United States v. Muriel-Cruz

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 02-2075

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

ALEXANDER MURIEL-CRUZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Héctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpi. U.S. Magistrate Judge]

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,

Selya, Circuit Judge,

and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge.

Elaine Mittleman, for appellant.
Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, and Sonia I. Torres-Pabón,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

June 15, 2005
CYR, Senior Circuit Judge. Alexander Muriel-Cruz

contends that the district court failed to conduct a proper mental

competency hearing prior to accepting his guilty plea to a drug

conspiracy charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In August 2000, Muriel-Cruz and eight codefendants were

jointly indicted on a single count of conspiring to distribute

cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Thereafter, in February

2001, the district court1 ordered that Muriel-Cruz undergo a

pretrial mental competency evaluation at the Federal Medical Center

(FMC) in Butner, North Carolina. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).2 Five

1
A magistrate judge conducted the district court proceedings
presently at issue on appeal. For convenience, we refer to the
magistrate judge as the “district court,” in light of the district
judge’s subsequent adoption of the recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.
2
Subsection 4241(d) provides in pertinent part:

If, after [a] hearing, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the
custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General
shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a
suitable facility –

(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to
exceed four months, as is necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that in
the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity

2
months later, the FMC certified in writing that Muriel-Cruz was

competent to stand trial, provided he maintained “strict compliance

with prescribed medications.”

On October 4, 2001, the district court convened a

competency hearing. Id. § 4241(e).3 The court found Muriel-Cruz

to permit the trial to proceed; and

(2) for an additional reasonable period of time
until –

(A) his mental condition is so improved that
trial may proceed, if the court finds that
there is a substantial probability that within
such additional period of time he will attain
the capacity to permit the trial to proceed;
or

(B) the pending charges against him are
disposed of according to law;

whichever is earlier.

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
3
Subsection 4241(e) provides, in pertinent part:

When the director of the facility in which a
defendant is hospitalized pursuant to subsection (d)
determines that the defendant has recovered to such an
extent that he is able to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist
properly in his defense, he shall promptly file a
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court
that ordered the commitment. . . . The court shall hold
a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of
section 4247(d), to determine the competency of the
defendant. If, after the hearing, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has
recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand
the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him and to assist properly in his defense, the court
shall order his immediate discharge from the facility in

3
competent, based upon: (i) the FMC certificate of competency; (ii)

defense counsel’s representations that she did not dispute the FMC

certificate’s clinical conclusions; (iii) defense counsel’s

personal observation that Muriel-Cruz had appeared to her to be

mentally astute during their recent consultations; (iv) defense

counsel’s commitment to notify the court in the event that she

perceived any material deterioration in the defendant's mental

competency; and (v) the defendant's statement that he “felt very

well” since his treatment at the FMC.

In February 2002, the district court conducted a change-

of-plea hearing, during which defense counsel (i) reminded the

court of Muriel-Cruz’s recent psychiatric treatment at the FMC for

“drug induced” mental problems, and (ii) opined that Muriel-Cruz

was presently competent to enter a plea. The court conducted a

thorough colloquy with Muriel-Cruz, whereupon Muriel-Cruz entered

which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for
trial.

18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). Subsection 4247(d) provides:

At a hearing ordered pursuant to this chapter the
person whose mental condition is the subject of the
hearing shall be represented by counsel and, if he is
financially unable to obtain adequate representation,
counsel shall be appointed for him pursuant to section
3006A. The person shall be afforded an opportunity to
testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on
his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses
who appear at the hearing.

18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).

4
a guilty plea, which the district court determined to be knowing

and voluntary.

During the months following the plea hearing, however,

appellant's mental condition temporarily deteriorated after prison

officials inadvertently reduced the maintenance dosage of his

medications. Thereafter, the scheduled sentencing date had to be

continued on two occasions. At a sentencing hearing on July 15,

2002, however, the district court determined Muriel-Cruz competent,

then sentenced him to a 60-month term of imprisonment.

Muriel-Cruz now appeals from the district court

determinations that he was competent to enter a guilty plea.

DISCUSSION

Represented by new counsel, Muriel-Cruz now contends

that, after receiving the FMC certificate of competency, the

district court failed to conduct a hearing which comported with the

requirements of subsections 4241(e) and 4247(d). See supra notes

2 & 3.

A. Standard of Review

As Muriel-Cruz failed to raise this issue below, we

review only for plain error. See United States v. Giron-Reyes, 234

F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).

