F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 11 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 02-7138
DOUGLAS VICTOR MATHIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CR-02-44-S)
Jeffrey A. Gallant (Sheldon J. Sperling, United States Attorney, with him on the
brief), Assistant United States Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellee.
Eddie Christian, Jr., (Dan George, Sallisaw, Oklahoma with him on the briefs),
Fort Smith, Arkansas for the Defendant-Appellant.
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McKAY, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
At issue in this case are several claims of error regarding the issuance of a
search warrant, which include the sufficiency and reliability of an affidavit
containing multiple layers of hearsay as a basis for the search warrant. The
district court rejected the defendant’s arguments, including that the warrant
improperly relied upon unreliable and stale hearsay, and found instead that the
magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause to issue a warrant to
search the defendant’s residence. We take the district court’s position on the
issues and, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirm.
I
On March 9, 2001, a warrant was executed at defendant Douglas Mathis’s
residence authorizing a search for records and other evidence of his purported
illegal activities, including distribution of methamphetamine and possession of
stolen vehicles. During the execution of the warrant, law enforcement agents
observed Mathis run out the back door of the residence and drop a small pouch
from his hand; authorities also found drug paraphernalia at the residence. Robert
Walden, an investigator for the District Attorney and the affiant for the first
search warrant, then requested a second warrant to search Mathis’s residence for
evidence of possession and distribution of methamphetamine. The second warrant
was executed the same day and, as a result of evidence obtained under these
warrants, Mathis was arrested.
Mathis was indicted June 13, 2002 by a federal grand jury; the three count
indictment charged him with drug and firearms violations, including the
manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine. Mathis moved to
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suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the two warrants, alleging that the
information upon which the magistrate judge relied in issuing the first warrant
was stale and based on impermissible hearsay and, therefore, that the warrant
issued without probable cause.
Specifically, Mathis alleged that the probable cause supporting the first
search warrant rested almost entirely upon information from four confidential
cooperating witnesses (CW #1-4). According to Mathis, the information provided
by those cooperating witnesses was stale, inconsistent, and filtered through an
unknown number of law enforcement agents before reaching the affiant, Walden.
As a result, Mathis claimed the magistrate who issued the warrants had no
substantial basis upon which to accept the cooperating witnesses’ information,
and without such a basis, the first search warrant lacked probable cause. Because
the first search warrant was not based on probable cause, Mathis continued, any
evidence obtained under the second warrant was tainted and must also be
suppressed.
After filing the motion to suppress, Mathis also filed a motion to compel
disclosure of the identity of the confidential informants who provided information
to Walden. The district court held hearings on both motions and conducted an in
camera inspection of documents which revealed the identities of the informants at
issue. When the court denied both motions, Mathis conditionally pled guilty to
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Count Two of the indictment, possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. He was sentenced to ninety-six months in prison, followed by
forty-eight months of supervised release. Mathis appeals to this court, arguing
that the district court erred both in denying his motion to suppress the evidence
and in denying his motion to reveal the identities of the confidential informants.
II
We consider: (1) whether the first search warrant lacked probable cause due
to hearsay and staleness problems such that all evidence obtained under either
search warrant should be suppressed, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484 (1963); and (2) if due to alleged inconsistencies between the accounts of
two of the cooperating witnesses, the prosecution must reveal the identities of
those witnesses to Mathis in order to allow him to mount an effective defense, see
Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61–62 (1957).
A
The United States Constitution requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const., amend IV.
While the phrase “probable cause” is not self-defining, the Supreme Court has
described the probable cause inquiry as a “commonsense, practical question” to be
informed by the totality of the circumstances present in any particular case.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
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Mathis initially argues that the first search warrant lacked probable cause
because the affidavit underlying the search warrant was based upon unknown
layers of hearsay. The problem, Mathis contends, is that Walden did not receive
the information he described in the affidavit from the cooperating witnesses
directly; rather, each cooperating witness related his or her tale to other law
enforcement agents who then passed along the information to Walden. Mathis
claims the magistrate’s reliance on Walden’s testimony regarding information
relayed through multiple layers of hearsay resulted in the issuance of a search
warrant unsupported by probable cause.
As Mathis concedes, hearsay evidence may form the basis for a probable
cause determination. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960);
United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990). Moreover, we have
previously recognized that multiple layers of hearsay may support a finding of
probable cause for a search warrant. United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S.
Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 874 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). Despite this clear precedent,
Mathis insists that in this case the affiant, Walden, was not sufficiently proximate
to the investigation to effectively corroborate the hearsay evidence to which he
attested. Mathis reasons that because Walden had not independently verified the
information provided by law enforcement agents, and because he did not
personally obtain the tips from the cooperating witnesses, he could not personally
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be aware of, or accountable for, the accuracy of the information contained in his
sworn affidavit. Therefore, Mathis urges, Walden’s oath was meaningless and as
a consequence, the magistrate erred in relying upon the hearsay contained in the
affidavit.
To bolster his argument, Mathis points to the Court’s discussion in Jones:
In testing the sufficiency of probable cause for an officer’s action
even without a warrant, we have held that he may rely upon
information received through an informant, rather than upon his
direct observation, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably
corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.
Jones, 362 U.S. at 269. Mathis’s reliance on Jones is misplaced. Jones did not
require an officer to corroborate information received from an informant through
personal observation as Mathis would have us hold. Rather, an officer simply
must have knowledge of other matters that reasonably corroborate the informant’s
statements. Mathis’s contention that Walden did not have sufficient personal
knowledge of corroborating information thus fails.
Next we consider the argument that because an unknown number of law
enforcement agents were involved in transmitting the informant’s tips from the
witnesses to Walden, the magistrate judge had no basis for determining the
reliability (or in one instance, the identity 1) of these links in the hearsay chain,
1
In the affidavit, Walden does name the law enforcement agents from
whom he received CW #1–3’s information; nonetheless, in the case of CW #4, the
(continued...)
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and thus, no substantial basis upon which to conclude the underlying tips were
reliable. We restate that multiple layers of hearsay may form the basis of a
finding of probable cause. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d at 874 n.3.
Moreover, it is not necessary to reveal the identities of the individuals providing
information to the police; hearsay from unknown or unnamed individuals has been
recognized as acceptable support for a finding of probable cause. See, e.g.,
Gates, 462 U.S. at 237–238 (approving of anonymous citizen tips).
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), decided shortly after
Jones, also directly undercuts Mathis’s argument. In Rugendorf, the defendant,
on facts similar to those presently before us, attacked a search warrant as invalid
because the affidavit upon which it was based contained hearsay from
confidential informants passed to the affiant by other law enforcement agents.
376 U.S. at 529–531. Without explicitly analyzing each of the multiple layers of
hearsay present, the Court concluded that a valid probable cause determination
requires only a substantial basis to find that evidence of a crime was probably
present in the place to be searched. Id. at 533; accord United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (regarding hearsay from police officers: “[o]bservations
of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are
1
(...continued)
affidavit does not provide the identity of or information regarding the reliability
of the law enforcement agent(s) who furnished Walden with CW #4’s story.
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plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.”); Snow,
919 F.2d at 1460 (finding that hearsay evidence from other police officers’
informants, bolstered in part with separate corroboration, was sufficient to
support probable cause). On these authorities, we reject Mathis’s contention that
the hearsay evidence in this case was inherently unreliable and move to the
primary inquiry in any probable cause determination: did the magistrate, in
considering the information which he was provided, make a practical, common-
sense judgment that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be
present at Mathis’s residence? See, e.g., Snow, 919 F.2d at 1460.
Generally, we give considerable deference to a magistrate’s determination
of probable cause; a reviewing court’s only duty is “to ensure that the magistrate
had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Gates, 462
U.S. at 236, 238 (quotation omitted). When judging information provided by an
informant as the foundation supporting probable cause for a search warrant, we
consider the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge as relevant
factors to evaluate in assessing whether “given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238. In addition, a law enforcement
agent’s opinion, based upon his professional expertise, that evidence of illegal
activity will be found in the place to be searched, is entitled to consideration in
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our determination of whether probable cause existed at the time a warrant issued.
United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 1993); $149,442.43 in U.S.
Currency, 965 F.2d at 874; United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 937
(10th Cir. 1990).
In reviewing the denial of Mathis’s motion to suppress, we uphold a district
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v.
Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000). Because Mathis claims the
affidavit in this case does not adequately support a finding of probable cause, we
first consider the extensive factual findings of the district court. The district
court found, inter alia, that in June 1999 cooperating witness #1 (CW #1) and a
man named Frank Chambers were observed by surveilling officers driving to
Mathis’s residence. The officers saw Chambers enter the residence, leave a short
time later to return to the vehicle, and drive away with CW #1. CW #1 stated that
he or she had provided Chambers with $1200 cash to buy methamphetamine; CW
#1 later provided 20.5 grams of methamphetamine to the DEA, purportedly from
this transaction.
The second cooperating witness (CW #2) informed an FBI special agent
that he or she had known Mathis for over two years and had seen Mathis sell
methamphetamine at least twenty-five times between approximately February
1999 and August 2000. During the same period, CW #2 purportedly witnessed
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Mathis trade drugs for stereos and other items and overheard a conversation
where Mathis claimed he routinely cooked methamphetamine at his residence.
CW #2 further asserted that he or she observed a dark colored, 1968 Chevrolet
truck and a white truck with red paint dots on it at Mathis’s home and that a
network of video cameras and police scanners were operating whenever CW #2
was present at the residence.
Professing to have known Mathis for over three years, the third
cooperating witness (CW #3) stated that he or she had personally observed Mathis
sell methamphetamine over fifty times, including a sale in January 2001. CW
#3’s observations of the quantity of methamphetamine Mathis generally sold in a
transaction, Mathis’s willingness to accept goods in exchange for
methamphetamine, his use of a network of video cameras and police scanners, his
admission that methamphetamine was cooked at the residence, and that a white
truck with red painted dots was present at the residence, all corroborate CW #2’s
observations. In addition, Investigator Walden drove by Mathis’s residence in
March of 2001 and observed a 1968 pickup fitting CW #2 and CW #3’s
description. Lastly, cooperating witness #4 (CW #4), in late January 2001,
informed the FBI of his personal knowledge that Mathis had distributed and
continued to distribute significant quantities of methamphetamine, and that he or
she had obtained methamphetamine from Mathis on a few occasions.
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In summary, the district court found that the affidavit contained reliable
information provided to law enforcement by the confidential informants; that each
cooperating witness’ basis of knowledge had been stated, i.e., each personally
knew Mathis and his residence; that the information provided by the informants
was internally corroborated in several respects; and that Walden had extensive
law enforcement experience, including training in investigations of illegal
narcotics. On these grounds, the court determined that sufficient facts were
available to establish a substantial basis to believe that evidence of a crime would
be found at Mathis’s residence. Our review of the affidavit and the record does
not persuade us that these findings of fact were erroneous. Furthermore, we
conclude that given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the magistrate
had a substantial basis upon which to conclude that there was a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of illegal activity would be present at Mathis’s
residence at the time the search warrant was issued. We therefore conclude that
the magistrate’s reliance on hearsay information as a basis for probable cause to
support the first search warrant was not in error.
B
As for Mathis’s argument that the evidence in the affidavit was stale, we
have previously held that “[p]robable cause to search cannot be based on stale
information that no longer suggests that the items sought will be found in the
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place to be searched.” Snow, 919 F.2d at 1459. Mathis contests the age or
reliability of the information supplied by each of the cooperating witnesses. For
example, Mathis contends that CW #1 could only provide information regarding
one incident, which occurred in 1999, nearly two years before the search warrant
was executed. While CW #2 provided relatively more recent information
regarding Mathis’s alleged criminal activity, his or her observations were limited
to a period prior to August 2000, months before the search warrant was executed.
Though CW #3’s account provided information regarding Mathis’s criminal
activity proximal to the time of the search warrant’s execution, Mathis argues that
CW #3’s account conflicts with CW #2’s account. Accordingly, Mathis
maintains, the only reliable substantiated information regarding his alleged
criminal activity dated back to August of 2000. CW #4’s account, which related
the most recent criminal activity by Mathis, was not as detailed as the other three
cooperating witnesses tips; therefore this information was inherently unreliable
and could not rescue the other witnesses’ fatally stale information.
Mathis’s argument fails on several grounds. First, we reject Mathis’s claim
that the information provided by CW #2 and CW #3 are contradictory, simply
because the last date on which each witness claims to have seen Mathis’s illegal
activities differs. Mathis has offered no evidence beyond theorizing that CW #2
and CW #3 might have been in a relationship and therefore might have been at the
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residence at the same time that the dates should match.
Second, Mathis ignores our case law, which has firmly established that
“whether information is too stale to establish probable cause depends on the
nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and the nature of the
property to be seized.” Snow, 919 F.2d at 1460 (quotation omitted). Mathis was
suspected of continuous and ongoing drug activity; information from the
cooperating witnesses dated Mathis’s criminal venture to June 1999, and
observations by various witnesses continued through January of 2001. “Such
ongoing and continuous activity makes the passage of time less critical” when
judging the staleness of information upon which a search warrant is based. Id.;
accord, United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1997). Mathis’s reliance upon the
passage of time alone to demonstrate the staleness of the witnesses’ accounts is
unavailing.
We reject also Mathis’s contention that the information relied upon by the
magistrate was unsubstantiated and therefore unreliable. Walden himself verified
that a few days before the search warrant was executed, a particular truck,
believed to be stolen and described by CW # 2 and CW #3, was still present at
Mathis’s residence; as a result, at least part of CW #2 and CW #3’s information
was confirmed immediately prior to the warrant’s execution. For the foregoing
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reasons, it is quite clear to us that the information contained in the affidavit was
not impermissibly stale or unreliable such as would preclude establishment of
probable cause.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s determination that the first warrant
issued was supported by probable cause; it is therefore unnecessary to address the
district court’s alternative analysis concerning the Leon good faith exception for
warrants issued without probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984).
II
The second general allegation of error is that the district court erred in
denying Mathis’s motion to compel disclosure of the identities of CW #2 and CW
#3. In addition to the appeal of the district court’s denial, Mathis has filed a
petition with this court asking to supplement the record on appeal to include a
transcript of the in camera hearing conducted by the district court, at which the
identities of CW #2 and CW #3 were disclosed. We review the district court’s
exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d
1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1021 (10th
Cir. 1991). In evaluating whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying Mathis’s motion to compel disclosure of confidential informants, we are
guided by Rovario: “Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the
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contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. ” 353 U.S. at 60-61. However, “[m]ere speculation about the usefulness of
an informant’s testimony is not sufficient to warrant disclosure.” United States v.
Brantley, 986 F.2d 379, 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
Underlying Mathis’s request for disclosure is his contradiction theory;
specifically, the information from CW #2 and CW #3 is strikingly similar in all
aspects except for the last date on which they reportedly observed Mathis’s drug
activities. Given that the witnesses’ observations parallel in all other respects,
Mathis argues, it stands to reason that they were present in the Mathis residence
at the same time and might even be husband and wife. He concludes that because
these witnesses were likely present in his residence at the same time, their
information should match in all respects, including the dates each witness
observed his illegal undertakings. Mathis tells us that the alleged contradiction
between CW #2 and CW #3 is critically important because the information
provided by these two witnesses was integral to the magistrate judge’s
determination that probable cause existed. Because he claims the relationship
between the two cooperating witnesses is crucial to his contradiction theory,
Mathis asserts it is essential to his defense that the identities of these two
cooperating witnesses be revealed.
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However, the district court considered these arguments at an in camera
hearing and determined that the revelation of the informant’s identities was not
relevant to Mathis’s defense. Additionally, the court found that Mathis had
provided no evidence that CW #2 and CW #3 were at his residence at the same
time. Regarding Mathis’s hypothesis that CW #2 and CW #3 may have been
husband and wife and therefore should have identical observations, the court
correctly observed, “[e]ven a husband and wife are not always at the same
location at the same time. Simply because [CW #2 and CW #3’s] observations
are not identical does not mean they are incorrect or inconsistent.” United States
v. Mathis, CR-02-00044, at 13, Aug. 2, 2002. We agree.
Mathis has marshaled the mere speculation that if CW #2 and CW #3 were
in a relationship, any inconsistencies in their observations of Mathis’s illegal
activities renders their accounts contradictory and unreliable. Such speculation is
insufficient to warrant the disclosure of the identities of confidential informants.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mathis’s motion to compel disclosure of the identities of CW #2 and CW #3.
Further, we deny Mathis’s motion to supplement the record on appeal with the
transcript of the district court’s in camera hearing.
III
AFFIRMED.
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United States v. Mathis
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2004-02-11
Citations: 357 F.3d 1200
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion