United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 99-1318
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
DANIEL LAFRENIERE, a/k/a Diablo Dan,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
Casellas* District Judge.
_____________________
Michael J. Cruz, by appointment of the Court, with whom
Bernard & Cruz, was on brief for appellant Daniel LaFreniere.
Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Andrew Levchuk,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
____________________
January 2, 2001
____________________
_____________________
* Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
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CASELLAS, District Judge. A jury convicted appellant Daniel
Lafreniere1 (hereinafter “Lafreniere”) of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute heroin. The district court
sentenced him to 120 months in prison, followed by 5 years of
supervised release. This appeal ensued. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 24, 1997, a federal grand jury returned a second
superseding indictment against Lafreniere and twelve other individuals
charging them with the commission of several offenses stemming from
their involvement in the Connecticut and Massachusetts chapters of the
Diablos Motorcycle Club (hereinafter the “Diablos,” or the “Club”).
Lafreniere was charged, either alone or in combination with others,
with conspiracy to commit racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (count 1),
and actually committing racketeering, id. (c) (count 2); interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles, id. § 2312 (counts 24, 26 and
28); possession and sale of stolen motor vehicles, id. § 2313 (counts
25, 27 and 29); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (counts 31 and 32); carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (counts 35 and 36); and possession and transfer of an
1
Lafreniere was tried and convicted with a number of other
defendants. Their appeals were heard at the same time, and are
addressed in separate decisions. United States v. Houle, No. 99-1310
(1st Cir. filed February 10, 1999); United States v. Baltas, No. 99-
1574 (1st Cir. filed April 2, 1999).
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unregistered sawed-off shotgun, id. § 5861(d) (count 39).
The jury acquitted Lafreniere on all counts with the
exception of count 32. He presents two related issues on appeal.
First, he assigns fault to the district court in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal, insisting that the court should have found that
he was entrapped as a matter of law. Second, he asserts, for the first
time on appeal, that the district court erred in instructing the jury
about the predisposition element of the defense of entrapment. We
sketch the facts contained in the record in the light most hospitable
to the jury’s verdict, see United States v. González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d
37, 40 (1st Cir. 2000), adding detail as it becomes necessary to the
discussion of the issues at hand.
The Diablos started out in San Bernardino, California in the
1960's, and from there expanded to the rest of the country. At the
times relevant to this appeal, the Diablos’s national presence included
chapters in California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire. They had a written constitution, which conditioned
membership, among other things, upon being at least 21 years old,
Caucasian, and owning a firearm and a Harley-Davidson motorcycle of a
particular size. Membership was by invitation only, and women and
African-Americans were specifically banned. Members first had to serve
as “prospects,” a role similar to that of a pledge in a fraternity,
before being eligible for full membership. The Diablos had both
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national and local governing structures.
One of the prosecution’s star witnesses was William Alvis
(hereinafter “Alvis”). Prior to becoming a Diablo, Alvis had been
affiliated with the Barbarians Motorcycle Club, where he became
knowledgeable of the biker culture and language. While associated with
the Barbarians, Alvis was charged with committing various crimes
unrelated to the instant indictment, and eventually began cooperating
with the government. He infiltrated the Diablos at the FBI’s behest.
At trial, Alvis testified that one important characteristic
of the Diablos was their shared sense of brotherhood. Alvis gained the
trust and confidence of the Diablos, and with his familiarity with the
biker culture, eased his way into the internal affairs of the
organization. He developed close relationships with several members of
the Club, particularly with various members of the Connecticut and
Massachusetts chapters, ultimately becoming vice president of the
latter. Simply put, Alvis was the FBI’s “eyes and ears inside of the
Diablos organization.”
As a result of his status within the Diablos, Alvis was able
to gather for the FBI valuable information about the Club’s structure
and daily operations. He also introduced several undercover agents
into the Club, and, with their help, put together a number of criminal
schemes involving the Diablos. Among these schemes were two reverse-
sting heroin deals. The government’s evidence of the circumstances
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surrounding these schemes consisted mainly of Alvis’s testimony at
trial. Following is a summary of this evidence.
At a meeting held in late July of 1995, Alvis, then treasurer
of the Massachusetts chapter, informed its members that the chapter was
in a bad financial situation and was unable to meet its expenses.
