United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 01-2495
01-2621
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
GIORGIY NISHNIANIDZE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Elizabeth L. Bostwick, with whom Joseph S. Berman and Berman
& Dowell were on brief, for appellant.
Samuel W. Buell, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.
August 26, 2003
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Giorgiy Nishnianidze raises a
host of challenges to his extortion conviction. After careful
review, we affirm.
I. Facts
A. Adoption
Lewis Finfer and Judith Shea, a married couple, adopted
an infant son, Alexander, from the country of Georgia in March
1996. They consulted with a Massachusetts adoption agency called
Wide Horizons for Children, Inc., which in turn worked with
Nishnianidze (pronounced nish-nee-ah-NID-zuh), an attorney in
Georgia. Finfer and Shea paid $10,000 for the adoption -- half to
Wide Horizons and half to Nishnianidze for his legal services.
Finfer and Shea traveled to Georgia to pick up their son,
staying with Nishnianidze at his home. Finfer and Shea asked to
meet the birth mother but Nishnianidze told her that he did not
know how to locate her. The adoption was without incident.
Nishnianidze provided the couple with Georgian legal documentation
of the adoption, including a document in which Alexander’s birth
mother relinquished all parental rights. These documents were
recognized by a Massachusetts court that finalized the adoption
after Finfer, Shea, and Alexander returned home.
B. Nishnianidze Contacts Parents
Nishnianidze emigrated to Brooklyn, New York in October,
1998, seeking permanent residency from the Legacy Immigration and
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Naturalization Service. Finfer and Shea heard nothing from
Nishnianidze until January 26, 1999, when he called their home and
spoke to Shea. He said he was in Boston and asked to see the
family. Shea told Nishnianidze to call Finfer, who then invited
Nishnianidze to their home for dinner.
Finfer picked up Nishnianidze in downtown Boston and
drove him to the family’s home in Dorchester. That evening, on the
pretense of documenting a successful international adoption,
Nishnianidze filmed the family with a video camera he brought.
Intimating that the birth mother was having "a rough time," he
asked if the couple would provide financial support to the birth
mother and her two children in Georgia. The couple refused.
At the end of the evening, Finfer drove Nishnianidze back
to downtown Boston. During the car ride, Nishnianidze told Finfer
that Alexander’s birth mother was upset, might challenge the
legality of the adoption, had made threats to Nishnianidze and
Nishnianidze’s family, and wanted $50,000 from Finfer and Shea.
Finfer was upset by the conversation and told Nishnianidze it
"sounded like blackmail."
Finfer relayed the conversation to Shea. The couple
contacted an attorney the next day and met with the FBI on
January 28, 1999. At this meeting, Finfer and Shea agreed to
record their subsequent conversations with Nishnianidze. They also
received advice from the agents about how to gather information
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from Nishnianidze. After this initial meeting, Finfer and Shea
occasionally spoke with a single FBI agent about their
conversations with Nishnianidze and received suggestions as to how
to handle the discussions.
C. Telephone Calls
On the morning of January 29, 1999, Nishnianidze called
Shea at home, and she recorded the conversation. Nishnianidze
began by describing recent events in Georgia, including opposition
and challenges to international adoptions. He stated that
Alexander’s biological mother was upset the boy had been adopted by
an American family and had threatened harm to Nishnianidze and
Nishnianidze’s son if Alexander was not returned. Nishnianidze
stated that he came to the United States because of the threats,
and that the birthmother requested "from me to take the child
back." He told Shea that if she paid him $50,000 (to be given to
the biological mother), the biological mother would guarantee not
to pursue the child.
Nishnianidze stressed that he had been threatened and
abused by Alexander’s biological family, whom he described as
"hungry," "homeless," and "crazy people," who were connected to the
Georgian police. Shea stated that it was "[s]cary to think about
. . . people wanting Alexander back." Nishnianidze responded,
"[I]t’s very hard for, for you, okay?"
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Near the end of the conversation, Nishnianidze told Shea
that if the biological mother "don’t receive money I don’t know
what will be happened." He told Shea to "be silence" and "not to
make noisy." Nishnianidze advised her to borrow the $50,000 from
a bank or from friends. The call ended when Shea told Nishnianidze
she would discuss the matter with Finfer.
Later that day, Nishnianidze called again and spoke to
Finfer, who recorded the call. Nishnianidze repeated that the
biological family wanted $50,000 and encouraged Finfer to promptly
pay whatever he could. Nishnianidze first said that his family in
Georgia was in danger, then stated "maybe they will call you or
come here I don’t know what they can do."
