UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4889
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD JONES, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.
(1:02-cr-00421-BEL)
Argued: May 15, 2008 Decided: August 20, 2008
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Gregory wrote a
dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Kenneth Wendell Ravenell, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Christopher John Romano, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Jones III appeals the district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress evidence seized during and statements made
following a traffic stop. For the reasons stated below, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Jones’ motion to suppress.
I.
A.
On the afternoon of August 29, 2002, Baltimore City Police
officers arrested an individual for a narcotics violation. That
individual agreed to cooperate with the police by serving as a
confidential informant (CI). The CI told Sergeant David Cheuvront
that Jones was a local drug dealer who sold crack-cocaine in multi-
ounce quantities. The CI also advised that Jones used two
addresses: 2920 Boarman Avenue in northwest Baltimore City and 8
Mountbatten Court in the Woodlawn precinct of western Baltimore
County. The CI further warned Cheuvront that Jones often carried
a gun.
Cheuvront cross-referenced the CI’s information against public
records and confirmed that (1) a Reginald Jones was listed as a
resident at 2920 Boarman Avenue and (2) Jones had “an extensive
record to include crimes of violence, handgun violations, and
several [controlled dangerous substances] arrests.” (J.A. at 30-
31.) Thereafter, acting on police instruction and using his own
2
cell phone, the CI called Jones and made arrangements to purchase
six ounces of crack-cocaine. Cheuvront could hear the CI’s portion
of the conversation. The CI and Jones agreed to meet that evening
around 9:00 or 10:00 at a location to be determined.
Cheuvront then contacted Sergeant Dennis O’Neill with the
Baltimore County Police Department and advised him that Baltimore
City officers were working with a CI to arrange a meeting with
Jones somewhere in the Baltimore area to purchase crack-cocaine
that evening. If the meeting took place in Baltimore County,
Cheuvront would need O’Neill’s assistance because Baltimore County
was outside of Cheuvront’s jurisdiction. Cheuvront also told
O’Neill about Jones’ criminal record, that Jones was known to carry
a gun and was connected to the two addresses.
At approximately 9:20 that evening, the CI spoke with Jones,
who told the CI that he was running late because he was in a
vehicle being stopped by the police for a burned-out headlight.
Jones did not describe the vehicle, give the precise location, or
say whether he was the driver or a passenger.
After receiving this information from the CI, Cheuvront
contacted O’Neill to inform him that Jones was currently stopped.
O’Neill knew that one of the two addresses associated with Jones
was in the Woodlawn area and contacted the police radio dispatcher
for the Woodlawn precinct to determine whether officers had anyone
currently stopped for a headlight violation. O’Neill also directed
3
other officers to contact dispatchers in the Wilkens and Garrison
precincts, both of which border the Woodlawn precinct. Together,
the Woodlawn, Wilkens and Garrison precincts cover roughly the
western half of Baltimore County.
O’Neill determined that several stops had been made and that
one of the stops was based on a headlight violation. O’Neill
contacted Officer Eric Cross, who was conducting the headlight
violation stop, and advised Cross that Baltimore City Police were
looking for a man named Jones, who was believed to be bringing six
ounces of crack-cocaine from Baltimore City to Baltimore County.
O’Neill also told Cross that Jones was currently stopped for a
headlight violation and that he could be carrying a gun.
Cross confirmed that he had pulled over a vehicle for a
burned-out headlight, that two men were in the vehicle, and that
the stop was occurring at the intersection of Liberty Road and
Kelox Road. O’Neill recognized that this intersection was roughly
halfway between the two addresses associated with Jones. In light
of this information, O’Neill directed Cross to call for backup and
to remove and pat down the occupants.
Thereafter, Officer Christopher Waite and other Baltimore
County Police officers arrived. Cross ordered both men out of the
vehicle, and Waite began to pat down Jones. As Waite attempted to
pat down Jones’ midsection, Jones repeatedly twisted his pelvis
away from Waite. Waite persisted with the pat down, and his hands
4
brushed against a flat, hard object just below Jones’ waistband.
According to Waite, he believed the object to be a weapon and
grasped the object firmly to immobilize it. He felt a large, hard,
irregular object, roughly the size and shape of a hockey puck,
wrapped in a plastic bag. At that point, Waite knew that the
object was not a weapon, but Waite removed the object because he
believed that he had found narcotics. The object proved to be
roughly six ounces of crack-cocaine. Waite then placed Jones under
arrest. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Jones agreed to
speak with law enforcement officers on the scene.
