United States v. Larry Darnell Ingram

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS
No. 05-10866 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ APRIL 25, 2006
THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket No. 02-80189-CR-DTKH CLERK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LARRY DARNELL INGRAM,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________

(April 25, 2006)

Before BLACK, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.

COX, Circuit Judge:

Larry Darnell Ingram appeals his convictions for making false statements in

connection with the attempted purchase of a firearm. He argues that the district court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that a two-year

delay between indictment and trial deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a

speedy trial. We reverse the conviction and remand with instructions to dismiss the

indictment.

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 28, 2000, Ingram, a convicted felon, attempted to purchase a

firearm from Scott Mandel, owner of Greenacres City Pawn Shop. In doing so, he

completed and signed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) Form 4473,

answering “no” to Question 9-C, “Have you been convicted in any court of a crime

for which the judge could have imprisoned you for more than one year even if the

judge actually gave you a shorter sentence?” In fact, Ingram had been convicted of

several felonies, including grand theft, burglary and possession of cocaine.

When Mandel submitted Ingram’s ATF Form 4473 to the National Instant

Criminal Background Check System, the request to purchase the weapon was denied.

As a result, in March 2000, ATF Special Agent Jeffrey Kunz began investigating the

transaction. As a part of his investigation, Kunz interviewed Mandel. Mandel told

Kunz that Ingram had admitted to Mandel that he had prior convictions but said that

he was eligible to buy a gun because his civil rights had been restored. Mandel also

told Kunz that Ingram had trouble with the form, actually filling it out more than

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once, and that Ingram had asked questions about Question 9-C. Mandel said that, in

response to Ingram’s questions, Mandel and Ingram had reviewed the exception on

the back of the form.1

Kunz’s review of Ingram’s criminal records revealed that, while Ingram’s civil

rights had been restored in March 1990 for all felony convictions prior to that date,

the restored rights did not include the right to possess a firearm. Also, Ingram had

been convicted of two more felonies after his civil rights had been restored.

In July 2000, Kunz interviewed Ingram at his place of employment. Ingram

admitted that he was a convicted felon and that he had signed the form answering “no”

to Question 9-C; he told Kunz that his civil rights had been restored and that his

convictions that were more than ten years old did not count. Ingram also gave Kunz

his home and cell phone numbers and the address of his home (which he owned); and

he told Kunz that his brother was a police officer with the City of Fort Lauderdale.

1
The back of Form 4473 says:

For one who has been convicted of a crime for which the judge could
have imprisoned the individual for more than one year . . . the
prohibition does not apply if, under the law where the conviction
occurred, the individual has been pardoned for the crime, or the
conviction has been expunged or set aside, or the person has had civil
rights restored, AND the person is not prohibited by the law of the
jurisdiction where the conviction occurred from receiving or
possessing any firearms. Persons subject to one of these exceptions
should answer “NO” to questions 9c or 9k, as applicable.

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Kunz turned his investigative report over to the U.S. Attorney’s office in the summer

of 2000 but did not hear anything else about it for over two years. When he checked

with the U.S. Attorney’s office in 2002, Kunz was told that the case had been

“misplaced” there.

On October 25, 2002, over two and one-half years after the incident at the pawn

shop, Ingram was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2),

making false statements to a firearms dealer in connection with an attempted

acquisition of a firearm. On the same day the indictment issued, it was sealed and a

warrant was issued for Ingram’s arrest. The indictment was unsealed nine months

later, on July 31, 2003.

Between October 2002 and July 2004, ATF Agent Kunz made some minimal

efforts to contact Ingram. Kunz left telephone messages for Ingram to call him and

went to Ingram’s residence once. At the residence, an unidentified person outside

informed Kunz that Ingram had moved. Ingram returned at least one of Kunz’s

telephone messages (on December 13, 2002), leaving his cell phone number and his

employer’s address for Kunz to contact him. After that, Kunz was unable to reach

Ingram by telephone. Kunz drove by Ingram’s residence and place of work on several

occasions but, not seeing Ingram, never got out of the car. On July 27, 2004, Kunz

called Ingram at his place of employment and spoke to someone else who gave Kunz

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another number to call to speak to Ingram; Kunz left a message at this new number,

and Ingram returned his call on July 28, 2004.

At no time prior to July 28, 2004, did Kunz communicate to Ingram that Ingram

had been indicted or that there was a warrant for his arrest. There is no evidence that

Ingram knew of the indictment prior to July 28, 2004, when he was finally told of it

by Agent Kunz. During the July 28, 2004 conversation, Ingram agreed to surrender

in court on August 3, 2004.

On September 30, 2004, Ingram moved to dismiss the indictment because of

pre- and post-indictment delay. A superceding two-count indictment was returned on

October 15, 2004. Count 1 alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A); Count 2

alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Both counts alleged that Ingram had

made false statements on ATF Form 4473. Ingram responded to the superceding

indictment by moving to dismiss on the same grounds asserted in his first motion. On

November 1, 2004, a magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on Ingram’s

motion to dismiss the indictment. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the

motion. The district court adopted the report and recommendations of the magistrate

judge in their entirety and denied Ingram’s motion to dismiss.

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 Trial on the superceding indictment was commenced on November 4, 2004. On

November 9, 2004, a jury found Ingram guilty on both counts. Ingram is currently

serving a 36-month sentence.

II. ISSUE ON APPEAL

Ingram appeals his convictions, arguing that the district court erred in denying

his motion to dismiss the indictment. He maintains that his Sixth Amendment right

to a speedy trial was violated when two years passed between his indictment and trial.2

He argues that the district court erred when it adopted the recommendations of the

magistrate judge, finding that Ingram was partially responsible for the delay and that

he could not demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay. The Government

argues that the district court correctly determined that Ingram was partially responsible

for the delay and that Ingram has not demonstrated actual prejudice.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Determination of whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has

been violated is a mixed question of law and fact. Questions of law are reviewed de

2
Ingram also makes an argument that the two and one-half year delay before indictment
violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights; but he concedes that he cannot demonstrate that
the delay was intentionally created by the Government for its tactical advantage. Therefore, his Fifth
Amendment claim fails. United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“[S]ubstantial prejudice from delay, standing alone, does not violate due process. The delay must
also be the product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage.”)
(citing United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983)).

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novo, and findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” United

States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Yapp v. Reno, 26 F.3d

1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1994)).

IV. DISCUSSION

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), the Supreme Court

established a four-factor test to determine when a defendant’s constitutional right to

a speedy trial has been violated. The four factors are: (1) the length of the delay; (2)

the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right; and (4)

the prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. “[T]o trigger a

speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and

trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’

delay . . . .” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91

(1992) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192). “Only if this threshold

point is satisfied may the court proceed with the final three factors in the Barker

analysis.” Clark, 83 F.3d at 1352. Delays exceeding one year are generally found to

be “presumptively prejudicial.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 112 S. Ct. at 2691 n.

1; see also Clark, 83 F.3d at 1352. If, after the threshold inquiry is satisfied and the

second and third factor are considered, all three of these factors weigh heavily against

the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice (the fourth factor) to

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succeed in showing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647,

112 S. Ct. 2686.

In this case, the magistrate judge identified the four factors of the Barker test

and made findings regarding against which party each factor weighed. However, the

magistrate judge and the district court failed to complete the Barker analysis by stating

how heavily each factor weighs against the identified party. We perform that analysis.

The district court found, and the Government concedes, that factor (1), the

length of post-indictment delay, satisfies the threshold requirement so as to entitle

Ingram to a presumption of prejudice sufficient to proceed with the other

considerations in the Barker analysis. We agree and find that the two-year delay

between indictment and trial requires us to proceed with the Barker test.3

In considering factor (2), the reason for the post-indictment delay, the district

court found that Ingram contributed to the delay by “making himself difficult to

locate.” The district court based this finding on three subsidiary factual

determinations: (1) Ingram changed his cell phone number; (2) Ingram disconnected

his home phone; and (3) Ingram did not respond to the numerous messages Agent

3
The district court’s factual finding that the post-indictment delay totaled 21 months is clearly
erroneous. The relevant delay is the time between the date of the indictment and the trial date.
United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). Ingram was indicted on October 25,
2002; trial commenced during the first week of November 2004. Thus, the delay between indictment
and trial was just over 24 months, or two years.

