United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 96-2545
Non-Argument Calendar.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ONE BEECHCRAFT KING AIR 300 AIRCRAFT, Defendant-Appellant,
Martha Elena Valencia Cardenas, Claimant,
Aerotaxi De Valledupar, Ltda, Claimant-Appellant.
Jan. 8, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 92-249-CIV-FTM-21D), George T. Swartz,
Unisted States Magistrate Judge.
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the district
court correctly upheld the constitutionality of 19 U.S.C. § 1615 as
applied in this case.1 Appellant contends that 19 U.S.C. § 1615 is
unconstitutional as applied in this case because the forfeiture of
its property based only upon a showing of probable cause denied it
due process of law. It argues that a higher burden of proof is
required because civil forfeitures constitute punishment for
purposes of due process. We disagree.
We agree with the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, which all have explicitly upheld the
constitutionality of 19 U.S.C. § 1615. United States v. $94,000.00
1
Title 19 U.S.C. § 1615 establishes the burdens of proof for
civil forfeiture proceedings.
in United States Currency, 2 F.3d 778, 783-84 (7th Cir.1993)
("[T]he penalty of civil forfeiture, while sufficiently akin to the
criminal law to invoke ... the strictures of the Eighth Amendment,
does not convert a civil forfeiture proceeding into a criminal
matter insofar as the allocation of the burden of proof is
concerned."); United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling, 916
F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S.Ct.
972, 112 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1991) ("We find nothing unconstitutional in
Congress' allocation of the burdens of proof in forfeiture
cases."); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th
Cir.1989) ("Congress may alter the burden of proof in a civil
proceeding as it sees fit, without constitutional implications.");
United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895,
900 (1st Cir.1987) ("Generally, Congress may alter the traditional
allocation of the burden of proof without infringing on the
litigant's due process rights unless the statute is criminal in
nature"); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66
(9th Cir.1976) ("[T]he challenged forfeiture statutes are not
criminal enough to prevent Congress from imposing the burden of
proof on the claimant."); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968
(10th Cir.1974) (due process does not require transformation of
civil forfeiture proceedings into criminal actions for procedural
purposes), cert. denied sub nom., Bramble v. Saxbe, 419 U.S. 1069,
95 S.Ct. 656, 42 L.Ed.2d 665 (1974).
Like the foregoing circuits, we view in rem forfeiture as a
civil proceeding. See United States v. Real Property and
Residence, 921 F.2d 1551, 1556-57 (11th Cir.1991). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----
116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), supports our view.
Although Ursery did not specifically address Appellant's claim that
19 U.S.C. § 1615's burden of proof violates due process, Ursery
made it clear that the Supreme Court continues to view in rem
forfeiture proceedings as civil actions rather than criminal
punishment. Accordingly, we hold that Congress's decision to
allocate the burden of proof to the claimant in civil forfeiture
proceedings is not unconstitutional. The judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.