B.
On September 19, 2002, a grand jury in the District of
Maryland returned a one-count indictment against Jones. The
indictment charged Jones with possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. Jones filed a motion to
suppress any evidence seized during the August 29, 2002, traffic
stop and any statements made to the police following that stop. On
February 19, 2004, the district court issued a memorandum opinion
and order denying the motion to suppress.
On June 2, 2004, Jones tendered a conditional guilty plea to
Count One of the indictment. He preserved his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district
court accepted Jones’ conditional guilty plea and convicted him of
one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.
5
Jones was then sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 151 months.
Jones filed a timely appeal, challenging the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.
II.
Jones argues that (1) there was no reasonable articulable
suspicion for the officers to conduct a pat down of Jones; (2)
Waite conducted an illegal search of Jones; (3) Jones’ detention
exceeded a constitutionally permissible duration before the Terry
frisk was conducted; and (4) the statements made by Jones should
have been suppressed.
We review for clear error a district court’s factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress, while its legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Rusher, 966
F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When reviewing the denial of a
motion to suppress, the evidence is construed in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d
542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
A.
Jones first contends that there was no reasonable articulable
suspicion for the police to conduct a pat down. Jones maintains
that the district court relied on factors that were either not
sufficiently proven during the suppression hearing or were not
6
appropriate factors to rely on in determining reasonable
articulable suspicion.
1.
We begin with a review of Fourth Amendment law relating to
traffic stops. Police officers are justified in stopping an
automobile where a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). During a routine traffic stop,
police officers may order, as a matter of course, a driver and
passengers to exit a vehicle with no more suspicion than that
justifying the traffic stop itself. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 415 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
Moreover, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a pat down, or “frisk,” is permitted “when
the officer perceive[s] an appropriate level of suspicion of
criminal activity and apprehension of danger.” United States v.
Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998).
Terry’s “reasonable suspicion” standard is not reduced to a
“neat set of legal rules,” but is a “commonsense, nontechnical
conception[] that deal[s] with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.” Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Accordingly, “[c]ourts are not remiss in crediting the
practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what
7
transpires on the street.” United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151,
154 (4th Cir. 1993).
When assessing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for
a Terry frisk, a court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 618 (4th
Cir. 1997). Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard
than probable cause,” requiring a showing “considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123 (2000). This Court has held that the reasonable suspicion
standard “may be satisfied by an officer’s objectively reasonable
suspicion that drugs are present in a vehicle that he lawfully
stops.” Sakyi, 160 F.3d at 169. Because guns often accompany
drugs, when an officer suspects the presence of drugs in a stopped
vehicle, the risk of danger to the officer is apparent. Id.
2.
In the case before us, the police officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a pat down of Jones. The officers knew that
(1) a CI had arranged a meeting with Jones for that evening to
purchase crack-cocaine; (2) Jones had an extensive criminal record,
including drug and gun charges; (3) Jones used two addresses, one
in northwest Baltimore City and one in the Woodlawn precinct of
western Baltimore County; (4) Jones was in a vehicle being stopped
by the police for a burned-out headlight; (5) Cross was the only
officer in the western half of Baltimore County who had stopped a
8
car for a headlight violation; and (6) Cross was conducting the
stop at the intersection of Liberty Road and Kelox Road, roughly
halfway between the two addresses associated with Jones. Taken
together, these factors establish that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot.
Specifically, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe
that Jones had drugs in the vehicle. Because guns often accompany
drugs, the risk of danger to Cross was apparent. See id. Cross
called for backup before ordering the driver and Jones out of the
vehicle for the pat down, providing further evidence that Cross was
concerned about his safety.
Jones contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that Jones was the person who would be meeting the CI to conduct
the transaction. However, Cheuvront testified that the CI stated
that he could contact Jones “by telephone and order up a quantity
of crack cocaine, and that he would then meet . . . Jones to get
the crack cocaine from him.” (J.A. at 31-32.) Cheuvront also had
an independent recollection that the CI stated that Jones was on
his way to meet with the CI. (J.A. at 45-48, 52.)