Moreover, we will not reverse unless we perceive, at a minimum, an

“‘error’ that is ‘plain’ and that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’”

5
United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). Even then, we retain the discretion to affirm

unless persuaded that the error “‘seriously affect[ed] the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

Id. (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal

First, we must consider whether Muriel-Cruz should be

permitted to supplement the record on appeal with evidence (e.g.,

recent psychiatric evaluations suggesting incompetence) that his

mental condition seriously deteriorated between the February 2002

plea hearing and the July 2002 sentencing hearing. See Fed. R.

App. 10(e).4 He contends that the evidence at issue would

demonstrate that he never regained competence to stand trial

following treatment at the FMC, and that the district court failed

to conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry during the October 4

hearing as to whether he was presently competent.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, not present here, we

consult only the record extant at the time the district court

4
Rule 10(e) provides:

If anything material to either party is omitted from
or misstated in the record by error or by accident, the
omission or misstatement may be corrected and a
supplemental record may be certified and forwarded: (A)
on stipulation of the parties; (B) by the district court
before or after the record has been forwarded; or (C) by
the court of appeals.

Fed. R. App. P. 10(e).

6
rendered its decision. See United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300

F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that “‘[a] 10(e) motion is

designed to only supplement the record on appeal so that it

accurately reflects what occurred before the district court [and]

. . . is not a procedure for putting additional evidence, no matter

how relevant, before the court of appeals that was not before the

district court’”).

Further, Muriel-Cruz’s mental condition since his

February 2002 plea hearing does not undercut the FMC certification

that he had regained competence, but at the very most suggests that

he may have experienced a subsequent relapse due to an inadvertent

and temporary change in his maintenance medications. The narrow

issue before us, on the other hand, is whether Muriel-Cruz was

competent at the time he entered the guilty plea. With respect to

that question, of course, the proffered supplemental record is

simply immaterial. Accordingly, we deny the motion to supplement

the record pursuant to FRAP 10(e).

C. The Adequacy of the October 4, 2001 Hearing under Section
4241(e)

Muriel-Cruz contends that the district court never

conducted a valid § 4241(e) competency hearing, in that the October

4, 2001 hearing was inadequate because (i) the court relied upon

the personal opinions of the prosecutor and defense counsel –

neither of whom is a qualified psychiatric professional – as

evidence of Muriel-Cruz’s competency; (ii) the court never rendered

7
an explicit finding that Muriel-Cruz was competent; and (iii) the

district court and defense counsel stated that Muriel-Cruz had

“waived” a § 4241(e) hearing.

Not only can we ascertain no plain error, we are unable

to discern what additional actions reasonably could have been

expected of the district court under § 4241(e). Upon its receipt

of the FMC certificate, the district court duly notified the

parties that it would convene a competency hearing on October 4,

see Giron-Reyes, 234 F.3d at 80 (holding that § 4241(e) mandates

that district court hold a hearing after receipt of a § 4241(e)

certificate), thereby affording them an adequate opportunity to

review the certificate, to determine whether they intended to

contest its findings, and whether to invoke Muriel-Cruz’s statutory

due-process rights “to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena

witnesses on his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine

witnesses who appear at the hearing,” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).

At the hearing, the district court did not rely

exclusively upon counsels’ opinion as to appellant’s competency.

The parties were presented with uncontroverted documentary evidence

of Muriel-Cruz’s current competency in the form of the FMC

certificate, which contained the clinical opinion of the FMC’s

psychiatric personnel. Subsection 4241(e) certificates

unquestionably constitute competent evidence of a defendant’s

mental condition. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 30 F.3d 575,

8
576 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The district court held a competency hearing

. . . and found the defendant competent based on the [§ 4241(e)]

forensic report.”); see also United States v. General, 278 F.3d

389, 398 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that, in making a competency

determination, “the [FMC] report is entitled to significant weight

because it is the most recent and comprehensive evaluation [of

defendant’s mental condition]”). Neither the prosecutor nor

defense counsel objected to the medical conclusions reported in the

FMC certificate. Notwithstanding defense counsel’s opinions,

therefore, the district court had independent evidence of Muriel-

Cruz’s competency: the FMC certificate.

Nor is there any basis for the contention that the

district court could not also consider other indicia of Muriel-

Cruz's competency. In arriving at a competency ruling, the

district court may rely upon various kinds of evidence, including

written medical opinions and observations by the court, counsel,

and defendant himself regarding the defendant's demeanor and

fitness to stand trial. See, e.g., United States v. Boigegrain,

155 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Nichols,

56 F.3d 403, 411 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d

921, 926 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoyt, 200 F. Supp. 2d

790, 793 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Given that defense counsel enjoys a

unique vantage for observing whether her client is competent, see

Collins, 949 F.2d at 926 (noting that defense counsel and defendant

9
are often the two parties “most familiar” with the facts pertinent

to this issue), it would be untoward indeed to disqualify her from

stating her opinion, particularly since competency means that “a

defendant must be able to understand the proceedings against him

and have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with

a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Giron-Reyes, 234

F.3d at 80 (emphasis added). Here, defense counsel assured the

court that Muriel-Cruz had demonstrated an ability to aid in and to

comprehend his defense. The district court reasonably accepted

this as corroboration of the conclusions reached in the FMC

certificate, and requested defense counsel to notify the court in

the event she were to perceive any material deterioration in the

appellant’s mental competency. Finally, the district court heard

Muriel-Cruz’s own admission that he “felt very well” after being

treated at the FMC, and the record discloses no other behavior by

Muriel-Cruz during the hearing which could have cast any serious

doubt as to his competency.

Thus, the district court accorded the parties notice of

the competency hearing, and an opportunity to adduce any evidence

which might contradict the finding of competency contained in the

FMC certificate. As the FMC certificate provided independent

evidence of competency, Muriel-Cruz’s argument – that the court

improperly relied solely upon defense counsel’s non-expert opinions

as to his mental competency – plainly fails.

10
It is noteworthy that Muriel-Cruz has not claimed that

the court had an independent duty under subsection 4241(e) to

summon and question its own expert medical witnesses to verify the

conclusions reached in the FMC certificate. No such authority

exists, either in the statute or in the case law. Subsections

4241(e) and 4247(d) plainly contemplate that the issue of

defendant’s competency vel non is to be resolved through the normal

workings of the adversarial process, and there is no reason to

suppose that defense counsel would act contrary to the interests of

an incompetent client by failing to contest the conclusions of a

subsection 4241(e) certificate. Cf. Giron-Reyes, 234 F.3d at 80-81

(“[T]here is no reasonable cause to hold an initial [§ 4241(d)]

competency hearing where ‘all the information from the [examining]

psychiatrist, the defense counsel and the judge [from a plea

colloquy] [is] in agreement.’”) (citation omitted); cf. also United

States v. Denkins, 367 F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We know of

no authority, and Defendant has not cited any, for the proposition

that [§ 4241(d)] mandates a hearing even when there is no prospect

of meeting the statutory standard of incompetency. Defendant and

his counsel evidently concluded that this standard could not be

satisfied, and the district court was not obligated to press

forward despite Defendant's abandonment of the issue.”). Although

subsection 4241(e) – unlike subsection 4241(d) – mandates a

hearing, see Giron-Reyes, 234 F.3d at 80, both sections leave the

11
decision whether to contest competency primarily to the government

and to defense counsel.

Second, Muriel-Cruz urges that the October 4 hearing was

not valid under subsection 4241(e) because the court made no final

finding of fact that he was competent. Quite the contrary, the

magistrate judge concluded the hearing by unequivocally

recommending to the district judge a finding of fact that Muriel-

Cruz was competent to stand trial. At oral argument on appeal,

appellant’s counsel contended that the district court failed to

enter findings that Muriel-Cruz presently understood the

proceedings against him and had sufficient capacity to consult with

counsel. Counsel cited neither case authority nor sound reason for

requiring a court to parse the definition of “competency,” and

arrive at specific findings as to each component.

Finally, we reject the contention that the October 4

hearing could not have been a subsection 4241(e) hearing given that

the magistrate and defense counsel stated that Muriel-Cruz had

“waived” the hearing. Instead, viewed in context the statements

advert not to the fact that no compliant hearing had been

conducted, but that the defense had waived its due-process right

“to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on his

behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who appear at

the hearing.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). Nothing in the record on

appeal remotely indicates that the district court imposed any

12
impediment to the defense decision as to whether or how to contest

Muriel-Cruz’s competency at the October 4 hearing. The term

“waiver” simply described the relevant reality: defense counsel

chose not to exercise these § 4247(d) rights. In no sense does

this alter the fact that the district court did conduct a

subsection 4241(e) hearing.

As the district court assiduously adhered to both the

letter and the spirit of subsection 4241(e), we perceive no error

whatever in the district court proceedings, let alone plain error.

Affirmed.