[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 1, 2007
No. 05-12765 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 04-00222-CR-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OMAR RAMIREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(February 1, 2007)
Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and TRAGER,* District Judge.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable David G. Trager, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
Appellant Omar Ramirez challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence in his case. On appeal, Ramirez argues that he was
unlawfully detained by the police in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that
therefore the evidence discovered as a result of that detention should have been
suppressed. Because we find that Ramirez’s Terry1 stop had become a consensual
encounter at the time he agreed to a search of his vehicle, we conclude that
suppression of the evidence was unwarranted. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
district court’s denial of his motion.
I . BACKGROUND
On 11 September 2004, at approximately 9 p.m., Alabama State Trooper
Corporal Charlton Martin was assisting a trooper in the arrest of two individuals on
the eastbound side of Interstate 10. Corporal Martin’s police vehicle was parked in
the emergency lane on the side of the highway. At that time, Corporal Martin
observed a blue Crown Victoria as it crossed the solid white on the side of the
highway and veered into the emergency lane, nearly hitting Corporal Martin’s car.
The car then returned to the highway, and continued traveling along Interstate 10.
Corporal Martin asked Sergeant Kerry Mitchum, of the Loxley, Alabama, Police
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
2
Department, who was present with him, to pull over the Crown Victoria while
Corporal Martin completed his arrest. Sergeant Mitchum proceeded to pull over
the Crown Victoria, which was being driven by Ramirez. Approximately two
minutes later,2 Corporal Martin arrived at the location where Ramirez’s car had
been stopped alongside Interstate 10. At that time, Corporal Martin took over the
stop from Sergeant Mitchum.
By the time Corporal Martin arrived at the scene, Ramirez had been asked
by Sergeant Mitchum to step out of his vehicle, due to some confusion as to who
was the owner of the car.3 When Corporal Martin approached Ramirez and
Sergeant Mitchum, he was handed Ramirez’s paperwork (including his driver’s
license and vehicle registration) and was informed by Sergeant Mitchum that there
was “a problem with [Ramirez]’s paperwork.” R2 at 8. When Corporal Martin
asked Ramirez from whom he had purchased the vehicle, Ramirez appeared
confused, and attempted to read the name off of the registration that Corporal
2
Ramirez’s traffic stop and his subsequent arrest were recorded on the police video that
was located in Sergeant Mitchum’s patrol car. The video camera’s time stamp reflects that
Ramirez was stopped at approximately 21:07, and that Corporal Martin arrived at the scene at
approximately 21:09.
3
The police videotape reflects that when Ramirez was initially asked by Sergeant
Mitchum who the car belonged to, Ramirez mentioned someone named “Perez.” See R, Exh. 1
at 21:09. Ramirez then was asked whether he had paperwork evincing the purchase from Mr.
Perez, such as a bill of sale, but he was unable to provide a satisfactory answer to that question.
Because of this apparent confusion over who owned the vehicle, Sergeant Mitchum asked
Ramirez to exit the vehicle so that he could question him further.
3
Martin was holding in his hand. Ramirez was unable to tell Corporal Martin from
whom he had purchased the car. At that time, Corporal Martin began to suspect
that the vehicle might be stolen.
Corporal Martin later testified that Ramirez appeared nervous, even more so
than the nervous behavior that Corporal Martin had typically observed during
routine traffic stops. He testified that “[the] carotid artery in his neck was bulging”
and that “[y]ou could see his heart pounding through his t-shirt.” R2 at 9. The
videotape of the stop reflects that, during the initial encounter with the police,
Ramirez was fidgeting and pacing in front his vehicle; at one point he attempted to
walk away and was instructed to remain close to the trunk of his car.
Corporal Martin asked Ramirez about his travel plans. Ramirez indicated
that he was traveling from Brownsville, Texas, where he resided, to south Florida,
near Miami, to pick up $1,500 in cash from a family member. When he was asked
why his family hadn’t simply wired the money to him– so as to avoid a drive from
Texas to Florida–Ramirez appeared confused by the question. Corporal Martin
and Sergeant Mitchum returned to their respective vehicles. Meanwhile, a third
officer, Trooper Charles Anderson, arrived at the scene to assist with the stop.
Throughout this time, Ramirez remained standing at the rear of his vehicle.
