United States v. Randall Taylor

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4113

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

RANDALL K. TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (6:12-cr-00135-1)

Submitted: July 2, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Randall Keith Taylor pled guilty, without a written

plea agreement, to failure to register as a sex offender, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). The district court

sentenced Taylor to eighteen months’ imprisonment and fifteen

years’ supervised release. On appeal, Taylor argues that his

fifteen-year term of supervised release is procedurally

unreasonable because the district court failed to make an

individualized assessment and that his fifteen-year term of

supervised release is substantively unreasonable because it is

greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

We affirm.

A “term of supervised release . . . [is] part of the

original sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913

(4th Cir. 1998), “and is reviewed for reasonableness.” United

States v. Preston, 706 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013); see Gall

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007) (stating that

appellate review of sentence is for abuse of discretion). We

review for “significant procedural error[s],” including “failing

to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors[] . . .

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall,

552 U.S. at 51. To avoid procedural error, “the district court

must make an individualized assessment,” wherein it applies the

relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific facts of the

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defendant’s case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Taylor argues that the district court’s reasons for

imposing the fifteen-year term of supervised release were not

individualized and could have been stated for any defendant

being sentenced to a term of supervised release. We disagree.

In fashioning the sentence, the district court considered

Taylor’s criminal history, stating that the fifteen-year term of

supervised release would “help make sure the defendant, who has

a significant criminal history, does not violate the law in some

other fashion.” (J.A. 85). * Further, the district court

considered the need to deter Taylor from repeating his offense,

noting that the fifteen-year term of supervised release would

“assist the Government to prosecute Mr. Taylor should he in the

future fail again to register as he’s required.” (J.A. 85). We

conclude that the district court demonstrated that it conducted

an individualized assessment and that Taylor’s sentence is

procedurally reasonable.

Taylor also argues that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a

sentence for abuse of discretion, “examin[ing] the totality of

the circumstances.” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d

*
“J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.

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212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). Assuming, without deciding, that the

supervised release term is not entitled to a presumption of

reasonableness on appeal, see United States v. Goodwin, ___ F.3d

___, ___, 2013 WL 1891302 at *5-*9 (7th Cir. May 8, 2013) (No.

12-2921), we conclude that the supervised release term is

nevertheless substantively reasonable. The district court was

statutorily authorized to impose Taylor’s fifteen-year term of

supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing

range of five years to life of supervised release for violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2250). Moreover, the district court adequately

considered the § 3553(a) factors applicable to the imposition of

supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2006). We find

Taylor’s argument that his fifteen-year term of supervised

release does not reflect his history and characteristics or the

nature and circumstances of the instant offense unpersuasive.

The district court referenced Taylor’s “significant criminal

history” when explaining the fifteen-year term of supervised

release (J.A. 85) and expressed concern that Taylor registered

for years in Ohio and understood his obligation, but when he

moved to West Virginia, Taylor “decided just not to comply.”

(J.A. 75). Further, the district court found that Taylor’s

sentence “reflects the nature and circumstance of the offense,

[and] the history and characteristics of [Taylor].” (J.A. 89).

Although Taylor argues that the district court should have

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considered that his offense was not as serious as other sex

offenses, the district court was not permitted to consider the

seriousness of Taylor’s offense when determining the term of

supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). Accordingly, we

conclude that that Taylor’s term of supervised release is

substantively reasonable.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED