United States v. Maldonado

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 03-1739

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE E. MALDONADO,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. David M. Cohen, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

Nicholas J.K. Mahoney on brief for appellant.
Paula D. Silsby, United States Attorney, and Margaret D.
McGaughey, Appellate Chief, on brief for appellee.

January 20, 2004
 SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to decide

whether interstate commercial trucking is a pervasively regulated

industry, and if so, whether the regulatory scheme applicable to

that industry comes within the purview of the administrative search

exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. These are

questions of first impression in this circuit. We answer both of

them affirmatively — and those answers lead us to affirm the

judgment below.

I. BACKGROUND

Although the parties draw different inferences from them,

the relevant facts are largely undisputed. During the afternoon of

August 8, 2002, a Maine state trooper, Robert Flint, Jr., was

patrolling the Maine Turnpike. While in Wells, he noticed a

northbound moving van that bore the legend "Allied Van Lines." The

truck appeared to be exceeding the posted speed limit (50 m.p.h.)

and Flint's radar, freshly calibrated, recorded its speed at 66

m.p.h. A second reading showed a slightly reduced speed (63

m.p.h.), consistent with the driver having spotted the trooper.

Flint chased the moving van and pulled it over for

speeding. As he walked up to the cab, he noticed that the driver,

defendant-appellant Lawrence E. Maldonado, was not wearing a seat

belt. Flint asked Maldonado for his driver's license, his medical

certificate (a document that is obligatory for all interstate

truckers), and the truck's registration. Maldonado produced a New

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Mexico license, a medical certificate, and a Texas registration.

Although the license and medical certificate both noted a need for

corrective eyeware, Maldonado was driving without either spectacles

or contact lenses. Upon inquiry, he informed Flint that he had

left his broken glasses in a motel room in Connecticut.

Maldonado mentioned that he was transporting a shipment

of household goods from Alabama to Maine. Because Flint knew that

federal regulations required truckers to keep log books for trips

of that length, he asked to see Maldonado's log book. The last

entry had been made at 11 a.m. on August 7 (more than 24 hours

earlier). Flint instructed Maldonado to update the log book. He

then returned to his cruiser to check on Maldonado's license. Word

came back that the license had been suspended.

Flint was concerned because Maldonado had breached

several federal trucking regulations (e.g., he had failed to keep

his log book current, 49 C.F.R. § 395.8; failed to wear a seat

belt, id. § 392.16; and operated the truck without a valid license,

id. § 391.15). For that reason, Flint summoned a fellow trooper,

Robert Nichols. Nichols is one of a handful of members of the

Maine State Police who specialize in enforcing commercial trucking

regulations. Those troopers serve in dual capacities as agents of

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and members

of the state police. As such, they are "authorized to enter upon,

to inspect, and to examine any and all . . . equipment of motor

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carriers . . . ." 49 C.F.R. Ch. III, Subch. B, App. B(1). Only

FMCSA agents (including dual-capacity agents) carry the forms that

appertain to commercial trucking violations.

Flint also summoned a tow truck because he realized that

Maldonado would not be allowed to drive with a suspended license.

That was the end of Flint's initiatives; Nichols arrived at the

scene about an hour after the initial stop and Flint immediately

surrendered control of the investigation (he had not arrested

Maldonado, nor did he plan to do so). The tow truck had not yet

responded.

Flint briefed Nichols about the situation and the

officers walked to the cab of the moving van. Nichols asked

Maldonado for the truck's operating authority (a document that

cedes the right to operate a commercial vehicle in Maine).

Maldonado did not have any such paperwork. Nichols then requested

Maldonado's fuel and toll receipts. Maldonado had no receipts for

fuel and only three toll receipts (from Massachusetts, New

Hampshire, and Maine, respectively). Nichols viewed this as

suspicious because, in his experience, commercial truckers

undertaking long cross-country hauls typically have "a pile" of

such receipts and he expected to see, at a bare minimum, additional

toll receipts from New Jersey and New York.

Nichols next requested Maldonado's shipping papers (he

testified that most moving vans carrying household goods take along

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what amounts to an inventory of the cargo). Maldonado had no

papers; he claimed to have left them in his motel room. On further

inquiry, however, he could not name the motel, pinpoint its

location, or produce a room key.

