NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0003n.06
No. 22-3235
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Jan 04, 2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
HARVEY JONES, ) OHIO
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Before: KETHLEDGE, READLER, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Harvey Jones pled guilty to federal drug and gun offenses,
and now argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We reject his
arguments and affirm.
In December 2020, DEA agents in Euclid, Ohio, saw Harvey Jones participate in what they
believed was a drug deal. The agents asked the Euclid Police Department to conduct a traffic stop
once Jones left the scene. During the stop, Jones consented to a search of his car. Therein officers
found 128.21 grams of cocaine, a .45 caliber pistol, and $25,000 in cash, along with $4,000 on
Jones’s person. Jones later admitted, among other things, that he had stolen the pistol and that he
obtained the money from cocaine sales. He also confessed to previously delivering over three
kilograms of cocaine to an associate.
A grand jury thereafter indicted Jones on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, two counts of possession with intent to distribute
No. 22-3235, United States v. Jones
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Jones pled guilty to all four counts
without a plea agreement.
Jones had two prior felony drug-trafficking convictions, so the probation office
recommended that the district court designate him a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Over
Jones’s objection, the court adopted that recommendation, finding among other things that Jones’s
2007 Ohio drug-trafficking conviction was a predicate offense. The court calculated a guidelines
range of 262 to 327 months, and sentenced Jones to 262 months’ imprisonment. This appeal
followed.
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of Jones’s sentence for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559, 567 (6th Cir. 2020).
Jones challenges his sentence on several grounds, most of which are barely developed.
Jones argues that the district court improperly designated him a career offender. Specifically,
Jones says, his 2007 Ohio drug-trafficking conviction “lacked temporal proximity to the instant
case.” Yet Jones was incarcerated for that offense as late as November 2016—which was within
15 years of the commission of his current offense. The 2007 Ohio drug-trafficking conviction was
therefore recent enough to count as a predicate offense. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.2(e)(1), 4B1.1.
Hence his argument is meritless.
Jones also argues that the court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The
record shows otherwise. At sentencing the court discussed, among other things, the circumstances
in which Jones possessed the stolen firearm and cocaine, the need to deter Jones from future
crimes, Jones’s personal background, and his lengthy criminal history, which included 29 adult
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No. 22-3235, United States v. Jones
convictions in 19 years. This argument is therefore meritless as well. See United States v. Smith,
505 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2007).
Jones likewise argues that the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory. The
district court expressly said the contrary, however, and the record otherwise provides no support
for Jones’s assertion. His sentence was procedurally reasonable.
Jones separately argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We presume
otherwise, given that Jones’s sentence was within his guidelines range. See United States v.
Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2008). Specifically, Jones says that the district court placed
too much weight on his criminal history and too little weight on factors that Jones sees as
mitigating. Yet the district court observed—properly—that none of Jones’s past sentences had
“deterred him,” and that, “no matter what kind of leniency he’s been shown,” Jones was unwilling
“to modify his behavior.” Jones has not rebutted the presumption that his sentence was
substantively reasonable. See United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2013).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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