UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Tenth Circuit
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294
(303) 844-3157
Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk
November 24, 1998
TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE OPINION
RE: 98-1022, United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya
Filed on November 23, 1998
The court’s slip opinion filed on November 23, 1998, contains a clerical error
on the cover page. Please replace your copy of page one of the opinion with the
attached corrected page.
Sincerely,
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By: Keith Nelson
Deputy Clerk
encl.
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
NOV 23 1998
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-1022
VICTOR HUGO GONZALEZ-
MONTOYA,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 97-CR-208-N)
Stephen M. Wheeler, Stephen M. Wheeler, P.C., Evergreen, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant.
John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney (Henry L. Solano, United
States Attorney, and James R. Boma, Assistant United States Attorney, with him
on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TACHA, BRORBY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Victor Hugo Gonzalez-Montoya appeals from his
sentence for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1) and 846. He contends that (1) insufficient
evidence supported the admission of hearsay statements by an alleged co-
conspirator; (2) the district court improperly denied his motion for mistrial after it
was discovered that the government had withheld material impeachment evidence
in violation of the disclosure requirements of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972); (3) the government’s misstatement of the deliberate ignorance jury
instruction during its closing argument and the court’s decision not to give a
curative instruction constituted reversible error; and (4) the district court should
have granted him a sentence reduction under the “safety valve” provision of the
sentencing guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c), and we affirm.
Background
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya and codefendant Roberto Bonillo-Esqueda were
indicted for participation in a conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of
methamphetamine on or about May 29, 1997. Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda negotiated a
plea agreement, in which he agreed to testify against Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya. The
grand jury then returned a three-count superseding indictment against Mr.
Gonzalez-Montoya. In the superseding indictment, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya was
first charged conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, methamphetamine
(count one); and two substantive counts of possession, with intent to distribute,
methamphetamine (counts two and three). The jury convicted him counts one and
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three and acquitted him of count two. This appeal followed.
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s appeal arises from four distinct incidents during
trial and sentencing. The first incident involves the court’s admission of hearsay
testimony by Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda. At trial, Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda named Mr.
Gonzalez-Montoya as the source of methamphetamine for a transaction between
Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda and “Jose,” a government informant, on May 27, 1997. Mr.
Bonillo-Esqueda testified to conversations with both Jose and the Defendant and
stated that he gave the “buy money” from the May 27 sale to Mr. Gonzalez-
Montoya. He further testified that he called Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya after Jose
requested more methamphetamine and that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya agreed to
provide four pounds at $8,000 per pound.
Defense counsel objected that the testimony about Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s
statements was inadmissible hearsay. However, the trial judge overruled the
objection and stated that he would make “make some findings at an appropriate
point.” See 2 R. at 57. Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda continued to testify to conversations
with Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya regarding the price of the methamphetamine. He
also provided details of a rendezvous between himself, Jose, and Mr. Gonzalez-
Montoya at a Denver restaurant on May 29, 1997. According to Mr. Bonillo-
Esqueda, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya showed Jose a bag of methamphetamine at the
restaurant, and, after two police officers entered the restaurant, Mr. Gonzalez-
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Montoya went into an adjoining alley with the bag. There, he gave the bag to
Jose and was arrested by an FBI agent.
After hearing this and other evidence, the court found that a conspiracy
existed between Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya and Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda and that the
statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See 2 R. at 115-116.
However, the record reveals that the judge was confused about whether the
testimony to which defense counsel objected was offered by Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda
or by the DEA agent, Thomas Bartusiak. See id. at 114-15. Moreover, the court
was not directed to particular statement’s in Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda’s testimony
challenged as inadmissible hearsay. See id. at 115-16.
