United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-4363.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Francisco SANCHEZ-CORCINO, Defendant-Appellant.
June 17, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 93-456-CR), Jacob Mishler, Visiting
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and RONEY and PHILLIPS*, Senior
Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge:
After a jury trial, Francisco Sanchez-Corcino (Sanchez) was
convicted of one count of engaging in the business of dealing in
firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) (Supp.1996),
924(a)(1)(D) (Supp.1996) (Count 1), and of nine counts of making
false statements with respect to information required to be kept on
file by licensed firearms dealers, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A)
(Supp.1996) (Counts 2 through 10). Sanchez appeals his convictions
on all counts, as well as his sentence. As to Count 1, Sanchez
claims that the district court erred in failing to instruct the
jury that, in order to find that Sanchez "willfully" sold guns
without a license, it had to conclude that Sanchez knew of the
licensing requirement he was accused of violating. Because we
agree that § 924(a)(1)(D)'s "willfulness" standard requires proof
that the defendant knew of the licensing requirement and,
*
Honorable J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit
Judge for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
nonetheless, intentionally violated it, we reverse Sanchez's
conviction on Count 1 and remand it to the district court for a new
trial. We affirm all of Sanchez's other convictions and their
accompanying sentences.
I.
Between April and September of 1993, Sanchez bought more than
150 handguns from two licensed firearms dealers in Miami. He
purchased the guns in nine separate transactions, the first seven
at Miami Police Supply Store, the last two at 27th Avenue Pawn
Shop.
Each time he bought guns, Sanchez filled out an Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) Form 4473. This form required Sanchez
to give his name, date of birth, and other basic personal
information, including his "Residence Address." On each form,
Sanchez gave his correct name and biographical data, and he listed
his address as 236 N.W. 24th Avenue, Miami, Florida.
After having purchased seven sets of handguns at Miami Police
Supply Store, Sanchez began patronizing 27th Avenue Pawn, where, on
his first visit, he bought twenty more guns. In connection with
this sale, the store owner completed and sent to the ATF a
"multiple gun purchase" form, which the ATF requires licensed
sellers to complete whenever they sell more than one firearm in a
single transaction. An ATF agent later called the owner and asked
him to notify the ATF if Sanchez returned to the store. When
Sanchez did return, he ordered thirteen more guns, and the owner,
as promised, notified the ATF. ATF Agent Foster then set up
surveillance outside the store. A few days later, Sanchez returned
and picked up the thirteen guns; Agent Foster then arrested him.
The men drove to the ATF station where, after having been
properly advised of his rights, Sanchez told ATF agents about his
weapons activity. He then signed a written statement in which he
admitted having purchased and resold at least 140 handguns. Also
in this statement, Sanchez explained that he had begun buying guns
for resale because he was unemployed and needed money. In
describing his sales activities, Sanchez explained that he did not
purchase the guns with specific buyers in mind, but that after he
bought the guns, potential buyers would contact him via his beeper.
He then would meet the buyers, whom he identified only as "latin
males," in Miami's "Little Havana" district, where he would sell
them the guns.
As to the address he used on the 4473 Forms, Sanchez explained
that, although he had not lived at 236 N.W. 24th Avenue for about
eight months, he had given that as his address for two reasons.
First, it was the address on the Florida identification card he
presented when he made the purchases, and, second, he had not yet
established another permanent address.
A few days after the arrest, a grand jury returned a ten-count
indictment against Sanchez. Count 1 charged him with engaging in
the business of selling firearms without a license, a violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D). Counts 2 through 10
charged him with making false statements with respect to
information required to be kept by licensed firearms sellers, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). More specifically, these
latter counts alleged that each time Sanchez filled out an ATF Form
4473, he knowingly gave a false residence address. Sanchez pleaded
not guilty to all counts.
At trial, the Government presented the above-described
evidence regarding Sanchez's purchase and resale of the handguns,
including Sanchez's own signed statement to the ATF. It also
presented testimony aimed at showing that, at the time he purchased
the guns, Sanchez did not live at 236 N.W. 24th Avenue.