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Kunz left for him at his place of employment. If the district court was correct, Ingram

must demonstrate actual prejudice to prevail. See Clark, 83 F.3d at 1354. Ingram

argues, however, that the district court clearly erred in attributing any fault for the

delay to him. We agree.

“A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the [Government] has that

duty . . . .” Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S. Ct. at 2190. “Because the prosecutor and

the court have an affirmative constitutional obligation to try the defendant in a timely

manner . . . the burden is on the prosecution to explain the cause of the pre-trial delay.”

United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). However, a defendant who intentionally evades the

Government’s efforts to bring him to trial is culpable in causing the delay. See id.;

Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (“While it is true that a defendant

is not under any obligation to take affirmative steps to ensure that he will be tried in

a timely fashion, a court need not ignore a defendant’s fugitivity in considering

whether there has been a violation of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.”)

(citation omitted).

The district court made no finding that Ingram intentionally evaded prosecution.

For this reason alone the court clearly erred in attributing part of the delay to Ingram.

But, even if the court had found Ingram intentionally evaded arrest, such a finding

9
would be clearly erroneous under the facts of this case. There is no evidence Ingram

knew of the indictment or the arrest warrant at any time during the two years

preceding his voluntary surrender. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S. Ct. at 2691

(holding that a defendant who left for Colombia after indictment could not be faulted

for post-indictment delay because there was no evidence he was aware of the

indictment or that the police had been looking for him); Brown, 169 F.3d at 349

(holding that the government failed to prove the defendant was culpable for the delay

because it failed to present credible evidence the defendant was aware of the

indictment and intentionally hid himself from law enforcement agents). Not only is

there no evidence Ingram knew of the indictment or arrest warrant, but there is no

evidence Ingram even suspected Agent Kunz planned on arresting him. His offense

was a nonviolent crime; he had already explained to Agent Kunz he made a mistake

in filling out the form; more than two and one-half years had passed since he last heard

from Kunz; and the messages Kunz left (assuming Ingram received them) never said

why he wanted to speak with Ingram.

The fact that the phone numbers Ingram gave Kunz were no longer valid two

and one-half years later and the fact that Ingram did not return messages Kunz left for

him at work do not support a finding that Ingram intended to evade arrest, particularly

where there is no evidence Ingram was cognizant of the pending charges. There are

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many innocent reasons why someone’s phone numbers might change over the course

of two and one-half years. At the time, cell phone numbers were not portable, and

switching cell phone providers meant changing cell phone numbers. Moreover,

Ingram’s brother testified that Ingram’s home phone was disconnected because Ingram

failed to pay the bill. With regard to the finding that Ingram did not return the

messages Kunz left at Ingram’s place of work, there is simply no evidence that Ingram

ever received them.

Further, Ingram’s actions are inconsistent with a finding of willful evasion.

Ingram returned Kunz’s call in December of 2002 and gave him additional contact

information. Although Ingram gave Kunz an incorrect phone number, there is no

evidence Ingram was trying to throw Kunz off his trail or that Ingram’s actions even

had this effect. If Ingram’s purpose was to evade arrest, he could have done so by

simply ignoring Kunz’s feeble efforts to locate him. But this is not what Ingram did;

instead he took affirmative steps to contact Kunz and voluntarily surrendered as soon

as he learned of the indictment and arrest warrant.

Thus, the district court clearly erred in holding Ingram culpable for part of the

delay. In the absence of any fault attributable to Ingram, we find that the delay was

caused entirely by the Government. Therefore, this factor weighs against the

Government.

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 The district court found that factor (3), the defendant’s assertion of his right to

a speedy trial, weighs against the Government. There is no error in this finding.

Indeed, the Government concedes that “Ingram properly asserted his right to a speedy

trial.”

Because we find that all three of these Barker factors weigh against the

Government, we proceed to determine whether they do so heavily. If they do not, then

Ingram must demonstrate factor (4), actual prejudice, to succeed in his appeal. As

stated above, the district court did not perform this part of the Barker analysis.

In Clark, we found that a seventeen-month delay due to Government negligence

was insufficient to excuse that defendant, indicted on six counts of controlled

substance violations and one count of carrying firearms during a drug trafficking

crime, from the requirement that he demonstrate actual prejudice. However, Clark

itself is clear that, “there is no hard and fast rule to apply here, and each case must be

decided on its own facts.” Clark, 83 F.3d at 1354. When we consider the facts of this

case, we conclude that each of the first three factors in the Barker test weigh heavily

against the Government.

The post-indictment delay in this case was two years, twice the threshold for

presuming prejudice. “In cases of government negligence, our concern for

substantiating prejudice decreases as the period of delay increases.” Id. at 1353. The

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Supreme Court has instructed, “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the

accused intensifies over time.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S. Ct. at 2691. We have

not considered the pre-indictment delay (two and one-half years) in our decision that

the length of the post-indictment delay (two years) is sufficient for us to proceed to

consider the other Barker factors. Only pretrial delay following a person’s arrest,

charge, or indictment is relevant to whether the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth

Amendment is triggered. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, 97 S.

Ct. 2044, 2048 (1977) (holding pre-indictment delay is “wholly irrelevant” to whether

the Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis is engaged) (quoting United States v.

Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S. Ct. 455, 463 (1971)). But once the Sixth

Amendment’s speedy trial analysis is triggered, it is appropriate to consider inordinate

pre-indictment delay in determining how heavily post-indictment delay weighs against

the Government. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1157 (2d Cir. 1979)

(stating “‘preindictment’ delay may have some relevance to the analysis of the speedy

trial right,” but concluding the post-indictment period not long enough to “raise a

Sixth Amendment issue”); United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328, 333 (2d Cir. 1976)

(stating that the delay between the government’s discovery of the offense and its filing

of the information was relevant in assessing whether the post-information delay was

intolerably long for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial). The

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rationale for presuming prejudice is, after all, that “excessive delay presumptively

compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that

matter, identify.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S. Ct. at 2693. Thus, the two-year

post-indictment delay in this case weighs more heavily than a two-year delay in

another case might if, in that case, the post-indictment delay began shortly after the

allegedly criminal acts occurred.

Comparing this case to Clark, not only is the delay more weighty here; the

Government’s negligence in creating the delay is more egregious in this case. As the

magistrate judge outlined in her report, there was much more that the Government

could have done to arrest Ingram. While the magistrate judge found that the efforts

that Kunz did make were “in good faith,” she made no finding as to whether the

investigation was performed diligently. After a review of the record, we find that it

was not.

Unlike Clark, where police officers failed to arrest the defendant because they

believed that the U.S. Marshal’s office was planning to execute the arrest warrant, the

record in this case does not support any reasonable explanation for the Government’s

neglect in executing the warrant. Considering the crime for which Ingram was

indicted, the state of the proof against him on the date of the indictment, and the

Government’s knowledge of Ingram’s whereabouts, we find the two-year post-

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indictment delay intolerable. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (“[T]he

delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a

serious, complex conspiracy charge.”). In October 2002, Kunz knew that he was the

only law enforcement agent responsible for arresting Ingram; and he had more than

enough information to do so. He knew where Ingram lived and worked and that

Ingram had a brother who was a Fort Lauderdale policeman. Ingram neither moved

nor changed jobs during the almost five years between the alleged offense and the

trial. While it is true that Kunz had difficulty reaching Ingram by telephone, Kunz’s

efforts to contact Ingram were less than weak. Post-indictment, Kunz never visited

Ingram’s place of employment (where he had originally interviewed Ingram); and he

visited Ingram’s residence only once when, not finding Ingram there, he relied on an

unidentified (and undescribed) person outside the residence who told him that Ingram

did not live there anymore. Kunz did not contact Ingram’s brother to ask Ingram’s

whereabouts. Neither did he refer the case to another law enforcement agency.

Finally, when Kunz finally made telephone contact with Ingram, Ingram agreed

to turn himself in on the charges and promptly asserted his right to a speedy trial. We

fail to see merit in the Government’s argument that, while Ingram did everything he

should to assert his right to a speedy trial, this should not weigh heavily against the

Government.

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 The first three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the Government. Thus,

Ingram need not demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay. The

indictment must be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ingram’s convictions are reversed. The case is

remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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