Finfer told Nishnianidze that he was worried and asked,
"Are you telling me that you’re gonna take our child?"
Nishnianidze responded, "Ah, I don’t know what will be happen."
Finfer concluded the call by telling Nishnianidze he would call him
in New York the following week.
On February 3, Nishnianidze left a message at the
couple’s home asking them to call him at his Brooklyn residence.
Finfer returned the call. In this recorded conversation,
Nishnianidze asked, "What you decide?" Finfer told him that they
had decided not to pay. Nishnianidze responded, "I think it would
be . . . worse for me and ah, also for your family." Nishnianidze
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told Finfer that the biological family knew Finfer and Shea’s
address and could send someone to the home. He continued:
They can take the child from yard or and
they’ll ah, request ah, twice more money. Or
they can I don’t know what they can do,
everything they can do. . . .
They can find ah, another people which can
come not to make photos but to take child.
And then you, you, you, you will, you will not
ah, know what we do when it would be happen
because they don’t warn you. . . .
They know address they will take ah, after one
month, two months, five months, ah, one year I
don’t know, which time it would be happen
. . . . [They told me to] warn them, that we
will take the child ah, or something we will
do it then.
Finfer stated he was concerned for his son’s safety, and
Nishnianidze again advised against going to the police or telling
anyone about the situation. He stated, "If you are afraid for
[Alexander] and his life in this case you must do right for son;
you must pay." Nishnianidze concluded by saying Finfer should call
him within one week if he decided to pay.
Finfer called Nishnianidze the next day and stated that
he was afraid for himself and his family and had decided to pay.
Over the next two weeks, Finfer and Nishnianidze spoke five times
regarding the exchange of money. They agreed to meet at Boston's
South Station to exchange $38,000.
In his final phone call on the evening of February 17,
1999, Nishnianidze told Finfer that he was sick and could not go to
Boston to pick up the money. He said Finfer could send the money
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directly to the birth mother, but stated that he believed he could
be arrested and did not want to touch the money.
D. FBI Questioning
On the morning of April 6, 1999, two New York FBI agents
and a New York City Police Department detective went to the
Manhattan apartment where Nishnianidze was staying. FBI agents in
Boston had requested that they locate Nishnianidze, interview him
and obtain any photographs or videotapes in his possession of
children whose adoptions he had processed.
When they arrived at the apartment between 8:00 and 8:30
a.m., the agents knocked and identified themselves. Nishnianidze
opened the door and they entered into a one-room apartment with a
bed and two additional mattresses on the floor. Nishnianidze
appeared to have been sleeping when he answered the door, and the
agents observed Nishnianidze’s son on a mattress on the floor where
he had been sleeping and where he remained throughout the
interview.
The agents (including one Russian speaker) informed
Nishnianidze that they were investigating his contacts with a
Massachusetts family and interviewed him for thirty to forty-five
minutes. Nishnianidze talked about his involvement in
international adoptions and his contacts with Finfer and Shea, and
then answered follow-up questions. The agents asked Nishnianidze
if he had any photographs or videotapes of the adopted children.
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An agent accompanied Nishnianidze as he searched the apartment and
produced the video of Alexander. The agents and detective were all
armed, and while Nishnianidze searched for the video, the detective
removed his snub-nosed handgun from its holster and held it behind
his back, reholstering it when the search was complete.
At some point during the interview, Nishnianidze’s
roommate arrived at the apartment. The detective asked him to wait
in the hallway while the interview was completed and he agreed to
do so. After giving Nishnianidze a receipt for the videotape and
a birth announcement relating to another adoption, the interview
ended.
E. Arrest and Pre-trial
Nishnianidze was arrested on May 17, 1999. He was
charged with four counts: (1) transmitting an interstate threat
with the intent of extorting $50,000 in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(b); (2) transmitting an interstate threat in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 875(c); (3) traveling in interstate commerce to perform
acts of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952; and (4) using
an interstate facility to perform acts of extortion in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1952.
Before trial, Nishnianidze made a motion to suppress his
April 6, 1999 statements to the FBI agents. After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court denied the motion.
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F. Trial
The government’s case at trial included the recorded
telephone conversations between Nishnianidze and Shea and Finfer.
Finfer and Shea testified about their conversations with
Nishnianidze as well as their subjective fear that their son was in
danger. An FBI agent described her interview of Nishnianidze in
Manhattan, including his statement that he believed he was
committing extortion.