Specifically, Alvis told the members that they would probably be
evicted from the clubhouse because the rent was in arrears. To
alleviate the situation, Alvis proposed that some members aid him in a
drug transaction. He told the Diablos that he needed them to “[r]un
security for [a] transportation of heroin.” He also explained that
each participant would be paid $500, which money would be “invested .
. . back into the Club.”
Lafreniere, who was among those present at the meeting,
agreed to take part in the plan. In expressing his acquiescence,
Lafreniere, who had already participated in a similar deal about a
month earlier, stated, matter-of-factly: “I already did one of these
things.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Entrapment as a Matter of Law
Entrapment consists of two prongs: “(1) improper Government
inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of
the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.” United States v.
Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1998). Once the defendant meets his
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initial burden of showing entitlement to an instruction on the defense,
“the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
either that there was no undue government pressure or trickery or that
the defendant was predisposed.” United States v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334,
338 (1st Cir. 1995). “As a matter of law, entrapment cannot flourish
unless both elements of the defense . . . coincide. The defense fails
if the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that either is
lacking.” United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1994)
(citation, internal quotation marks, alterations and footnote omitted).
We review de novo Lafreniere’s claim that the district court
should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because he was
entrapped as a matter of law, applying the traditional sufficiency-of-
the-evidence standard.2 See Acosta, 67 F.3d at 338; Gifford, 17 F.3d
at 467. Thus, we review all the evidence, direct and circumstantial,
in the light most charitable to the prosecution, drawing all reasonable
inferences consistent with the verdict, and eschewing credibility
judgments, to determine whether a rational jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States
v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 772 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.
Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1996). The crux of the issue
is whether “the jury reasonably could have thought that this was not a
2
Since the government does not question Lafreniere’s entitlement
to an entrapment charge, we go directly to the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge.
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case in which government agents implanted in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induced its
commission in order that they may prosecute.” Gifford, 17 F.3d at 470
(citation, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Lafreniere first alleges improper inducement. He argues that
Alvis spurred him to participate in the drug deal by exploiting their
bond as Diablos and by stressing the financial hardships of the
Massachusetts chapter. It is settled that not all inducement is
unlawful; only that which is “improper” is considered “inducement” for
purposes of entrapment. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961
(1st Cir. 1994). Inducement “consists of an ‘opportunity’ plus
something else—typically, excessive pressure by the government upon the
defendant or the government’s taking advantage of an alternative non-
criminal type of motive.” Id. In the case at bar, the evidence
presented to the jury reasonably established that no such pressure was
brought upon Lafreniere. Alvis merely explained the Club’s financial
situation to its members and presented a plan, albeit an illegal one,
to alleviate it. While in doing so Alvis provided Club members with an
opportunity to commit a crime, there was nothing else to it.
Lafreniere urges us to consider Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932) as an example of the “subtle nature of improper
inducement,” which he claims he was subjected to. According to him,
“[d]espite the layman’s belief that entrapment requires aggressive and
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coercive behavior on the part of a government agent, the facts in
Sorrells provide effective illustration of an inducement which went
beyond merely providing the defendant with an opportunity to commit a
crime.” Id.
Sorrells involved a conviction under the National Prohibition
Act. The defendant, a World War I veteran, was visited by a
prohibition agent posing as a tourist, who, as it turned out, was also
a war veteran. Playing upon their common experiences, the agent twice
asked the defendant for some liquor without result. Upon the agent’s
third request, the defendant gave in. At trial, the defendant alleged
entrapment, but the court refused to sustain the defense ruling that,
as a matter of law, there had been no entrapment. The circuit court
affirmed; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Contrary to Lafreniere’s contention, the Court in Sorrells
did not rule that the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law,
but “that upon [the] evidence produced . . . the defense of entrapment
was available and that the trial court was in error in holding that as
a matter of law there was no entrapment and in refusing to submit the
issue to the jury.” Id. at 452 (emphasis added). The Court found that
the agent had “lured” the defendant “by repeated and persistent
solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of their
experiences as companions in arms in the World War.” Id. at 441. No
such insistence occurred in this case.
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Lafreniere asserts, nonetheless, that Alvis “purposefully
took advantage of the emotional bond” between them to induce him. At
trial, Alvis acknowledged having used Lafreniere’s “trust,” “loyalty”
and “affection” to get him involved in the drug deal. Yet such
cunning, without more, is not impermissible. See United States v.
