[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 14, 2003
No. 02-10782 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 01-00132-CR-ORL-22
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KARL P. ZINN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 14, 2003)
Before TJOFLAT and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG*, Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge, United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
Appellant Karl P. Zinn pled guilty to possessing child pornography and was
sentenced to imprisonment to be followed by a period of supervised release. The
supervised release included a number of special conditions, four of which
Appellant challenges on appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm
Appellant’s sentence in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 13, 2002, Appellant pled guilty1 to a one-count indictment charging
him with possessing materials containing images of child pornography that had
been mailed, shipped or transported in interstate commerce, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). According to the presentence investigation report
(PSR), to which Appellant raised no objections and the district court adopted as its
findings of fact, on March 15, 2001, Appellant contacted an undercover United
States Customs Service web site and expressed an interest in purchasing two
pornographic videotapes depicting girls between the ages of 6 and 13 years old.
He subsequently received an order form, which he completed and mailed to the
web site operators along with a check for $85. On April 3, 2001, two child
pornographic video tapes arrived at Appellant’s home as part of a controlled
delivery. Hours later, Customs agents executed a search warrant of the home and
1
Appellant pled guilty without the benefit of a written plea agreement.
2
recovered compact discs and computer diskettes containing in excess of 4,000
images of child pornography. During his plea hearing, Appellant admitted to the
district court that he had “received child pornography over the internet.”
The PSR noted Appellant admitted being suicidal and had voluntarily begun
mental health counseling shortly after his arrest. His attorney also told the district
court during sentencing that Appellant suffered from “profound psychological
problems” and requested that Appellant be placed in a federal medical facility
where he could receive appropriate treatment. The district court sentenced
Appellant to a term of 33 months’ imprisonment, with a recommendation that he
be committed to a medical facility. The court also sentenced Appellant to a term
of three years’ supervised release, which included the following special
conditions:
[1] You shall participate as directed in a program of mental health
treatment including a sexual offender treatment program approved by the
probation officer. You shall abide by the rules, requirements and
conditions of the treatment program, including submitting to polygraph
testing, at your own expense, to aid in the treatment and supervision
process. The results of the polygraph examination may not be used as
evidence in court to prove that a violation of community supervision has
occurred, but may be considered in a hearing to modify release
conditions.
Further, you shall be required to contribute to the costs of services
for such treatment in an amount determined reasonable by the probation
officer based upon ability to pay or availability of third-party payment
3
and in conformance with the Probation Office’s sliding scale for mental
health treatment services. [2] You shall register with the State Sexual
Offender Registration Agency [in] any State where you reside, visit, or
are employed, carry on a vocation or are a student as directed by your
probation officer. The probation officer will provide State officials with
all information required under Florida Sexual Predators and Sexual
Offender Notification and Registration Statutes and [may] direct you to
report to these agencies personally for required additional processing
such as photographic, fingerprinting and DNA collection.
[3] You shall have no direct contact with minors under the age of
18 without the written approval of the probation officer and shall refrain
from entering into any area where children frequently congregate
including schools, day care centers, theme parks, playgrounds, et cetera
. . . . [4] You shall not possess or use a computer with access to any on-
line service at any location, including employment, without written
approval from the probation officer. This includes access through any
Internet service provider, bulletin board system, or any public or private
computer network system . . . .2
After the district court imposed sentence, Appellant’s counsel objected to
the special conditions of supervised release:
And I would also like to state for the record my objections to the
supervised release conditions that this Court has imposed. I think, well,
I object in particular to the polygraph examination. I think that’s not a
2
In addition to these four special conditions of supervised release, Appellant
was ordered not to possess materials depicting children in the nude or in sexually
explicit positions, and to undergo periodic searches of his computer systems,
person, and residence. He does not challenge these other conditions on appeal.
The district court also ordered Appellant to perform community service and forfeit
certain assets, which he has not challenged. In addition, although the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines called for a fine between $6,000 and $60,000, both parties
stipulated that Appellant was unable to pay a fine.
4
proper condition of his supervised release. I think that, I strongly object
to that condition Your Honor.
I also object to the restrictions as to the internet access. I think
there’s some First Amendment concerns there. I also object, I will say
for the record I object to many of the restrictions this Court has put on
his supervised release. I think it’s unduly harsh. I think it also violates
his Constitutional rights. The First and Eighth Amendments and I think
that, I understand the Court’s concern in these type of cases, but I think,
I think the Court has been unduly harsh with Mr. Zinn. I think the
supervised release constitutes an excessive punishment.
