United States v. $23,000 in United States Currency

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 03-1748
UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

$23,000 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Defendant,

RENÉ RODRÍGUEZ-BARRIENTOS,

Claimant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Oberdorfer,* Senior District Judge.

Anne W. Marsh, with whom John F. Cicilline was on brief, for
appellant.
Isabel Muñoz-Acosta, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, and Miguel A. Fernández,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellees.

January 23, 2004

_____________________

*Of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, sitting by designation.
 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Claimant René Rodríguez-Barrientos

("Rodríguez") asserts ownership of $23,000 seized by the United

States. The district court entered a default judgment in favor of

the United States, ruling that Rodríguez's claim was procedurally

deficient, and denied Rodríguez's subsequent motion to vacate and

motion to reconsider. Rodríguez now appeals the denial of the

motion to reconsider. After carefully considering the procedural

missteps in this case, some by Rodríguez and some by the court, we

affirm.

I.

On July 10, 2001, Rodríguez was scheduled to fly on a

commercial airline from the John F. Kennedy International Airport

("JFK") in Queens, New York to Luis Munoz Marin International

Airport ("LMMIA") in Carolina, Puerto Rico. Suspecting that

Rodríguez was carrying money to pay for a shipment of cocaine that

had arrived at JFK from LMMIA on June 24, 2001, agents of the U.S.

Drug Enforcement Agency detained Rodríguez at JFK while his flight

proceeded on to Puerto Rico carrying his checked luggage. The

agents questioned Rodríguez and obtained his consent to search his

luggage once it arrived at LMMIA. Upon searching his luggage, DEA

agents in Puerto Rico seized $23,000 in U.S. currency pursuant to

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).

Subsequently, Rodríguez attempted to retrieve the seized

currency. The first step towards retrieving seized property is to

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file a sworn claim of ownership with the agency that made the

seizure--here the DEA. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A) (2003). This

"verified administrative claim" notifies the agency of the party's

alleged interest in the property. Rodríguez properly filed a

verified administrative claim with the DEA on January 18, 2002,

asserting that he was the owner of the $23,000 seized at LMMIA.

Once a party has filed an administrative claim, the

government has 90 days either to file a complaint for forfeiture in

the district court or to release the property. 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2003). In this case, the government filed a

timely complaint for forfeiture on April 17, 2002, in the Puerto

Rico district court and served a copy of the complaint on

Rodríguez's counsel.1 The government also published notice of the

forfeiture in the May 8, 2002, edition of "El Nuevo Dia," a

newspaper of general circulation in Puerto Rico authorized for

notice purposes by Local Admiralty Rule G(3) of the Puerto Rico

District Court.2

1
Appellant claims that his counsel did not receive the
complaint until May 24, 2002. Because the district court granted
Rodríguez an extension of time to file his pleadings, and Rodríguez
met this extended schedule, the date on which his counsel received
the complaint is not relevant to determining Rodríguez's compliance
with the filing requirements.
2
Rule C(4) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims requires that, in a civil forfeiture proceeding,
the government "must promptly--or within the time that the court
allows--give public notice of the action and arrest in a newspaper
designated by court order and having general circulation in the

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 Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty

and Maritime Claims governs pleading in a civil forfeiture

proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. One Dairy Farm, 918 F.2d

310, 311 (1st Cir. 1990). That rule, as it existed during the

lower court proceedings in this case, requires that any person with

a claim to the property must file a "verified statement identifying

that interest or right" ("verified statement") within 20 days of

actual notice or completed publication of notice, or within the

time the court allows.3 The claimant must then serve an answer to

the complaint within 20 days of filing the verified statement.4

district.... The notice must specify the time under Rule C(6) to
file a statement of interest in or right against the seized
property and to answer."
3
In previous cases, such as United States v. One Urban Lot,
885 F.2d 994, 999 (1st Cir. 1989), we have referred to the
"verified statement" as a "verified claim." The year 2000
Amendments to Rule C(6) changed the terminology from "claim" to
"statement." The Advisory Committee notes explain that the change
"permits parallel drafting, and facilitates cross references in
other rules. The substantive nature of the statement remains the
same as the former claim." Thus, despite the different
terminology, the "verified statement" we refer to now is
functionally identical to the "verified claim" we have referred to
in the past when discussing the requirements of Rule C(6).
4
When this case was first before the district court, prior to
the amendments effective December 1, 2002, Rule C(6) stated that:

