loss criteria, see, e.g.,
id. 2B1.3 (providing that "relevant conduct," for guideline
sentencing purposes, may encompass conduct not charged in indict-
ment, and conduct underlying the counts upon which defendant was
acquitted), the reduction in Gilberg's restitutionary sentence
requires no readjustment in the offense level. See supra Section
II.B.1.
17