United States v. Lavon Dobie

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-8052

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAVON DOBIE, a/k/a Becky Parker, a/k/a Theresa Waller, a/k/a
Dobie Parker,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4208

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAVON DOBIE, a/k/a Becky Parker, a/k/a Theresa Waller, a/k/a
Dobie Parker,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:04-cr-00235-RWT-9)

Submitted: September 25, 2013 Decided: October 17, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jonathan A. Gladstone, LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN A. GLADSTONE,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Nicolas A. Mitchell, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Lavon Dobie appeals the 170-month sentence imposed

following this court’s remand for consideration of her request

for a minor role adjustment under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 3B1.2 (2012). * Dobie challenges the reasonableness of

her sentence, arguing that the district court erroneously found

that it was barred from sentencing Dobie below the Guidelines

range and that the court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors. We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires

consideration of both the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining

procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district

court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines

range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an

*
Dobie also appealed from the district court’s order
denying her motion for retroactive application of the Fair
Sentencing Act, giving rise to Appeal No. 12-8052, which was
consolidated with Appeal No. 13-4208. Because Dobie’s brief
challenges only the sentence imposed on resentencing, Dobie has
abandoned any challenge to the application of the Fair
Sentencing Act and we do not consider that issue here. See
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir.
1999) (noting that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A),
issues not briefed are deemed abandoned).

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appropriate sentence, considered the § 3553(a) factors, or

failed to explain sufficiently the selected sentence. Id. at

49-51.

If the sentence is free of significant procedural

error, we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.

When, as here, the sentence is within the properly calculated

Guidelines range, we apply a presumption on appeal that the

sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-

Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption

is rebutted only if the defendant shows “that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”

United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court correctly calculated and considered

the advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from counsel, and

heard allocution from Dobie. Contrary to Dobie’s argument, the

court considered the § 3553(a) factors and explained that the

within-Guidelines sentence was warranted. The district court

understood it had the authority to sentence Dobie below the

Guidelines range but opted to impose a sentence at the bottom of

that range. Dobie offers no argument to rebut the presumption

on appeal that her within-Guidelines sentence is substantively

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reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Dobie.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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