The district court overruled the objections. Appellant then filed a timely
notice of appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court ordinarily reviews the district court’s sentence of supervised
release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275, 1278
(11th Cir. 2000). Where a defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for an
objection in the district court, however, he waives the objection on appeal and we
are limited to reviewing for plain error. United States v. Delgado, 903 F.2d 1495,
1504 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir.
1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th
Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Riggs, 967 F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 1992)
(noting that a defendant who fails to articulate a “clear objection” to a supervised
5
release condition waives the objection on appeal). To find reversible error under
the plain error standard, we must conclude that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error
was plain, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. United States v.
Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 2002).
Regarding the degree of clarity needed to preserve an objection for appeal,
we have stated that:
Whenever a litigant has a meritorious proposition of law which he
is seriously pressing upon the attention of the trial court, he should raise
that point in such clear and simple language that the trial court may not
misunderstand it, and if his point is so obscurely hinted at that the trial
court quite excusably may fail to grasp it, it will avail naught to disturb
the judgment on appeal.
Riggs, 967 F.2d at 564 (quoting United States v. Reyes-Vasquez, 905 F.2d 1497,
1500 (11th Cir. 1990)). Thus, if a defendant fails to clearly articulate a specific
objection during sentencing, the objection is waived on appeal and we confine our
review to plain error.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellant challenges the special conditions of supervised
release: (1) requiring him to register as a sexual offender; (2) prohibiting him
from entering places where children frequent; (3) requiring him to submit to
polygraph testing; and (4) prohibiting him from using the Internet. As to the first
6
two, we conclude the district court did not err and affirm without further
discussion.3 We write, however, to address the remaining two special conditions.
A. Polygraph Testing
Appellant asserts the special condition requiring him to submit to polygraph
testing: (1) is not reasonably related to the history and facts of this case,
(2) improperly delegates judicial authority to the probation officer, (3) violates his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and (4) improperly requires
him to pay for polygraph testing despite his inability to do so.
We will address each of these arguments seriatim. Before turning to the
merits, however, we first consider the Government’s contention that Appellant’s
challenge to the polygraph testing is generally not ripe for our review because
supervised release has not yet begun.
1. Ripeness.
Federal courts are constrained under Article III to deciding only actual cases
or controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. As part of the case or controversy
requirement, a party must come into immediate danger of suffering injury before a
court may consider his claim. Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir.
1999). Ripeness “prevent[s] the courts, through the avoidance of premature
3
See 11th Cir. R. 36-1.
7
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Id. (quoting
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967)).
An injury need not have already occurred, however, for a controversy to be ripe.
Rather, we have found claims on appeal ripe where they assert an imminent threat
of future injury. Ecee Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 611 F.2d 554, 557
n.7 (5th Cir. 1980).4
Contrary to the Government’s assertions, Appellant’s challenge to the
polygraph exam is neither premature nor speculative. The district court’s
sentence, of which the conditions of supervised release are a part, is a final
judgment immediately appealable to this Court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Moreover, though he is presently incarcerated, it seems apparent that Appellant
will be subject to the challenged condition upon his release from prison.5 See
4
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
5
The Government suggests the probation officer might select a course of
mental health treatment that does not include polygraph testing. Although this
possibility might lend support to the Government’s ripeness argument, we find no
basis for it in the record. The district court ordered that Appellant “shall abide by
the rules, requirements and conditions of the treatment program, including
submitting to polygraph testing” (emphasis added). While there is room for
interpretation, we construe this language as mandating polygraph testing as a
component of mental health treatment.
8
United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding challenge to
condition of supervised release was “not hypothetical” where supervised release
was to begin immediately following prison sentence). By determining a challenge
to the polygraph testing requirement to be generally ripe, however, we do not
imply that all specific challenges to the implementation of this condition are
necessarily ripe. In fact, as explained below, the reverse is true in this case.
2. Polygraph Testing Generally.
Turning to Appellant’s challenge to the polygraph testing, we first consider
his assertion on appeal that polygraph testing in general is not reasonably related
to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Counsel’s statement
during sentencing that polygraph testing is “not a proper condition” of supervised
release, though perhaps imprecise, adequately conveyed the nature of his objection
so as to preserve it for appeal. Therefore, we review the objection for abuse of
discretion. See Bull, 214 F.3d at 1278.
