United States v. Lares-Meraz

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit June 6, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-11143

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

IGNACIO LARES-MERAZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

Before DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ignacio Lares-Meraz appeals his sentence on the grounds that

his constitutional rights were violated under United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). During the pendency of his appeal,

Lares-Meraz served twelve months’ imprisonment, was released, and

was deported to his native Mexico. Lares-Meraz remains subject to

a three-year term of supervised release, an element of his total

sentence. This Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of

mootness in light of Lares-Meraz’s release and deportation. We

conclude that Lares-Meraz’s appeal is not moot, and because Lares-
Meraz expressly concedes that any error in sentencing is harmless

and requests affirmance of his sentence, we affirm.

I.

Lares-Meraz was indicted for illegal reentry into the United

States after prior deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He

was charged with reentry “on or about March 10, 2004.” Lares-Meraz

pleaded guilty, and in association with his guilty plea, Lares-

Meraz signed a factual resume which stated that he had been found

in the United States on November 28, 2003.1 At his guilty plea,

Lares-Meraz again affirmed the accuracy of the factual stipulation.

The presentence report (“PSR”) reflected that Lares-Meraz

entered the United States illegally on February 10, 2002, and

accordingly his criminal history calculation included two

additional points because the commission of the instant offense was

commenced less than two years after Lares-Meraz’s prior release for

imprisonment for illegal entry. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES

§ 4A1.1(b), (e).2 The PSR also included an additional criminal

1
In the factual resume, the typed March 10, 2004 date was
crossed out, and the November 28, 2003 date was hand-written
above it. These changes were initialed by Lares-Meraz, his
counsel, and counsel for the government. The presentence report
also gives November 28, 2003 as the date, relevant to the instant
offense, upon which Lares-Meraz was found in the United States by
a federal agent.
2
The underlying offense giving rise to this two-point
increase in criminal history was a July 30, 2001 judgment entered
upon Lares-Meraz’s guilty plea in the Western District of Texas
for illegal entry. On that plea, Lares-Meraz was sentenced,
according to the PSR, to 180 days in custody and deported to
Mexico on November 15, 2001. The PSR and factual resume

2
history point for a prior Colorado conviction of driving while

impaired. See id. § 4A1.1(c). Lares-Meraz’s PSR calculated a

total of seven criminal history points and a criminal history

category of IV. These calculations, combined with a total offense

level of six, resulted in a guidelines sentencing range of six to

twelve months’ imprisonment. Lares-Meraz objected to the

calculation before the district court under Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004). The court overruled the objection and

sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment and three years’

supervised release.

Lares-Meraz argues that the criminal history calculations

resulted in an unconstitutional sentence because the PSR’s date of

offense (February 10, 2002) was used, rather than the November 28,

2003 date that was admitted by Lares-Meraz in the factual resume,

to increase the points of his criminal history calculation. Both

the one-point and two-point increases to his criminal history

calculation, according to Lares-Meraz, were based upon these facts

that were neither found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt nor

admitted by him.

The records of the Federal Bureau of Prisons indicate that

potentially conflict regarding the date of Lares-Meraz’s most
recent illegal entry offense. The two criminal history points
were added for an offense that produced deportation on November
15, 2001; other information suggests that Lares-Meraz was
deported more recently on January 24, 2002, and that he
subsequently reentered the United States on February 10, 2002.

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Lares-Meraz was released on March 8, 2005, and defense counsel

admits that Lares-Meraz was deported to Mexico and that his

whereabouts are unknown.

II.

“A controversy is mooted when there are no longer adverse

parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.

A moot case presents no Article III case or controversy, and a

court has no constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues it

presents.” Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 717 (5th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted). “Accordingly, an actual, live controversy

must remain at all stages of federal court proceedings, both at the

trial and appellate levels. That is, the requisite personal

interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation

(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” De

La O v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 417 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir.)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 808 (2005); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998);

United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1999).