The second ground for appeal involves the government’s failure to disclose
impeachment evidence to defense counsel in a timely manner. During cross-
examination, Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda testified that he had not sold drugs to Jose
prior to May 27,1997. This testimony contradicted information that the
government possessed regarding a sale by Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda to Jose on May
22, 1997. On redirect, the prosecutor attempted to impeach Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda
on this issue, but the judge cut him short. When defense counsel objected that the
government had failed to disclose impeachment evidence regarding the May 22
sale, the court instructed the government to fax the relevant documents to defense
counsel. After reviewing the newly-provided material, defense counsel moved for
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a mistrial. The court denied this motion on the grounds that giving the defense
lawyer access to the impeachment material and an opportunity to question Mr.
Bonillo-Esqueda at trial regarding the May 22 transaction put the defense lawyer
in “in the same position [he] would have occupied if [he] had gotten the report on
a timely basis.” 3 R. at 138. Defense counsel elected not to conduct further cross-
examination of Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda. Yet, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya contends on
appeal that his case was prejudiced by the untimely production of the Giglio
material.
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s third claim arises from the government’s
erroneous explanation of a jury instruction on deliberate ignorance. During his
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury to pay close attention to the
court’s deliberate ignorance instruction. When the prosecutor started to read the
instruction, defense counsel objected. The judge sustained the objection and
stated that the court would read the jury instructions, but the prosecutor
nevertheless proceeded to advise the jury on the meaning of deliberate ignorance
until the court halted him.
As a result of this incident, the court elected not to give the deliberate
ignorance instruction. It also declined to give a curative instruction that the
government requested on the grounds that further discussion of deliberate
ignorance would confuse the jury. Defense counsel did not request a curative
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instruction.
Finally, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya appeals the denial of his request for a two-
level sentence reduction under the safety valve provision of the sentencing
guidelines, 18 U.S.C.§3553(f). On January 2, 1998, he was sentenced to a term of
108 months in prison, followed by four years of supervised release. The court
declined to reduce his sentence under the safety valve provision because he
continued to maintain that he delivered the bag of methamphetamine from Mr.
Bonillo-Esqueda to Jose without knowledge of its contents. Because the court
considered this assertion to be false, it found that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya failed to
satisfy the fifth requirement of the safety valve provision: that the defendant
truthfully provide the government with all information concerning the offense.
Discussion
A. Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya argues that the district court erred in admitting Mr.
Bonillo-Esqueda’s testimony about statements that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya made.
According to Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya, the trial judge improperly found that such
testimony contained co-conspirator statements, which are non-hearsay under
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya contends that the court erred in
not holding a pre-trial James hearing to make the three factual determinations
necessary to admit co-conspirator statements: (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2)
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that both the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, and (3)
that the statements were made in the course of the conspiracy. See United States
v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. James, 590 F.2d
575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979).
The record shows that Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda testified to out-of-court
conversations between himself, Jose, and Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya. See 2 R. at 56-
58. His testimony encompassed out-of-court declarations by Mr. Gonzalez-
Montoya admissible as non-hearsay under two distinct sub-sections of
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d). Although the district court admitted all of these statements
under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), see 2 R. at 115, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s out-of-
court statements were also party admissions under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).
See United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 463 and n.8 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
that statements by defendants in tape-recorded conversations with co-conspirators
were party admissions). Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda recounted a conversation in which
the defendant admitted critical elements of the offense with which he was
charged: possession of methamphetamine, intent to sell it to Jose, the price, and
the date and time that he hoped to close the deal. See 2 R. at 56-58. Such
statements fall squarely within the parameters of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). See
Mayes, 917 F.2d at 463; see also United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218, 1222 &
n.2 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1101 (1998). Hence, we need not
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reach the James issue with regard to them.
However, because the district court admitted remarks attributed to both the
defendant and Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda under the co-conspirator rule, and because of
the apparent confusion about which statements defense counsel alleged to be
inadmissible hearsay, see 2 R. at 114-15, we take this opportunity to reiterate our
strong preference for James proceedings where the government relies on co-
conspirator statements. See United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235, 1242
(10th Cir. 1996); Owens, 70 F.3d at 1123.