Having grown increasingly suspicious, Nichols asked

Maldonado to step out of the vehicle. He searched the cab area,

knowing that the truck was destined to be towed. He was surprised

to find neither luggage nor extra clothing (he did, however, find

a machete).

As Flint was preparing to leave, Nichols asked him if he

thought that the expiration date on the moving van's registration

had been altered. The troopers agreed that it looked suspicious.

At that point, Nichols called in a canine drug search unit. While

this unit was en route, Flint departed. Nichols proceeded to run

the license plate. This check revealed that the truck's

registration had in fact expired.

Nichols then asked Maldonado to unlock the trailer.

Maldonado opened the doors of the unlocked storage compartments but

did not have keys to unlock the sealed units. He asked Nichols for

bolt cutters but Nichols had none. By that time, the tow truck had

arrived, and the driver proffered his bolt cutters. Maldonado cut

the padlocks.

When the doors to the van were opened, Nichols noticed an

upside-down couch and a pile of boxes. He testified that, by this

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time, he suspected that drugs were being transported and that the

goods in plain view comprised a "cover load." Nichols entered the

van. As he tried to maneuver toward the front, he had to move a

number of boxes in order to clear a path. Although the boxes were

marked with room destinations and the name "Baily," they were

empty.

Upon reaching the front of the trailer, Nichols kicked

another box, thinking that it too would be empty. The box did not

budge. Nichols opened it and saw what appeared to be marijuana.

By then, the canine unit had arrived and the drug dog responded

positively to the opened box.

The denouement followed: Nichols stepped out of the

trailer, arrested Maldonado, and placed him in handcuffs. The van

was towed to a holding facility and Maldonado was taken to jail.

A subsequent search of the truck, conducted pursuant to a warrant,

revealed no additional contraband.

A federal grand jury sitting in the District of Maine

charged Maldonado with possession with intent to distribute 50 or

more kilograms of marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).

Maldonado's motion to suppress was denied after an evidentiary

hearing. See United States v. Maldonado, No. 02-85, 2002 WL

31444563 (D. Me. Nov. 1, 2002).1 In due course, Maldonado entered

1
The district judge referred the suppression motion to a
magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). On de novo review, he thereafter accepted and adopted the

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a conditional guilty plea, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), reserving

his right to seek review of the denial of his motion to suppress.

This appeal followed. Its scope is relatively narrow.

In the lower court, Maldonado moved to suppress both the evidence

seized and the statements he had made. In this venue, however, he

focuses solely on the alleged illegality of the search. His

earlier claims of Miranda violations, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), are therefore waived. See United States

v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

II. ANALYSIS

When reviewing a trial court's disposition of a motion to

suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, we accept the court's

findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and evaluate its legal

conclusions de novo. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 5 (1st

Cir. 2001); United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir.

1998).

Maldonado wisely chooses not to question the legitimacy

of the initial stop. He was driving in excess of the speed limit

and this active violation of the law afforded an ample basis for

Flint to halt the moving van. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648, 659 (1979). Nor do Flint's ensuing actions provide any grist

magistrate judge's detailed report and recommendation. For
simplicity's sake, we do not distinguish between the two judicial
officers, but, rather, take an institutional view and refer to the
determinations below as those of the district court.

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for Maldonado's appellate mill. When a police officer stops a

motorist for a traffic violation, the officer may ask the motorist

to produce routine driving documents. See, e.g., id.; United

States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001). The question

of which documents are routine (and, thus, can reasonably be

requested) is context-specific. See United States v. Hornbecker,

316 F.3d 40, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2003); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6. A

driver's license and registration are plainly routine documents

that the police may review in the course of any highway stop.

Caro, 248 F.3d at 1244. In the case of a commercial trucker, a

medical certificate and a log book fall into the same category —

they are documents that the trucker is legally required to possess.

See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.43, 395.8; Me. State Police, Motor

Carrier Safety Rules ch. 4, § 2. Therefore, it was not

unreasonable for Flint to request that Maldonado produce these

documents.

