IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 92-8257
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ZACARIAS RODRIGUEZ-RIOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
_________________________
(February 11, 1994)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING, GARWOOD, JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM,
DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHÉ, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and
DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Today we overrule the "exculpatory no" exception to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 as the law in this circuit. We therefore affirm the convic-
tion of Zacarias Rodriguez-Rios ("Rodriguez") of one count of
making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent representation of a
material fact in violation of § 1001.
I.
We take the following facts from the panel opinion, United
States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 991 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1993). Rodriguez
was viewed by a United States customs agent as he was exiting an
airplane at the airport in Santa Teresa, New Mexico. Rodriguez
placed a suitcase in the trunk of an automobile sporting a paper
license plate in its rear window and driven by a young woman.
Rodriguez then entered the passenger side of the vehicle and pro-
ceeded to the Bridge of the Americas Port of Entry, which divides
El Paso, Texas, from Juarez, Mexico.
Customs agents followed Rodriguez from the airport to the
bridge and stopped him just before he could cross the border.
Agent McCarthy informed Rodriguez that he was conducting a routine
export examination and asked, among other things, how much money
Rodriguez had with him. Rodriguez responded, "About a thousand
dollars," and removed what turned out to be $1,400 from his pocket.
McCarthy continued to question Rodriguez, asking him whether
anything in the trunk belonged to him. His suspicions apparently
aroused, Rodriguez inquired as to the agent's purpose, whereupon
McCarthy repeated that it was a routine export examination. McCar-
thy next asked Rodriguez where he had flown from before arriving in
Santa Teresa, and Rodriguez replied that he had left Springfield,
Illinois, for Santa Teresa in a private aircraft and that he was a
personal assistant to the mayor of Juarez.
When McCarthy again asked Rodriguez how much money he was
carrying, he made no reply. When asked whether anything in the
trunk belonged to him, Rodriguez stated, "That depends on why you
are asking." McCarthy again asked how much money he had, but this
time Rodriguez answered that he did not know.
2
Rodriguez was taken inside the customs office and advised in
Spanish by customs inspector Vega of the currency reporting re-
quirement )) that it is not illegal to leave the country with more
than $10,000, but that he must complete a Customs Form 4790 Cur-
rency Monetary Instrument Report declaring any sum in excess of
that amount. Vega then asked Rodriguez whether he had more than
$10,000 with him and whether he had filled out the required form.
Rodriguez did not respond to these questions, and Vega testified
that his body mannerisms were evasive. When McCarthy again asked
whether any of the suitcases in the trunk were his, and Rodriguez
reiterated that "[i]t depends on why you are asking," the vehicle
was moved into a secondary inspection area, and Rodriguez and the
car's driver were taken inside the customs office.
Two narcotics dogs were brought to inspect the car; the first
alerted to its exterior, and the second sniffed the packages in the
open trunk and alerted to the suitcase and a shoebox wrapped with
duct tape. Both were opened and found to be filled with U.S.
currency in the cumulative approximate sum of $598,000.
Meanwhile, back in the customs office, Rodriguez was asked to
fill out a Form 4790. Acknowledging that the money was his, Rodri-
guez began to fill out the report with agent Straba's assistance.
Straba restated the currency reporting requirements, again assuring
Rodriguez that he could take any sum out of the country so long as
he declared it in writing. Apparently finished, Rodriguez placed
the form on the counter, but when Straba picked it up, Rodriguez
took the form from him and folded it into his pocket, saying he did
3
not wish to give it to Straba. Nonetheless, Straba had seen enough
of the form to notice that it declared an amount of $530,000.
When informed that large amounts of cash had been discovered
in the trunk, Straba proceeded to arrest Rodriguez, who refused to
speak to the agents until he could consult with an attorney.
Later, Rodriguez changed his mind and agreed to talk. He requested
a second opportunity to complete a reporting form, was provided
one, and stated thereon that he was exporting $500,000.
II.
A federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging
Rodriguez with failing to file the prescribed report for the trans-
portation of currency and monetary instruments of more than $10,000
in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316(a)(1)(A) and 5322(a) (first
count), and making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (second count).