Under Tenth Circuit law, the district court may satisfy the prerequisites for
admission of a co-conspirator statement through either of two means: by holding a
James hearing or by provisionally admitting the statement “with the caveat
that . . . the party offering [it] must prove the existence of the predicate
conspiracy through trial testimony or other evidence.” Owens, 70 F.3d at 1123. In
either case, the court may consider the hearsay statement itself, as well as
independent factors, in determining whether the government has established a
conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); see
also United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S.171, 181(1987).
Here, the presence of Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya at the restaurant and in the
alley with methamphetamine in his hands, the transfer of marked “buy money”
between himself and Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda, combined with the provisionally-
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admitted hearsay testimony, support the court’s determination that a conspiracy
existed. We reject Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s argument that he had no more than a
buyer-seller relationship with Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda. As we noted in United States
v. Flores, 149 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir.1998), “the purpose of the buyer-seller
rule is to separate consumers, who do not plan to redistribute drugs for profit,
from street-level, mid-level, and other distributors.” Id.; see also United States v.
Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996). Neither Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya, nor
Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda, qualified as a mere consumer.
Because Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda’s testimony contained both non-hearsay party
admissions and statements that the government proved were made in furtherance
of the conspiracy, we hold that it was properly admitted. However, this case
underscores our preference for the use of pre-trial hearings to determine the
existence of the predicate conspiracy.
B. Untimely Disclosure of Giglio Evidence
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya unsuccessfully sought a mistrial on the grounds that
the government’s violation of the disclosure rules of Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972), deprived him of a fair trial. We review questions
regarding the disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment evidence de novo. See
Smith v. Sec. of New Mexico Dep’t. of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 827 (10th Cir.
1995). Impeachment, as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the rule,
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articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), that suppression of
material information favorable to the accused violates due process. See Giglio,
405 U.S. at 154; Smith, 50 F.3d at 822, 825. In order to establish a Brady or
Giglio violation, “the defendant bears the burden of establishing (1) that the
prosecution suppressed the evidence, (2) that the evidence was favorable to the
accused, and (3) that the evidence was material.” Smith, 50 F.3d at 824.
According to the Supreme Court, the criterion of materiality is met only if there is
a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the trial would have been different
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985); see also Smith, 50 F. 3d at 827.
The documents relating to Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda’s involvement in an earlier
drug transaction constituted impeachment evidence that the prosecution should
have disclosed in a timely manner. See 3 R. at 137. Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda was an
alleged co-conspirator. He was thus a material witness whose credibility, or lack
thereof, played a critical role in the determination of Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s
guilt or innocence. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 15; United States v. Buchanan, 891
F.2d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1989).
In denying a mistrial, the district court incorrectly stated that bad faith is a
prerequisite for a mistrial on Giglio grounds. See 3 R. at 134. Constitutional
error arises from “the character of the evidence, not character of the prosecutor.”
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United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady, 373 U.S. at 8. Although
we held in United States v. Dennison, 891 F.2d 255, 260 (10th Cir. 1989), that
dismissal of a case in mid-trial for failure to fully comply with a discovery order
is too extreme a sanction where the prosecutor did not act in bad faith and no
prejudice occurred, our precedent establishes that “the term ‘suppression,’ in the
Brady context, does not require a finding of . . [a] culpable state of mind. . . .”
Smith, 50 F.3d at 824; see also, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403,
1426 (10th Cir. 1990). Distinctions between late disclosure and non-disclosure,
good faith and bad faith, have no relevance if the government’s conduct
prejudices the outcome of the case.
Here, no prejudice resulted. The trial judge found that untimely disclosure
did not affect the results of the proceeding because defense counsel had an
opportunity to review the new evidence and question Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda about
it. See id. at 138. When assessing the materiality of Giglio information, we must
consider the significance of the suppressed evidence in relation to the entire
record. See Smith, 50 F.3d at 827. We will not automatically order a new trial
“whenever a combing of the prosecutor’s files . . . has disclosed evidence
possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict.” Giglio,
405 U.S. at 154; United States v. Washita Construction Co., 780 F.2d 809, 824
(10th Cir. 1986).
