United States v. Patten

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 9 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-8052
RUSSELL WILLIAM PATTEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 96-CR-127-J)

David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. Freudenthal, United
States Attorney with him on the brief), Casper, Wyoming for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jeffrey L. Russell (Victor D. Vertner with him on the brief), San Jose, California for
Defendant-Appellant.

Before PORFILIO, McWILLIAMS, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Federal prosecutors charged Defendant Russell William Patten in a one-count

information with possession of thirty-nine pounds of ephedrine, a chemical used to

produce methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress the ephedrine, which a Wyoming state trooper found in Defendant’s

suitcase following a routine traffic stop. According to Defendant, the officer: (1)

unlawfully detained Defendant longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

stop; (2) exceeded the scope of Defendant’s consent by searching his suitcase; and (3)

lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district

court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of

guilty pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), and the district court sentenced him to forty-

six months imprisonment. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

The historical facts as found by the district court are undisputed. At the

suppression hearing, Wyoming state trooper Daniel Dyer, a twenty-year veteran of the

force, testified that on November 13, 1996, he was patrolling along I-80 west of Laramie.

At approximately 12:45 p.m., Officer Dyer clocked Defendant’s vehicle traveling

westbound at 77-78 miles per hour in a 75 miles per hour zone. Officer Dyer stopped

Defendant. Defendant informed the officer that he was traveling from New York to

California in a rental car. After determining that Defendant’s driver’s license was valid

and that he was lawfully in possession of the vehicle, Officer Dyer gave Defendant a

warning ticket and returned his documentation.

When Officer Dyer returned to Defendant’s vehicle, Defendant was reading a road

map. Defendant asked the officer about tourist attractions in the vicinity. Officer Dyer

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mentioned a territorial prison and national park, but Defendant indicated he wanted to

stay on I-80. Officer Dyer then asked Defendant how he got to New York. Defendant

responded that he flew from California with a deceased friend’s ashes for burial.

Officer Dyer inquired about how many suitcases Defendant was carrying.

Defendant informed the officer that he had two suitcases–one in the back seat and one in

the trunk. Officer Dyer asked Defendant if he was carrying anything illegal in the trunk.

Defendant did not respond. Officer Dyer then stated: “Well, do you think we could take

a look at your suitcase there? I don’t want to necessarily look in it, but – nor do I want to

read any letters necessarily, but maybe we could just take a look?” Defendant responded

“okay” and opened the trunk of the vehicle with his keys.

Inside the trunk was a large, soft-sided suitcase. Officer Dyer pushed down on the

suitcase and then tried to slide it with his hand. He noted the suitcase was quite heavy.

Officer Dyer commented: “What do you got in there, the airplane tire from the jet that

you flew into New York City on?” Defendant did not respond. Officer Dyer then stated:

“Well, let’s just unzip it.” Defendant partially unzipped the suitcase to a point where

straps surrounded it. Officer Dyer stated: “To unzip it more, you just got to squeeze the

prongs there. Just squeeze them together there and it will open up.” Defendant hesitated.

Officer Dyer reiterated: “Well, just squeeze them together and it will come out.”

Defendant unbuckled the suitcase’s straps. Officer Dyer stated: “Well then, we’ll just

have to unzip it.”

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Defendant unzipped the suitcase. When Defendant began shuffling a leather

jacket which rested on top of the suitcase’s contents, Officer Dyer noticed a green plastic

sack underneath the jacket. Officer Dyer asked: “Well, what is that?” Defendant again

did not respond. Officer Dyer pulled open the green sack and saw several clear plastic

baggies containing a white powdery substance. Officer Dyer ordered Defendant to give

him the keys to the rental car. Officer Dyer asked Defendant to identify the substance in

the baggies. Defendant responded that although he did not own the suitcase, he believed

the substance was either dextrose or steroids. Approximately twenty-five minutes after

the initial stop, Officer Dyer summoned a canine unit to the scene. He also requested

cocaine and methamphetamine test kits. The canine alerted around the rear of the vehicle

and directly on the suitcase. Officer Dyer placed Defendant under arrest. Officials

subsequently determined that the substance was ephedrine, a federally controlled

chemical substance used in the production of methamphetamine.