After a bench trial, the court dismissed the first count for insuf-
ficient evidence but found Rodriguez guilty on the second.
Rodriguez appealed, arguing that he was protected by the
"exculpatory no" exception to § 1001, which provides that "a gener-
ally negative and exculpatory response made by a subject of a
criminal investigation in reply to questions directed to him by
investigating officers is not a crime under § 1001." United States
v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113, 117 (5th Cir. 1975). A panel of this
court, acknowledging that it was bound by circuit precedent, agreed
and reversed the conviction, holding that Rodriguez could not be
4
prosecuted under § 1001 for his initial statement that he was
carrying no more than $1,000. United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 991
F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1993).1 We granted a rehearing en banc,
id. at 171, in order to re-examine the "exculpatory no" exception,
as suggested by one of the panel members, see id. at 170-71
(Higginbotham, J., concurring).
III.
Section 1001 provides,
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001. Since 1962, this circuit has held that a brief
denial of guilt to an investigating federal officer is not punish-
able under § 1001.2
In Paternostro, we held that a policeman's denial that he had
received graft money was not punishable under § 1001, because
[1] [t]he appellant in the case at bar made no statement
relating to any claim on his behalf against the United
States or an agency thereof; [2] he was not seeking to
obtain or retain any official position or employment in
any agency or department of the Federal Government; and
[3] he did not aggressively and deliberately initiate
any positive or affirmative statement calculated to per-
vert the legitimate functions of Government.
1
The issue before the panel was whether Rodriguez's statement that he had
only $1,000 fell within the "exculpatory no" exception.
2
See United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bush,
503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 (5th
Cir. 1974) (en banc); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.
1962).
5
311 F.2d at 305. Thus, we examined whether any of the three pur-
poses of § 1001 would be vindicated in the case at hand. Conclud-
ing that they would not, we held that the "exculpatory no" excep-
tion applied.
Subsequent cases have not involved persons lodging claims
against or seeking employment with the government, and therefore
the perversion-of-function rationale has been paramount.3 In addi-
tion to the purposes of § 1001, we have relied upon yet another
justification for the exception, reasoning that a literal interpre-
tation would come "uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amendment."
Lambert, 501 F.2d at 946 n.4; see also Bush, 503 F.2d at 818-19.
Seven other circuits have embraced the "exculpatory no" excep-
tion in one form or another.4 Some circuits have neither adopted
nor rejected the doctrine.5 One circuit has eschewed the excep-
tion.6
Of the approaches adopted by the other courts, that of the
3
See Lambert, 501 F.2d at 946 ("Perversion of a governmental body's
function is the hallmark of a § 1001 offense.") (citation omitted);
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d at 1212 ("This last factor has been critical in the Fifth
Circuit cases . . . .").
4
See United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Medina de
Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714,
717-719 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 879-80
(10th Cir. 1980); United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674-75 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 935 (1976).
5
See United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 811 (1992); United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1069 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated on other
grounds, 817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1987).
6
See United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1320 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 303 (1991) (rejecting the five-step test adopted by the Ninth
and Fourth Circuits).
6
Ninth Circuit is especially noteworthy. That court held that a
false statement does not violate § 1001 if five requirements are
satisfied: (1) the false statement must be unrelated to a claim to
a privilege or a claim against the government; (2) the declarant
must be responding to inquiries initiated by a federal agency or
department; (3) the false statement must not impair the basic
functions entrusted by law to the agency; (4) the government's
inquiries must not constitute a routine exercise of administrative
responsibility; and (5) a truthful answer would have incriminated
the declarant. United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222,
1224 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 544
n.5).7
IV.