Sergeant Mitchum ran a check of Ramirez’s driver’s license, which was
4
reported as being “status clear.” See R, Exh. 1 at 21:13. Sergeant Mitchum was
also informed that the vehicle was registered in the name of a Raul Perez, which
was consistent with the answer Ramirez had given Sergeant Mitchum at the time of
the initial stop. See id. at 21:09. In addition to the driver’s license check, Sergeant
Mitchum requested a background check on Ramirez from the Blue Light
Operations Center (“BLOC”). Corporal Martin later testified that he had decided
to run a BLOC check on Ramirez because he was from Brownsville, Texas, a
border town that is a source of heavy narcotic activity, and he was traveling to
south Florida, another source area for narcotic activity. While the officers were
awaiting the results of the BLOC check, Corporal Martin began to prepare a
warning citation for Ramirez for crossing over the line into the emergency lane on
a highway.
As the traffic citation was being prepared, Sergeant Mitchum and Corporal
Martin engaged in additional questioning of Ramirez. They asked Ramirez if he
had stopped to eat during his travels, and where he had stopped. Ramirez was also
asked by Corporal Martin why he had been weaving on the highway; he answered
that he had been talking on his cell phone with his mother. Sergeant Mitchum
interjected that Ramirez had told him earlier that he had been weaving because he
was tired and had been driving all day. Although Ramirez was arguably
5
inconsistent in explaining why he had been weaving, however, as Corporal Martin
later confirmed, there was no evidence to suggest that Ramirez was under the
influence of any drugs or alcohol. The officers also asked Ramirez at one point
how much money he was carrying on him, and whether he was planning on using
that cash for food and gas stops along the highway.
Corporal Martin then issued a warning citation to Ramirez for failing to
remain in the lane on an interstate. Corporal Martin gave the citation to Ramirez
for his signature, along with his driver’s license and registration.4 Almost
immediately after returning all of Ramirez’s paperwork to him– and advising
Ramirez that “the traffic stop [was] over,” R2 at 16– the officers received a call
from BLOC, notifying them that Ramirez’s criminal background was clean, other
than a minor marijuana offense when Ramirez was a juvenile.5
4
Although Corporal Martin and Ramirez are not in view of the camera located in the
police vehicle, audio portions of their dialogue are discernible. Corporal Martin can be heard
saying “here’s your paperwork,” advising Ramirez that the citation is a warning, and asking him
to sign the citation. R, Exh. 1, at 21:21:23-32. Approximately ten seconds later, Corporal
Martin can be overhead asking “you got your license?”. R, Exh. 1, at 21:21:44. Ramirez
responds, “yeah, I got my license.” R, Exh. 1 at 21:21:45-49. The officer then asks, “you got
your registration?” and receives an inaudible response. R, Exh. 1 at 21:21:49-51.
5
Although Corporal Martin testified that he stated to Ramirez that “the traffic stop [was]
over,” R2 at 16, that portion of the audio is not discernible from the videotape recording. This is
perhaps due to the fact that the audio recording of the conversation between Corporal Martin and
Ramirez– alongside the highway– is drowned out by the phone call from BLOC, which was
received inside Sergeant Mitchum’s vehicle. See R2 at 44; R, Exh. 1 at 21:21:51. Although
Corporal Martin’s statement is not perceptible from the video, it is his unrebutted testimony that
he stated “the traffic stop is over,” R2 at 16, and the district court accepted this testimony as
fully credible in rendering its decision. R2 at 73.
6
At this time, Ramirez had apparently been given back his paperwork,6 and,
according to Corporal Martin’s testimony, the traffic stop had ended. Corporal
Martin testified that, “after [he] issued the citation and gave him back all his
personal belongings,” he asked Ramirez “if he was carrying anything illegal in the
car.” R2 at 17. Ramirez responded by advising Corporal Martin that he could
search the vehicle if he wanted to.7 After some additional discussion, a consent to
search form was provided to Ramirez. Corporal Martin explained the substance of
the form to him, Ramirez promptly signed it,8 and Corporal Martin began a search
of Ramirez’s vehicle. After searching the vehicle for approximately 20 minutes,
Corporal Martin uncovered approximately seven kilograms of cocaine, which had
been hidden inside of the dashboard of the vehicle.
After he was indicted, Ramirez filed a motion to suppress the evidence that
had been discovered in connection with the search of his car. He argued that he
6
At a minimum, the videotape reflects that Ramirez had been given the citation and his
license and registration; Ramirez held them in his hand while conversing with Corporal Martin,
prior to the search of the vehicle. See R, Exh. 1 at 21:21:51- 21:22:17.