Whether an appeal is moot is a jurisdictional issue because it

implicates Article III’s requirement of a live case or controversy.

Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987). This

Court must raise the question of mootness sua sponte when, as here,

it is not raised by a party, and the Court reviews the question de

novo. See Donovan v. Air Trans., Dist. Lodge No. 146, 754 F.2d

4
621, 624 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Bailey, 821 F.2d at 278. The

parties responded to this Court’s order for supplemental briefing

on this issue.

To the extent a defendant appeals his conviction, his appeal

is not moot simply because his term of imprisonment has expired.

See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Neither is Lares-Meraz’s challenge to

his sentence moot because he remains subject to a term of

supervised release, an element of the overall sentence. See Clark,

193 F.3d at 847.

Generally, a term of supervised release is not immune to

modification by the district court. A district court may have the

authority to modify conditions of supervised release under 18

U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(2), or the authority to terminate obligations of

supervised release, after the expiration of one year of supervised

release, under § 3583(e)(1). See United States v. Johnson, 529

U.S. 53, 59 (2000); see also Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917,

918 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hernandez, No. 05-40729, 2006

U.S. App. LEXIS 6876 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006); United States v.

Benavides, 145 F. App’x 971 (5th Cir. 2005). In addition, on this

record the government and defense counsel agree that Lares-Meraz’s

subjection to the terms of supervised release satisfy an ongoing

consequence that is a sufficient legal interest to support Article

III’s case or controversy requirement; although this Court will not

rely upon the parties’ stipulation to find that Article III

5
jurisdiction exists. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998); United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851,

857 (5th Cir. 2000). Lares-Meraz’s appeal is not moot.

III.

Lares-Meraz preserved his objection under Booker before the

district court by objecting to the calculation of criminal history

score based upon facts in the PSR that were not admitted by Lares-

Meraz. Therefore, our review is for harmful error under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). United States v. Pineiro, 410

F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d

511, 520 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005). Rule 52(a) provides that “any error,

defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial

rights must be disregarded.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). An error is

deemed harmless only if the government proves beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error did not contribute to the sentence that the

defendant received. United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d 255, 280 (5th

Cir. 2006); United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 381-82 (5th

Cir. 2005).

In supplemental briefing, both defense counsel and the

government argue that the error here, while harmful in theory

because it affected Lares-Meraz’s substantial rights at the time,

is an error that is now, practically speaking, harmless because

Lares-Meraz has served his imprisonment term and because the terms

of his supervised release require that he not reenter the United

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States illegally and subject him to additional penalty for failure

to comply.3

In United States v. Benavides, 145 F. App’x 971 (5th Cir.

2005), the defendant’s sentence was vacated and the case remanded

for resentencing because the government failed to show harmless

Booker error and because although Benavides had already served his

imprisonment term and been released, the district court retained

discretion to consider equitable factors under the United States

Code or to modify or terminate the term of supervised release. See

id. at 973. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)-(2)). Benavides did not

resolve the question of statutory modification of or termination of

supervised release and instead remanded the issues for the district

court’s consideration in the first instance. Id. at 972-73. The

instant case, however, differs materially from Benavides because

Benavides was neither deported upon release, nor did he concede

that any error at the time of disposition on appeal was harmless.

On this atypical record, Lares-Meraz concedes that the error

was harmless. The Government agrees. On such a record, Lares-

3
In original briefing, Lares-Meraz argued that the
calculation of his criminal history points and category, and
imposition of sentence based upon the relevant guideline range,
was harmful error because in the absence of the error, he would
have been subject to a criminal history category of III,
producing a guideline range of two to eight months. However, in
supplemental briefing, Lares-Meraz expressly abandons this
position and argues that the district court’s error, while
subject to harmless error review, was harmful at the time but is
now practically harmless as a result of deportation and the
unknown location of Lares-Meraz.

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Meraz cannot be heard to complain that he was harmed by the

district court’s error.

IV.

Based upon the foregoing, we AFFIRM the sentence.

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