The "exculpatory no" exception cannot be found in the plain
language of § 1001, which prohibits three possible acts:
concealing a material fact, making a false statement, and using a
false writing. Although it cannot be discerned immediately from
the statute, the "knowingly and willfully" requirement applies to
all three types of conduct. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d
1280, 1287 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mekjian, 505
7
Although the Supreme Court has never considered the "exculpatory no"
doctrine, it has interpreted § 1001 in three cases. In United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941), the Court held that the predecessor to § 1001 was
not limited to cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government. In
United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), the Court determined that the
Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives is a "department or agency" of
the United States within the meaning of § 1001. In United States v. Rodgers,
466 U.S. 475 (1984), the Court concluded that an FBI investigation is under the
"jurisdiction" of a federal department or agency within the meaning of § 1001.
Although these cases are not controlling, we interpret them as evincing a
tendency to apply § 1001 broadly.
7
F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975).
The instant case and the "exculpatory no" exception concern
the "false statement" portion of § 1001. Thus, the relevant
language of § 1001 is this: "Whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations . . . ."
A literal interpretation of the statute does not countenance
the "exculpatory no" exception. Some courts have found the word
"statements" to be a ready textual hook upon which to place
concerns about legislative intent. Although that word may connote
affirmative, aggressive, or overt declarations, we consider that as
a matter of common sense and plain meaning, the word "no" is indeed
a statement.
It has been argued that in the phrase "statements and
representations," the word "statements" properly should be
interpreted to borrow the definition of the word "representations."
The court in United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205 (D. Md.
1955), stated,
And it must be noted that in the alternative and
broadening prohibition included in the 1934 amendment
the word "statements" is closely associated with the
word "representations" which connotes the kind of a
statement that is intended to be acted on by the person
to whom made. That is, the ordinary legal concept of
representation at various fields of jurisprudence, and
would seem to have similar meaning in this statute. 37
Words and Phrases, pp. 35, et seq.
It is likely, however, that by including "statements" with
"representations," Congress did not intend the scope of § 1001 to
8
be limited to representations. In other words, we abide, where
possible, by the general rule of statutory construction that
requires us to give meaning to every portion of a statute. See
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015
(1992).
In Stark, the court also suggested that because other actions
condemned by § 1001 are aggressive actions (For example, it
prohibits falsifying or concealing or covering up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact.), "statements" must mean only
aggressive, or inducing, statements.8 We are not convinced by this
ejusdem generis argument. It is just as likely that Congress used
broader language in the "false statement" clause in order to
distinguish false statements from other types of prohibited
conduct.
We are authorized to deviate from the literal language of a
statute only if the plain language would lead to absurd results, or
if such an interpretation would defeat the intent of Congress.9
Most recently, the Supreme Court has admonished that "[w]hen we
8
The Stark court reasoned,
[W]e also find in the same closely worded phraseology that the
statement must have been knowingly and willfully made or concealed
or accompanied by some trick, scheme, or device and must relate to
a material fact. Again, in close verbal association are specified
various types of false statements such as bills, receipts, vouchers,
rolls, accounts, claims, certificates, affidavits or depositions.
131 F. Supp. at 205-06 (referring to the 1934 predecessor of § 1001).
9
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 362 (1926) ("General terms
descriptive of a class of persons made subject to a criminal statute may and
should be limited where the literal application . . . would lead to extreme or
absurd results, and where the legislative purpose gathered from the whole Act
would be satisfied by a more limited interpretation."); Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980).
9
find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances." Demarest
v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (citations omitted). Thus,
we are told to follow a statute's plain meaning unless "[w]e can[]
say that [it] is so bizarre that Congress `could not have intended'
it." Id. at 191 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S.
564, 575 (1982)). Accord Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart, 927 F.2d
828, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2589
(1992) (per curiam). Finding no such reason to deviate from the
plain language of § 1001, we now discard the "exculpatory no"
doctrine in this circuit.
V.
It is said that the purpose of § 1001 is to protect the
government from practices that would pervert its legitimate
functions.10 The principal purpose of the "exculpatory no"
exception, on the other hand, is to exclude from coverage those
10
See Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93:
The [1934] amendment eliminated the words "cheating and swindling"
and broadened the provision so as to leave no adequate basis for the
limited construction which had previously obtained. The statute was
made to embrace false and fraudulent statements or representations
where these were knowingly and willfully used in documents or
affidavits "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States." In this, there was no restriction
to cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government.