Young, 78 F.3d 758, 761 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting “the proposition
that friendship, without a plea predicated upon friendship, suffices
legally as inducement.”); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441 (“Artifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal
enterprises.”). While Alvis may have led Lafreniere to believe that
the plan would benefit the Club, he did not twist his arm to make him
take part in it. The evidence reasonably supports a finding that
rather than an “unwary innocent,” Lafreniere was an “unwary criminal.”
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
Our conclusion that Lafreniere was not wrongfully induced
suffices to dispose of his claim that he was entrapped as a matter of
law. We note, nonetheless, that the evidence also supports a finding
that he did not lack the requisite predisposition. In this connection
we ask “how the defendant likely would have reacted to an ordinary
opportunity to commit the crime,” Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962, taking into
consideration factors such as (1) Lafreniere’s character or reputation;
(2) whether the initial suggestion to commit the crime was made by the
government; (3) whether Lafreniere was engaged in criminal activity for
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profit; (4) whether he showed reluctance to commit the offense, which
was overcome by governmental persuasion; and (5) the nature of such
persuasion or inducement, see Gamache, 156 F.3d at 9-10.
It is not disputed that Alvis initially suggested the drug
deal as a way to generate money for the Club. Also, Lafreniere did not
have a criminal record, particularly as to drug trafficking. The
relevance of these circumstances, however, is markedly outweighed by
more substantial factors. First and foremost, Lafreniere showed no
reluctance to engage in the heroin transaction; he readily agreed to
the plan. This factor, in itself, can “adequately evince an
individual’s predisposition.” Gifford, 17 F.3d at 469. Moreover, in
expressing his acquiescence, Lafreniere remarked that he had “already
d[one] one of these things,” in reference to the previous reverse sting
heroin transaction in which he had been involved.3 Second, as already
noted, the government’s inducement was not improper; Alvis did not
coerce, threaten or doggedly pressure Lafreniere to participate in the
3
Lafreniere objects to the consideration of the evidence of this
prior involvement arguing that under Jacobson v. United States, 503
U.S. 540, 549 (1992), a defendant’s predisposition must be determined
prior to any contact with government agents. However:
[T]his is not a correct statement of the law. It is true
that, when a defendant raises a defense of entrapment, the
government must show that he was predisposed to commit the
charged crime prior to his contact with government agents;
however, the government may use the defendant’s behavior
after he was approached by government agents as evidence of
his predisposition prior to meeting the agents.
United States v. Rogers, 121 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334, 339 (1st Cir. 1995)).
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transaction. Third, Lafreniere was a regular drug user. He argues
nonetheless that the evidence showed that he was “essentially a hard-
working family man.” However, as we have noted before, “it cannot be
enough where the defendant readily agreed to engage in a criminal act,
to show that he enjoys good reputation.” United States v. Panet-
Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation, internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). In sum, we find that, based
on the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Lafreniere was
not entrapped.
B. Instructional Error
Lafreniere next alleges that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury as to the defense of entrapment. Because
Lafreniere did not object to the charge at trial, we review this claim
for plain error. United States v. Alzate, 70 F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir.
1995). “This type of review entails inquiry into whether affirmance
would skew the fundamental fairness or basic integrity of the
proceeding below in some major respect, so as to result in a
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 484
(1st Cir. 2000) (citation, internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Finding no such circumstances, we affirm the district
court’s instructional decision.
According to Lafreniere, the instruction was “deficient and
misleading in two important ways.” First, he argues, “the instruction
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only directs the jury to evaluate predisposition according to how
quickly the defendant agreed to commit the offense.” Anent to this
challenge, Lafreniere also alleges that the instruction impermissibly
directed the jury “to explore what motives the defendant might [have]
had if he displayed any hesitation or reluctance.”
In instructing the jury on inducement, the trial court
referred to the element of predisposition as follows: “[A] defendant
may not be convicted of a crime if it was the Government that not only
gave the defendant the idea to commit the crime, but also persuaded him
to commit a crime that he was not ready and willing –that is,
predisposed– to commit before Government officials or agents first
spoke with him.” “On the other hand,” the court continued, “if the
defendant was predisposed to violate the law under circumstances making
it desirable in his view to do so, and the Government merely presented
him with those circumstances, that would not constitute entrapment.”
Moreover, the trial court specifically instructed the jury on
predisposition:
You must decide if the Government has satisfied
its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that,
prior to first being approached by Government agents,
the defendant was predisposed, or ready and willing, to
commit the crime in any event.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed –that is, ready and willing–
to commit the offenses charged, and the Government
merely offered a favorable opportunity to commit them,
then you should find that the defendant was not
entrapped.
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You may consider as evidence on this point a
defendant’s initial willingness or unwillingness to
consider the crime. You may also decide whether
evidence of a defendant’s hesitation at the criminal
suggestions reflects the conscience of an innocent
person or merely the caution of a criminal.
The trial court’s instruction neatly followed our
jurisprudence on entrapment. Specifically, calling upon the jury’s
attention to a defendant’s readiness to commit the crime comported with
our statement in Gifford, to the effect that “ready commission of the
criminal act can itself adequately evince an individual’s
predisposition.” 17 F.3d at 469. Moreover, contrary to Lafreniere’s
contention, the trial court did not solely refer to a defendant’s
readiness to commit the offense; it also directed the jury to examine
whether Lafreniere “was predisposed to violate the law under
circumstances making it desirable in his view to do so,” having been
merely presented with the opportunity to do so, and prior to being
approached by government agents. This part of the court’s instruction
echoes the test set forth in Gendron to assess predisposition; that is,
asking “how the defendant likely would have reacted to an ordinary
opportunity to commit the crime.” 18 F.3d at 962. Furthermore, the
district court instructed the jury that it may “consider as evidence
[of predisposition] a defendant’s initial willingness or unwillingness
to consider the crime.” The court’s indication to the jury to “decide
whether evidence of a defendant’s hesitation at the criminal
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suggestions reflects the conscience of an innocent person or merely the
caution of a criminal,” was also in accordance with our case law. See,
e.g., United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 219 (1st Cir. 1992)
(evaluating whether the defendant’s delay in committing the crime
resulted from “an experienced person’s wariness in dealing with a
comparative stranger”); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 989 (1st
Cir. 1990) (concluding that the defendant’s failure to make telephone
calls and appear at meetings in relation to a drug transaction was
attributable to difficulties in raising the purchase money).
Second, Lafreniere alleges that the instruction failed to
direct the jury to “make any examination of the defendant’s
background.” In this connection, he argues that, due to his
participation in two government-orchestrated heroin transactions, the
instruction should have offered guidance as to which of the
transactions should have been taken into consideration when assessing
predisposition. We find, however, no error in the trial court’s
charge. The jury was specifically instructed to assess predisposition
prior to any contact with government officials. Regarding Lafreniere’s
background, we note that “[w]hile a more precisely tailored instruction
might well have been suitable if specially sought, such refinements
tailoring the language to the situation require that the judge be
advised of the request.” Alzate, 70 F.3d at 201. Reviewing the charge
“as a whole,” in the context of all the evidence presented at trial, we
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fail to find reversible error. Alicea, 205 F.3d at 484.
C. Sentencing
After oral argument was held, letters were transmitted
to the court under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) calling our attention
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
— U.S. — (2000), 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). While the letters were
transmitted by two of Lafreniere’s co-defendants, we extended an
invitation to Lafreniere and the government to supplement their
briefs addressing the possible relevance of Apprendi and,
assuming that Apprendi applies, addressing the issue of
prejudice. Such memoranda having been filed, the matter is now
properly submitted for disposition.
The Supreme Court in Appprendi held as a matter of
constitutional law that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 120 S. Ct. at
2362-63. Invoking this rule, Lafreniere seeks to have his
sentence vacated because the amount of the heroin attributed to
him was never submitted to the jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because Lafreniere did not raise this issue
below, we review for plain error. See United States v. Mojica-
Báez, 229 F.3d 292, 307 (1st Cir. 2000).
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Lafreniere makes two arguments on appeal: first, that
the district court imposed a sentence above the lowest statutory
maximum provided by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); and second, that
the district court erroneously imposed a sentence in excess of
the lowest statutory mandatory minimum.