18 U.S.C. § 3553 directs the sentencing court to consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; [and]
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
9
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court should “impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to achieve the statutory purposes. Id.
The United States Code further states that the district court may impose any
condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with
the factors enumerated in § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Similarly, the federal
Sentencing Guidelines permit the sentencing court to impose any conditions of
supervised release that are “reasonably related” to the § 3553(a) factors, so long as
the conditions “involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary for the purposes set forth [in § 3553(a)] and are consistent with any
pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).
We have observed it is not necessary for a special condition to be supported
by each factor enumerated in § 3553(a). Rather, each is an independent
consideration to be weighed. Bull, 214 F.3d at 1278. Moreover, while the
10
Sentencing Guidelines recognize that a condition of supervised release should not
unduly restrict a defendant’s liberty, a condition is not invalid simply because it
affects a probationer’s ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights. See
Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982).
Appellant admitted having severe psychological problems, including an
affinity for child pornography. At the time of his arrest, he was in possession of
thousands of pornographic images depicting children as young as six years old.
The district court found it necessary to impose a sentence near the high end of the
Guidelines for Appellant’s own safety and rehabilitation “and the safety of the
public.” In light of Appellant’s crime and personal history, we agree with the
district court that he poses a danger to himself and others and is likely to require
further rehabilitation upon his release from prison. Under the circumstances, we
conclude polygraph testing to ensure compliance with probationary terms is both
reasonably related to Appellant’s offense and personal history, and when
reasonably applied will not unduly burden his rights. Therefore, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to generally require Appellant’s
submission to polygraph testing. See also United States v. Music, 49 Fed. Appx.
393 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
11
polygraph testing on supervised release for defendant convicted of possessing
child pornography).
3. Implementation of Polygraph Testing.
Appellant’s remaining arguments6 regarding the condition requiring
submission to polygraph testing can be fairly characterized as challenging the
potential abuses in its implementation. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, he has
not preserved these arguments for appeal and we are therefore limited to reviewing
them for plain error.7
6
We refer in this section mainly to Appellant’s arguments that the polygraph
testing violates his Fifth Amendment rights and unduly delegates authority to the
probation officer. The remaining argument Appellant raised in support of his
challenge to the polygraph testing was that by ordering Appellant to contribute to
the costs of polygraph testing, the district court contravened its earlier finding that
Appellant was unable to pay a fine. This argument is unavailing. Although the
district court directed that Appellant pay for polygraph testing, it also stated
during sentencing that the costs of mental health treatment, of which the polygraph
testing was a component, would only be assessed to Appellant based on his ability
to pay or the availability of third-party payment. We have previously observed
that “[i]n determining the terms of a sentence, it is the intent of the sentencing
judge which controls and that intent is to be determined by reference to the entire
record.” Bull, 214 F.3d at 1279 (citation omitted). As we did when confronted with
similar circumstances in Bull, we conclude the only reasonable construction of the overall
sentence in this case is that Appellant must pay for polygraph testing based on his ability to pay
at the time the testing occurs. This instruction is not inconsistent with the district
court’s finding Appellant unable to pay a fine at the time of sentence, and did not
constitute reversible error.
7
Appellant’s counsel’s argument to the district court that polygraph testing
was “not a proper condition” of supervised release was inadequate to properly
12
Appellant first asserts polygraph testing would violate the Fifth Amendment
based on the principle that it is unconstitutional for the Government to compel him
to “answer official questions put to him in any . . . proceeding, civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S. Ct. 316, 322 (1973).
Seizing on this principle, he argues that if he is asked a potentially incriminating
question during a polygraph exam, he will be unconstitutionally forced to choose
between answering or refusing to answer at the risk of having his supervised
release adversely modified.8
apprize the court of the very focused objections he now raises for the first time on
appeal, including that the condition violates his Fifth Amendment rights and
improperly delegates authority to the probation officer. As we have already
indicated, the district court is not expected to read minds or independently
conceive of every possible argument a party might raise in support of an objection.
It is a defendant’s–or his counsel’s–burden to articulate the specific nature of his
objection to a condition of supervised release so that the district court may
reasonably have an opportunity to consider it. Similarly, we are unpersuaded that
counsel’s vague reference to Appellant’s “Constitutional rights” was sufficient to
preserve his objections for appeal.
8
The district court expressly ordered as part of its sentence that “[t]he results
of the polygraph examination may not be used as evidence in court to prove that a
violation of community supervision has occurred, but may be considered in a
hearing to modify release conditions.” The court’s order is unclear as to what type
of “modification” might be a permissible response to a failed polygraph exam. We
will assume without deciding that the potential consequences in refusing to answer
would be sufficiently adverse to create a genuine Fifth Amendment dilemma.
13
The Supreme Court has stated that a state may generally require a
probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status
without violating the Fifth Amendment. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435,
104 S. Ct. 1136, 1146 (1984); see also United States v. Robinson, 893 F.2d 1244,
1245 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming revocation of convicted currency smuggler’s
probation where probationer violated condition of release by refusing to answer
questions regarding sources of income). The Court in Murphy admitted some
exceptions to the general rule, such as where a state forces a probationer to answer
incriminating questions over a claim of privilege:
The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer,
however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would
incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. There is thus
a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State, either
expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege
would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic
penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused,
and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 104 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court went on to note, however,
that “questions put to a probationer [that] were relevant to his probationary status
14
and posed no realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding”
would not violate the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 435 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 1146 n.7.9
It is undisputed that at this juncture there has been no potentially
incriminating question or invocation of the privilege, much less any government
compulsion to testify over a valid claim of privilege. Such an eventuality is within
the realm of possibility, but hypothetical possibilities do not present a cognizable
Fifth Amendment claim. As the First Circuit recently observed in rejecting a
similar challenge, it would be pure speculation to assume such facts now simply
because they might conceivably come to exist at some future time. See Davis, 242
F.3d at 52 (“Should the court revoke Davis’s supervised release as a penalty for
his legitimate exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, he remains free to
challenge that action at the time it occurs. That eventuality, however, has not yet
occurred (and may never occur).”). If and when Appellant is forced to testify over
his valid claim of privilege, he may raise a Fifth Amendment challenge. In the
9
The Court held in Murphy that a Fifth Amendment privilege was not self-
executing where a probationer is required to answer questions affecting his
probation. In other words, even if the probationer gave incriminating testimony,
such testimony would not be barred in a subsequent proceeding unless the
probationer actually asserted a claim of privilege. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 440,
104 S. Ct. at 1149. In this case, not only has Appellant not yet asserted a claim of
privilege, he has not given any incriminating testimony or even been requested to
give such testimony.
15
meantime, we can only decide whether requiring polygraph testing as a condition
of supervised release generally violates the Fifth Amendment so as to amount to
plain error. We hold it does not.
For the same reasons, Appellant cannot demonstrate plain error in the
district court’s delegation of authority to the probation officer for overseeing
Appellant’s mental health treatment, including administration of polygraph exams.
The district court’s sentence was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, which
expressly permitted the court to impose “a condition [of supervised release]
requiring that the defendant participate in a mental health program approved by
the United States Probation Office.” U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(d)(5), p.s. (emphasis
added). Furthermore, we have recognized the vital role probation officers fulfill in
effectuating the district court’s sentence. See United States v. Bernardine, 237
F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (“For purposes of efficiency, district courts must
be able to rely as extensively as possible on the support services of probation
officers.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). Thus, the delegation of
authority to the probation officer generally does not constitute plain error. And,
while we might again conceive of a scenario where a probation officer abuses or
oversteps his lawful authority, there is no reason to suspect at this time that such
will be the case here.
16
Accordingly, the district court did not err in requiring Appellant’s
submission to polygraph testing as a condition of supervised release.
B. Restriction on Internet Usage
Appellant asserts the restriction on Internet usage is improper under 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d) because it is not reasonably related to legitimate sentencing
considerations and overly burdens his First Amendment rights. Specifically, he
argues the district court could have satisfied the statutory sentencing goals in
relation to his offense without entirely foreclosing all Internet use. We review the
special condition restricting Internet use for abuse of discretion. See Bull, 214
F.3d at 1278.
Whether a district court may prohibit a convicted child pornography
offender from using the Internet while on supervised release is an issue of first
impression in this circuit. The Fifth Circuit has upheld a complete ban on a
convicted sex-offender’s Internet use while on supervised release. See United
States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit has held a general prohibition against Internet use on supervised release is
not error where the offender is allowed to use the Internet with his probation
officer’s prior permission. See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 988 (10th
17
Cir. 2001).10 These courts have noted the strong link between child pornography
and the Internet, and the need to protect the public, particularly children, from sex
offenders. See, e.g., Paul, 274 F.3d at 169 (“The record reveals that Paul has in
the past used the Internet to encourage exploitation of children by seeking out
fellow ‘boy lovers’ and providing them with advice on how to find and obtain
access to ‘young friends.’ Restricting his access to this communication medium
clearly serves the dual statutory goals of protecting the public and preventing
future criminal activity.”).