The amendment indicated the congressional intent to protect the
authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from
the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices
described.
Accord Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 202 ("[T]he kind of statements which are
proscribed are those which necessarily have important relation to the protection
of the authorized functions of the governmental departments and agencies from
perversion which might result from this kind of deceptive practices which are
prohibited.").
10
statements that do not so threaten.11 We conclude, however, that
§ 1001 should not be limited to those statements that pervert
governmental functions but should be determined by the text and not
by a judicial reconstruction of its purpose.
A.
In Gilliland, the Court refused to limit § 1001's predecessor
to the narrow task of aiding the punishment of those who produced,
transported, or removed oil in contravention of § 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (the "NIRA").12 Such oil
11
See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov.
1981) ("The exculpatory no doctrine developed because this court believed that
Congress intended section 1001 to punish only positive false statements that
would pervert governmental functions.") (citations omitted). The "exculpatory
no" doctrine vindicates the statutory purpose, because short exculpatory
statements seldom pervert any governmental function. United States v. Lambert,
501 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) ("We note, too, that an exculpatory
denial by a person under investigation may have less potential for misleading
the Bureau and perverting its function than a discursive voluntary statement
involving the suggestion that persons other than the maker of the statement are
guilty of federal crimes.") (footnote omitted). In Bush, we interpreted the
"exculpatory no" doctrine to distinguish "cases wherein a false written net
worth statement was voluntarily prepared and submitted to the Internal Revenue
agents for the purpose of misleading the IRS." Bush, 503 F.2d at 818 (emphasis
added).
Nowhere is the perversion-of-government rationale more evident than in the
currency reporting cases. The Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1101, requires a
person to report the transfer of more than $10,000 across a United States
border. Travelers entering the country are asked to fill out a customs form
asking whether they are carrying more than $10,000 in currency. We have held
that a traveler who answers "no" to the question is not criminally liable if he
does not know of the reporting requirement. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d at 1208. We
reasoned that for § 1001 to be implicated, "the government would have to
demonstrate a knowing and willful intent to pervert the purpose of the Bank
Secrecy Act." Id. at 1213. Conversely, if the declarant has been apprised of
the currency disclosure law, the "exculpatory no" doctrine is not available.
United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1991).
12
Pub. L. No. 73-67, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 200. Section 9(c) was
declared unconstitutional in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Congress attempted to cure the constitutional defects, passing a substitute in
1935. The "Hot Oil" Act, Pub. L. No. 74-14, 49 Stat. 30 (1935).
11
illegally produced was referred to as "hot oil."13 Just as the
Court rejected the idea that the scope of § 1001's predecessor
should be limited to prosecutions under the NIRA, we discard the
proposition that § 1001 should be limited to a broader formulation
of congressional intent, that of preventing perversions of
government functions.
Section 1001 has its origins in the Civil War: The original
version was passed in 1863. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat.
696; see United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504 (1955). One
clause of the statute made it a criminal offense for a member of
the armed forces to make a false claim, specifically, for
any person in the land or naval forces of the United
States . . . [to] make or cause to be made, or present
or cause to be presented for payment or approval to or
by any person or officer in the civil or military
service of the United States, any claim upon or against
the Government of the United States, or any department
or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious, or fraudulent . . . .
12 Stat. 696. A second clause dealt with statements that
buttressed false claims. It was illegal for
any person in such forces or service who shall, for the
purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the
approval or payment of such claim, make, use, or cause
to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher,
entry, roll, account, claim, statement, certificate,
affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain
any false or fraudulent statement or entry.
In 1873, when the statute was codified as Revised Statute
13
See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 418 (defining "hot oil" as "oil
exceeding state allowances"); but see William J. Schwartz, Note, Fairness in
Criminal Investigations Under the Federal False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
316, 317 n.11 (1977) ("`Hot oil' was oil produced cheaply enough to be sold for
less than the parity price established under regulations promulgated under the
[NIRA].").