7
As with Corporal Martin’s statement “the traffic stop is over,” R2 at 16, none of the
audio from this pivotal exchange between Corporal Martin and Ramirez is discernible from a
review of the videotape. However, approximately 30 seconds into their discussion, Corporal
Martin can be overheard advising Sergeant Mitchum: “he offered for us to search his car.” R,
Exh. 1 at 21:22:18.
8
The lapse between the time Ramirez was given his license and registration and when he
signed the consent form, agreeing a search of his car, was approximately one minute. See R,
Exh. 1 at 21:21:51-21:22:55.
7
was unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in that his
continued detention by the police was undertaken without any reasonable suspicion
of any further criminal activity.9 Because his prolonged detention was
unconstitutional, Ramirez argued that everything which followed from that alleged
detention–the consent to search, the search of the vehicle, and all items seized from
the vehicle– should have been excluded.
The district court conducted a hearing on Ramirez’s motion, at which
Corporal Martin testified. After reviewing Corporal Martin’s testimony and the
evidentiary record, the district court denied Ramirez’s motion. The district court
found that Corporal Martin’s testimony was credible, and that it had not been
rebutted by Ramirez. The court first found that the facts presented– the initial
traffic violation, Ramirez’s nervous behavior upon further questioning, and his
suspicious answers concerning the ownership of the vehicle–were sufficient to
create a reasonable suspicion so as to justify the initial detention of Ramirez and
the license check. The court concluded that the officer’s check of the driver’s
license, and the preparation of the traffic citation, were undertaken within a
reasonable time and were entirely lawful. Turning to the question of whether the
9
Ramirez also intimated in his motion to suppress that the consent to search his vehicle
was not voluntarily obtained, and that therefore it was invalid. See R1-15 at 3-4. However,
Ramirez has abandoned that argument on appeal, focusing only on the lawfulness of the
underlying detention.
8
prolonging of the traffic stop– after Ramirez’s license came back clear– was
unlawful, the court found:
The driver’s license registration was returned to Mr. Ramirez, and he
was issued a warning ticket. And almost simultaneous with the issue
of the warrant [sic.], or as it was being handed . . . he was asked if
there was contraband in the car and gave initially verbal consent
which almost immediately transitioned into the written consent.
R2 at 74-75. In light of these findings of fact, the court concluded that “there [was]
no unlawful detention within the meaning of those terms and principles as
governed by the law in this Circuit.” Id. at 75. Because there was no unlawful
detention at the moment when Ramirez consented to have his car searched– a
consent which the court accepted as voluntary–the court concluded that Ramirez’s
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, and, consequently, there was no basis
to suppress the evidence that had been discovered by the police.
After his motion to suppress was denied, Ramirez pled guilty to one count of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841, but preserved his
right to appeal the denial of his motion. Ramirez was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of 46 months. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review its
findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo.
9
United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, when
considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, all facts are construed in the light
most favorable to the party prevailing in the district court– in this case, the
government. United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 688 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right
of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. C ONST.
amend. IV. A seizure takes place “whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away.” United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965,
969 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Traffic stops qualify as seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396
(1979); Perkins, 348 F.3d at 969. “Because a routine traffic stop is only a limited
form of seizure,” however, “it is more analogous to an investigative detention than
a custodial arrest.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
Therefore, we analyze the legality of these stops under the standard articulated in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Id. (citations omitted).
According to that standard, “an officer’s investigation of a traffic stop must be
‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.’” United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879). Furthermore, the duration of the
10
traffic stop “must be limited to the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.” Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277. Despite hinting at these arguments in his initial
motion to suppress, on appeal Ramirez does not challenge either the legality or the
duration of the initial stop. That is, Ramirez does not dispute that the police had a
reasonable suspicion to support both the initial traffic stop and the license check
that ensued.
Instead, Ramirez’s argument is that once Corporal Martin had confirmed
that Ramirez’s vehicle was not stolen, and once he had been advised that
Ramirez’s driving record was clean, Corporal Martin had no basis to continue to
detain him against his will.10 According to this argument, once Corporal Martin
had issued a formal traffic citation, and once Corporal Martin’s suspicions of
illegality had been completely dispelled, Ramirez was free to go. Nevertheless,
Corporal Martin asked him an additional question–whether he had anything illegal
in his vehicle–which, Ramirez contends, extended his detention unnecessarily in
violation of Terry. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th
Cir. 1999) (stating that, after a traffic citation had been processed, the defendants
10
As was discussed previously, Ramirez’s argument centers only on the unlawfulness of
his detention–after the police had completed their check of his license, registration, and criminal
background–rather than on the validity of his consent. If Ramirez can successfully show that his
consent was obtained “as the result of an illegal detention,” then the consent to search was
invalid and the evidence discovered as a result of the search should have been suppressed. See
United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004).
11
“should have been free to go, as [the officer] was provided at that time with no
reasonable suspicion of their criminal activity,” and suggesting that, under those
circumstances, additional questioning which unlawfully extended their detention
violated Terry). Ramirez argues that, because his consent, the search of his
vehicle, and the discovery of the cocaine were products of an unconstitutional
detention, they should have been suppressed. See United States v. Chanthasouxat,
342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (“As a general rule, the evidence gathered as
a result of an unconstitutional stop must be suppressed.”) (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963)).
We have held that a traffic stop “must last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220 (citation omitted).11 In
Pruitt, we made clear that a police officer’s “[l]engthening the detention for further
questioning beyond that related to the initial stop is permissible in two
circumstances.” Id. “First, the officer may detain the driver for questioning
unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable
11
We have also stated that, in reviewing a detention, “it is unreasonable extensions of the
duration– not the scope of the [questioning]– that could render an otherwise justified detention
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.” United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206,
1209 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). That is, we do not inquire as to the substantive reasonableness of the
questions that are asked by a police officer in the context of a traffic stop, but only whether the
“duration” of the detention was prolonged “for an unreasonable time.” Id. Here, because we
conclude that Ramirez was not “detained” at all for purposes of the Fourth Amendment at the
time Corporal Martin asked further questions of him, we need not address whether the alleged
extension of the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable or unreasonable under Hernandez.
12
suspicion that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.” Id.; see also Boyce,
351 F.3d at 1106. “Second, further questioning unrelated to the initial stop is
permissible if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter.” Pruitt, 174
F.3d at 1220. For purposes of the second situation, a consensual encounter does
not implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434,
111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). In this case, we conclude that Ramirez’s stop had
become a consensual encounter at the time Corporal Martin asked Ramirez
whether he had anything illegal in his car.12 Accordingly, we conclude that
Ramirez was not “detained” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and that
12
Both of the parties have argued, in their briefs and at oral argument, as to whether the
police had “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” so as to
support the prolonging of Ramirez’s detention. Perkins, 348 F.3d at 970 (citation and internal
quotations omitted). The government argues that the “totality of the circumstances,” id., clearly
gave rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that Ramirez had engaged in some illegal
activity at the time Corporal Martin continued to question him. Specifically, the government
contends that, taken together, the facts of Ramirez’s case– his nervous behavior, his vague
answers as to who owned the car, his itinerary (which involved travel from a Texas border town
to south Florida), and his story concerning the purpose of his trip (to pick up $1500 from a
family member)– were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion on the part of Corporal
Martin that some criminal activity was afoot. In light of that argument, the government asserts
that the purported prolonging of his detention (by questioning Ramirez) was lawful. See, e.g.,
Simms, 385 F.3d at 1354-55 (a prior history with drugs, nervous conduct, and a questionable
story about the defendant’s travel plans were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion so as to
justify prolonging the detention).
Ramirez, on the other hand, contends that his nervousness, his itinerary, and his odd
behavior were not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion to support prolonging his detention,
and that therefore this case is akin to the extended detention based on a “hunch” which we
deemed unconstitutional in Perkins, 348 F.3d at 971. As is discussed subsequently, however,
because we find that the traffic stop became a consensual exchange upon issuance of the traffic
citation, we need not pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to support a reasonable suspicion–
the first situation discussed in Pruitt. See 174 F.3d at 1220.
13
therefore there is no basis for suppression.
Although we have not directly addressed the question of when a Terry
traffic stop shifts from a “detention” to a “consensual encounter,” Pruitt, 174 F.3d
at 1220, we are not without guidance on this question. The Supreme Court, in
other contexts, has held that a person being questioned by police is not seized “if a
reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.” United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002). That is, where a
reasonable person “would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter,” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S. Ct. at 2387, the
encounter with the police is consensual, and the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated. This test “is objective and presupposes an innocent person.” Drayton,
536 U.S. at 201, 122 S. Ct. at 2110 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
Our sister circuits have been more specific in addressing the issue of when a
Terry traffic stop segues into a consensual encounter. In United States v.
Lattimore, a case similar to Ramirez’s, the Fourth Circuit rejected a defendant’s
assertion that additional questioning by the police constituted an illegal prolonging
of his detention. 87 F.3d 647, 650, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In that case,
after the police officer returned the defendant’s license and handed him a traffic
citation, the officer questioned the defendant as to whether there were any
14
narcotics or contraband in the automobile. Id. at 649. The Fourth Circuit rejected
the defendant’s claim that this questioning constituted an unlawfully prolonged
detention. Id. at 653. The court observed that the defendant’s documents had been
returned to him, which suggested that
all business with [the defendant] was completed and that he was
free to leave. During the subsequent conversation between [the
officer] and [the defendant], a reasonable person would have
felt free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter. The totality of the circumstances presented
indicate that from this point forward the encounter was
consensual . . . .
Id. (citation, alterations, and internal quotations omitted).
Likewise, in United States v. White, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case in
which a police officer “handed [the defendant] his license and registration, and
explained the warning ticket” to the defendant. 81 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir. 1996).
The officer then asked the defendant for permission to search his vehicle. Id. at
778. The court rejected the defendant’s claims that the traffic stop had escalated
into an unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the
court stated:
[A]fter [the defendant]’s license and registration were
returned and the warning was issued, the encounter
became nothing more than a consensual encounter
between a private citizen and a law enforcement officer.
Id. at 778. The court based this determination on a number of factors, including
15
the fact that the officer did not behave in a threatening or coercive manner during
the post-citation conversation, the fact that the tone of the exchange was
cooperative, and the fact that “at the time [the officer] asked to search the vehicle,
[the defendant] had everything he needed to lawfully proceed on his journey.” Id.
at 779.
Similarly, in United States v. Sanchez-Pena, the Fifth Circuit held that,
where a defendant had received all of his documentation back and was
subsequently questioned, the encounter was consensual and the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated. 336 F.3d 431, 443 (5th Cir. 2003). The court
based this conclusion on the fact that, in conversing further with the defendant, the
officer did not accuse the defendant of any illegality or wrongdoing. Id. The court
also observed that the defendants had been given back their documentation,
suggesting that they were free to go on their way at the time additional questions
were asked of them. Id. As an aside, the court noted that its conclusion that such
an encounter was consensual was in line with the decisions of the vast majority of
circuits that have ruled on this issue. Id. n.60.
In this case, the district court’s opinion implicitly found that Corporal Martin
had returned Ramirez’s license and registration to him prior to instigating any
additional questioning about contraband in the car. See R2 at 74 (stating, at the
16
outset, that “[t]he driver’s license registration was returned to Mr. Ramirez, and he
was issued a warning ticket”). Although the court went on to state that Corporal
Martin’s handing of the Ramirez’s paperwork back to him was “almost
simultaneous” with his follow-up question, R2 at 74-75, the court’s opinion
nevertheless suggested that, while “almost simultaneous,” R2 at 74-75, the
issuance of the citation and the return of Ramirez’s paperwork preceded the
questioning concerning contraband in the vehicle.13 Accordingly, the court
concluded that Ramirez was not detained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
These conclusions were proper. Corporal Martin’s testimony, which was
credited by the district court as fully credible, made clear that he “had returned
everything to [Ramirez] and told him the traffic stop [was] over” prior to asking
about contraband in the vehicle. R2 at 16. Furthermore, in response to the
question “what happened after you issued [Ramirez’s] citation and gave him back
all his personal belongings?,” Corporal Martin testified that he then asked Ramirez
13
The phrase “almost simultaneous” is rather ambiguous and is open to interpretation.
On the one hand, the use of the qualifying word “almost” suggests that the two events were not
simultaneous, i.e. that one clearly did precede the other. On the other hand, the word “almost”
could be construed as suggesting that the two events happened at more or less the same time. To
the extent that the district court found that the two events were simultaneous in nature, that
finding was clearly erroneous. Indeed, as is discussed subsequently, our review of the record
suggests that the two events were not simultaneous, and that the handing over of Ramirez’s
paperwork clearly preceded the follow-up question concerning contraband in the car. However,
because we construe the district court’s opinion as finding that the handing of the paperwork
preceded the subsequent question, we discern no error in the court’s findings of fact.
17
“if he was carrying anything illegal in the car.” R2 at 17.
The videotape corroborates this version of events; at a minimum, the video
suggests that Ramirez had received his citation, and had been handed his license
and registration, prior to being asked any questions about whether there was
contraband in the car. Although the parties are out of view on the video recording,
Corporal Martin can first be overheard saying “here’s your paperwork,” advising
Ramirez that the citation is only a warning, and asking him to sign the citation. R,
Exh. 1, at 21:21:28-32. Approximately ten seconds later, Corporal Martin can be
overheard asking “you got your license?”, to which Ramirez responds, “yeah, I got
my license.” R, Exh. 1, at 21:21:44-49. Corporal Martin then asks, “you got your
registration?”, and receives an inaudible response. R, Exh. 1, at 21:21:49-51.
Within seconds of that exchange–“almost simultaneous” with it, R2 at 74-75, but
clearly after it–Ramirez can be seen holding his documents in his hand while he
converses further with Corporal Martin, presumably about the prospect of
searching his vehicle. See R, Exh. 1 at 21:51:21- 21:22:30. While holding the
documents in his hand, Ramirez gestures toward the vehicle and asks an inaudible
question, apparently about the nature of the search. R, Exh. 1 at 21:22:20-
21:22:30. All of these occurrences take place prior to Ramirez’s signing of the
consent to search form, which he signs on the hood of Sergeant Mitchum’s vehicle.
18
We find that the videotape, taken together with Corporal Martin’s unrebutted
testimony, makes clear that the question to Ramirez occurred after Ramirez had
been handed his paperwork and had received the traffic citation. That evidence
suggests that, at the time of Corporal Martin’s follow-up question, “all business
with [Ramirez] was completed and that he was free to leave.” Lattimore, 87 F.3d
at 653, and that at that time the traffic stop had converted into a consensual
encounter. Cf. Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1280 (suggesting that where the citation and
paperwork had not been given back to the driver, the defendant was still detained).
Accordingly, we discern no Fourth Amendment violation in Corporal Martin’s
post-citation question.
This is not to suggest that our decision is based solely on the fact that the
traffic ticket and driver’s license had been returned to Ramirez at the time Corporal
Martin asked his follow-up question. Our conclusion in this case is based upon
more than timing. Nor should our decision be construed as creating a per se rule
that once a person’s documentation has been returned to him in a traffic stop, it has
automatically converted into a consensual encounter.14 There is no bright-line
14
In fact, our case law in this area has suggested that a person may nevertheless be
unlawfully detained by the police, despite the fact that the citation has been completed and all of
the person’s paperwork has been given back to them. See, e.g., Perkins, 348 F.3d at 968-972
(concluding that person was held unlawfully, despite the fact that the ticket had been issued and
the traffic stop was over, where the police asked defendant to await the arrival of a drug dog).
19
“litmus test” for whether a traffic stop is a seizure or is a consensual encounter.
White, 81 F.3d at 779. As with our sister circuits, we find that it is appropriate to
examine the “totality of the circumstances” in each case, Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 653,
weighing a range of factors, such as whether there is any coerciveness on the part
of the police, whether the exchange is cooperative in nature, and whether the
defendant had everything he reasonably required to proceed on his journey. See
White, 81 F.3d at 779. As the Supreme Court has instructed, our ultimate inquiry
remains whether “a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.”
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201, 122 S. Ct. at 2110; see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436,
111 S. Ct. at 2387.
Guided by that objective standard, we conclude that a reasonable person in
Ramirez’s circumstances would have felt free to terminate the encounter and to
decline Corporal Martin’s request for further information. This conclusion is
based not only on the fact that Ramirez had received all of his documentation and
thus had everything he needed to proceed on his way, but also that his follow-up
discussion with Corporal Martin appears, from the videotape of the event, to have
been fully cooperative and non-coercive. The fact that Ramirez opted to answer
Corporal Martin’s follow-up question, rather than voluntarily terminating the
encounter, does not change our conclusion that the exchange had converted from a
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traffic stop into a consensual encounter. Viewing the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the post-citation discussion with Corporal Martin was consensual
in nature, and that, as a result, Ramirez was not detained at the time he offered to
have his car searched. Consequently, Ramirez’s Fourth Amendment rights were
not implicated by this encounter, and the district court properly denied his motion
to suppress.
III. CONCLUSION
Ramirez appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence seized after a search of his car, contending that his authorization of the
car search, the search, and the subsequent discovery of 7 kilograms of cocaine all
should have been excluded as products of an unlawful detention. Because we
conclude that a reasonable person in Ramirez’s position would have felt free to
terminate the encounter with Corporal Martin, we find that the post-citation
encounter with Corporal Martin was consensual in nature, and that therefore
Ramirez was not detained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Because there
was no constitutional violation, the district court acted properly in denying
Ramirez’s motion to suppress. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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United States v. Omar Ramirez
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date filed: 2007-02-01
Citations: 476 F.3d 1231
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