(i) a person who asserts an interest in or
right against the property that is the subject
of the action must file a verified statement
identifying the interest or right:
(A) within 20 days after the earlier of
(1) the actual notice of execution of process
or (2) completed publication of notice under

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Rodríguez requested an extension of time. On May 28, 2002, the

district court granted him a 30-day extension to file his

pleadings.

Rodríguez filed an answer on June 27, 2002, but he

neglected to file the verified statement required by Rule C(6). On

July 3, 2002, the government filed two motions: one to strike the

answer because Rodríguez had never filed a verified statement, and

one to enter a "Default Decree of Forfeiture." Copies of these

motions were served on Rodríguez's counsel. Nevertheless,

Rodríguez did not reply to either motion. On July 16, 2002, the

district court granted the government's motion for a "Default

Decree of Forfeiture," forfeiting the $23,000 to the government.

On July 22, 2002, appellant filed a motion to vacate the

judgment by default. He attached a copy of his verified

administrative claim and argued that, although it was originally

Rule C(4), or
(B) within the time that the court
allows.
...
(iii) a person who files a statement of
interest in or right against the property must
serve an answer within 20 days after filing
the statement.

The 2002 amendments, none of which affect the judgment in this
case, allow 30 days to file a verified statement, change the first
alternative event for measuring the 30 days to the government's
service of the complaint, and allow 20 days to both serve and file
an answer after the filing of the verified statement.

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filed with the DEA and had not previously been before the court,5

it was a sufficient substitute for the verified statement required

by Rule C(6). He did not offer any explanation for the failure to

file the verified statement required by the rules before filing his

answer, and he did not ground his motion to vacate in any

particular rule.

In a written order entered on January 28, 2003, the court

rejected appellant's argument that filing a verified administrative

claim fulfilled the pleading requirements of Rule C(6). The court

cited precedent that filing a verified statement is required to

establish standing in a civil forfeiture case. It also

distinguished this case, in which the claimant filed an unverified

answer, from the exception we adopted in United States v. One Urban

Lot, where we held that a verified answer "can serve as both a

[verified statement] and answer." 885 F.2d 994, 1000 (1st Cir.

1989). The court did not, however, specify the rule or standard of

relief that it applied to the motion to vacate the default

judgment.

5
At oral argument, appellant claimed that the U.S. Attorney's
office had forwarded the administrative claim to the district
court. Appellee denied this, and we can find no evidence in the
record that the U.S. Attorney forwarded the administrative claim to
the district court. Rather, it appears that the court had the
administrative claim before it for the first time when claimant
filed a motion to vacate.

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 On February 3, appellant submitted a motion to reconsider

the denial of the January 28 motion. Again he attached a copy of

the verified administrative claim and again he argued that it

fulfilled the verification requirement of Rule C(6). He did not

invoke a particular rule when filing his motion. On February 5,

the government filed an opposition to the motion.

On April 23, the court denied the motion to reconsider,

which it characterized as a request for relief under Rule 60(b).

After quoting Rule 60(b) in its entirety, but without citing any

one of the six possible grounds for vacating a judgment under Rule

60(b), the court reiterated that the filing of a verified

administrative claim and an unverified answer does not meet the

requirements of Rule C(6) and is not sufficiently similar to the

filing of a verified answer to invoke the exception we adopted in

One Urban Lot. Rodríguez now appeals the district court's denial

of the motion to reconsider.

II.

A. Default

The filing of a verified statement, as required by Rule

C(6), is no mere procedural technicality. It forces claimants to

assert their alleged ownership under oath, creating a deterrent

against filing false claims. See, e.g., United States v. Commodity

Account No. 549 54930, 219 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir.