Based upon Officer Dyer’s undisputed testimony, the district court denied

Defendant’s motion to suppress. In a thorough, written order, the court held that (1)

Defendant’s continued detention after the initial stop was “an ordinary consensual

encounter” between Defendant and Officer Dyer; (2) Defendant voluntarily consented to

the search of his suitcase; and (3) the canine’s alert on the suitcase established probable

cause to arrest Defendant. As to probable cause, the court held in the alternative that “the

finding of several small packages of a powdery substance packaged in the exact way that

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Officer Dyer had previously observed illegal drugs to be packaged, constituted probable

cause for defendant’s arrest.”

II.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in a light

most favorable to the government. United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 765 (10th Cir.

1999). We review the district court’s findings of historical fact for clear error and give

due weight to inferences which the district court draws from those findings. See Ornelas

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given the evidence is the province of the district court. United States v. Elliott, 107

F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997). The district court’s ultimate determination as to the

constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of a law enforcement official’s action is a

question of law reviewable de novo. See United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797,

801 (10th Cir. 1997).

Defendant first complains that Officer Dyer unlawfully detained him in violation

of the Fourth Amendment by continuing to question him after returning his driver’s

license and rental agreement. As a result, Defendant asserts that the fruits of that

unlawful detention, i.e., the ephedrine, must be suppressed. Generally, an investigative

detention must “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). When a driver has produced a valid license

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and proof of entitlement to operate the vehicle, an officer may issue a citation, but then

usually must allow the driver to proceed without further delay or questioning. United

States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998). Two exceptions to this

general rule exist however. An officer may question the driver further if (1) the officer

has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal

activity, or (2) the driver voluntarily consents to further questioning. Id. Because the

Government acknowledges that Officer Dyer had no reasonable and articulable suspicion

of illegal activity when he continued to question Defendant after returning his

documentation, we are concerned only with whether Defendant voluntarily consented to

Officer Dyer’s questioning.

Because a consensual encounter is voluntary, such an encounter does not constitute

a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. “A consensual encounter is

simply the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive

questioning by a law enforcement official.” United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404,

1408 (10th Cir. 1990). In contrast, an individual is “seized” when he has an objective

reason to believe that he is not free to terminate his conversation with the officer and

proceed on his way. Id. The question of whether an encounter was consensual “calls for

the refined judgment of the trial court.” Id. at 1409.

We cannot say on the record before us that the district court’s findings on this

question constitute reversible error. Officer Dyer was not required to inform Defendant

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that he was free to leave. See Gordon, 173 F.3d at 765 (encounter does not become

non-consensual simply because an officer fails to advise defendant that he does not have

to respond to the officer’s questioning and is free to leave). Importantly, Officer Dyer did

not constrain Defendant by a “coercive show of authority” which might have rendered

Defendant’s encounter with Officer Dyer involuntary. See Elliott, 107 F.3d at 814 (return

of a driver’s documents does not end a detention if evidence establishes a coercive show

of authority, such as the presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon,

physical touching, or the use of commanding language, indicating that compliance is

required). Defendant in fact encouraged the encounter when he asked Officer Dyer about

tourist attractions in the area after the officer had returned his documentation. Officer

Dyer’s subsequent questions to Defendant regarding illegal contraband, and his request to

“take a look,” were not sufficient to render an otherwise consensual encounter coercive.

See United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996).

Defendant next contends that even if he consented to Officer Dyer’s questioning

following the initial stop, he did not consent to Officer Dyer’s search of his suitcase.

Valid consent is that which is freely and voluntarily given. United States v. Pena, 143

F.3d 1363, 1366 (10th Cir. 1998). Whether a consent to search during a consensual

encounter with a police officer is voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the

totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (“The Fourth

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Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary and

voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.”) (internal

quotations and brackets omitted). The burden is on the government to show that the

consent was voluntary. Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1500. In determining the scope of a

defendant’s consent, we ask what a reasonable person would have understood by the

exchange between the defendant and police officer. Elliott, 107 F.3d at 815. A

defendant’s silence and acquiescence may support a finding of voluntary consent.

Gordon, 173 F.3d at 766. Moreover, a defendant’s “failure to object when the search

exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication the search was

within the scope of consent.” Id.

During their conversation, Officer Dyer stated to Defendant: “Well, do you think

we could take a look at your suitcase there? I don’t want to necessarily look in it.” The

district court found the language–

“I don’t necessarily want to” alerts the hearer that there is a possibility of
looking into the suitcase, although it may not be necessary to do so. This
court finds that a reasonable person hearing this request would understand it
to mean that the officer may, or may not, want to look into the suitcase.

(emphasis in original). Additionally, the court found Defendant’s silence and

acquiescence in opening his suitcase indicated that Defendant’s consent to search was not

limited to examining the exterior of the suitcase: “Defendant’s silence and cooperation in

opening the suitcase can be seen as part and parcel of his earlier consent to search the

suitcase, a search that might or might not include the inside of the suitcase.” Again, we

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cannot say that the district court’s findings on this question constitute error when viewed

in a light most favorable to the government.

This case is unlike our decision in Elliott, 107 F.3d at 810. In that case, the same

Officer Dyer testified at a suppression hearing that he asked the defendant if he could

“look through the trunk there and see what you got in there? I don’t want to look through

each item.” Officer Dyer also informed the defendant that he just wanted to see how

things were “packed” or “packaged.” Id. at 815. After defendant opened the trunk from

inside her vehicle, Officer Dyer proceeded to unzip defendant’s luggage in the trunk,

outside of her presence. In reversing the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion

to suppress, we concluded that Officer Dyer’s questioning “would have conveyed to a

reasonable person that Dyer was interested only in visually inspecting the trunk and its

contents, and did not convey his intent to look into any containers in the trunk.” Id.

In contrast, Officer Dyer did not inform Defendant in this case that “he just wanted

to see how things were ‘packed’ or ‘packaged’” in the trunk. Id. The district court found

that by his questioning, Officer Dyer left open the distinct possibility that he might wish

to view the inside of Defendant’s suitcase. Moreover, Defendant accompanied Officer

Dyer to the rear of the vehicle. Defendant, not Officer Dyer, unzipped his suitcase. At no

time did Officer Dyer make a “coercive show of authority” towards Defendant, and at no

time did Defendant object to unzipping his suitcase. See Gordon, 173 F.3d at 766

(defendant’s failure to object to a search of his locked bag after officer asked “can you

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open that” deemed significant to court’s finding that consent to search was voluntary).

The district court reasonably construed Officer Dyer’s questioning in this case together

with Defendant’s verbal and nonverbal responses as constituting a voluntary consent to

search the contents of his suitcase.

Finally, Defendant contends that because the government failed to produce any

evidence regarding the canine’s accuracy in detecting ephedrine, the canine alert on his

suitcase did not constitute probable cause to arrest him. To determine if probable cause

for a warrantless arrest exists, we ask whether at the time of the arrest, the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge were sufficient to justify a prudent

officer in believing the defendant was engaged in illegal activity. Gordon 173 F.3d at

766. As a general rule, an alert from a canine with a sufficient accuracy record is

sufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28

(10th Cir. 1993). The problem in this case is that the canine had never been trained to

alert on ephedrine. Rather the canine had been trained to alert on, among other drugs,

methamphetamine, of which ephedrine is a component.

We need not resolve this problem here, however, for we agree with the district

court that aside from the canine alert, the facts in this case established probable cause for

Defendant’s arrest. Officer Dyer observed several small packages of a powdery

substance in Defendant’s suitcase. See United States v. Trimble, 986 F.2d 394, 399 (10th

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Cir. 1993) (officer’s observation of amber colored pill vile containing what he believe to

be rock cocaine established probable cause to arrest defendant). Defendant also stated

that (1) the substance might be steroids (an illegal substance); (2) he did not own the

suitcase; and (3) he was traveling one way from New York to California in a rental car.

Under these facts and circumstances, Officer Dyer was justified in his belief that

Defendant was engaged in illegal activity.

AFFIRMED.