IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-60577
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
WALTER F. LUCAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
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October 9, 1998
Before KING, SMITH, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
The government appeals the district court's application of the
sentencing guidelines. Finding error, we reverse and remand for
resentencing.
I.
Walter Lucas was Acting Warden of River County Jail in River
County, Mississippi. Eunice Alfred, a pretrial detainee, was
working in Lucas's office when Lucas, without warning, reached into
her sweat pants and placed his fingers into her vagina. Alfred,
who was standing near an open door, ran from the room.
A few weeks later, Lucas asked a male prisoner to act as a
lookout so that he could take care of some “business” in the
booking room, which was located behind his office. Lucas called
Alfred into the room and locked the door, then pulled off her pants
and raped her.1 When interviewed by the FBI about this incident,
Lucas denied having sexual contact with any inmate.
Lucas was indicted for three violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242,
which was at that time a civil rights violation misdemeanor, and
one violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, making a false statement in an
official investigation. Counts one, two, and three charged him,
while acting under color of law, with sexually assaulting three
female prisoners who were in his custody. Count four charged him
with willfully making a false statement to the FBI.
As his trial was about to begin, Lucas pleaded guilty to count
one, violating the civil rights of Eunice Alfred, and count four,
making a false official statement. As part of the plea agreement,
Lucas stipulated that count one should be classified pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1. Defense counsel explained to Lucas that he
believed the plea agreement required six years' imprisonment for
the two offenses. Lucas accepted the plea.
While under oath, Lucas testified that he agreed with the
1
These facts come from the presentence report.
2
prosecutor's summation of the facts, that he had “coerced [his
victim] to engage in sexual intercourse and other sexual acts
without her consent and that . . . [he] acted willfully, . . . with
the specific intent to deprive [the victim] of the rights secured
by the ConstitutionSSthat is, the right to be free from unwanted
sexual intercourse.”
The presentence report (“PSR”) stated that the most analogous
guideline was § 2A3.1 (criminal sexual abuse), which has a base
offense level of 27. The PSR calculated the total offense level to
be 35, adding two levels pursuant to § 2A3.1(b)(3) because the
victim was in custody, six levels pursuant to § 2H1.1(b)(1)(B)
because count one was committed under color of law, and two levels
pursuant to § 3C1.1 because count four constituted obstruction of
justice relating to count one. The PSR then subtracted two levels
pursuant to § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility.
The guideline range was 168 to 210 months' imprisonment.
Because the maximum possible sentence was six yearsSSone year for
count one and five years for count fourSSand that sentence was less
than the total punishment called for by the guidelines, the PSR
stated that the guidelines required a sentence of 72 months.
The district court, however, sentenced Lucas using § 2A3.3,
which normally is applied to consensual criminal sexual abuse of a
ward. The court was concerned that the sentence under § 2A3.1 was
unduly harsh because count four was a collateral offense, and count
3
one was only a misdemeanor that had a maximum penalty of one year.2
Moreover, the court stated, an exception under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for
an “exculpatory no” had existed until “very recently.” The court
declared:
I'm not sure Congress intended. . . to increase [to such
an extent] the level of the underlying offense . . . .
Lying to an FBI agent . . . is a crime under our law.
I'm not minimizing that. But when you use that to
enhance the statutory penalty, the maximum statutory
penalty the Congress has outlined for this type of sexual
conduct, which is one year, then I don't think that that
has been and is the intent of Congress.
The court imposed a sentence of two years: one year for count
one and one year for count four. It used § 2A3.3, for a base level
of 9, then added six levels pursuant to § 2H1.1(b)(1)(B), as count
one was committed under color of law, and added two levels pursuant
to § 3C1.1 because count four constituted obstruction of justice
relating to count one, and subtracted two levels pursuant to
§ 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility. The total of 15, along
with Lucas's not having a previous criminal record, placed the
sentence at 18-24 months, according to the sentencing guidelines.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL chap. 5, part A (1995).
The government appeals the use of § 2A3.3, arguing that the
court should have used § 2A3.1 as the most analogous section. It
also appeals the two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.
2
Section 242 was amended in 1994, after the events involved in this case,
to provide that committing aggravated sexual abuse under this section is subject
to imprisonment for “any term of years or for life.”