2000)("Verification forces the claimant to place himself at risk

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for perjury of false claims, and the requirement of oath or

affirmation is not a mere technical requirement that we easily

excuse."). For this reason, filing a verified statement is

normally "a prerequisite to the right to file an answer and defend

on the merits." One Dairy Farm, 918 F.2d at 311 (quoting United

States v. Fourteen (14) Handguns, 524 F.Supp. 395, 397 (S.D. Tex.

1981)); see also One Urban Lot, 885 F.2d at 999 ("[S]ympathy alone

does not suffice to require the district judge to disregard

[claimants'] complete failure to abide by the command of Supp. Rule

C(6) to file a verified claim or answer."). When a claimant files

only an answer without a verified statement, the district court may

strike the answer. See, e.g., United States v. Beechcraft Queen

Airplane, 789 F.2d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1986)(holding that "the

District Court did not abuse its discretion by requiring strict

compliance with Rule C(6) and striking [claimant's] answer because

he did not precede it with a verified [statement].").

The failure to file a verified statement implicates

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, which governs the entry of a

default judgment. See, e.g., One Urban Lot, 885 F.2d at 997

(applying Rule 55 to a civil forfeiture default). The rule

distinguishes between the "entry of default" under Rule 55(a) and

"judgment by default" under Rule 55(b). Entry of default is an

interlocutory order--entered in anticipation of a final judgment--

formally recognizing that a party "has failed to plead or otherwise

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defend as provided by [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Because Rodríguez did not file a verified

statement in accordance with Rule C(6), the court was entitled to

enter a default under Rule 55(a) for failing to "otherwise defend"

as required by the rules.

In contrast to the entry of default under Rule 55(a), a

Rule 55(b) judgment by default is a "final disposition of the case

and an appealable order" that has the same effect as a judgment

rendered after a trial on the merits. 10A Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Civil 3d, § 2684 (1998). Rule 55(b)(2) provides that the court may

enter a judgment by default provided that "[i]f the party against

whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the

party ... shall be served with written notice of the application

for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such

application."

In this case, Rodríguez's filing of an answer constituted

an appearance before the court. See 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, §

2686 (noting that an appearance merely "involves some presentation

or submission to the court."). Thus, he was entitled to notice,

under Rule 55(b)(2), of the application for a default judgment.

The government provided notice of the motion for a default judgment

by sending a copy to claimant's counsel via certified mail.

Receiving no opposition to the motion to enter a default judgment,

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the court proceeded, on July 16, 2002, to issue a "Default Decree

of Forfeiture," which acted as a final judgment by default pursuant

to Rule 55(b)(2).

B. Motion to Vacate and Motion to Reconsider

Rule 55(c) applies different standards for setting aside

an entry of default under Rule 55(a) and a judgment by default

under Rule 55(b). A court may set aside an entry of default "for

good cause." This standard is "a liberal one," Coon v. Grenier,

867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989); the relevant factors are "whether

(1) the default was willful, (2) a set-aside would prejudice

plaintiff, and (3) the alleged defense was meritorious." Keegel v.

Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir.

1980). By contrast, the court can set aside a final judgment by

default only "in accordance with Rule 60(b)." Rule 60(b)(1), the

provision relevant here, requires a showing of "excusable neglect"

to win relief from a final judgment.6 This is a demanding

6
Rule 60(b) states in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the

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standard. See Coon, 867 F.2d at 76. It allows the court, "where

appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence,

mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances

beyond the party's control." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick

Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993).7 However, "ignorance

of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually

constitute 'excusable' neglect...." Id. at 392. We have said

that, while other factors play an important role in the "excusable

neglect" analysis, "the reason-for-delay factor will always be

critical to the inquiry...." Hospital Del Maestro v. Nat'l Labor

Relations Bd., 263 F.3d 173, 175 (1st Cir. 2001)(quoting Lowry v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir. 2000)). We

have also recognized that

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
7
Although the "excusable neglect" standard at issue in Pioneer
arose under the bankruptcy code, the court's analysis applies to
the "excusable neglect" standard as used throughout the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Graphic
Communications Int'l Union Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing
Providence, Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001); Davila-Alvarez v.
Escuela de Medicina Universidad Central de Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64
n.9 (1st Cir. 2001).

