United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 96-2280

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

MANUEL GONZALEZ-GONZALEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.

Laura H. Parsky, Trial Attorney, with whom John C. Keeney, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, and Theresa M.B. Van Vliet, Chief of the

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section, Department of Justice, were on
brief, for appellee.
Lawrence E. Besser for appellant.

Manuel Gonzalez-Gonzalez on brief pro se.

February 5, 1998

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Manuel Gonzalez-Gonzalez was
LYNCH, Circuit Judge

convicted of a major drug smuggling and money laundering

conspiracy based in Puerto Rico. Gonzalez' defense at trial

was that such a conspiracy did exist, but that he was not

part of it. Gonzalez now argues through counsel that an

admittedly improper definition of reasonable doubt argued by

the prosecutor in closing requires a new trial, as does a

jury instruction on the effect of a guilty plea by a co-

defendant. Gonzalez also filed a brief pro se, arguing that

the district court erred for other reasons in denying his

motion for a new trial. We affirm.

I.

Gonzalez was charged on November 2, 1994 with

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and

marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana,

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, importation of

marijuana and cocaine, and aiding and abetting in the

laundering of monetary instruments. After a nineteen-day

trial, the jury found Gonzalez guilty as charged. Gonzalez

was sentenced on September 20, 1996 to life imprisonment and

was fined.

Because this appeal involves admittedly improper

remarks by the prosecutor, and because the verdict could have

been tainted by these remarks, we do not consider the facts

in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Our

description of the facts is "designed to provide a balanced

picture of the evidence appropriate for determining whether

the remarks were harmless or prejudicial." United States v.

Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 755 (1st Cir. 1994). See Arrieta-

Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1993).

Several witnesses testified that they belonged to

Gonzalez' drug smuggling and money laundering operation.

This extensive testimonial evidence was corroborated by tape

recorded conversations, surveillance photographs, passport

entries, travel records, and telephone records. Ricardo

Rivero ("Rivero") testified that Gonzalez recruited him to

retrieve and repackage 900 pounds of marijuana imported from

Colombia in 1991. Rivero testified that Gonzalez stored

cocaine and marijuana at a house belonging to Manuel Garrido,

which other witnesses, a co-defendant and an FBI agent,

subsequently confirmed.

Gonzalez transported 125 kilograms of cocaine from

Puerto Rico to New York for distribution with help from

Rivero. Gonzalez also hired Roberto Garraton-Rivera and

Alberto Maysonet to transport cocaine. Garraton testified

that Gonzalez came to his house to deliver cocaine to

Maysonet. Garraton and Maysonet traveled to New York in

August of 1991 to deliver cocaine to Gonzalez. While in New

York, Gonzalez instructed Ricardo on how to distribute the

cocaine and resolved a dispute over payment for the drugs.

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After the success of this deal, Gonzalez purchased several

cars before returning to Puerto Rico.

Witnesses described other drug transactions in

1992. Co-defendant Luz Marina-Giraldo testified that she

helped Gonzalez import 6,500 pounds of marijuana into Puerto

Rico. Gonzalez stored the marijuana at a stash house and

sold it in Puerto Rico. Rivero also testified about that

marijuana shipment. According to Rivero, Gonzalez supervised

the unloading and transportation of the marijuana.

Both Rivero and Marina-Giraldo testified that

Gonzalez was involved in transporting 300 kilograms of

cocaine from St. Martin to Puerto Rico in 1992. These

witnesses also testified about a major shipment of cocaine

and marijuana Gonzalez had imported from Colombia to Puerto

Rico in September of 1992. Part of this shipment was seized

by the police.

Several witnesses testified that they helped

Gonzalez' cousin, Augustin Rivero ("Augustin"), import 625

kilograms of cocaine in November of 1992. Ricardo Rivero

testified that Gonzalez supplied a motor for a boat to help

bring in the shipment. Roberto Sierra-Rivera, a paid

informant, testified that Gonzalez provided surveillance for

this shipment, which was later sold in Puerto Rico and New

York. Sierra-Rivera testified that Gonzalez and Augustin

agreed that each time one of them brought in a load of

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cocaine, the other would be given 10 kilograms of cocaine or

$100,000. There was also testimony about later cocaine

smuggling operations conducted by Gonzalez' cousin Augustin.

Angel Santiago-Mora, a cooperating witness, and

Martin Suarez, an FBI agent, testified that Gonzalez and his

associates often delivered money to them to be laundered. On

several separate occasions Gonzalez delivered hundreds of

thousands of dollars to them. Other people closely connected

to Gonzalez also delivered substantial sums of money to be

laundered.

The government also presented tape recordings of

conversations between Gonzalez and his associates in which

Gonzalez admitted his involvement in drug smuggling and

distribution. This evidence was supplemented by tapes of

Gonzalez' associates referring to Gonzalez' involvement in

drug trafficking.