Lafreniere was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intention to distribute and to distribute heroin, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The amount of heroin attributed to him was
not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it
was determined by the district court under a preponderance of
evidence standard at the sentencing hearing. Under this
standard, the district court determined that the transaction
involved from 1 to 3 kilograms of heroin. Based on its findings
the court sentenced Lafreniere to a ten year mandatory minimum
sentence under 841(b)(1)(A).
The statutory framework involved in this case begins
with Section 846, which provides that the penalty for an attempt
or conspiracy to commit a drug trafficking offense shall be the
same as the penalty for the offense that was the object of the
attempt or conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 846. The underlying offense
is set out in section 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful to
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”
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21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Section 841(b)(1)(A)-(D), in turn,
establishes the penalties applicable to a violation of section
841(a)(1). Section 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory catchall
authorizes a term of imprisonment for a schedule I or II
narcotic, such as heroin, without reference to drug quantity, of
“not more than 20 years.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
Lafreniere first argues that the district court imposed
a sentence above the lowest statutory maximum provided in
Section 841. In support of his argument he relies on the Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.
2000). In that case, the jury made no finding as to the
specific amount of marijuana that the defendant possessed with
the intent to distribute. Similarly, the judge determined the
quantity of drugs using the preponderance of evidence standard.
The error occurred when the district court’s finding imposed a
sentence that went beyond the five year maximum for an
undetermined amount of marijuana. Nordby was sentenced to the ten
years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). However, 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(D) states that “in the case of less than 50 kilograms of
marijuana, except in the case of 50 or more marijuana plants regardless
of weight . . . [the defendant shall] be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than 5 years.” Id. at 1056-57. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit found the ten year sentence exceeded the maximum
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allowed for a marijuana conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(D).
Although he does not spell out his argument, it appears that
Lafreniere believes his case is exactly like Nordby, because his
sentence exceeded the statutory maximum provided in 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). However, his reliance is misplaced. First, unlike
Nordby, Lafreniere was convicted of a heroin offense and not a
marijuana offense. Therefore, the five year statutory maximum
provision of Section 841(b)(1)(D), that was exceeded in Nordby, is
inapplicable to the case at bar. As such, the correct “statutory
maximum” for a schedule two substance, like heroin, is found in the
catchall provision of Section 841(b)(1)(C). This section states that
“in the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II . . . except
as provided in subparagraphs (A),(B), and (D), such person shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years.” 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Therefore, since the district court sentenced
Lafreniere to a term of 10 years, well below the maximum of twenty
years, his reliance on Nordby is incorrect.
Lafreniere also argues that the district court erroneously
imposed a sentence in excess of the lowest statutory mandatory minimum,
and invites the court to read Apprendi more broadly to include
mandatory minimums. Under Lafreniere’s proposed reading, any factor
that would increase the mandatory minimum penalty associated with an
offense, albeit within the statutory maximum, would also have to be
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submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The main obstacle to this proposition is Apprendi itself.
The majority in Apprendi declined to overrule their previous decision
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1965), which authorizes
legislatures to increase minimum penalties based upon non-jury factual
determinations, as long as the penalty imposed does not exceed the
maximum range. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at — n.13. As the Eighth
Circuit noted in Aguayo-Delgado:
If the non-jury factual determination only narrows the
sentencing judge’s discretion within the range already
authorized by the offense of conviction . . ., then the
governing constitutional standard is provided by McMillan.
As we have said, McMillan allows the legislature to raise
the minimum penalty associated with a crime based on non-
jury factual findings, as long as the penalty is within the
range specified for the crime for which the defendant was
convicted by the jury. Apprendi expressly states that
McMillan is still good law . . . .
220 F.3d 926, 933-34 (5th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2000) (approving of a more
limited reading of Apprendi). We believe that this is the proper
construction under existing precedent; and therefore, refuse to apply
Apprendi in cases concerning the mandatory minimums.
Our holding today is that no Apprendi violation occurs
when the district court sentences the defendant within the
statutory maximum, regardless that drug quantity was never
determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This holding
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is consistent with those of our sister circuits which have had
the opportunity to address challenges similar to the ones
presented by Lafreniere. See, e.g., Meshack, 225 F.3d at 576-77;
Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d at 926; United States v. Gerrow, 2000
WL 1675594, at *2 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000); United States v.
Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2000).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and
sentence.
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