United States v. Lebron

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1096

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JOSE LEBRON,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

Coffin and Rosenn,* Senior Circuit Judges.

David A.F. Lewis, by Appointment of the Court, for

appellant.
Jean B. Weld, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief for

appellee.

February 14, 1996

* Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

ROSENN, Circuit Judge. This appeal from a guilty plea
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

and sentence requires that we consider the process due a

defendant whose behavior may raise questions concerning his

mental competency.

I.
I.

A federal grand jury for the District of New Hampshire

indicted Jos Lebr n on ten counts stemming from his two armed

robberies of a pawnshop and a bank in Manchester, New Hampshire.

His co-defendants, Paul Hazen and Frank Jones, pled guilty to

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g).

The court imposed sentence and neither of them appealed. Lebr n

requested counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.

3006A. However, he vehemently objected to his court-appointed

counsel and filed several motions with the court requesting new

counsel. A magistrate judge denied the motion, finding that

Lebr n had not articulated sufficient reasons. The magistrate

informed Lebr n that he could either retain his appointed

counsel, or proceed pro se.

At a hearing on Lebr n's motion for a new court-

appointed counsel, the district court found no valid reason to

substitute counsel. The court informed Lebr n that he could

proceed pro se and that his court-appointed counsel would stand

by, and take over the case if Lebr n did not conform to courtroom

rules. Lebr n lost his temper, and his behavior prompted the

marshals to handcuff him before the hearing ended. The court

denied his motion for reconsideration. Lebr n then filed a

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Renewed Motion for Reappointment of Counsel, in which he asserted

that there was medication he could take which could "affect his

ability to be aware of exactly what is happening around him."

On May 10, 1994, Lebr n represented himself during jury

selection. Although he initially asked for, and was denied, an

interpreter, Lebr n was able to communicate with the jury.

Several of his objections to jury members were granted. After

jury selection, the court held an ex parte session with Lebr n

and his counsel to enable them to air the disagreements between

them without compromising the attorney-client privilege. At this

session, the judge informed Lebr n that he had done a good job in

jury selection, but that he was "not competent to represent

himself in the sense he's not aware of fundamental issues that

ought to be raised on his behalf." Lebr n concedes that the

district court meant this statement to refer to Lebr n's

competence as an attorney, not to Lebr n's mental competence. At

the same ex parte session, Lebr n's counsel informed the court

that Lebr n used to receive prescriptions for thorazine (an

antipsychotic) and trazodone (an antidepressant) from the

Veteran's Administration hospital, and that he would like to take

these drugs during the trial.

In response, the judge alerted the Government that

Lebr n had a previous psychiatric history. He believed that this

might be relevant to the defendant's ability to intelligently

waive his right to counsel. The court then held a hearing later

that day to determine the issue of Lebr n's competency, and

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whether Lebr n should be permitted to take his requested drugs

during trial. The court took testimony from Dr. Nathan Sidley,

the prison psychiatrist. Sidley stated that he had briefly

reviewed Lebr n's Veteran's Administration medical records, which

revealed a possible diagnosis of schizophrenia in the 1970s.

Sidley had attempted to meet with Lebr n, but Lebr n terminated

their meeting within the first five minutes, upon learning that

their discussion would not be confidential. Sidley concluded

that, based on these facts, Lebr n was not psychotic, and was

competent to stand trial. He further concluded that any possible

benefits from the drugs Lebr n requested were outweighed by the

detriments of giving him massive quantities needed without

sufficient time for the drugs to build up in his bloodstream.

Lebr n then testified that he was using heroin and

Valium, and that he had both drugs in his system at the time.

Two days later, the district court judge issued an order which

continued the trial date, permitted Lebr n's counsel to withdraw,

and appointed Paul Twomey as new counsel for Lebr n.

The next day, the Government and Twomey jointly filed a

request for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

4241, which the court granted. The parties agreed that Dr.

Albert Druktenis should perform the evaluation. Druktenis met

with Lebr n and evaluated him pursuant to the court's order to

determine both Lebr n's sanity at the time of the offense, and

his competency to stand trial now. Druktenis concluded that

Lebr n was not insane at the time of the offense, and that he was

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competent to stand trial. He noted that Lebr n's personality was

manipulative, but that he was aware of the charges against him,

and had been able to speak intelligently, lucidly and logically

at court hearings. Druktenis also addressed the issue of

Lebr n's current medications, and noted that they "would not

cloud his thinking in any substantial way and, in fact, are

probably helping him by reducing anxiety and agitation."

After the psychiatrist submitted this report, Lebr n

withdrew his motion to dismiss based on incompetency, and the

parties reached a plea agreement. Under this agreement, Lebr n

would plead guilty to two counts of use and carrying of a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and the Government would

dismiss the remaining eight counts.

The court conducted a change of plea hearing on

October 3, 1994. Before the judge entered the courtroom for the

hearing, Lebr n threw a pitcher of water at the case

investigators, narrowly missing one agent. Soon thereafter, the

hearing proceeded, with the court stating that it understood

there was "no issue at this point with regard to the defendant's

competence." Both counsel agreed that Lebr n was competent.

Defense counsel then added that he had come to that conclusion

himself independently after reviewing the psychiatric report.

The court then asked Lebr n if the Government's proffer of the

evidence to the charges was correct. At first Lebr n claimed

that he could not remember any of the events. On further

questioning, he admitted to the conduct. After fully advising

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Lebr n of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, the court

accepted the plea.

The court sentenced Lebr n to imprisonment for 240

months on one count and 60 months on the other, to be served

consecutively, three years supervised release with a condition of

treatment for his chemical dependency, $500 in restitution, and a

$100 special assessment. Lebr n appeals, raising as his sole

issue whether the district court denied him due process by not

holding a hearing under 18 U.S.C. 4241 to determine his

competency when he changed his plea. We affirm.

II.
II.

The conviction of a criminal defendant while he is

legally incompetent violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383

U.S. 375, 378 (1965). The test for a defendant's mental

competency to plead guilty is the same as that of a defendant's

competence to stand trial. United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d

515, 517 (6th Cir. 1973). That test, as set forth by the Supreme

Court, is whether the defendant understands the proceedings

against him and has sufficient present ability to consult with

his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

To assist courts in making this test, Congress has

established certain procedures. Section 4241 of Title 18 of the

United States Code provides the relevant reference in matters of

a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial. 4241(a)

provides in pertinent part:

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...[T]he defendant or the attorney for
the Government may file a motion for a
hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. The court
shall grant the motion, or shall order
such a hearing on its own motion, if
there is reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent
that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.

In the present case, no such hearing was held or requested.

Lebr n, however, asserts that the district court had reasonable

cause to believe that he, Lebr n, was suffering from a mental

disease or defect. Therefore, he claims, the court violated his

due process rights by not ordering a competency hearing on its

own motion.

By the language of the statute, a district court judge

has a duty to order a competency hearing only if there is

"reasonable cause" to doubt the defendant's mental competence. A

district court's findings about the competency of a defendant

after holding such a hearing will be upheld unless they are

clearly erroneous. United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 927

(7th Cir. 1991). When there has been no hearing, and no

examination of the defendant whatsoever, the appellate court

reviews the district court's findings comprehensively. Id. This

case falls in between these two standards.

Although the trial judge did not order a formal

hearing, he carefully and painstakingly sought, commencing with

the defendant's initial appearance before him, to ascertain

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whether there was any question of mental competency and to

protect Lebr n's due process rights. To this end, the judge

discharged the jury, continued the trial and ordered that the

defendant be examined by a psychiatrist. Thus, the court had

before it the psychiatrist's report, as well as Lebr n's

Veteran's Administration medical records and the testimony of the

prison psychiatrist. In addition, defendant's counsel also had

concluded that Lebr n was mentally competent to enter a guilty

plea. Because the judge had substantial facts before him when he

made findings as to defendant's competency, we will give his

decision not to hold a competency hearing due deference.

