F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
June 14, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-3134
v.
OSCAR MALDONADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 03-CR-20076-CM)
Robert S. Streepy, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Kansas,
Kansas City, Kansas, appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender, appearing for
Defendant-Appellant.
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HENRY and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM
This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to enforce
the plea agreement and the defendant’s response thereto. We grant the
government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
The defendant pled guilty to a two-count indictment charging him
with distribution of cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense. 1 The plea agreement contains the following
waiver of appellate rights:
Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any
right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in
connection with this prosecution, conviction and
sentence. The defendant is aware that Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to
appeal the conviction and sentence imposed. By
entering into this agreement, the defendant
knowingly waives any right to appeal a sentence
imposed which is within the guideline range
determined appropriate by the court. The defendant
also waives any right to challenge a sentence or
otherwise attempt to modify or change his sentence
or manner in which it was determined in any
collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a
motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255
[except as limited by United States v. Cockerham,
237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001)] and a motion
brought under Title 18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In
other words, the defendant waives the right to
appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to
the extent, if any, the court departs upwards from
the applicable sentencing guideline range
determined by the court. However, if the United
States exercises its right to appeal the sentence
imposed as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. §
3742(b), the defendant is released from this waiver
1
The defendant does not challenge his conviction or the sentence
imposed for the firearm offense.
2
and may appeal the sentence received as authorized
by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Plea Agreement, at p. 4-5.
The agreement also recognizes the possible use of relevant conduct by
the district court to calculate the guideline range. However, the parties left
open the question of the amount of cocaine involved and reserved the right
to present evidence to the court regarding quantity.
At the sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony on quantity. The
government presented evidence that the defendant had offered to sell a
confidential informant a kilo, in addition to the 27 grams he admitted
selling. The defendant testified that he was only bragging to impress the
confidential informant and that he had no way to obtain that much cocaine.
The district court agreed with the government that the additional kilo
should be taken into consideration in calculating the defendant’s sentence.
The resulting guideline range was 70 to 87 months. The judge sentenced the
defendant to the low end of the range, 70 months.
Under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004),
the court of appeals, in reviewing appeals brought
after a defendant has entered into an appeal waiver,
determine[s]: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls
within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights;
(2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3)
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whether enforcing the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice as we define herein.
Miscarriage of justice results where: 1) “the district court relied on
an impermissible factor such as race;” 2) “ineffective assistance of counsel
in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
invalid;” 3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum;” or 4) “the
waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id., at 1327. To satisfy the last factor,
“‘the error [must] seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
The defendant makes two claims under the Hahn miscarriage of
justice inquiry: that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum as
defined by Blakely v. Washington, 124 U.S. 2531 (2004); 2 and that, because
the facts found by the judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard
more than doubled his drug sentence, the Blakely/Booker error seriously
affects the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” He argues that if the court had used only the amount he
2
Raising Blakely is sufficient to raise issues under United States
v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). See United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d
1175, n. 1 (10th Cir. 2005) (This court “must apply the holdings in Blakely
and Booker to all cases in which a defendant properly raised an issue under
either case.”).
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admitted, the statutory maximum for the drug offense would be 33 months.
These arguments are without merit.
This court held in United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th
Cir. 2005), that “statutory maximum” for purposes of Hahn does not have
the same meaning as that given by the Court in Blakely and extended to the
sentencing guidelines by United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
“‘[S]tatutory maximum’ under the Hahn miscarriage of justice inquiry
refers to the statute of conviction.” See also United States v. Green, 405
F.3d 1180, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Moreover, using the Blakely/Booker
definition of ‘statutory maximum’ in interpreting Hahn would be improper
because doing so would render it virtually impossible for a defendant to
waive his or her Sixth Amendment Booker rights. After all, if we were to
use the Blakely/Booker definition of ‘statutory maximum’ in interpreting
Hahn, a defendant could appeal his or her sentence, alleging a
constitutional Booker error (or Blakely challenge), and raise that issue
regardless of a general waiver of appellate rights in the plea agreement.”)
Thus, the defendant’s 70-month sentence does not exceed the Hahn
statutory maximum of 20 years.
We also reject the defendant’s contention that enforcement of the
waiver seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
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judicial proceedings. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion on this
point. Porter, 405 F.3d at 1143. The factors we consider include whether
the plea agreement stated the appropriate statutory maximum, informed the
defendant that he was giving up multiple constitutional and appellate rights
in exchange for concessions from the government, and implied that the
sentence would be imposed in accordance with the guidelines then in effect.
We also review whether the defendant’s sentence conforms with the terms
of the plea agreement and the defendant’s understanding of the plea. Id., at
1145. As in Porter, the sentence imposed by the district court complies
with the terms of the agreement and the understanding expressed by the
defendant at the plea hearing.
In addition, contrary to the defendant’s argument, the mere fact that
the defendant’s sentence is based on judge-made findings does not
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. When a court errs by relying on judge-made findings, that is
considered a “constitutional Booker error.” United States v. Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mozee, 405
F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2005).
Constitutional Booker error, however, is unique
because the remedy for such an error is not a direct
cure. That is, the remedy is not to set aside the
unconstitutional judicial finding and remand for a
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retrial at which the jury would have to find all facts
needed to determine the offense level. Rather, the
remedy--a remand for resentencing under a
discretionary guidelines regime--only cures the
error indirectly. Thus, in the instant case, the
question before us is whether a reversal and remand
for resentencing by the district court under a
discretionary guidelines regime would advance the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
courts.
Id., at 1091.
The defendant’s argument that the district court would have
sentenced him to a term not taking into consideration the larger amount of
drugs is unconvincing. The defendant testified at the sentencing hearing
that he had no intention and no way to provide the additional drugs. The
court, however, found the government’s evidence more persuasive.
In addition, although the court rejected the government’s request to
impose enhancements for obstruction of justice and for use of a minor and
sentenced the defendant to the low end of the guidelines range, there is no
indication that the judge would have imposed a shorter sentence.
THE COURT: The court is ready to announce its
proposed findings of fact and tentative sentence. In
determining the sentence to be imposed, the court
has taken into consideration the nature of the instant
offense, defendant’s personal history,
characteristics, and criminal history. What’s
troubling to the court, Mr. Maldonado, is that this
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was not the first time you appeared in a court to be
sentenced. You know, you tell the court that you’re
sorry for what you did, but you had several other
times where a court had told you stop, and you chose
to continue with your lifestyle, your choices. You
say you feel bad for your family who’s here. Why
didn’t you think of your family after the first time
you committed a crime?
DEFENDANT THROUGH INTERPRETER:
Probably because I was too young at the time. But
now that I’ve been locked up, I’ve matured a lot,
and I’ve considered the pain and suffering that I’m
putting my family through, and I want to get ahead
with my life.
THE COURT: You know, it’s too bad you didn’t
think of that before, because now you’re in a
position where you have some very serious sentence
time that you’re going to have to serve. Now the
range is 70 to 87 months. Your attorney’s asking
for the low end. The government’s gone along with
that. You know, the court would hope that you don’t
believe that if you get the low end, that the court
somehow is minimizing what you did. I mean, you
committed a very serious offense. You put yourself
at danger. That firearm in your – on your person,
you know, how would someone else know that it
didn’t have any bullets in it? You know, and if you
weren’t telling me the truth and if you had bullets in
it, what if you would have used it? this drug
activity you were involved in, very dangerous. You
say you care about your family. How would they
feel if something happened to you or if you hurt
someone else? I hope what you’ve said is the truth
to me, and that finally at this point, you want to
change what you’re doing, and not put yourself in a
position where you get locked up or have your
family miss you for an extended period of time. The
court believes that a sentence at the low end which
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would be 70 months for Count One is appropriate.
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, 3/23/04, at pp. 42-43.
Thus, there is “no basis for us to assume that [the defendant] would
receive a lesser sentence if he were resentenced under a discretionary
sentencing regime in which the district court is required to ‘consider’ the
guidelines when it exercises its discretion.” Mozee, 405 F.3d at 1092.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Blakely/Booker error did not seriously
affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
The government’s motion to enforce the plea agreement is
GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED. The defendant’s motion to
refer the government’s motion to the merits panel is DENIED. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
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