United States v. Munoz

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-2133

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN JAIRO MUNOZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.

Sara Rapport on brief for appellant.

Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, Margaret E. Curran,

Assistant United States Attorney, and Stephanie S. Browne, Assistant

United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

April 26, 1996

Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant John Jairo Munoz Estrada

pled guilty to illegal reenty after deportation, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. 1326. He appeals from his sentence on the sole

ground that the district court erred in denying him a one-

level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b)(2) for

"timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a

plea of guilty." We vacate his sentence and remand for

resentencing.

"A defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to

decreases in the offense level, including downward

adjustments for acceptance of responsibility. Once the

sentencing court has ruled against him on such an issue, the

defendant faces an uphill battle." United States v. Morillo,

8 F.3d 864, 871 (1st Cir. 1993). "The clearly erroneous

standard . . . guides appellate review of district court

determinations under section 3E1.1(b)." Id.

"The timeliness of the defendant's acceptance of

responsibility is . . . context specific." U.S.S.G. 3E1.1,

comment. (n.6). To qualify for the additional one-level

reduction under 3E1.1(b)(2), the defendant "must have

notified authorities of his intention to enter a plea of

guilty at a sufficiently early point in the process so that

the government may avoid preparing for trial and the court

may schedule its calendar efficiently." Id.

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In denying the one-level reduction for timeliness, the

district court focused on the court's ability to "allocate

its resources efficiently," 3E1.1(b)(2), rather than on the

government's expenditure of resources in preparing for trial.

(The government concedes in its brief that "[t]here was no

direct evidence on the record that the prosecution had

actually prepared for trial -- outside of preparing responses

to defense counsel's boilerplate motions.")1 Specifically,
1

the court emphasized that Munoz did not plead guilty until

after the case was placed on the court's trial calendar.

Wasting judicial resources is, of course, a valid ground

for denying the extra one-level reduction. Here, however,

the case was placed on the court's trial calendar on March

22, 1995. Munoz did not actually enter his plea until April

5, 1995. The language of 3E1.1(b)(2) refers to the date

that the defendant "notif[ies] authorities of his intention

to enter a plea of guilty," not the date that the plea is

entered. In this case, notification occurred on March 16,

1995, the date on which the parties filed their executed plea

agreement with the court. Therefore, notification occurred

before the district court placed the case on the trial

1We do not suggest that work by prosecutors in responding
1
to pretrial motions cannot, in many circumstances, constitute
"preparing for trial" within the purview of 3E1.1(b)(2).
We merely point out that, here, the government gave the
district court very little to work with, and, in all events,
the court did not premise its denial of the added reduction
on the government's preparatory work.

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calendar. It was clear error for the district court to rule

that Munoz's acceptance of responsibility was untimely on the

ground that it occurred after the case was placed on the

court's trial calendar.

The sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for

resentencing. At the new sentencing hearing, either side may

proffer relevant information concerning the government's work

in preparing the case up to the time of the plea agreement.

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