We consider the reasoning in these cases persuasive and conclude there was
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s limited restriction on Appellant’s
Internet usage. We realize the Internet has become an important resource for
information, communication, commerce, and other legitimate uses, all of which
may be potentially limited to Appellant as a result of our decision. Nevertheless,
the particular facts of this case highlight the concomitant dangers of the Internet
10
Walser clarified an earlier decision of the Tenth Circuit, United States v.
White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001), where the court held that a complete ban
on Internet usage with no exceptions was improper under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
We are cognizant that White was decided under an abuse of discretion standard
while in Walser the court was limited to reviewing for plain error. Nevertheless,
the restriction at issue in this case is virtually identical to Walser’s in that in
allows Appellant to use the Internet with his probation officer’s permission, and
we find Walser’s reasoning persuasive.
18
and the need to protect both the public and sex offenders themselves from its
potential abuses.11 We are also satisfied that the restriction in this case is not
overly broad in that Appellant may still use the Internet for valid purposes by
obtaining his probation officer’s prior permission. As the Tenth Circuit observed
in Walser, this relatively narrowly-tailored condition “readily accomplishes the
goal of restricting use of the Internet and more delicately balances the protection
of the public with the goals of sentencing.” Walser, 275 F.3d at 988.
We acknowledge that two other circuits have embraced a holding opposite
from the one we adopt today. See United States v. Freeman, No. 01-3475, 2003
WL 57329 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2003); United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir.
2002). In Sofsky, the Second Circuit held a restriction on computer and Internet
use was invalid even where there was an exception if the offender received his
probation officer’s approval. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.12 In Freeman, the Third
11
We reiterate that at the time he was arrested for the instant offense,
Appellant was in possession of over 4,000 images of child pornography stored on
computer diskettes and compact disks. Appellant’s counsel admitted during oral
argument that there is a “reasonable assumption” these images came from the
Internet. Moreover, it is undisputed that Appellant used the Internet to facilitate
the purchase of pornographic videotapes, ultimately leading to his arrest and
conviction in this case.
12
The Second Circuit in Sofsky appeared to rely on its earlier decision in
United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001). In Peterson, the court
rejected a prohibition on computer and Internet usage where the appellant had
19
Circuit relied on Sofsky in reaching the same conclusion. Freeman, No. 01-3475,
2003 WL 57329.13 Although we appreciate these courts’ concerns that restrictions
on Internet usage may effect some deprivation of liberty, we agree with those
courts holding that a limited restriction on a sex offender’s Internet use is a
necessary and reasonable condition of supervised release.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in ordering Appellant to submit to polygraph
examinations as part of his mental health treatment on supervised release. This
condition is reasonably related to his offense and history, satisfies the statutory
sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and does not unduly infringe on
Appellant’s liberties. Moreover, although the challenge to the polygraph exam is
been convicted of larceny and the Internet restriction was actually related to a
prior unrelated sex offense. Under those circumstances, the court held the
restriction was neither reasonably related to the conviction nor reasonably
necessary to achieving the statutory sentencing objectives. See id. at 82-83. Of
course, that was neither the case in Sofsky nor here, where the restrictions bear a
strong tie to the offenses that precipitated the sentences being challenged on
appeal.
13
Freeman distinguished an earlier Third Circuit decision, United States v.
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999), where the court had upheld a restriction on
Internet use. In Crandon, the offender had actually contacted minors over the
Internet. In Freeman, the offender had used the Internet to obtain child
pornography, but had not directly contacted minors. According to the Third
Circuit, only the former circumstance justified a limited restriction on Internet use.
See Freeman, No. 01-3475, 2003 WL 57329. We disagree.
20
generally ripe for our review, certain of Appellant’s arguments against polygraph
testing lack merit because they depend on future contingency and speculation. If
those contingencies come to fruition, Appellant may challenge the condition at the
appropriate time. Finally, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing a limited restriction on Appellant’s Internet use during the period of
supervised release.
AFFIRMED.
21
United States v. Karl P. Zinn
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date filed: 2003-02-14
Citations: 321 F.3d 1084
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion