IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
FILED
April 13, 2007
Nos. 06-30535, 06-30563 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NYRON JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
--------------------
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Nyron Jones was convicted by a jury of
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Jones
grounds his appeal of this conviction in the assertedly erroneous
ruling of the district court that allowed the government to
introduce evidence of a prior conviction for the same crime
committed under circumstances virtually identical to those alleged
in this case.
Also, at the time of his arrest, Jones was serving a term of
supervised release related to his prior firearms conviction and
thus was subject to revocation of release and reimprisonment
(“revocation sentence”) for violating the terms of his release.
Jones received the statutory maximum two-year revocation sentence,
which he now appeals as unreasonable.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
In 2002, a New Orleans police officer saw Jones remove a
handgun from his front waistband and place it under a house.
Jones, who had an earlier felony conviction for robbery, was
arrested and subsequently charged with unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment and
three years of supervised release.
Only four months into his supervised release following his
completion of that term of imprisonment, Jones was again arrested
and again charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At Jones’s trial on this second
firearms charge, New Orleans Police Detective Brian Pollard
testified that, while in a police car on a night patrol, he saw
Jones adjust an object in his front waistband. Suspecting that
object to be a firearm, Detective Pollard got out of the patrol car
and approached Jones, who, according to Detective Pollard, fled
into an alley between two houses. Detective Pollard testified that
he followed Jones into the alley and saw him remove an object from
his waistband and toss it under one of the houses. Shortly
2
thereafter, Detective Pollard recovered a handgun from underneath
that house.
Jones’s cousin, Keva Peters, was present when Jones was
arrested. At Jones’s trial, Peters contradicted Detective
Pollard’s testimony, stating that he and Jones were standing on the
porch of a house when Detective Pollard approached, and that Jones
was questioned and detained in that area but never went into the
alley between the two houses. Peters also testified that he saw
Detective Pollard go into the alley after Jones had been placed in
police custody and return with a firearm.
Even though Jones stipulated to his convicted-felon status,
the government filed a motion to introduce the factual basis from
Jones’s prior firearm offense. After hearing opening statements
and some of the testimony, the district court granted the
government’s motion. At the conclusion of a two-day jury trial,
Jones was convicted as charged.
At sentencing, the court imposed a term of 78 months
imprisonment, expressing several reasons for its decision to
sentence Jones above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 33
to 41 months. The court specifically noted that Jones had been
convicted of precisely the same offense just a few years earlier
and had been out on supervised release for only four months when he
was arrested for this repetition of the same crime.
3
In a separate proceeding after Jones was sentenced, a
different district judge, the one who was continuing to oversee
Jones’s earlier felon-in-possession case, revoked his supervised
release and imposed the statutory maximum revocation sentence of
two years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his new
sentence for firearm possession. This revocation sentence of 24
months represented an upward variance from the Guidelines range of
6-12 months for such a supervised release violation. In imposing
the maximum revocation sentence, the supervising district judge
noted, inter alia, that the new conviction that produced the
revocation of Jones’s supervised release involved the same conduct
for which Jones had been convicted previously and that the new
firearms violation occurred only four months into the term of
supervised release for the old one.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Rule 404(b) Evidence1
1. Standard of Review
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.2 In a
criminal case, however, Rule 404(b) evidence must “be strictly
relevant to the particular offense charged.”3
1
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
2
United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 631 (5th Cir. 2006).
3
Id. (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d
863, 869 (5th Cir. 1998)).
4
2. Applicable Law
“Relevant evidence” is that “having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”4 “All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided.”5 Even relevant evidence, however,
“may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”6
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith,” and may only be admitted for legitimate non-
character purposes such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”7
In United States v. Beechum, we established that evidence of
prior crimes is not admissible in criminal cases unless (1) it is
relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character or his
4
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
5
Fed. R. Evid. 402.
6
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
7
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
5
propensity to act in accordance therewith, and (2) its incremental
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice to the defendant.8 Beechum and its progeny inform
our decision today.
3. Merits
Jones contends that evidence of his prior firearms crime
offends both prongs of the Beechum test, because (1) its only
relevance is to prove his propensity to possess firearms illegally,
an impermissible purpose under Rule 404(b), and (2) its probative
value is outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial impact. The
government counters that (1) evidence of Jones’s prior firearms
offense is probative of knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake
or accident, which are material facts unrelated to Jones’s
propensity to possess firearms illegally, and (2) the probative
value of that evidence outweighs any unfairly prejudicial effect.
a. Relevance
Jones does not dispute that evidence of his prior unlawful
firearm possession meets Rule 401's general definition of relevant
evidence, at least to the extent that a criminal defendant’s prior
offense makes it more likely that he would commit the same crime
again. Jones nevertheless insists that, in this case, the prior-
crimes evidence only serves to prove his propensity to carry
8
582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc).
6
firearms and has no relevance to any other fact “of consequence to
the determination of the action” against him.9
i. The District Court’s Reasoning
At the moment of his apprehension, Jones did not physically
control the firearm he was charged with unlawfully possessing,
i.e., it was not on his person when he was taken into custody.
According to the government, this fact makes evidence of his prior
firearm-possession conviction relevant to (1) show that he had
knowingly and intentionally possessed the gun that was found under
the house only minutes later, and (2) disprove any claim of
accidental or mistaken possession or rebut a “mere presence”
defense. The trial court agreed, recognizing that “the government
will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones, among
other things, knowingly possessed a firearm.” The court reasoned
that the government “may prove this element [knowledge] by offering
evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for possession of a
firearm in a similar situation which tends to show that he was in
knowing possession of the gun.”
The trial court went further, however, and speculated that
“because the detective did not find the gun on Jones’s person,” the
government might need to (1) prove “constructive possession,” which
would require it to show Jones’s knowledge of the presence of the
9
See Fed. R. Evid. 401.
7
firearm under the house and his intent to exercise dominion or
control over the gun, or (2) rebut the defense that Jones was
“simply in the ‘mere presence’ of the firearm, should the jury
discredit the detective’s testimony that he saw Jones’s [sic]
remove an item from his waistband and place it under the house.”10
ii. “Actual” or “Constructive” Possession
The government can prove possession by showing that a
defendant exercised either direct physical control over a thing
(actual possession) or “dominion or control” over the thing itself
or the area in which it was found (constructive possession).11
Jones insists that, because Detective Pollard claimed to have seen
him remove something from his waistband and dispose of it in the
spot where a firearm was later found, his was exclusively an actual
10
At the time the district court made its 404(b) ruling,
Keva Peters had not testified, and Jones had not otherwise denied
being present in the area from which the gun was recovered. The
record makes clear, however, that Jones never asserted a “mere
presence” defense, and the court never issued a “mere presence”
instruction to the jury.
11
See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir.
1998)(“Actual possession means the defendant knowingly has direct
physical control over a thing at a given time.”); United States
v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir.1999)(“Constructive
possession is the ownership, dominion or control over an illegal
item itself or dominion or control over the premises in which the
item is found.”)(citations omitted). Constructive possession may
also be proven by showing that contraband was in the direct
physical possession of a person over whom a defendant exercised
control. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257, 262
(5th Cir. 1993) overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
8
possession case. The district court nevertheless concluded that,
because Detective Pollard’s testimony was arguably suspect, the
government might have to offer evidence in support of the
alternative theory that Jones constructively possessed the firearm
found under the house. This formed the basis of the court’s ruling
that evidence of Jones’s prior crime was admissible to show the
knowledge and intent elements of constructive possession, even
though they are not separate elements of actual possession.
In constructive possession cases, knowledge and intent are
frequently at issue. A defendant will often deny any knowledge of
a thing found in an area that is under his control (e.g, a
residence, an automobile) or claim that it was placed there by
accident or mistake. The government then must offer evidence to
prove that the defendant (1) knew that the thing was present, and
(2) intended to exercised dominion or control over it.
In contrast, the only knowledge that the government must show
in an actual possession prosecution is the defendant’s awareness
that (1) he physically possesses the thing, and (2) the thing he
possesses is contraband.12 Intent is not an element of actual
possession under § 922.13 More to the point in this firearms case,
12
See United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 946-47 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
13
See id. at 948.
9
once the government has shown that the defendant had a firearm
under his immediate physical control, any contention that he did
not know the nature of what he possessed is effectively precluded.14
Jones insists that, as his is exclusively an actual possession
case, the district court erred in allowing the 404(b) evidence to
prove his knowledge or intent. We agree. Two cases from the D.C.
Circuit are illustrative of our reasoning on this issue.
In United States v. Linares, the defendant was prosecuted for
firearms possession on the basis of three eyewitness accounts of
his having wielded and fired a handgun, and then tossed it away.15
The district court allowed the government to offer evidence of
Linares’s prior conviction for firearms possession as proof of
“intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake.”16 In appealing his
conviction, Linares insisted (as Jones does here) that, because his
was exclusively an actual possession case, such evidence had no
probative value on any of those issues.17 The D.C. Circuit agreed
with Linares and reversed his conviction, reasoning that, because
the government’s evidence consisted entirely of eyewitness accounts
of actual possession, the jury could find either actual possession
14
See id. at 947.
15
Id. at 943-45.
16
Id. at 946.
17
Id.
10
or no possession, but that “no reasonable jury could have concluded
that the defendant possessed a firearm either unknowingly or
mistakenly.”18
The facts of Jones’s case are quite similar to those in
Linares and leave no doubt that his is exclusively an actual
possession case. The prosecution’s only substantive fact witness,
Detective Pollard, testified that both (1) his initial suspicion
that Jones had a gun and (2) his ultimate discovery of the firearm
under the house were prompted by his contemporaneous observations
of Jones’s actual possession of an object later determined to be a
firearm. As in Linares, if the jury believed Detective Pollard’s
testimony in toto, the government would have established, albeit
circumstantially, Jones’s direct physical control of the firearm.
The district court nevertheless anticipated the possibility
that, because Jones’s arrest occurred at night in a poorly lit
area, the jury might discredit the accuracy of some of Detective
Pollard’s observations but credit the accuracy of others. This
possibility, the district court reasoned, could compel the
government to present evidence supporting an alternative basis for
conviction: Jones’s constructive possession of the firearm found
under the house. (At this juncture, we note that the record is
devoid of evidence that Jones owned, rented, or occupied the house
18
Id. at 950.
11
or had any relationship with it whatsoever that could conceivably
support the dominion or control needed in a constructive possession
case.)
Linares involved three eyewitnesses to actual possession
(including a passenger in the car that the defendant was driving
while he fired the gun) and little if any question of the
reliability of those observations. The D.C. Circuit rejected the
government’s concern that “a jury that credited some of the
government’s evidence and some of [the defendant’s] testimony might
have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant]
constructively possessed the weapon.”19 The Linares court concluded
that, given the defendant’s unconditional denial of any possession
and the government’s evidence of actual possession only, the jury
could find either actual possession or no possession, but never
constructive possession.20
Although Jones’s case differs from Linares in some respects,
we reach the same conclusion as did the D.C. Circuit. Keva Peters
testified that Jones did not have a gun and did not go into the
alley by the house where the gun was recovered. Detective Pollard
testified that he saw Jones go into the alley and throw something
under the house where the gun was later found. As this was the
19
Id. at 948.
20
Id.
12
extent of the material evidence presented, the jury could have
either believed Detective Pollard and found actual possession or
believed Peters and found no possession. As in Linares, the
conflicting versions of events (devoid of any evidence of dominion
or control by Jones over the alleged location of the gun) make
illogical any contention that, as a third alternative to actual
possession or no possession, a jury might somehow find constructive
possession by believing some (but not all) of Detective Pollard’s
testimony and some (but not all) of Peters’s testimony.
The government doggedly insists, though, that it is at least
theoretically plausible that the jury could have found constructive
possession if it disbelieved all of Peters’s testimony and believed
some, but not all, of Detective Pollard’s testimony. We think not.
In United States v. Garner,21 a subsequent D.C. Circuit case
relied on by the government and the district court, an officer
testified that he looked through a darkly tinted car window and saw
the defendant place a firearm under his seat. The trial court
allowed the government to introduce 404(b) evidence of the
defendant’s prior firearm offense to prove the knowledge and intent
elements of constructive possession in the event that the jury
discredited as unreliable the officer’s observations of the
defendant’s actual possession made through the heavily tinted
21
396 F.3d 438, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
13
window.22 As in this case, the government primarily relied on the
officer’s testimony at trial, and the defendant argued on appeal
that evidence of his prior crime was not relevant to his actual
possession case.
In Garner, the appellate court affirmed, holding that, even
though the government relied almost exclusively on the officer’s
testimony of the defendant’s actual possession of the firearm,
. . . unlike in Linares, the trial evidence here, at the
time the district court ruled on [the 404(b) evidence],
did not force the jury to a disjunctive choice between
actual possession or no possession at all. At the time
the district court admitted [the 404(b) evidence], it
could reasonably have believed the jury might discredit
[the officer’s] testimony (based on his observations
through a tinted window and smoke-filled compartment) and
nevertheless convict Garner based on the undisputed
testimony that the gun was found under Garner’s seat when
the car was searched. In that event, the jury would have
faced a paradigmatic constructive possession scenario in
which contraband (here, a firearm) is found in proximity
to a defendant who may or may not have been “‘knowingly
in a position to, or [have] had the right to exercise
“dominion or control” over the [contraband].’”23
The D.C. Circuit concluded that, without the officer’s testimony,
the key facts (a firearm found under passenger’s seat) presented
“‘a classic case for introducing prior instances of gun possession,
22
Id. at 440.
23
Id. at 442-43 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 981 F.2d
1281, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
14
since the government would otherwise find it extremely difficult to
prove that the charged possession was knowing.’”24
Jones’s case is similar to Garner’s in some respects, but it
differs from it in at least one crucial respect. If, in the
instant case, the jury were to discredit Detective Pollard’s
observations of Jones’s actual possession yet believe that the
officer followed a fleeing Jones into the alley, the credited facts
would present neither “a paradigmatic constructive possession
scenario” (contraband found under defendant’s seat in a car) nor a
“classic case” for introducing 404(b) evidence. Instead, the jury
would be left with the picture of a man walking, running, or
standing next to a house that he did not own, rent, occupy, or
otherwise exercise any dominion over, underneath which a gun just
happened to be found. Without significantly more, such facts
simply cannot support a finding of constructive possession.
This case shares some key factual elements with Linares and
shares others with Garner, a pair of cases from the same court that
produced opposite holdings on the question of the relevance of
404(b) evidence. Nevertheless, given the fundamental difference
between the picture painted by the evidence here and those that
emerge in the vast majority of constructive possession cases, we
conclude that (1) Jones’s was exclusively an actual possession case
24
Id. (quoting Linares,367 F.3d at 949).
15
(albeit one based on circumstantial evidence), and (2) evidence of
Jones’s prior crime was not relevant to proving actual possession.
b. Rule 403 Balancing
As we have concluded that the 404(b) evidence in this case was
not relevant to prove the government’s actual possession case
against Jones, we need not proceed to the second step of the
Beechum analysis, i.e., determining whether the probative value of
that evidence outweighed its unfairly prejudicial impact.25
B. Jones’s Revocation Sentence
As Jones was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of
a firearm while serving a term of supervised release imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction on the very same charge, he
was subject to revocation of supervised release and reimprisonment.
It was only after he was sentenced in the instant case that the
district judge who had presided over Jones’s first felon-in-
possession conviction revoked his supervised release, imposed the
statutory maximum two-year term of imprisonment, and ordered that
it be served consecutively to his new firearms-possession sentence.
Jones insists that this revocation sentence was unreasonable,
as the judge who imposed it justified exceeding the advisory
Guidelines range of 6-12 months26 for the same reasons that the
25
Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911.
26
See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4.
16
district judge in the instant firearms-possession case gave for his
upward variance from the Guidelines range. Jones argues that, for
this reason, the non-Guidelines revocation sentence amounts to
double punishment for the same conduct. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker,27 the accepted standard of review for revocation sentences
in this Circuit was well-established. As there were “no applicable
guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release,”
a revocation sentence would be upheld unless it was “in violation
of the law or plainly unreasonable.”28 This “plainly unreasonable”
review has its origin in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4).29
Jones asserts, however, that Booker totally invalidated §
3742(e) and, by making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in its
entirety, (1) eliminated the difference between Guidelines and
advisory policy statements (such as those pertaining to revocation
sentences) and (2) established a “reasonableness” standard of
review for all criminal sentences, including revocation sentences.
27
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
28
United States v. Gonzales, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5th Cir.
2001).
29
The statute states: “Upon review of the record, the court
of appeals shall determine whether the sentence . . . was imposed
for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.”
17
There is a division among the circuits as to whether to
continue reviewing revocation sentences under the “plainly
unreasonable” standard or to adopt Booker’s “reasonableness”
standard across the board.30 Other courts of appeal have held that
the two standards are functionally the same.31 These courts point
out that Booker cites, as examples of “reasonableness” review,
several cases in which courts actually applied the § 3742(e)(4)
“plainly unreasonable” standard.32
30
See United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99 (2nd Cir.
2005)(adopting a “reasonableness” standard); United States v.
Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1176 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006)(same); United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 n.5 (4th Cir.
2006)(maintaining “plainly unreasonable” review).
31
See, e.g., United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105,
1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d
1159, 1161 (10th Cir.2005); United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d
913, 916 (8th Cir.2005).
32
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 262. The Booker Court expressly
addressed this point:
“Reasonableness” standards are not foreign to
sentencing law. The Act has long required their use in
important sentencing circumstances-both on review of
departures, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.), and
on review of sentences imposed where there was no
applicable Guideline, see §§ 3742(a)(4), (b)(4),
(e)(4).
Id. (emphasis added).
18
We have yet to address the issue squarely,33 but we need not
do so today to resolve this case. This is because Jones made no
objection to his revocation sentence in the district court, so it
is subject only to plain error review on appeal. As such, his
revocation sentence must be upheld unless we conclude that “there
is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial
rights. . . [and] (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”34 We do
not come to that conclusion.
2. Applicable Law
The statutory maximum term of imprisonment for possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon is ten years,35 making that offense
a Class C felony.36 A defendant convicted of a Class C felony who
subsequently violates the terms of his supervised release may be
reimprisoned for no more than two years.37 The advisory policy
statements in section 7B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines, however,
recommend a revocation sentence of 6-12 months for Class C felons
33
See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 119-20 (5th
Cir. 2005).
34
United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.
2005)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
35
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
36
18 U.S.C. § 3559(a).
37
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
19
in Jones’s Criminal History Category (IV). Section 7B1.3(f) of the
Guidelines states that,
[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of
probation or supervised release shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that
the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of
imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that
is the basis of the revocation of probation or supervised
release.
3. Merits
The record dispels any question that the re-sentencing court
erred in imposing Jones’s revocation sentence. As the foregoing
section shows, the revocation sentence itself, its duration, and
its being made to run consecutively, are explicitly authorized by
law. Moreover, even before Booker, the policy statements in §
7B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines were recognized as advisory
only,38 and the record reflects that the re-sentencing judge
considered but rejected those policy statements for reasons
detailed in his sentencing colloquy. We are satisfied that he
committed no legal error in imposing the non-Guidelines revocation
sentence.
In fact, Jones does not allege error; he merely challenges the
“reasonableness” of the revocation sentence, because the re-
sentencing judge justified imposing the statutory maximum
38
See Unites States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 91 (5th Cir.
1994).
20
revocation sentence for some of the same reasons given by the judge
in the instant case for imposing an above-Guidelines sentence.
Although the re-sentencing judge does appear to have imposed the
maximum revocation sentence in partial reliance on some of the
same reasons verbalized by the judge who imposed an above-
Guidelines sentence in the instant case, the revocation sentencing
colloquy reveals numerous additional bases for the re-sentencing
judge’s decision. We are satisfied that the re-sentencing court
did not plainly err in deciding to impose the statutory maximum
revocation sentence.
That said, however, we recognize that our vacatur of Jones’s
firearm possession conviction at least arguably may have nullified
the re-sentencing judge’s primary basis for imposing the maximum
revocation sentence that it did and for making it run consecutively
to this one. The law is clear that the violative conduct
warranting revocation of supervised release and reimprisonment
“need not be criminal and need only be found by a judge under a
preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”39 We nevertheless think it prudent to remand
this matter to the court that handed down the revocation sentence
based in large part on the conviction we now vacate and remand, so
39
See Hinson, 429 F.3d at 119.
21
that the underlying basis for Jones’s revocation sentence may be
reconsidered and clarified.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court abused its discretion in
allowing the government to introduce evidence of Jones’s prior
firearm offense. We accordingly VACATE Jones’s conviction and
sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We hold that Jones’s revocation sentence was not plainly
erroneous, but we nevertheless REMAND to the re-sentencing court
for reconsideration in light of our vacatur of Jones’s subsequent
conviction and sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm.
VACATED in part and REMANDED.
22
United States v. Jones
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2007-04-13
Citations: 484 F.3d 783
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