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On appeal, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya has failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that timely revelation of the impeachment evidence would have altered
the outcome of his case. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. After obtaining and
reviewing the new evidence during trial, defense counsel declined to interview
Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda or to examine him in front of the jury about the prior drug
deal. See 3 R. at 136. The record suggests, and defense counsel conceded at oral
argument, that the decision not to probe the issue further stemmed from concern
about opening the door to evidence of the Defendant’s involvement in the earlier
transaction. See 2 R. at 95-96, 133. Defense counsel stated at oral argument that,
if he had obtained the impeachment evidence earlier, he would have used a
private investigator to show that Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda was the leader and
organizer of the illegal activity. However, the defense lawyer’s reluctance to
question Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda about the May 22 transaction, for fear of
implicating Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya, would not have abated with additional time to
prepare. Thus, the district court properly denied Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s motion
for a mistrial.
C. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct
when he discussed the “deliberate ignorance” standard in his rebuttal closing
argument and that the court abused its discretion in failing to give a curative jury
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instruction.
Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor began to read the deliberate
ignorance instruction, but he did not challenge the prosecutor’s subsequent
misstatement of the law. Because defense counsel did not specifically object to
the prosecutor’s remarks about the reasonable person standard, we review them
for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993); United
States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998 WL
396485 (1998). A court of appeals has the authority, but is not required, to order
correction of plain errors that were not brought to the attention of the district
court, if they affect substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. We employ a
two-step process in evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct: First, we
determine whether the prosecutor’s behavior was improper; if so, we decide
whether it mandates reversal. See id. In evaluating such incidents for plain error,
we will reverse “only if, after reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the
error is obvious and one that would undermine the fairness of the trial and result
in a miscarriage of justice.” Id.
Here, the prosecutor’s definition of deliberate ignorance as failure to learn
what a reasonable person would know represented an incorrect statement of the
law. Deliberate ignorance is found where the defendant had subjective, rather
than objective knowledge of his criminal behavior. See United States v. Lee, 54
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F.3d 1534, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995). However, the fact that the prosecutor misstated
the standard does not mean that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya was deprived of a fair
trial. See Oberle, 136 F.3d at 1421. We generally do not reverse a conviction “if
the conduct [that the defendant challenges] was merely ‘singular and isolated.’”
United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266,1288 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.
Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1491 (10th Cir. 1991). Here, the inappropriate remarks
constituted one incident that the trial court cut short sua sponte by censuring the
prosecutor before the jury.
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya also contends that the district court’s failure to give
a deliberate ignorance instruction “left the jury without anything to guide them but
the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law.” See Aplt. Br. at 17. Even if defense
counsel had made a timely objection at trial, curative actions by the district court
constitute only one factor in our determination of whether prejudice resulted. See
United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1991). Although the trial
judge decided not to revisit the deliberate ignorance issue, he reminded the jury
that, where the court and the lawyers disagreed, the jury was to be governed by the
court’s version of the instruction and the law. See 3 R. at 293; see also Ivy, 83
F.3d at 1288 (prosecutorial misconduct not usually prejudicial where the court tells
the jury what weight to give the closing argument). Viewing the prosecutor’s
misconduct in light of the entire record, we conclude that the inappropriate
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remarks did not “influence the jury to convict on grounds other than the evidence
presented” and that the fairness of Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya’s trial was not
undermined. United States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937, 944 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 473 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Nor did the court abuse its discretion in deciding not to give the deliberate
ignorance instruction. We review refusal to give a particular jury instruction for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pacheco, 154 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. McIntosh, 124 F.3d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir. 1997). While
“[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if the
instruction is a correct statement of the law and if he has offered sufficient
evidence for the jury to find in his favor,” McIntosh, 124 F.3d at 1337, Mr.
Gonzalez-Montoya did not request a deliberate ignorance instruction. In fact,
before closing arguments, defense counsel argued that such an instruction should
not be given. See 3 R. at 229. In omitting the deliberate ignorance instruction, the
trial court essentially complied with defense counsel’s wishes and punished the
government for its inappropriate remarks.
Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya also maintains that, in a broader sense, the jury was
improperly instructed on the controlling principles of law. We consider jury
instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they correctly stated the
governing law and provided the jury with a sufficient understanding of the
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relevant standards and issues. See Pacheco, 154 F.3d at 1238. Viewed in their
entirety, the instructions informed the jury in the instant case that the government
must prove knowledge and intent.
We decline to order a new trial because of either the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the deliberate ignorance standard or the court’s refusal to give a
curative instruction.
D. Safety Valve Provision
Finally, Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya contends that he was improperly denied a
two-level downward adjustment under the safety valve provision of the sentencing
guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). We review the district court’s determination of a
particular defendant’s eligibility for relief under § 3553(f) for clear error. See
United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 784 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 377 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995). To the extent that district
court interpreted the “scope and meaning” of 3553(f)(5), we review its legal
interpretation de novo. See Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 377 n.3.
To override a mandatory minimum sentence, a defendant must prove that he
meets all five requirements of the safety valve provision: (1) that he does not have
more than one criminal history point under the sentencing guidelines; (2) that he
did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other
dangerous weapon in connection with the offense; (3) that the offense did not
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result in death or serious bodily injury; (4) that the defendant was not a leader or
organizer of the offense and that he was not engaged in a continuing criminal
enterprise; and (5) that, not later than the time of sentencing, he “truthfully
provided to the Government all information and evidence concerning the offense
or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme or
plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The burden of proving all five requirements by a
preponderance of the evidence lies with the defendant. See United States v.
Verners, 103 F.3d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Ortiz, 136
F.3d 882, 883 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1104 (1998).
The district court’s ruling that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya did not qualify for a
downward adjustment under § 3553(f) hinged on his failure to satisfy the fifth
requirement. Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya continued to maintain at sentencing that he
was too drunk on May 29 to knowingly participate in a drug deal or to be aware of
the contents of the bag. See 4 R. at 7. His written statement that he had consumed
10 to 12 beers in several hours conflicted with his subsequent trial testimony that
he drank as many as 25 beers; both of these claims belied the lucidity he displayed
at the time of arrest. Moreover, he denied knowing Mr. Bonillo-Esqueda’s name
or conversing with him prior to May 29, 1997. On this basis, the trial judge found
that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya had not conveyed to the government “all information
or evidence” about the May 29 offense, as required by § 3553(f)(5). See 3 R. at 18.
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Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya argues that the “tell all” requirement of 3553(f)(5)
does not mandate a confession of guilt on the part of the defendant. While we
agree that the safety valve provision and acceptance of responsibility under
U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a) are not coterminous, we conclude that 3553(f)(5) goes beyond
merely barring the defendant from denying the offense of conviction. See United
States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 753 (3d Cir. 1997). Under § 3353(f)(5), a
defendant must affirmatively volunteer all he knows, including facts beyond the
basic elements of the crime. See United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th
Cir. 1997, cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 117 S. Ct. 2446 (1997) (stating that “section 5 is
very broad”); Sabir, 117 F.3d at 752. Because both the trial court and the jury
found that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya untruthfully minimized his role in the May 29
drug transaction, we cannot say that the trial court’s findings were clearly
erroneous. See Sabir, 117 F.3d at 753 (holding that defendant’s false efforts to
minimize his role disqualified him from a safety valve adjustment).
Conviction by a jury does not foreclose relief under the safety valve
provision. See United States v. Sherpa, 110 F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendant who claimed ignorance of the contents of a suitcase
satisfied §3553(f)(5), even though the jury found that he knowingly possessed
heroin). However, a trial judge, like a jury, is free to find a defendant’s
contentions untruthful. Given such a finding, we hold that Mr. Gonzalez-Montoya
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did not meet his burden of establishing all five requirements for a downward
adjustment under safety valve provision.
AFFIRMED.
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United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1998-11-23
Citations: 161 F.3d 643
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion