United States v. Mayfield

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6212

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DANETTE LAVAINE MAYFIELD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:01-cv-00083-RLV; 5:98-cr-00164-
RLV-11)

Submitted: February 9, 2009 Decided: April 8, 2009

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael L. Waldman, Brian A. Pérez-Daple, ROBBINS, RUSSELL,
ENGLERT, ORSECK, UNTEREINER & SAUBER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Adam
Morris, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Danette Mayfield appeals from the district court’s

order denying her 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2008) motion.

Previously, we resolved all of Mayfield’s claims but one: that

her attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to object to the inclusion of two juvenile convictions

in the calculation of her criminal history category. As to that

claim, we found that the district court had improperly dismissed

it as untimely, and we remanded for consideration of the claim

on its merits. See United States v. Mayfield, No. 06-6282 (4th

Cir. Dec. 7, 2006) (unpublished).

On remand, the district court sua sponte entered a

final order, finding that Mayfield could not show prejudice from

any error of counsel. Specifically, the court stated that,

because Mayfield pled guilty, she was required to show that “but

for counsel’s alleged errors, this petitioner would have

insisted on a trial,” citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59

(1985). The court then went on to note that Mayfield had

“[i]ncredibly” “not bothered to assert or even to hint that but

for this alleged error, she would have insisted upon going to

trial.” Finding that there was little likelihood that Mayfield

would have demanded a trial absent counsel’s alleged error, the

court rejected Mayfield’s claim.

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 On appeal, the parties agree that the district court

applied the wrong legal standard. While ineffective assistance

claims in the guilty plea context are usually evaluated under

the standards announced in Hill, Mayfield does not challenge her

counsel’s actions in relation to the entry of her guilty plea.

Instead, because Mayfield argues that her attorney was

ineffective at sentencing, the standard Strickland analysis is

appropriate. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984) (movant must show that attorney’s conduct fell below

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a

reasonable probability that, absent these errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different); see also Royal v.

Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 248-49 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that Hill

standard applies only during “challenge to guilty plea” and

applying Strickland to ineffective assistance at sentencing

claim, requiring only that “sentence would have been more

lenient” absent counsel’s errors).

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and

remand for consideration of Mayfield’s claim under the proper

standard. Although the parties suggest that we may decide the

matter on the record before us in the first instance, we find

that there is a factual issue which must be determined by the

district court prior to the application of the Strickland legal

analysis. Specifically, on remand, the district court must

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determine when Mayfield commenced her conduct for the offense of

conviction, in accordance with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 4A1.2(d)(2) (1998). Once this factual dispute is resolved,

the district court can proceed to address whether counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the inclusion of the

juvenile convictions in Mayfield’s criminal history category

calculation. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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