12
§ 5438, Congress amended the penalty provisions and modified the
statute to cover "every person," not just military personnel. Act
of Dec. 1, 1873, § 5438, 18 Stat. 1054-55; see Bramblett, 348 U.S.
at 506 n.2. In 1908, the penalty provisions again were amended.
Act of May 30, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-175, § 5438, 35 Stat. 555; see
Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 506 n.2. In 1909, the statute was
redesignated as § 35. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350,
§ 35, 35 Stat. 1088, 1095; see Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 506 n.2.
In 1918, Congress modified the false statement portion of the
statute so that it required a purpose to cheat and swindle or
defraud the government. Act of Oct. 23, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-228,
§ 35, 40 Stat. 1015-16. The new language provided that
whoever, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to
obtain the payment or approval of such a claim, or for
the purpose and with the intent of cheating and
swindling or defrauding the Government of the United
States, or any department thereof, or any corporation in
which the United States of America is a stockholder,
shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or
cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact, or make or cause to be made any false or
fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use
or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt,
voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit,
or deposition, knowing the same to contain any
fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry; . . . shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1934, the purpose requirement was removed at the behest of
the Secretary of the Interior, who wished to use the statute to
13
enforce § 9(c) of the NIRA.14 The purpose requirement of pecuniary
or property loss in the earlier, 1918 version had prevented the
statute from being used to enforce the NIRA. Gilliland, 312 U.S.
at 94.15
After the 1934 amendment, the relevant language read,
or whoever, shall knowingly and willfully falsify or
conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or
fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use
or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt,
voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit,
or deposition, knowing the same to contain any
fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States or of any corporation in
which the United States of America is a
stockholder; . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-394, § 35, 48 Stat. 996.
Subsequent legislative changes were substantively unimportant.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508.16
14
See Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93-94 ("Legislation had been sought by the
Secretary of the Interior to aid the enforcement of laws relating to the
functions of the Department of the Interior and, in particular, to the
enforcement of regulations under § 9(c) of the [NIRA]."); id. at 94 (after the
President objected to the original legislation, "[a]nother measure was then
proposed by the Secretary of the Interior which would obviate these objections
and accomplish the purpose of reaching the presentation of false papers in
relation to `hot oil.'"); id. at 94-95 (citing S. Rep. No. 1202, 73d Cong., 2d
sess.) ("The report of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate stated that the
amendment in question had been proposed by the Department of the Interior with
the purpose `of reaching a large number of cases involving the shipment of "hot"
oil, where false papers are presented in connection therewith.'").
15
The purpose requirement contained in the 1918 version had been
construed to mean that the United States suffer (or perhaps, be intended to
suffer) "pecuniary or property loss." Id. at 92 (citing United States v. Cohn,
270 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1926). A sale of "hot oil" did not cause such a loss.
Any loss would be suffered by other oil producers, not by the government, as the
other oil producers would face a reduction in profit following the slight
decrease in the price of oil caused by a sale of "hot oil."
16
In 1938, Congress subdivided § 35 into separate parts but did not
change the substance of the false statement language. Act of Apr. 4, 1938, Pub.
L. No. 75-465, § 35, 52 Stat. 197; Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508 n.8. In 1948,
the false claims and false statement portions were split up, the false claims
(continued...)
14
In Gilliland, the Court rejected the argument that the
predecessor to § 1001 should be restricted to the narrow purpose of
the 1934 amendment of aiding in the enforcement of the NIRA. The
Court stated,
The fact that the Secretary of the Interior was then
seeking aid in the enforcement of § 9(c) of the [NIRA],
which this Court later found to be invalid (Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388), in no way affects
the present application of the statute. Its provisions
were not limited to the enforcement of § 9(c) of the
[NIRA] but were enacted with appropriate breadth so that
they at once applied to the presentation of affidavits,
reports, etc., required by the subsequent Act of
February 22, 1935, and the regulations duly prescribed
thereunder.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 95.
Thus, the Court approached the statute by looking not at its
purpose, but at its plain language.17 By the same token, we should
not restrict § 1001 to only false statements that pervert
legitimate governmental functions.
B.
