United States v. Perez-Campos

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

JUN 2 2003
PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 02-6123

ADRIAN PEREZ-CAMPOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the W. District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CR-01-20-L)

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for the Defendant-Appellant.

Randal A. Sengel (Robert G. McCampbell, United States Attorney, and Rozia
McKinney-Foster, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), Assistant
United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before LUCERO, McWILLIAMS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Adrian Perez-Campos was convicted of false use of a social security

number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). On appeal, he argues that there
was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of this offense because he

did not possess the requisite intent to deceive. Exercising jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I

On November 27, 2000, Officer Travis David stopped Perez-Campos in

Oklahoma City after observing him commit a traffic violation. Perez-Campos

informed Officer David that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he

did not have automobile insurance. After confirming this information through a

computer database, Officer David arrested Perez-Campos for driving under

suspension and failing to carry insurance. Initiating roadside book-in

proceedings, Officer David asked Perez-Campos for his social security number.

Perez-Campos responded that he did not have one.

Officer David then transported Perez-Campos to Oklahoma County Jail,

where a jail clerk, Jacob Parham, continued through the next steps of the book-in

process. Parham subjected Perez-Campos to the Morpho identification system,

which required Perez-Campos to place his right index finger on a scanning

machine for identification purposes. Officer David testified that when Parham

asked Perez-Campos for a social security number, Perez-Campos provided one.

Although Parham himself could not specifically recall processing Perez-Campos,

he confirmed that the first question he normally asks arrestees is whether they

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have ever been in the jail before, and regardless of their answer, requests a social

security number for verification purposes. Parham confirmed that he had entered

a social security number in Perez-Campos’s file, and it is undisputed that Perez-

Campos was the one who provided the number to Parham. This number, however,

belonged to someone else.

During the next phase of the book-in procedure, Perez-Campos provided

accurate information regarding his date and place of birth, occupation, and illegal

alien status. In light of this information, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (“INS”) was alerted, placed a hold on Perez-Campos, and learned that he

had used the same social security number in the past, in connection with his

deportation in 1993.

Perez-Campos was charged with and convicted of false use of a social

security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). The court sentenced

him to a one-month term of imprisonment and imposed a $100 fine.

II

On appeal, Perez-Campos argues that there was insufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction. “The standard of review makes it difficult to prevail on a

sufficiency of the evidence claim. Although we review the trial record de novo,

we do not reverse if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McPhilomy, 270 F.3d

1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).

Section 408(a)(7)(B) provides: “Whoever . . . for any . . . purpose . . . with

intent to deceive, falsely represents a number to be the social security account

number assigned by the Commissioner of Social Security to him or to another

person, when in fact such number is not the social security account number

assigned by the Commissioner of Social Security to him or to such other

person . . . shall be guilty of a felony.” This requires the government to show that

defendant (1) for any purpose, (2) with the intent to deceive, (3) represented a

particular social security number to be his or another person’s, (4) which

representation is false. United States v. Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647 (10th Cir.

1987).

Other cases that have upheld convictions under this provision have

involved the use of a false social security number for the purpose of obtaining

something of pecuniary value. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 50 F.3d 419, 428

(7th Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction where the defendant used a false social

security number in loan and insurance applications); United States v. Sparks, 67

F.3d 1145, 1148–50 (4th Cir. 1995) (same for bank-loan application). In the

instant case, defendant’s alleged purpose in using the false number was not to

obtain something of value, but rather to conceal his identity. This bears no

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import, however, as § 408(a)(7)(B) criminalizes the use of a false social security

number “for any purpose.” See Darrell, 828 F.2d at 648 (upholding conviction

where the defendant used a false social security number to hinder police discovery

of outstanding warrants for his arrest); United States v. McDow, 27 F.3d 132, 137

(5th Cir. 1994) (same).

Thus, there is no real dispute as to the first element, that Perez-Campos

provided the social security number for some purpose. Nor is there any dispute as

to the third element, that he represented a social security number to be his, or the

fourth, that this representation was false. Rather, this appeal hinges on the

second element, whether there is sufficient evidence of an intent to deceive. The

government posits that a juror could infer that Perez-Campos intended to deceive

with regard to his past criminal history when he provided the false number to the

jail clerk. Perez-Campos cites three facts that he claims negate any alleged intent

to deceive. First, he points out that upon arrest, he honestly disclosed to Officer

David that he did not have a social security number. Second, he cites his

willingness to provide accurate information during every stage of the book-in

procedure, with the exception, of course, of providing the false social security

number. Third, he places great weight on the fact that the false social security

number may have facilitated, rather than hindered, discovery of his criminal

history and illegal-alien status.

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 As to Perez-Campos’s first argument, we reject the claim that his initial

statement to Officer David that he did not have a social security number negates

his subsequent false assertion to the contrary. Although his initial statement to

Officer David was accurate, this does not preclude the later development of an

intent to deceive when Parham requested a social security number at intake for

use in the jail database. Cf. Ellis, 50 F.3d at 428 (holding that although the

defendant told the arresting officer that he did not know his social security

number, this did not prevent a jury from concluding that he intended to deceive

when he provided a false social security number on a previous occasion).

Next, we consider Perez-Campos’s second claim—that his voluntary and

honest disclosure of all other information, with the exception of the false social

security number, precludes a finding of any intent to deceive. In United States v.

Manning, 955 F.2d 770, 771 (1st Cir. 1992), the defendant used a false social

security number in an employment application and again in an application for

welfare benefits. On learning of a discrepancy in the defendant’s application, the

administrator of the local welfare office advised him to clarify the situation with

the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Id. at 772. Taking this advice, the

defendant applied for a replacement card with the SSA, accurately providing his

name, date and place of birth, and parents’ names. His application, however,

misstated his social security number again. Id. The defendant was arrested, and

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the authorities found in his apartment altered birth certificates and other

documents bearing various aliases, in addition to his real social security card. Id.

Law enforcement officers also learned that the defendant had two outstanding

warrants in another state. Id. Appealing his conviction, the defendant argued that

there was insufficient evidence of an intent to deceive because he did not know

his correct social security number. Id. Rejecting this claim, the First Circuit

concluded that a jury could infer from the evidence that the defendant intended to

deceive the authorities as to his identity when he misrepresented his social

security number. Id. at 773. Like the defendant in Manning, Perez-Campos

accurately stated his name, date and place of birth, and other facts to the

authorities. Nonetheless, given his criminal history and immigration status, and

his prior use of the same false social security number, a jury could infer that he

possessed the requisite deceitful intent when he provided the false number to the

jail clerk.

We are also unpersuaded by the fact that the false social security number

may have facilitated, rather than hindered, the authorities’ discovery of Perez-

Campos’s criminal history and immigration status. In Manning, the defendant

unsuccessfully argued that he did not possess an intent to deceive and that he

honestly did not know his social security number. He claimed that he could not

have known it because it would be “inconceivable” that he would intentionally

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misrepresent his social security number to the Social Security Administration. Id.

Similarly, Perez-Campos appears to argue that he did not possess an intent to

deceive, claiming that his purpose in using the false social security number could

not have been to conceal his past record because the number actually facilitated

the authorities’ discovery of his criminal history. Whether the use of a false

social security number hinders or aids law enforcement officers is not dispositive

of the intent inquiry. While the actual effect of the social security number may

have been to notify the officers of Perez-Campos’s criminal history and illegal-

alien status, it does not follow that this necessarily was the intended effect. A

rational juror could conclude that Perez-Campos’s intent was to conceal his past

record, but that this scheme merely backfired. Viewing the evidence, including

Perez-Campos’s criminal history, immigration status, and prior use of the same

false social security number, in the light most favorable to the government—as we

must in utilizing the proper standard of review, we hold that a rational juror could

infer that Perez-Campos possessed the requisite intent to deceive under

§ 408(a)(7)(B).

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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