Jones also challenges the officers’ reliance on the CI,
arguing that the CI had not been proven to be reliable and that the
information provided by the CI was uncorroborated. This case does
not present us with a situation in which we are concerned about the
reliability of the CI. The CI was not an anonymous informant.
9
Instead, the CI was face to face with the officers, told the
officers that he could place a call to Jones to order drugs, and
did in fact place that call in the presence of Cheuvront.
Moreover, Cheuvront cross-referenced the CI’s information against
public records and confirmed (1) that a Reginald Jones was listed
as a resident at 2920 Boarman Avenue and (2) that Jones had “an
extensive record to include crimes of violence, handgun violations,
and several [controlled dangerous substances] arrests.” (J.A. at
30-31.) The CI also provided the officers with the information
that Jones had been stopped for a headlight violation, a fact that
the CI knew was subject to verification.
Under a totality of the circumstances, we hold that the pat
down of Jones was justified because the officers had a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
B.
Having concluded that the pat down was justified, we turn next
to Jones’ contention that Waite conducted an illegal search of
Jones. Jones argues that Officer Waite exceeded the bounds of a
Terry stop by removing the object from Jones’ waistband after
realizing that the object was not a weapon and posed no threat.
1.
As previously observed, if an officer has a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, he may conduct a limited search of
outer clothing to discover any weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
10
“[C]ontraband discovered during a lawful Terry stop is admissible
so long as the search does not exceed the bounds permitted by
Terry.” United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir.
1998) (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993)
(setting forth the “plain feel” doctrine)). If an officer, while
conducting a pat down, “feels an object whose contour or mass makes
its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of
the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the
officer’s search for weapons.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375. On the
other hand, “[o]nce an officer has determined that the object is
not a weapon . . . and if its shape or size does not indicate its
contraband nature, the search must stop.” Raymond, 152 F.3d at 312
(citing Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378).
2.
Jones argues that
[b]ecause Terry frisks are not meant to discover evidence
of a crime, but rather are limited to a search for
weapons that might endanger the officer or the public, it
was not permissible for . . . Waite to continue his
search and remove the object from Jones’[] waistband once
he determined that the object was not a weapon.
(Appellant’s Br. 23.) To the contrary, Waite was justified in
removing the contraband under the “plain feel” doctrine.
When Waite began to pat down Jones, Jones started to “cant his
middle section away from [Officer Waite],” (J.A. at 253), and
“continu[ed] to spin, to keep that section away from the search,”
(J.A. at 254). This movement indicated to Waite that Jones was
11
concerned about something Waite might find. When Waite was able to
search Jones’ midsection, Waite felt a “hard object” that he
initially thought was a weapon. (J.A. at 254.)
After feeling the object, Waite grabbed it to immobilize it.
Once he secured it, he realized that the object was not a weapon,
but instead a large, hard, irregular object, roughly the size and
shape of a hockey puck, wrapped in a plastic bag. At that point,
he removed the object, believing it to be a controlled dangerous
substance. Waite was justified in removing the contraband and
there was no invasion of Jones’ privacy beyond that already
authorized by Waite’s search for weapons. See Dickerson, 508 U.S.
at 375.
C.
Jones next avers that his detention exceeded a
constitutionally permissible duration before the Terry frisk was
conducted. Specifically, Jones contends that the detention lasted
longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic
stop.
1.
During a routine traffic stop, a police officer may “request
a driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check,
and issue a citation.” United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781
(4th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876-
77 (4th Cir. 1992)). Once the driver has shown that he is entitled
12
to operate the vehicle and the police officer has issued the
citation, the driver “must be allowed to proceed on his way.”
Rusher, 966 F.2d at 876. If, however, the driver obstructs the
police officer’s efforts in any way, a longer traffic stop would be
reasonable. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88
(1985) (rejecting the argument that “a 20-minute stop is
unreasonable when the police have acted diligently and a suspect’s
actions contribute[d] to the added delay about which he
complains”).
A stop “justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning
ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond
the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Thus, a prolonged traffic
stop requires either (1) the driver’s consent or (2) a reasonable
suspicion that illegal activity is afoot. Foreman, 369 F.3d at
781.
2.