Dr. Druktenis, after conducting a two-hour interview

with Lebr n, concluded that Lebr n was competent to stand trial.

If a psychiatrist has determined that a defendant is competent, a

court is not required to hold a further evidentiary hearing

absent extenuating circumstances. See United States v. Prewitt,

553 F.2d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 1977). It was well within the

district court's discretion to conclude that such circumstances

were not present here.

Lebr n points to his irrational and outrageous behavior

in the courtroom. He claims that this should have alerted the

district court judge that Lebr n was incompetent to enter a plea.

Lebr n had been handcuffed at the April hearing. Also, at this

hearing, he had pleaded to be removed from the courtroom,

stating, "I have too much trouble on my mind, your Honor." At

the change of plea hearing, Lebr n threw a pitcher full of water

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at case investigators. Such behavior may be uncontrolled,

manipulative, or even theatrical. It is not determinative of

competency. Agitated or violent courtroom antics alone do not

mandate a finding by the trial court of reasonable cause. United

States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1972). In

Marshall, the defendant behaved belligerently in the courtroom,

shouted obscenities, and threw not only a water pitcher, but also

a chair in the courtroom. Two psychiatric reports, however,

disclosed that the defendant was competent, and predicted that he

would engage in disruptive behavior. The Court of Appeals held

that the trial court was within its discretion in failing to hold

a competency hearing. Similarly here, two psychiatrists examined

Lebr n and found him competent.1

Lebr n further argues that his medical record and

history of taking medications should have provided the necessary

reasonable cause. However, past treatment or drug use is not

determinative of present competency. United States v. Pryor, 960

F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992). Lebr n's Veteran's Administration

records were from the 1970s, twenty years ago. Moreover, Dr.

Druktenis expressly addressed the issue of the medications Lebr n

1 Lebr n argues that Dr. Sidley's opinion should be discounted
because their meeting was inadequate. It is true that Sidley had
little contact with Lebr n, and that his review of Lebr n's
medical records was cursory. We agree that Dr. Sidley's
testimony alone would not have sufficient indicia of reliability
to obviate the need for further findings. However, Dr. Druktenis
conducted an extended face-to-face examination of Lebr n.

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was currently taking and noted that they would not cloud his

thinking.

In summary, although Lebr n occasionally behaved

belligerently and has a medical history showing past possible

mental illness and past drug use, these are more than

counterbalanced by Dr. Druktenis' report of Lebr n's present

competence, his counsel's assertion that Lebr n was competent to

enter the plea, and the trial court's careful plea colloquy

ensuring that Lebr n understood the charges against him, and the

consequences of pleading guilty to them. All of these factors

pointed unequivocally to the defendant's mental competency.

There was no reasonable cause for the trial court to hold a

hearing when all the information from the psychiatrist, the

defense counsel, and the judge himself were in agreement. See

id. United States v. Pryor, 960 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992)(where

district court had an opportunity to observe defendant rationally

and vigorously participating in his defense at a pretrial

proceeding, and psychiatrist found that defendant was oriented as

to time and place, there was no cause for the court to hold a

further hearing, under section 4241 despite defendant's history

of drug problems and psychiatric treatment).

As this court noted in Hern ndez-Hern ndez v. United

States, 904 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1990), a ruling that this case

provides reasonable cause for a hearing would "come close to

requiring district courts to order competency hearings sua sponte

in every case where a defendant has some history of psychiatric

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treatment and, even vaguely, mentions the problem." Id., at 760

(quoting Figueroa-V zquez v. United States, 718 F.2d 511, 612

(1st Cir. 1983). We decline to impose such a heavy, unnecessary,

and costly burden on district courts.

III.
III.

We hold that when a qualified psychiatrist examines a

defendant before he enters a plea to criminal charges, and the

psychiatric report and other pertinent current information reveal

that the defendant is competent to stand trial, it is not

reversible error for a district court to fail or refuse to

conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.

4241(a). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is

affirmed.
affirmed

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