4
II.
We review application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and
findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. See United
States v. Stevenson, 126 F.3d 662, 664 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Reyna-Espinosa, 117 F.3d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1997). We
review de novo a determination of the meaning and effect of any
factual stipulations on a sentence. See Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344, 350 (1991); United States v. Domino, 62 F.3d 716, 719
(5th Cir. 1995). We also give plenary review to the decision
concerning which guideline provision is most analogous to the
offense of conviction. See United States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336,
338 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
III.
A.
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242 are sentenced according to
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1,3 which provides:
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest):
(1) the offense level from the offense guideline
applicable to any underlying offense;
(2) 12, if the offense involved two or more
3
The provision in effect at the time of the offense was § 2H1.4. Section
2H1.4 was deleted by consolidation with § 2H1.1 effective November 1, 1995. See
Appendix C, amendment 521. Section 2H1.1 was the provision in effect at the time
of Lucas's sentencing, and he does not claim prejudice in the application of this
provision.
5
participants;
(3) 10, if the offense involved (A) the use
or threat of force against a person; or
(B) property damage or threat of property
damage; or
(4) 6, otherwise.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristic
(1) If (A) the defendant was a public
official at the time of the offense; or
(B) the offense was committed under color
of law, increase by 6 levels.
The first application note to this section specifies: “'Offense
Guideline applicable to any underlying offense' means the offense
Guideline applicable to any conduct established by the offense of
conviction that constitutes an offense under federal, state, or
local law.”
Section 1B1.2(a) provides that in the case of a plea agreement
“containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more
serious crime than the offense of conviction, determine the offense
guideline . . . most applicable to the stipulated offense.”
Accordingly, by the plain language of the guidelines, the crime
used for sentencing need not be the crime of conviction.4
4
The first application note to this section also provides:
Where a stipulation . . . made between the parties on the record
during a plea proceeding specifically establishes facts that prove
a more serious offense or offenses than the offense or offenses of
conviction, the court is to apply the guideline most applicable to
the more serious offense or offenses established.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) application note 1.
6
B.
Lucas admitted under oath to “coerc[ing the victim] to engage
in sexual intercourse and other sexual acts without her consent,”
and to depriving her of her right to be free from “unwanted sexual
intercourse.” Lucas admits in his brief that “[d]efinitionally
this is probably [rape].” The district court accepted his plea and
did not make any factual findings contradicting the plea's
statement that the sex was nonconsensual.
The court applied § 2A3.3 because count one was a misdemeanor.
The court stated that had count one “been a felony, no doubt 2A3.1
. . . would be the guideline” to apply.5 As we have said, because
the maximum penalty for violating 18 U.S.C. § 242 was only one
year, the court did not wish to invoke § 2A3.1.
The court misconstrued the law because, for sentencing
guideline purposes, it does not matter whether one of the offenses
has a maximum of only one year. When a defendant is sentenced on
multiple counts under a single indictment, the court computes a
total punishment by looking at the combined offense level with the
appropriate criminal history category to arrive at a sentencing
range. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b). The total punishment can be more
than the maximum statutory penalty for any particular offense if
the defendant is sentenced on multiple counts. See United States
5
Section 2A3.3 corresponds to 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b), which involves non-
coercive conduct and makes criminal consensual intercourse with a person in
official detention.
7
v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Kings, 981 F.2d 790, 797 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).6 The
maximum statutory penalty sets the upper limit that may be imposed
for a particular count. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2; Segler, 37 F.3d
at 1136.
We therefore must look to the underlying offense to which
defendant has stipulated. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2H1.1, 1B1.2(a). To
apply § 2A3.1, we must find that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 2241
or 2242, or a similar provision of state law.7 The PSR found that
Lucas should be charged under § 2A3.1, as the crimes to which he
pleaded are most analogous to the rape statutes, §§ 2241 and 2242.8
6
In Kings, a defendant was sentenced to 120-150 months' imprisonment for
two offenses, even though one offense, an assault count, had a three-year
statutory maximum. The total punishment for the two offenses was not just the
three-year statutory maximum, even though the offense level and guideline range
for both offenses were “wholly determined by his assault count.” Id. at
795 n.11. See also United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that sentence on multiple counts was not limited by the statutory
maximum for a particular count, even though that count dictates the offense level
and calculation of total punishment for all the offenses); Segler, 37 F.3d
at 1135.
7
The government did not raise the issue of Lucas's having violated state
law, and we, as a consequence, do not address it.
8
Section 2241(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) By force or threat. SS Whoever, in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal
prison, knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act SS
(1) by using force against that person; or
(2) by threatening or placing that other person in
fear that any person will be subjected to death,
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping;
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
for any term of years or life, or both.
Section 2242 provides in pertinent part:
8
Lucas’s offense is analogous to a violation of § 2241, because
he used actual force against his victim. A defendant uses force
within the meaning of § 2241 when he employs restraint sufficient
to prevent the victim from escaping the sexual conduct. See United
States v. Allery, 139 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2389 (1998); United States v. Jones, 104 F.3d 193, 197
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2470 (1997); United States v.
Fulton, 987 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, force can
be implied from a disparity in size and coercive power between the
defendant and his victim, as for example when the defendant is an
adult male and the victim is a child. See United States v.
Bordeaux, 997 F.2d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 1993).
In this case, the PSR declared, “It was through not only his
abuse of [his powers as a warden], but through actual use of force,
that the defendant committed the rapes and sexual assaults as
charged in the indictment” (emphasis added). Lucas summoned Alfred
to a relatively secluded location, locked the door so that she
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly SS
(1) causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening
or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or
placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected
to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping);
* * *
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both.
9
could not escape his advances,9 and pressed her against a table in
such a way that she could not leave. Moreover, the disparity in
power between a jail warden and an inmate, combined with physical
restraint, is sufficient to satisfy the force requirement of
§ 2241.
The evidence also demonstrates that Lucas caused Alfred to
engage in a sexual act by placing her in fear within the meaning of
§ 2242. The definition of “fear” is very broad. See United States
v. Gavin, 959 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1992). This element is
satisfied when the defendant’s actions implicitly place the victim
in fear of some bodily harm. See United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d
748, 755 (7th Cir. 1991). Like force, fear can be inferred from
the circumstances, particularly a disparity in power between
defendant and victim. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874,
885 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d
377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, a defendant’s control
over a victim’s everyday life can generate fear. See United States
v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 742-43 (8th Cir. 1994).
In his position as warden, Lucas had almost complete control
over his victim’s life. He oversaw the jail in which she was
incarcerated, reporting only to off-site supervisors; controlled
inmates’ freedom to move inside the jail, receive visits from
9
At his second sentencing hearing on July 28, 1997, Lucas insisted that he
had closed but not locked the door. Even assuming that to be true, however, Lucas’s
pressing the victim against a table and thereby blocking her means of egress
suffices to constitute force within the meaning of § 2241.
10
friends and family, and take yard calls; determined what work
inmates would do; and possessed wide-ranging power to punish them.
Lucas’s control over Alfred was easily sufficient to imply fear.
The record thus supports the conclusion that he caused her to
engage in a sexual act by placing her in fear as a result of the
disparity in power between them.
The district court was reluctant to use § 2A3.1 only because
18 U.S.C. § 242 was a misdemeanor. The court stated that had it
been a felony, the court would have applied § 2A3.1. Because the
crime's classification as a misdemeanor is irrelevant to the choice
of an appropriate sentencing guideline, the court erred by applying
§ 2A3.3 instead of § 2A3.1.
IV.
The government asks us to reverse the two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1(a). We need not
reach this issue, however, in light of our conclusion that the
court should have applied § 2A3.1 instead of § 2A3.3.
If § 2A3.1 is applied instead of § 2A3.3, the reduction for
acceptance of responsibility makes absolutely no difference. Under
§ 2A3.1, the sentence with the reduction would be 168-210 months,
as the offense level would be 35. Without the reduction, the
offense level would be 37, resulting in a sentence of 210-262
months. The minimum sentence with the acceptance of responsibility
11
under S 2A3.1, 168 months, however, is more than the six-year
maximum that Lucas can serve. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) (stating
that when the minimum sentence in the applicable guideline range
exceeds the statutory maximum, the statutory maximum shall be the
guideline sentence).
The judgment of sentence is REVERSED and REMANDED for re-
sentencing.
12