The district court found that twenty minutes had elapsed
between the initial stop and the pat down of Jones, and we are
unaware of any case holding that a twenty-minute detention for a
traffic stop is unconstitutional. Cross was entitled to detain
Jones after observing the headlight violation. Cross testified
that he was writing a repair order for the headlight violation and
that it usually took him ten to fifteen minutes to write a repair
13
order. This stop took longer because the driver failed to produce
any identification. Therefore, Cross had to return to his squad
car to contact headquarters to verify the driver’s identity and to
ensure that the car was not stolen. Accordingly, we hold that
Officer Cross’ twenty-minute detention of Jones was constitutional.
D.
Jones’ remaining argument is that the statements made by him
after the stop should have been suppressed. Specifically, he
asserts that “because the initial pat down and removal of the crack
cocaine . . . were unlawful, the statements made by Jones to the
police officers following his arrest should be suppressed as fruit
of the illegal search and seizure of Jones.” (Appellant’s Br. 27.)
Having rejected Jones’ arguments that the search and seizure were
illegal, we also reject Jones’ final argument.
III.
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Jones’ motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED
14
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Today, the Majority affirms the district court=s denial of
Jones=s motion to suppress. I agree with the Majority=s conclusion
that the police had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a
Terry frisk of Jones. However, I disagree with the Majority that
the facts in this case comport with the plain feel doctrine. The
police exceeded the scope of their Terry frisk when they realized
that the object in Jones=s pocket was not a weapon. Although it was
not immediately apparent that it was contraband the police
continued to manipulate Jones=s pocket until they discovered the
non-weapon object was in a plastic bag. Because Aan officer=s
>squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of [a]
defendant=s pocket=, if the officer knows the pocket contains no
weapon, is prohibited,@ United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 275
(4th Cir. 1998) (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378
(1993)), I must respectfully dissent.
AWhen an officer is justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, the
officer may conduct a patdown search to determine whether the
person is in fact carrying a weapon.@ Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373-
374; see also Swann, 149 F.3d at 274. AThe purpose of this limited
search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the
officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence....@
15
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373-374. ARather, a protective search-
permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable
suspicion less than probable cause-must be strictly limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used
to harm the officer or others nearby.@ Id. AIf the protective
search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is
armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be
suppressed.@ Id.
An exception to this rule is the plain feel doctrine. The
plain feel doctrine is analogous to the plain view doctrine, see
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375, which permits the police to seize an
item without a warrant if: (1) the Apolice are lawfully in a
position from which they view an item,@ (2) Aits incriminating
character is immediately apparent,@ and (3) Athe officers have a
lawful right of access to the object.@ Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375
(emphasis added). AIf, however, the police lack probable cause to
believe that an object in plain view is contraband without
conducting further search of the object--i.e., if >its incriminating
character [is not] immediately apparent,= the plain-view doctrine
cannot justify its seizure.@ Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321 (1987)). As the Supreme Court explained in Dickerson,
A[t]he rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband
is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a
lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate
16
expectation of privacy and thus no >search= within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment--or at least no search independent of the
initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point.@ Id.
In a plain feel case, we have held that Aan officer=s
>squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of [a]
defendant=s pocket=, if the officer knows the pocket contains no
weapon, is prohibited.@ Swann, 149 F.3d at 275. AAn officer is not
justified in conducting a general exploratory search for evidence
under the guise of a stop and frisk.@ Id. at 274.
Officer Waite testified that when he patted Jones, he Afelt a
hard object below his waist line.@ (J.A. 254.) He testified that
he believed it might be a weapon. Officer Waite also testified
that A[t]o be quite honest, it was roughly the size of a hockey
puck, and when [he] grabbed the object, it felt like the flat side
of a weapon until [he] grabbed down on it.@ Id. After feeling
around some more, Officer Waite realized that the object, which he
now thought was not a weapon, was in a plastic bag. I conclude
that Officer Waite=s decision to probe further after realizing that
the hockey puck shaped item was not a weapon was akin to the
situation in Swann where an officer manipulated the contents of the
defendant=s sock further to determine what was the object in his
sock. It was not until Officer Waite realized that the object was
inside a plastic bag that he believed it to be contraband. For the
17
foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court=s denial of
Jones=s motion to suppress.
18
United States v. Jones
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date filed: 2008-08-20
Citations: 289 F. App'x 593
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