Nishnianidze testified in his defense. He said he never
intended to extort money, but was trying to make Finfer and Shea
aware of the danger he was facing from Alexander's biological
family in Georgia. Nishnianidze suggested that he wanted the
couple to help him demonstrate fear of persecution so he could
receive political asylum. Nishnianidze also stated that Finfer was
playing "games" with Nishnianidze, and Nishnianidze simply joined
the game, although he never actually intended a kidnapping.
The jury found Nishnianidze guilty on all four counts.
He was sentenced to fifty-seven months imprisonment followed by two
years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay a special
assessment of $400. This timely appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Suppress
Nishnianidze challenges the district court's denial of
his motion to suppress. We review the district court's factual
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determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2000).
"[A] person questioned by law enforcement officers after
being 'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way' must first" receive Miranda
warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). In
determining whether a defendant was in "custody" when interrogated,
"a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was
a formal arrest or restraint on the freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. (quotation omitted);
accord United States v. Fernández-Ventura, 132 F.3d 844, 846 (1st
Cir. 1998).
The officer's subjective belief is irrelevant; the
inquiry is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would
have understood his situation." Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-24.
Among the factors to consider are "whether the suspect was
questioned in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, the number
of law enforcement officers present at the scene, the degree of
physical restraint placed upon the suspect, and the duration and
character of the interrogation." United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d
805, 809 (1st Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted).
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Considering all the circumstances, we hold that the
district court did not err in denying Nishnianidze’s motion to
suppress. Admittedly, there are some factors in favor of
suppression, including the fact that the interview took place early
in the morning and was administered by three agents in a small
area. Additionally, Nishnianidze was never told he was free to
leave. On the other hand, Nishnianidze was interviewed at the
place where he was staying; he was therefore familiar with the
surroundings. The interview was forty-five minutes or less -- not
exceptionally long. Cf. Fernández-Ventura, 132 F.3d at 848
(finding that the duration of the interrogation, on its own, is not
a determinative factor).
The agents did not make physical contact with
Nishnianidze or restrain his movement. At the hearing,
Nishnianidze’s son testified that he saw one of the detective's gun
when it was briefly unholstered. However, there is no evidence
that Nishnianidze saw the weapon or felt it restrained his movement
in any way. Finally, Nishnianidze's son testified that
Nishnianidze was told by the Russian-speaking agent that if he
cooperated and agreed with the agents he would not be arrested.
Nishnianidze asserts that he was confused and felt pressured to
speak. This argument fails because the district court heard the
son’s testimony regarding the agent’s behavior, and was in the best
position to judge its credibility. The district court's factual
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finding that the son's story was implausible is not clearly
erroneous. In all, there was not the "restraint on movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest," and Nishnianidze's motion
to suppress his statements was properly denied. See Stansbury, 511
U. S. at 322; cf. United States v. Lanni, 951 F.2d 440, 443 (1st
Cir. 1991) (finding no clear error in determining that defendant
was not in custody where she was interviewed and asked to provide
handwriting samples by two agents for four hours in a "tense
atmosphere").
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Nishnianidze asserts that the government failed to
present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(b)1 and (c)2 and 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the "Travel Act"). In
assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
"review the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable
1
Whoever, with intent to extort from any person . . ., any
money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat
to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person
of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 875(b) (2003).
2
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person
or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
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inferences therefrom, taken as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, would allow a rational jury to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [was] guilty
as charged." United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 747 (1st Cir.
1996) (quotation omitted). "An appellate court plays a very
circumscribed role in gauging the sufficiency of the evidentiary
foundation upon which a criminal conviction rests." United States
v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 1998). We are mindful that
the jury's duty is to assess credibility, and it may accept or
reject, in whole or in part, any testimony. United States v. Mena-
Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st Cir. 1993).
1. Threats Transmitted Via Interstate Communication
To convict under § 875, the government had to prove that
the defendant intended to transmit the interstate communication and
that the communication contained a true threat. See United States
v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1066 (4th Cir. 1994)). A true threat is
one that a reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the
communication would find threatening. Id. For a conviction under
§ 875(b), the government also had to prove that the threat was
transmitted with the specific intent to extort money or a thing of
value. See United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 783 (3d Cir.
1994).
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A reasonable jury could find that Nishnianidze
transmitted a threat in interstate commerce with the intent of
extorting money. The jury heard Nishnianidze’s telephone
conversations, specifically the interstate telephone call of
February 3 in which Nishnianidze stated that not paying the money
would be "worse for me and ah, also for your family." He told
Finfer that "[t]hey can take the child from yard," and warned that
Finfer could never be safe because "they" could act at any time in
the future. Nishnianidze finished by saying, "If you are afraid
for [your son] and his life in this case you must do right for your
son, you must pay."
The jury also considered the circumstances leading up to
this conversation: Nishnianidze appeared in Boston out of the blue
after nearly three years; went to the family’s home and videotaped
the child; and began a series of phone calls to the family
discussing the danger posed by the biological family (who were
referred to as "crazy people") and the need to pay $50,000 to avoid
harm to either Nishnianidze’s family or Alexander.
Nishnianidze asserts that he was simply warning the
family and cannot be convicted because he never threatened to
personally kidnap Alexander. His argument fails. Nishnianidze
told Finfer and Shea that the only way to ensure their son's safety
was to pay him $50,000. Thus, Nishnianidze acknowledged that he
alone could prevent harm from befalling Alexander. His statements
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in the final phone call that Finfer could send the money directly
to the birth mother came after the threats had already been made.
A jury could have found that Nishnianidze either controlled the
biological family's actions or, more likely, that the story of the
biological family was fabricated and the real danger was posed by
Nishnianidze himself. There was ample evidence to support a
finding that Nishnianidze’s comments placed Finfer and Shea in
immediate fear for their son’s safety.
2. Criminal Conduct and Interstate Travel
To convict under the Travel Act, the government must show
"(1) interstate travel or the use of an interstate facility; (2)
with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or
facilitate an unlawful activity" (here, violation of the
Massachusetts extortion statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 25
(2003)); and (3) "performance or attempted performance of acts in
furtherance of the unlawful activity." Woodward, 149 F.3d at 65.
A reasonable jury could have found that Nishnianidze
traveled from his home in Brooklyn, New York to Boston,
Massachusetts in January 1999 and made interstate telephone calls
in February 1999 intending to promote and facilitate extortion.
Nishnianidze established contact with Finfer and Shea, came to
their house and made a video of the family, and asked the couple
for money for the biological mother. He continued to pressure the
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family after he returned to New York. There was ample evidence to
support his conviction under the Travel Act.
C. Jury Instructions
1. "True" Threat
Nishnianidze argues that the district court erred in
instructing the jury to consider whether the recipient felt
threatened, rather than whether an objective speaker making the
statements would believe a recipient would feel threatened. Since
no objection was made at trial, we review only for plain error.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We evaluate the error in light of the
record as a whole. United States v. Smith, 278 F.3d 33, 38 (1st
Cir. 2002). Nishnianidze must demonstrate that the error was plain
and that it affected his substantial rights. United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); accord United States v. Tom, 330
F.3d 83, 93 (1st Cir. 2003). This court will not correct a
forfeited error unless the error "seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano,
507 U.S. at 732 (quotation omitted).
"True threats" are not protected by the First Amendment.
United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492-93 (1st Cir. 1997).
A defendant may be convicted for making a threat if "he should have
reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as
a threat by those to whom it is made." Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491;
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see also United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997)
(applying Fulmer to § 875(c)). While the fact-finder may consider
other evidence, including the effect of the statement on the
recipient, the ultimate standard is an objective one -- whether a
reasonable person would understand the statement to be threatening.
Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491. Nishnianidze asserts that the judge
improperly instructed the jury to consider the recipient's state of
mind when determining whether a threat was made.
Although the district court first (incorrectly) stated
that the threat was determined by the recipient's reaction, the
instruction later clarified that the burden is on the government to
show that a reasonable speaker would have understood the statement
to be threatening.3 We find no plain error in the district court's
3
The district court charged:
A communication contains a threat to kidnap another
person if it is made under circumstances such that an
ordinary reasonable recipient of the communication would
interpret it as a true threat of injury or kidnapping.
With respect to this element you may consider the
circumstance under which the statement was made,
including the kind of statement made, the place where it
was made, how it was spoken, and its context with respect
to the surrounding circumstances. You may also consider
the language the defendant used and the reaction of the
person to whom the communication was addressed. The
government is not required to prove that the defendant
subjectively intended the recipient to understand the
communication as a threat, nor that the defendant
intended or was able to actually carry out the threat
contained in the communication. But the government must
prove that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen
that the communication would be taken as a threat by the
listener.