Gonzalez testified and denied it all.

II.

Gonzalez argues that he was deprived of his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial because in the prosecutor's

closing argument the prosecutor said:

[Y]ou heard [defense counsel] say at the end
of his argument, that there was reasonable
doubt as to whether he was or was not and I
am going to tell you something, you will
listen to the instructions from the judge as
to what reasonable doubt is -- it is
something very simple. If in your mind you
think that he was a member of the

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organization, and in your heart, you feel
that he was a member of the organization,
then he was a member of the organization, and
you say so with your verdict. Don't let
yourselves be confused by the definition of
reasonable doubt.

The government appropriately concedes that the prosecutor's

remarks incorrectly defined reasonable doubt. Because there

was no objection to these remarks (which the defendant

concedes), we apply a plain error standard of review. See

United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 237 (1st Cir.

1997); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972-73 (1st Cir.

1995). The "decision to correct the forfeited error [is]

within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the

court should not exercise that discretion unless the error

'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings.'" United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting United States v.

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).

Gonzalez relies on a series of cases holding that

jury instructions which misstate the reasonable doubt

standard require a new trial. He argues that the

prosecutor's comments on reasonable doubt are the "functional

equivalent" of jury instructions, especially since the

prosecutor followed his incorrect definition with a statement

that the jury should not be confused by the definition of

reasonable doubt. Gonzalez argues that the prosecutor

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essentially told the jury to ignore the judge's instructions

on reasonable doubt and to follow his "mind and heart" test

instead. We start with the latter contention.

The remark, "Don't let yourselves be confused by

the definition of reasonable doubt" is ambiguous, and could

have at least three meanings. It could mean "Don't be

confused by the definition that I, the prosecutor, have just

told you." It could mean, "Don't be confused by the

definition you hear from either lawyer." And it could mean,

"Don't be confused by the definition you hear from the

judge," with the implication that the prosecutor's definition

governs.

In context, the third meaning is by far the least

likely of the three.1 The prosecutor prefaced his remarks by

telling the jury to listen to the judge's instructions, and

his statement that the jury should not be confused by the

definition of reasonable doubt is subject to benign

interpretation. Furthermore, the prosecutor concluded his

argument by stating, "You will listen to the instructions of

1 We note but need not resort to the rule that when a
prosecutor's comments are ambiguous, and there is no
contemporaneous objection, the ambiguity is construed in favor of
a proper meaning. See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 979 ("[W]hen the target

of the comments does not interrupt and register a timely
objection, it seems especially appropriate to 'give the arguer
the benefit of every plausible interpretation of her words.' . .
. Given the absence of a contemporaneous objection, we must cede
to the government the benefit of a legitimate, plausible
interpretation of the prosecutor's words.") (quoting United

States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1187 (1st Cir. 1993)).

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the Honorable Judge, as he explains them to you, you will

decide what the facts in this case were [and] you will apply

the law . . . ." The prosecutor's own comments went a long

way toward curing any understanding of the comment as an

admonition to ignore the court's instruction.

The problem with the prosecutor's error was

obviated by the court's instructions on reasonable doubt,

which Gonzalez concedes were correct, as well as the court's

admonition to the jurors that instructions on the law come

only from the court, and not from counsel.

We flatly reject Gonzalez' argument that a

misstatement of the law by a prosecutor should be treated the

same way as a misstatement of law by the judge. No juror

would mistake a prosecutor for a judge. Our law assumes that

the jurors follow jury instructions and thus that they

followed the judge's, not counsel's, definition of reasonable

doubt. See United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993, 999

(1st Cir. 1995) ("[O]ur system of trial by jury is premised

on the assumption that jurors will scrupulously follow the

court's instructions."); Refuse & Envtl. Sys., Inc. v.

Industrial Serv. of Am., Inc., 932 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir.

1991) ("A basic premise of our jury system is that the jury

follows the court's instructions."). That assumption is

especially so here, since the prosecutor also told the jury

to listen to the judge.

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Whether the prosecutor's remarks amount to plain

error warranting a new trial depends on analysis of several

factors: "(1) the extent to which the conduct is recurrent

and/or deliberate; (2) the extent to which the trial judge's

instructions insulated the jury against, or palliated, the

possibility of unfair prejudice; and (3) the overall strength

of the prosecution's case, with particular regard to the

likelihood that any prejudice might have affected the jury's

judgment." Taylor, 54 F.3d at 977.

We make no determination on the first of the Taylor

factors. We do note a long history of improper statements in

closing argument from federal prosecutors in Puerto Rico.

See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Carmona, 111 F.3d 122,

1997 WL 157738, at *4 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.

Fernandez, 94 F.3d 640, 1996 WL 469009, at *17 (1st Cir.

1996); United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706,

713 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d

1002, 1009 (1st Cir. 1995); Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 527

(citing cases); United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoita, 996 F.2d

436, 441 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We do not understand, however, why

after numerous warnings from this court, the prosecuting

attorneys in the District of Puerto Rico persist in spiking

their arguments with comments that put their cases at risk.")

(collecting cases). In light of this history, the government

gains no advantage under the first factor.

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As to the second factor, we are persuaded the jury

was not led astray. That is because of the court's

concededly correct jury instructions on reasonable doubt and

the direction to disregard statements about the law from

counsel. As to the third factor, the government had a very

strong case against Gonzalez. Given these considerations, we

do not think the jury's judgment was affected and a new trial

is not warranted. Cf. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d at 1008 (holding

that several "obviously improper" prosecutorial comments did

not warrant a new trial).

III.

In his counselled appeal, Gonzalez says the

district court committed error in its jury instructions

regarding the guilty plea of co-defendant Luz Marina-

Giraldo.2 Specifically, Gonzalez argues that the court's

2 Before Marina-Giraldo testified as a witness, the court
instructed the jury:
[T]he government must establish each case
against each defendant separately. Now, the
fact that this co-defendant is going to
testify, you are going to hear from her that
she did enter a plea of guilty and now she is
testifying for the government. Now the fact
that a co-defendant has entered a plea of
guilty to the offense charged, that fact
also, the entering of a plea of guilty in and
of itself is not evidence of any guilt of any
other of the co-defendants. I repeat that.
The fact that a co-defendant has entered a
plea of guilty to the offense charged is not
evidence in and of itself of the guilt of any
other co-defendant and I cannot emphasize
that enough.

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statement that his co-defendant's guilty plea is not "in and

of itself" proof of Gonzalez' guilt implies that the plea

could be considered as evidence of guilt in conjunction with

other evidence in the case. There was no objection to these

instructions, so we apply the plain error standard of review

(which Gonzalez concedes). See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 976;

United States v. Colon-Pagan, 1 F.3d 80, 81 (1st Cir. 1993).

The phrase "in and of itself," in isolation, could

be understood to mean what Gonzalez posits: that standing

alone, the guilty plea of a co-defendant could not be

evidence of guilt of the defendant, but, in combination with

such other evidence, the plea could be taken as evidence of

the defendant's guilt. That is, of course, not the law, nor,

we are sure, was that the trial judge's intended meaning when

he gave the instructions.

The guilty plea of Luz Marina-Giraldo may
not be regarded by you as substantive
evidence of the other defendant's guilt nor
may you draw any inference of guilt as to the
remaining co-defendants. The fact that she
pled is what I am talking about, that cannot
be used as evidence against the other
defendants nor may you draw any inference
from the fact that she pled guilty. . . .
[W]hat you cannot consider is the fact that
she has entered a plea of guilty, that fact
cannot be considered. It is not evidence
against the other defendants and affords no
inference or suggestion of guilt as to the
other defendants.

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The trial judge may have relied on dicta in United

States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1083 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S.

832 (1989). In describing the events at the trial, this

court's opinion referred to the following language given by

the trial judge as a "standard accomplice" instruction: "the

fact that an accomplice has entered a plea of guilty to the

offense charged is not evidence in and of itself of the guilt

of any other person." The language of the instruction itself

was not at issue in Rivera-Santiago3 and this Court has not

ruled on the propriety of such language in an accomplice

instruction. We do so now and discourage the use of such "in

and of itself" language. There is no need for such language,

as the pattern jury instructions from other jurisdictions

make evident.4

3 The Fifth Circuit also described a similar "in and of
itself" accomplice instruction in United States v. Abravaya, 616

F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1980). The new District Court Criminal Law
Pattern Jury Instructions for this circuit do not address guilty
pleas by accomplices or co-defendants.

4 The pattern instructions of other circuits are more
straightforward and do not contain "in and of itself" language.
For example, Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction 7.08 reads as
follows:
(3) The fact that has pleaded
guilty to a crime is not evidence that the
defendant is guilty, and you cannot consider

this against the defendant in any way.

The Seventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction 3.23 reads:
The witness, , has pleaded guilty to
a crime arising out of the same occurrence
for which the defendant is now on trial. You
may give his testimony such weight as you

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Despite the potentially misleading nature of the

"in and of itself" language, a new trial is not warranted

here. The district court instructions, taken as a whole,

repeatedly and unequivocally told the jury not to consider

the co-defendant's guilty plea as evidence of the defendant's

guilt.5

feel it deserves, keeping in mind that it
must be considered with caution and great
care. Moreover, his guilty plea is not to be

considered as evidence against the defendant.

Pattern jury instruction 2.19 from the Eighth Circuit states:
You have heard evidence that witness (name)
has pleaded guilty to a crime which arose out
of the same events for which the defendant is
on trial here. You must not consider that

guilty plea as any evidence of this

defendant's guilt. You may consider that

witness' guilty plea only for the purpose of
determining how much, if at all, to rely upon
that witness' testimony.
Finally, Ninth Circuit pattern instruction 4.12 reads:
The witness, , has pleaded guilty to
a crime arising out of the same events for
which the defendant is on trial. This guilty

plea is not evidence against the defendant

and you may consider it only in determining

this witness' believability. You should

consider this witness' testimony with great

caution, giving it the weight you feel it

deserves.

5 The court also instructed the jury:
Now, the case against Luz Marina-Giraldo
has been disposed of and will no longer be
before you. It is very important that you
realize that you cannot guess or concern
yourselves or speculate as to the reason for
the disposition of her case. The disposition
cannot and should not influence your verdict
with reference to the remaining defendants
that are on trial here.

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We examine jury instructions in the context of the

charge as a whole to determine whether the court's

If you recall, I think I advised you on the
first day that each defendant, although being
tried together, has a right to have the jury
consider his case separately of the other
defendants and considering the evidence that
applies or that is admitted as to that
defendant specifically. . . . [A]lthough [the
defendants] are being tried together, you
must give separate consideration to each
defendant. . . . I repeat that you cannot and
you must not consider the fact that Luz
Marina-Giraldo is not here again and it
should not enter into your deliberations. . .
. [The disposition of her case] should not
enter whatsoever in your deliberations as to
the other two defendants.

In its final instructions to the jury, the court
said:
[D]uring the course of the trial, I
instructed you that the case against Luz
Marina-Giraldo . . . [had] been disposed of,
and was no longer before you. And the
disposition of the case[] . . . should not
influence your verdict with reference to . .
. Gonzalez and you must base your verdict
solely on the evidence against Mr. Gonzalez-
Gonzalez. In other words, the government
must establish its case against Mr. Gonzalez
separately of the disposition of the cases
against the other two defendants.
And I also instructed you, the fact that
co-defendant Luz Marina-Giraldo entered a
plea of guilty to the offense charged is not
evidence in and of itself of the guilt of the
defendant here on trial and I cannot
emphasize this enough. The guilty plea of
Luz Marina-Giraldo may not be regarded by you
as substantive evidence of the guilt [of] Mr.
Gonzalez-Gonzalez. Nonetheless, you may give
her testimony such weight as you think it
deserves, keeping in mind that it must be
considered with caution and great care.

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instructions require a new trial. See United States v. Rose,

104 F.3d 1408, 1416 (1st Cir. 1997). When we take this

context into account, it is apparent that the court's

instructions in this case do not warrant a new trial. We

also reject Gonzalez' claim that the synergistic effect of

two errors requires a new trial.

IV.

In his pro se brief, Gonzalez argues that the

district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.6

The motion based the request for a new trial on claimed newly

discovered evidence and claimed prosecutorial misconduct,

including presentation of false testimony.7

We review a trial judge's ruling on a motion for a

new trial for manifest abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Brimage, 115 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1997). "The

remedy of a new trial is rarely used; it is warranted 'only

where there would be a miscarriage of justice' or 'where the

evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.'" United

States v. Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting

6 After oral argument in this case, Gonzalez filed a letter
with this court, which we accepted as a supplemental brief,
raising issues in addition to those raised by his able counsel.
We requested the government to file a responsive brief, which it
has done. We reach the merits of Gonzalez' pro se appeal.

7 Gonzalez also complains of a factual error concerning
whether the name "Lin" appeared on any of the drug packages from
Loiza beach, an error contained in the transcript. At oral
argument before us, the government conceded this factual error,
saying the name did not appear.

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United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 386 (1st Cir.

1979)). See United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060

(1st Cir. 1997). In a motion for a new trial based upon

newly discovered evidence, the defendant must establish that

"the evidence was: (i) unknown or unavailable at the time of

trial, (ii) despite due diligence, (iii) material, and (iv)

likely to result in an acquittal upon retrial." United

States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 971 (1st Cir. 1995). But

Gonzalez' complaints are largely about what happened at trial

and were not newly discovered.

The district court gave a careful explanation of

its denial of Gonzalez' motion, and we affirm for the reasons

stated in the court's Memorandum and Order dated December 3,

1996. We add only that the "new evidence" Gonzalez presents

does not come close to "so undermin[ing] the government's

case as to give rise to a 'reasonable' probability of

acquittal on retrial." Tibolt, 72 F.3d at 972 (quoting

Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1220)).

The judgment is affirmed.

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