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 a trial judge has wide discretion in dealing
with a litigant whose predicament results from
blatant ignorance of clear or easily
ascertainable rules, and, if the trial judge
decides that such neglect is not excusable in
the particular case, we will not meddle unless
we are persuaded that some exceptional
justification exists.

Quebecor Printing, 270 F.3d at 6-7.8

In this case, Rodríguez filed two motions after the

judgment by default: the motion to vacate and the motion to

reconsider. Although the motion to vacate did not invoke Rule

60(b), and the district court did not explicitly rely on Rule 60(b)

in its decision, the motion was nonetheless a Rule 60(b) motion

because it sought to vacate a final judgment by default that, by

the explicit terms of Rule 55(c), may be "set... aside in

accordance with Rule 60(b)." Rodríguez’s second motion--the motion

to reconsider--essentially restated his claims from the motion to

vacate, but this time the court explicitly analyzed the motion

under Rule 60(b). In essence, the court allowed Rodríguez a second

chance to argue his prior motion to vacate. For the purposes of

this appeal, we accept the district court’s analytical framework

8
For cases finding excusable neglect, see 10A Wright, Miller
& Kane, § 2695 (citing examples of "excusable neglect" including
cases where the default was caused by lack of notice, illness,
death, withdrawal of counsel, misunderstandings between multiple
defendants, problems due to an out-of-state defendant and, in
limited circumstances, honest mistake).

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and will treat the motion to reconsider as a Rule 60(b) motion.9

We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for

abuse of discretion. See Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 277

(1st Cir. 1993)("District courts enjoy considerable discretion in

deciding motions brought under Civil Rule 60(b). We review such

rulings only for abuse of that wide discretion.").

III.

A. Excusable Neglect

As stated above, the reason for delay is a critical

factor in the "excusable neglect" analysis. At no stage in this

process, either in the trial court or here, has appellant explained

why, after being granted a 30-day extension by the district court

to respond to the government's forfeiture complaint, he did not

comply with Rule C(6), did not oppose the government's motion to

9
We note that a motion "ask[ing] the court to modify its
earlier disposition of the case because of an allegedly erroneous
legal result is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)." Appeal of
Sun Pipe Line Co.,831 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1987); see also 11
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2810.1 (1998) ("Rule 59(e)...
include[s] motions for reconsideration."). Thus, Rodríguez’s
motion to reconsider was, in essence, a Rule 59(e) motion which was
filed within the required 10 days. However, Rule 59(e) "does not
provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural
failures...." Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.
1997). Moreover, the motion to reconsider filed by Rodríguez
merely restated the facts set out in the motion to vacate. The
repetition of previous arguments is not sufficient to prevail on a
Rule 59(e) motion. See FDIC v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16
(1st Cir. 1992) ("Motions under Rule 59(e) must either clearly
establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered
evidence.").

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strike his answer, and did not ask the court for leave to file a

verified statement and new answer after the court entered its

judgment by default. At each stage, appellant has instead argued

that his filing of a verified administrative claim somehow negates

the requirement to file a verified statement in the judicial

forfeiture proceeding pursuant to Rule C(6), despite the absence of

any precedent supporting that proposition.

We acknowledge that both the administrative claim and

verified statement contain essentially the same information: they

identify the property, the claim to the property, and bear a sworn

statement by the claimant asserting his or her claim. 18 U.S.C. §

983(a)(2)(A) (2003); Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. R. C(6). Nevertheless,

the two documents serve distinct purposes: the administrative claim

notifies the agency of the claim while the verified statement

notifies the court. This distinction is important, inter alia,

because the party that files an administrative claim may not be the

only party with a claim against the property. More than one

claimant may emerge to file a verified statement after public

notice of the complaint for forfeiture. Filing a verified

statement with the court notifies all other parties of each claim

to the property so that all interests may properly be resolved.

For this reason, the facial similarity between the two documents

does not negate the obligation to file a verified statement. See,

e.g., United States v. $2,857.00, 754 F.2d 208, 212 (7th Cir.

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1985)("An administrative claim does not give the claimant any

rights in the judicial condemnation proceeding; it only ensures

that a judicial proceeding will take place before the property is

forfeited.").

Appellant also makes a passing reference in his brief to

the difficulty caused by his incarceration in Puerto Rico and the

apparent language barrier between Rodríguez and his counsel.

Nevertheless, appellant did not present this argument in his motion

to vacate and does not explain why these difficulties, which did

not prevent him from filing a timely verified administrative claim,

prevented him from filing a verified statement. Under the

circumstances, we can find no abuse of discretion in the district

court's refusal to vacate the default judgment pursuant to Rule

60(b) on the basis of excusable neglect.

B. Good Cause

Finally, Rodríguez attempts to avoid the "excusable

neglect" analysis by arguing that his submission of a verified

administrative claim to the court in conjunction with his motion to

vacate invoked the Rule 55(c) "good cause" standard of review. He

argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in applying

the Rule 60(b) standard because appellant's procedural deficiency

(failure to file a verified statement) only justified an entry of

default rather than a judgment by default. If the court could only

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enter a default under Rule 55(a), the more lenient Rule 55(c) "good

cause" standard should have applied to the request for relief.

Appellant analogizes his case to that of the claimant in

One Urban Lot, whose pleadings were sufficient to present a valid

claim to the property even absent the filing of a verified

statement. In One Urban Lot, we found no abuse of discretion where

the district court entered a default judgment against three

claimants who did not file a verified statement. However, in the

case of one claimant who filed a verified answer, we held that such

an answer submitted prior to judgment by default, if it includes

all of the material normally contained in a verified statement,

"can serve as both a [verified statement] and answer." 885 F.2d at

1000. Hence the district court should not have stricken that

answer. Furthermore, with the verified answer still in place, the

district court in One Urban Lot should not have elevated the entry

of default to a judgment by default under Rule 55(b), susceptible

to relief only under Rule 60(b). Instead, the district court

should have applied the more lenient Rule 55(c) "good cause"

standard and set aside the entry of default on that basis.10

10
The court in One Urban Lot also wrote that "since we have
determined that the substance of a valid claim was before the court
in the form of a verified answer, there was no default. There
being no default, a default judgment could not be entered. Thus we
need not analyze the elements of 'good cause'...." 885 F.2d at
1001. Arguably, this statement is inconsistent with the court's
earlier assertion that it was applying the "good cause" standard of
Rule 55(c). However, we read the court to be saying that it did

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 Appellant now invites us to extend the exception of One

Urban Lot and apply the Rule 55(c) "good cause" standard to parties

who provide only an unverified answer prior to default, and a sworn

claim of interest only after the court has entered a judgment by

default. We decline the invitation.

Even assuming that the administrative claim would be a

valid substitute for a verified statement,11 we cannot fault the

district court, in the exercise of its discretion, for refusing to

vacate a default judgment upon presentation of a verified document

that should have been filed prior to default. The timely filing of

a verified statement "force[s] claimants to come forward as soon as

possible after forfeiture proceedings have begun...." One Urban

Lot, 885 F.2d at 1001. Allowing claimants to rely on a verified

administrative claim filed after the court has entered a default

judgment would undermine this important goal of timeliness and an

important related value--the finality of judgments. See, e.g.,

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) ("'[I]nroads on

the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the

integrity of our procedures' and inevitably delay and impair the

not have to analyze discretely the elements of good cause
(willfulness, prejudice, a meritorious defense) because the filing
of a verified answer so clearly constituted "good cause" to set
aside the entry of default.
11
We express no opinion on whether a verified administrative
claim, filed prior to default, would be an adequate replacement for
a verified statement in accordance with Rule C(6).

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orderly administration of justice."). Moreover, we take judicial

notice of the fact that the Puerto Rico District Court is an

exceptionally busy court, where the pressures for timely

proceedings are relentless.12 The requirement that a verified

statement be filed before the filing of an answer was clearly set

forth in Rule C(6), and there was nothing difficult about the

compliance with this requirement. The district court was entitled

to insist upon procedural regularity.

In reaching this conclusion, we have considered several

procedural irregularities in this case that, in some circumstances,

might justify applying the Rule 55(c) “good cause” standard rather

than the Rule 60(b) "excusable neglect" standard. First, while the

local rules of the Puerto Rico district court require a party to

respond to motions within ten days, the district court waited only

eight computable days after the government filed its motions before

entering its default decree.13 Second, instead of ruling separately

12
In the five year period from 1998 until 2002, the Puerto Rico
district courts saw 2121 cases filed per judgeship. This number is
the highest in the First Circuit and 34% greater than that of the
District of Massachusetts, the second-busiest district in cases per
judgeship. United States Courts for the First Circuit 2002 Annual
Report, August 2003, at 89-122, available at
http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/circuitexec/2002annualrpt.pdf.
13
Puerto Rico District Court Local Rule 7(b) (formerly Rule
311.5) provides that a party must respond to a motion within ten
days of its service or be deemed to have waived objection.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), the day of filing is not included
in calculating time, and "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or
allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and

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on the motion to strike the answer, the court treated the answer as

stricken in its default decree.14 Finally, the district court did

not explicitly enter a default pursuant to Rule 55(a) prior to

entering a default judgment under Rule 55(b).15

On the facts of this case, however, these procedural

irregularities do not warrant 55(c) “good cause” review. Appellant

legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." The
government filed its motion on Wednesday, July 3, 2002. Excluding
intermediate weekends and the July 4 holiday, only eight days of
the ten day period had expired when the district court entered the
default judgment on July 16, 2002.
14
The record indicates no disposition of the motion to strike.
However, in denying Rodríguez's motion to vacate, the district
court wrote that, when it had issued its default judgment, "no
claims had been filed to the verified complaint.... [A]lthough an
answer was filed, it was insufficient to be considered a claim."
Thus, the district court treated the record before it as if it had
stricken the answer.
15
"Prior to obtaining a default judgment under [Rule 55(b)],
there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a)." 10A
Wright, Miller & Kane, § 2682. Thus, if the court had strictly
adhered to the rules in this case, the court should have allowed
ten days, pursuant to Local Rule 7(b), before ruling on the motion
to strike the answer. After striking the answer, the court was
entitled to enter a default pursuant to Rule 55(a) because, since
Rodríguez's answer had been stricken, he had no pleading before the
court. However, as previously stated, Rodríguez's deficient
pleading was enough to constitute an appearance. Therefore, the
court should have given him at least three days notice pursuant to
Rule 55(b)(2) prior to entry of a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55 ("If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has
appeared in the action, the party ... shall be served with written
notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the
hearing on such application."); see also 10A Wright, Miller &
Kane, § 2687 ("Under Rule 55(b)(2), a party ... who has appeared
in an action but has failed to defend must be given written notice
of an application to the court for entry of a judgment by
default.").

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has not argued, before either the district court or on appeal, that

any of these missteps require application of the “good cause”

standard or that they prejudiced his case. Thus, these arguments

are waived. See, e.g., Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys.,

323 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2003)("Issues raised on appeal in a

perfunctory manner (or not at all) are waived."). Further, we have

no reason to believe that these missteps by the court denied

Rodríguez a fair review of his claim. Each occurred after the time

for filing a verified statement had expired, including a 30-day

extension granted by the court. We see no evidence that Rodríguez

would have remedied his procedural deficiency if the court had

waited the full ten days before entering a default judgment instead

of eight, or if the court had first entered a default before

entering a default judgment. Nothing in the history of the case

barred the court from striking the answer explicitly and separately

if it had chosen to do so. Finally, the court gave careful

consideration on two occasions to Rodríguez's request for 60(b)

relief.

IV.

Rodríguez filed deficient pleadings, failed to remedy

those pleadings, and failed to explain his procedural missteps.

While we "recognize the desirability of deciding disputes on their

merits," Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local

59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1992), we

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cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by

embracing the countervailing goals of timeliness and the finality

of judgments. Our ruling is in accord with other Courts of Appeals

that have similarly found no abuse of discretion when a district

court requires claimants to comply strictly with the verified

statement requirement of Rule C(6). See, e.g., Beechcraft Queen

Airplane, 789 F.2d at 630; United States v. $2,857, 754 F.2d 208

(7th Cir. 1985); United States v. One 1978 Piper Navajo PA-31

Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1984).

AFFIRMED.

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