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instruction. At most, the district court misspoke at the beginning
of the instruction. The misdescription or omission of an element
of a crime does not necessarily constitute plain error. Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1999).
The evidence was overwhelming that Nishnianidze should
have known that the threats would frighten the victims. Finfer and
Shea told Nishnianidze they were frightened and Nishnianidze
acknowledged that it was hard for them to hear what he said.
Nishnianidze told them that someone could take their child at any
time and told them not to go to the police. A reasonable person
who made these statements would understand them to be threatening.
Any error in the instruction did not affect Nishnianidze's
substantial rights.
2. Entrapment
Nishnianidze challenges the district court's denial of
his request for an entrapment instruction. We apply plenary review
to that decision. United States v. Rodríguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812
(1st Cir. 1988). "[A]n accused is entitled to an instruction on
his theory of defense so long as the theory is a valid one and
there is evidence in the record to support it." Id. In making
this determination, a court may not weigh the evidence, make
credibility determinations, or resolve conflicts in the proof.
(Emphasis added).
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United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1998). Rather,
we consider whether "there is record evidence which fairly supports
the claims of both government inducement of the crime and
defendant's lack of predisposition to engage in it." Rodríguez,
858 F.2d at 814.
An improper "inducement" consists of the opportunity plus
something else like excessive pressure, dogged persistence, or the
government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type
of motive. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961; United States v. Joost, 92
F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1996). "[I]t is not enough simply that the
government afforded the defendant the opportunity for commission of
the offense." Rodríguez, 858 F.2d at 813.
Nishnianidze argues improper inducement resulted when the
FBI suggested questions for Finfer and Shea to pose to Nishnianidze
and monitored the case. We think this is a prime example of the
government simply giving a suspect the opportunity to commit a
crime: the FBI did not design or initiate the plan, Finfer and Shea
simply asked open-ended questions and Nishnianidze provided the
incriminatory details. Nishnianidze mentioned the possible harm to
Alexander and the need to pay $50,000 to ensure his safety. Finfer
and Shea (as governmental agents) did nothing to pressure
Nishnianidze -- indeed, the most serious threats came when Finfer
stated that they would not pay. Cf. id. at 815 (finding that
defendant made a sufficient showing of government inducement where
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the government actor "designed the plan, created the opportunity
for defendant's participation, made the initial approach, solicited
defendant forcefully, and displayed dogged insistence until
[defendant] capitulated").
As to predisposition, we remove the government's improper
inducement and "ask how the defendant likely would have reacted to
an ordinary opportunity to commit the crime." Gendron, 18 F.3d at
962. Factors to consider in assessing whether the defendant was
predisposed to commit to crime charged are:
(1) the character or reputation of the
defendant; (2) whether the initial suggestion
of criminal activity was made by the
Government; (3) whether the defendant was
engaged in the criminal activity for profit;
(4) whether the defendant showed reluctance to
commit the offense, which was overcome by the
governmental persuasion; and (5) the nature of
the inducement of persuasion offered by the
Government.
Gamache, 156 F.3d at 9-10.
Nishnianidze has not shown a lack of predisposition. He
initiated contact with Finfer and Shea, sought to profit from his
threats, showed no reluctance to the crime (his hesitancy in
collecting the money at the end came too late -- the threats had
already been communicated), and there was little, if any,
inducement by the government. As Nishnianidze has not shown either
government inducement or lack of predisposition, the district
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court's refusal to instruct the jury on an entrapment defense was
proper.
D. Pro Se Motions
In a pro se brief, Nishnianidze maintains that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel. This claim requires
resolution of factual issues, as appellant must demonstrate that
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We have held that "fact-
specific claims of ineffective assistance cannot make their debut
on direct review of criminal convictions, but, rather, must
originally be presented to, and acted upon by, the trial court."
United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1062 (1st Cir. 1993).
Nishnianidze's claim of ineffective counsel is therefore dismissed
without prejudice to appellant's right to litigate the claim in an
application for post-conviction relief. See id. at 1063.
Nishnianidze also filed a pro se motion to dismiss based
on the Vienna Convention, an issue raised for the first time on
appeal. His argument is not developed and therefore waived.
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
at developed argumentation, are deemed waived."). His allusion to
prosecutorial misconduct fails for the same reason. Id.
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III. Conclusion
Finding no merit in Nishnianidze's appeals, we affirm the
decision of the district court.
Affirmed.
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