Until 1934, the predecessor to § 1001 applied only to
statements that were made "for the purpose of obtaining or aiding
to obtain the payment or approval of such a claim, or for the
purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or
(...continued)
portion becoming 18 U.S.C. § 287 and the false statement provision becoming the
present 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat.
683. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 508. The reference to corporations was deleted,
and the "in any matter" clause was moved to the beginning of the section.
17
Note that although the Court stated that the purpose of § 1001's
predecessor was to deter perversions of governmental functions, the Court
refused to limit the statute to the "hot oil" rationale, not because the
rationale was an inaccurate characterization of the statute's purpose, but
because such a limitation would conflict with its text.
15
defrauding" the federal government.18 The "exculpatory no"
exception is used to resurrect a requirement similar to this
"purpose" requirement, as part of the Paternostro test seeks to
determine whether the declarant "aggressively and deliberately
initiate[d] any positive or affirmative statement calculated to
pervert the legislative functions of government." Paternostro, 311
F.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
The brief presence of a "purpose" requirement demonstrated
that when Congress wished to restrict the scope of § 1001 to
statements made for certain purposes, it did so explicitly.19
Therefore, even if it were necessary to go beyond the statute's
plain meaning, the "exculpatory no" exception defies the
legislative history of § 1001.
VI.
One criticism of a literal interpretation of § 1001 is that
Congress simply could not have intended such a broad
interpretation.20 We note the difficulty with ascertaining the
18
Apparently, the "for the purpose" language was replaced with the phrase
"in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a
stockholder." Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 507-08.
19
Subsequently, Congress has considered, but failed to pass, one bill
that required prosecutions under § 1001 to be based upon a recorded conversation
made with the declarant's knowledge and another bill that required the
government to have advised defendants that lying was a crime. Giles A. Birch,
Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory
No, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1273, 1291 n.82 (1990) (citing Criminal Code Revision Act of
1980, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1742 (1980); Criminal Code Reform Act
of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343(a)(1)(A) (1981)).
20
United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1972); Stark,
131 F. Supp. at 207 ("The sweeping generality of the language of section 1001,
especially when isolated as it appears in the 1948 revision from the remainder
(continued...)
16
congressional intent behind the provision. Furthermore, the
section's language carries its own restraints.
First, any violation of § 1001 must be knowing and willful.21
Second, any violation must be material. United States v. Krause,
507 F.2d 113, 118 (5th Cir. 1975). Third, not all lies are
punished, but only lies within the jurisdiction of the United
States Government.
Another argument against a literal construction is that the
punishment for a false statement is greater than the punishment for
perjury, arguably a more serious crime.22 We reject this
rationale. It would be impossible and inappropriate for us to try
to modify the scope of every statute to ensure that it consistently
correlates the perceived harm of a crime with the penalty.23 More
(...continued)
of the 1934 amendment, requires caution in applying it to particular
situations.").
21
On appeal, Rodriguez does not contest whether the statement in question
was made "knowingly and willfully." Therefore, we have no cause to consider the
intent issue.
The Supreme Court recently has held that the word "willfully" in
31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) requires that a defendant "act[] with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful." Ratzlaf v. United States, 62 U.S.L.W. 4037, 4037 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1994). Section 5322(a) is a criminal enforcement provision that sets
out the punishment for a number of substantive criminal offenses, including
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, which forbids structuring bank transactions with
a "purpose of evading the reporting requirements of [31 U.S.C. §] 5313(a)."
Thus, the statutory scheme requires both willfulness and a purpose of evasion.
According to the Court, "willfulness" must require more than the "purpose
of evading" in order to be more than mere "surplusage." 62 U.S.L.W. at 4038-39.
In contrast to §§ 5322(a) and 5324, however, § 1001 does not contain any purpose
requirement. Therefore, the Ratzlaf decision is inapplicable to the present
case.
22
The maximum penalty for perjury is $2,000 or five years in prison.
18 U.S.C. § 1621. The maximum penalty for a violation of § 1001 is $10,000 or
five years in prison.
23
In other circumstances, the Supreme Court has rejected the same
argument as a justification for narrowing the scope of § 1001. In Rodgers, the
(continued...)
17
than one hundred federal statutes make false statements illegal.
See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 316 n.1. Furthermore, the current
scope of the "exculpatory no" exception does not perfectly exclude
from punishment all statements that are less deserving of
punishment than is perjured testimony.
An additional attack on a literal interpretation of § 1001 is
that it would swallow other statutes that make false statements
illegal. But multiple statutes often punish the same conduct.24
Furthermore, even if we believed that Congress intended the false
statement statute and other statutes to be mutually exclusive, such
an intention would not be furthered by the "exculpatory no"
exception, the scope of which is determined by certain
characteristics of the statements in question, not by the scope of
the other statutes.
(...continued)
Court stated,
The Court of Appeals supported its failure to give the statute a
"literal interpretation" by offering several policy arguments in
favor of a more limited construction. For example, the court noted
that § 1001 carried a penalty exceeding the penalty for perjury and
argued that Congress could not have "considered it more serious for
one to informally volunteer an untrue statement to an F.B.I. agent
than to relate the same story under oath before a court of law."
Friedman v. United States, [374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967)]. A
similar argument was made and rejected in United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 95. The fact that the maximum possible
penalty under § 1001 marginally exceeds that for perjury provides no
indication of the particular penalties, within the permitted range,
that Congress thought appropriate for each of the myriad violations
covered by the statute. Section 1001 covers "a variety of offenses
and the penalties prescribed were maximum penalties which gave a
range for judicial sentences according to the circumstances and
gravity of particular violations." Ibid.
466 U.S. at 482-83 (footnotes omitted).
24
Such cumulative punishment is legal if it does not infringe on a
defendant's double jeopardy rights. If violation of one statute automatically
proves a violation of another, cumulative application of the two statutes
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause unless there is a plain indication of
contrary legislative intent to assess cumulative punishment. Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980).
18
Some courts have considered making § 1001 applicable to
statements only if they are uttered to government agents acting in
an administrative, as opposed to an investigatory, capacity. A lie
to an investigator may actually aid, not hinder, the investigator.
Birch, supra note 19, at 1278. An investigator lacking proof of a
substantive offense could ask questions to which he knows the
answer. If the answerer lies, he can be convicted of making a
false statement, even though he could not be convicted of the
underlying offense.
Nonetheless, the potential aggressive use of § 1001 is not so
persuasive that we should disregard the language of the statute.
The Supreme Court firmly rejected any such investigatory
limitation:
The statutory language clearly encompasses criminal
investigations conducted by the FBI and the Secret
Service, and nothing in the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended a more restricted reach
for the statute.
Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 477.
A further rationale advanced for the "exculpatory no"
exception is that a mere denial may be insufficient to prove
intent.25 Although this may be true in some circumstances, we are
unable to conclude that any person who utters the word "no" to a
federal agent lacks the requisite intent to be convicted under
§ 1001. Therefore, the question of intent should be analyzed
25
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d at 1213 ("For Schnaiderman's statement to have
come within the scope of § 1001 as defined in Lambert, the government would have
to demonstrate a knowing and willful intent to pervert the purpose of the Bank
Secrecy Act. On the record before us, there is simply no evidence that he had
such an intent.").
19
separately from the "exculpatory no" doctrine.
VII.
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not
applicable as an independent justification for the "exculpatory no"
exception. Although the Fifth Amendment protects a person's right
to remain silent in response to an incriminating question, an
outright lie is not protected. In Bryson v. United States, 396
U.S. 64, 72 (1969), the Court observed that "[a] citizen may
decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he
cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a
falsehood." Accord United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 274 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.); Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 207
(Fifth Amendment is "not strictly applicable here"). Thus, while
the self-incrimination aspect of the "exculpatory no" exception may
somehow be relevant to congressional intent, it is not an
independent justification for that exception.
There is a concern that § 1001 forces persons who had
committed a crime to choose between lying and incriminating
themselves. This concern is not entirely correct. In such a
situation, such individuals have the third option of remaining
silent )) a choice protected by the Fifth Amendment.26
26
This is not to say that remaining silent is not without its drawbacks.