In all events, Maldonado pays little attention to Flint's

actions. Instead, he trains his sights on Nichols's warrantless

search of the moving van and characterizes that search as a

violation of the Fourth Amendment. This characterization misfires:

Nichols's actions were valid under the administrative search

exception to the warrant requirement.2

2
The fact that Nichols is a state trooper is unimportant to
our analysis. For one thing, he was authorized to act as a federal
agent. See supra pp. 3, 4. For another thing, the Maine State

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 Commerce, by its very nature, often results in a

heightened governmental interest in regulation. This increased

interest necessarily results in a diminution of the privacy

interests of those who operate commercial premises. See New York

v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987). That trend crests when an

industry operates under pervasive regulation. Id. In such

circumstances, warrantless inspections of commercial sites may be

constitutionally permissible. Id. at 702-03.

Under the Burger doctrine, such inspections must satisfy

three criteria in order to pass Fourth Amendment muster. First,

there must be a "substantial government interest that informs the

regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made." Id.

at 702. Second, inspections must be necessary to advance the

regulatory agenda. Id. Finally, the inspection program must

provide constitutionally adequate safeguards to ensure both the

certainty and regularity of its application. Id. at 703. This

last criterion looks to notice as to the scope of the search as

well as limitations on the discretion afforded to inspecting

officers. Id.

For purposes of the Burger doctrine, we see no meaningful

distinction between commercial premises and commercial vehicles.

Police are authorized to adopt rules incorporating the federal
administrative regulatory framework, see 49 C.F.R. § 350; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 555(2), and Maine has done so, see Me. State
Police, Motor Carrier Safety Rules ch. 4, § 2.

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Consequently, the threshold question in this case is whether

interstate commercial trucking is regulated to the extent necessary

to give rise to the administrative search exception. We conclude

that it is. After all, the interstate trucking industry is

regulated extensively by both federal and state agencies. Federal

regulations alone cover such things as drivers' qualifications,

drivers' hours of service, inspection, repair and maintenance of

trucks, vehicle parts and accessories, reporting of accidents,

recording of itineraries, safe handling of cargo, transportation of

hazardous materials, and a myriad of other issues. See 49 C.F.R.

§§ 300-399. By like token, many states regulate the industry.

See, e.g., Me. State Police, Motor Carrier Safety Rules, ch. 4;

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-1302 to 66-1330, & 74-2108; Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 65-15-101 to 65-15-126. In light of this far-flung regulatory

web, we join three of our sister circuits in holding that

interstate commercial trucking is a pervasively regulated industry

capable of supporting recourse to the administrative search

exception. See United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207,

1210 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 480

(5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464,

468 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. V-1 Oil Co., 63

F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding regulation under the

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act pervasive); cf. California

v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (noting that private

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automobiles carry a reduced expectation of privacy and are subject

to heavy governmental regulation).

We next must determine whether the regulatory scheme

surrounding this industry satisfies the tripartite Burger standard.

As to the first criterion, it cannot be gainsaid that the

government has a significant interest in regulating the interstate

trucking industry (e.g., to ensure traveler safety, hold costs in

check, and restrict what commodities may be transported

interstate). See Fort, 248 F.3d at 480; Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d

at 468. Taken in the ensemble, these justifications comprise a set

of legitimate and substantial interests.

As to the second criterion, we think it self-evident that

warrantless inspections of commercial trucks are necessary to

further the regulatory scheme. Because the industry is so mobile,

surprise is an important component of an efficacious inspection

regime. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)

(stating that "if inspection is to be effective and serve as a

credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are

essential"); V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d at 912 (similar). Fairly

measured, the interests justifying warrantless searches in the

interstate trucking industry are even greater than those present in

Burger (which involved the regulation of junkyards) because of the

speed with which commercial vehicles move from place to place. See

Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1211; Fort, 248 F.3d at 481. And,

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finally, because violations of the regulatory scheme often are not

apparent to a patrolling officer, inspections are sometimes the

only way in which violations can be discovered. We conclude,

therefore, that effective enforcement of the regulatory regime

would be impossible in the absence of impromptu inspections.

The regulatory scheme applicable to the interstate

commercial trucking industry also satisfies the final Burger

criterion. The carefully delineated scope of the federal

regulations suitably cabins the discretion of the enforcing

officer. Moreover, the regulations themselves give ample notice to

interstate truckers that inspections will be made on a regular

basis. To cinch matters, commercial drivers are required by law to

be familiar with the applicable regulations, see 49 C.F.R. §

390.3(e)(2), and Maldonado concedes that he was aware that his

vehicle could be searched "at the discretion of an inspecting

officer." Appellant's Br. at 23.

Since all three of the Burger criteria are satisfied, it

follows inexorably that an administrative search of a commercial

truck is constitutionally permissible. Accord Vasquez-Castillo,

258 F.3d at 1212; Fort, 248 F.3d at 480-82. We so hold.

Maldonado makes two related attempts to circumvent the

application of the administrative search exception. Both attempts

hinge on his perception that Nichols was trolling for drugs, not

for administrative violations. We discuss each argument in turn.

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 Maldonado's basic premise is that this particular search

violates the second Burger criterion as it was not in furtherance

of the regulatory scheme. That is so, he argues, because Nichols

did not care a fig for regulatory violations, but, rather, intended

all along to rummage for drugs. This argument reflects a

misunderstanding of Supreme Court doctrine. The Burger criteria

apply to a regulatory scheme generally, not to the particular

search at issue. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (finding searches

made pursuant to a particular state regulatory statute within the

administrative exception to the warrant requirement); id. at 703-12

(applying the three-part test to the scheme regulating vehicle

dismantling as opposed to the specific search at issue). In other

words, the Burger criteria are applied generally to a statutory

scheme, not to a given set of facts arising under that scheme.

Alternatively, Maldonado argues that Nichols's actual

intent in carrying out the search takes this case outside the

boundaries of the administrative search exception and renders

constitutionally infirm what otherwise might have been a

permissible Burger search. The suggestion here is that even if the

regulatory scheme satisfies the Burger criteria — and we have so

held, see supra — this particular search is beyond the pale.

This construct has a patina of plausibility. In Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court suggested that the

exemption from the warrant requirement afforded to an

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administrative search only extends to searches actually made for

administrative purposes. See id. at 811-12. Thus, the general

rule of Whren — that the subjective intent of the officer plays no

role in a Fourth Amendment analysis — arguably may not apply in

this context.

We need not resolve this question definitively because

the answer to it will in no way alter the outcome of the case. Cf.

Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reserv'n v. Wold Eng'g,

P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (noting the "fundamental rule of

judicial restraint" that courts ought not to "reach constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them"). The key

is that Maldonado's argument concerning Nichols's subjective intent

fails on the facts.

The district court found "no evidence that Nichols had

any intent to search for drugs" when he examined the passenger

compartment of the van (i.e., the cab). Maldonado, 2002 WL

31444563, at *8 n.4. This finding is amply supported by the record

and is thus not clearly erroneous. Only the search of the trailer,

then, is susceptible to legitimate question — and when that search

occurred there was sufficient probable cause to satisfy the

automobile exception to the warrant requirement. After all,

Maldonado was driving a truck that had an expired and illegally

altered registration; he had no valid driver's license; he could

not produce an operating authority; he had told a tale that

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bordered on the incredible (he had no shipping papers, no fuel

receipts, an unrealistically tiny number of toll receipts, no way

to identify the motel room that he supposedly occupied, no luggage

or other overnight gear), and the trooper was aware that Maldonado

had violated virtually every rule in the book. He also was aware

that the truck contained what appeared to his experienced eye to be

a "cover load."

These facts, taken in conjunction with Maldonado's

implausible explanations, were sufficient to give rise to probable

cause to believe that Maldonado was carrying contraband. See

United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining

that "[p]robable cause often accretes gradually"). Thus, the

search of the trailer was justified by the automobile exception to

the warrant requirement. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467

(1999) (per curiam) (deciding that the automobile exception to the

warrant requirement is satisfied if there is probable cause to

believe a car contains contraband); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518

U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam) (holding, with an exception not

pertinent here, that if "probable cause exists to believe [a

vehicle] contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits

police to search the vehicle without more"); see also United States

v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 710 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that the

only "essential predicate" for a valid warrantless search of an

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automobile is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains

contraband).

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. Because we find the warrantless

inspection of Maldonado's moving van consistent with the Fourth

Amendment, we uphold the district court's denial of the motion to

suppress.

Affirmed.

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