Silence may be used to impeach one's testimony in court. Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (evidence of silence may be used to impeach the witness
if the witness had not received a Miranda warning). Silence is an unnatural
response from which the questioner may infer the suspect's guilt. United States
v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 822 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976); Birch, supra note 19, at
1276.
20
Nor did the Fifth Amendment play a part in this court's
pronouncement of the "exculpatory no" exception. Paternostro, for
example, was based upon the premise that mere denial of guilt was
not "calculated to pervert the legitimate functions of Government."
Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 305. Nor was such a denial a "statement"
or a "representation." Id. at 302 (citing Stark).
VIII.
Following oral argument, we instructed the parties to brief
the question of whether our decision should apply retroactively.
In United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984), the Court
applied its decision retroactively in holding that the phrase
"within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States" included investigations by federal agents, thus overruling
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967), which had
stood for the proposition that "within the jurisdiction" referred
only to "the power to make final or binding determinations." The
Rodgers Court reasoned that the critical language of § 1001 was
"not sufficiently ambiguous" to warrant prospective application.
Furthermore, even if the defendant could show that he relied upon
the Friedman case, he could not establish that its reversal was not
"reasonably foreseeable."
"Prospective application is not required for due process"
where a defendant did not rely upon prior precedent from this court
in taking the action in question. United States v. Bachynsky, 934
F.2d 1349, 1362 n.13 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
21
402 (1991). Although the panel relied upon Schnaiderman in
invoking the "exculpatory no" exception, see 991 F.2d at 169, the
facts of this case do not fit snugly within the circumstance
present in Schnaiderman. There, the defendant merely answered
"no." Rodriguez's statement, "[a]bout a thousand dollars," is
different in degree, and, prior to the panel decision here, no
opinion from this court had applied the exception to a statement
exactly like Rodriguez's. Moreover, the split in authority among
the circuits would make a person less likely to count on prior
precedent for protection.
Applying the factors considered by the Rodgers court, we
conclude that the unambiguous language of § 1001 supports
Rodriguez's conviction, that it is unlikely that Rodriguez relied
upon the "exculpatory no" exception, and that it was "reasonably
foreseeable" that this court would either restrict or eliminate the
"exculpatory no" doctrine.27 Therefore, our decision applies
retroactively.
The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge, with whom POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority's total overruling of
the "exculpatory no" doctrine, a limiting construction of
27
Even if we did not abolish the "exculpatory no" exception, we could
limit the exception to negative statements that do not go beyond a simple "no."
Such a holding arguably would exclude Rodriguez's answer, "About a thousand
dollars," from the benefit of the exception.
22
"statements" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that, as the majority
opinion reflects, has clearly been the law of this Circuit for more
than thirty years, has been explicitly recognized by seven other
circuits, and has been rejected by none. Stare decisis is indeed
not an inflexible command. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson,
885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989). However, the thoroughly established
nature of the "exculpatory no" doctrine, in both length of time and
frequency of approval by so many decisions of this and other
courts, argues strongly against its wholesale rejection at this
late date. That is particularly so as today's decision in effect
retroactively broadens the reach of section 1001 to criminalize
conduct that the courts have so long and often held was not within
its scope. Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (1964);
Batiste v. Blackburn, 786 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1986).
While the core of the "exculpatory no" doctrineSQthat in
personal questioning initiated by criminal investigating officers,
a suspect's mere verbal "no" response is not a section 1001
statementSQis not the only permissible interpretation of section
1001, it is plainly reasonable and has much to recommend it, as
reflected by its long and wide acceptance by so many different
federal courts. Its expansion beyond this core meaning is more
problematical, and appropriate trimming at the fuzzy edges is
clearly warranted from time to time. Cf. United States v.
Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 904 (5th Cir. 1982) (dissenting opinion).
But this surely does not justify the total uprooting of what has
been so long, widely, and clearly established as the settled
23
limitation of the reach of this criminal statute.
24