At the close of the Government's case, and again at the close
of all the evidence, Sanchez's attorney moved for a judgment of
acquittal. As to Count 1, Sanchez's counsel argued that the
Government had failed to prove that Sanchez had "willfully" engaged
in the business of selling firearms without a license, as required
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D). More specifically, he argued that
"there is no evidence by which a jury could rationally conclude
that Francisco Sanchez was aware of the licensing requirements and
that he sold these guns with the specific intent of circumventing
or somehow violating that known legal duty." The district court
denied Sanchez's motion as to Count 1, noting that Sanchez's
"surreptitious[ ]" use of a beeper suggested that "he knew he was
in an illegal business." The court similarly denied Sanchez's Rule
29 motion with respect to Counts 2 through 10.
Then at the charge conference, the parties and the court again
presented their conflicting positions on the meaning of willfulness
under § 924(a)(1)(D). The defense argued that
it's not sufficient if the government simply proves that this
man knew of the generally unlawful nature of his conduct. The
government must prove above and beyond that that he knew about
the licensing requirement and willfully violated that
provision.
The Government disagreed, asking the court to instruct that "the
government is not required to prove the defendant was aware of the
licensing requirement." The court ultimately rejected the
defense's suggestion, concluding instead "the government must show
... that in conducting his business [Sanchez] was aware he was in
an illegal business." Both parties conformed their closing
arguments to the district court's chosen "willfulness" definition.
In its jury instructions, the court described the elements of
Count 1 as follows:
[T]he government must prove the following three essential
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. One, that the defendant
Sanchez engaged in the business of dealing in firearms. Two,
the defendant Sanchez was not then a federally licensed
firearms dealer. Three, the defendant Sanchez acted
willfully.
(Emphasis added). The court then defined "willfully":
The word "willfully" ... means that the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do
something the law forbids. That is, with bad purpose either
to disobey or disregard the law. The government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez was in the business of
dealing in firearms and that he was aware that his conduct was
illegal and that he deliberately conducted the business of
dealing in firearms.
The jury convicted Sanchez on all counts. Sanchez was
sentenced to thirty-three months' imprisonment and three years of
supervised release on each count, all sentences to run
concurrently. Sanchez now appeals his convictions and sentences,
contending first that the district court erred in rejecting his
proposed jury instruction on the "willfully" scienter requirement
of Count 1. Sanchez also contests the admission of his signed
statement, some aspects of the Government's closing argument, and
his sentence.
II.
We first address whether the district court erred in
instructing the jury on the "willfulness" element of the unlicensed
sale of firearms offense charged in Count 1, and conclude that the
court did so err, and that the error requires vacatur of Sanchez's
conviction on Count 1.
As we have had occasion to note, "willfully" is a word of
many meanings and each usage of the word must be interpreted with
reference to the statutory context in which it appears. United
States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1576 (11th Cir.1994) (citing
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, ----, 114 S.Ct. 655, 659,
126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994)), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.
1312, 131 L.Ed.2d 194 (1995); see also United States v. Obiechie,
38 F.3d 309, 313-14 (7th Cir.1994) ( Ratzlaf requires court to
construe "willfully" as used in § 924(a)(1)(D) with reference to
its statutory context); United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 132
n. 9 (3d Cir.1995) (same). Accordingly, we must first identify the
context in which the "willfully" requirement is used in the
statutory provisions under which Sanchez was charged in Count 1.
The word does not appear in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), the
subsection which directly prohibits any person other than a
licensed dealer from dealing in firearms. That subsection in fact
contains no mens rea requirement. Instead, § 924(a)(1)(D) supplies
the applicable mens rea requirement for § 922(a)(1)(A)'s "dealing
without a license" offense. While subsections 924(a)(1)(A) through
(C) require that certain violations of §§ 922 and 924 be committed
"knowingly," subsection 924(a)(1)(D) is a catch-all provision that
specifies a different mens rea for all other violations of the
chapter: "Whoever ... willfully violates any other provision of
this chapter...." Because no other provision of § 924(a)(1)
specifically applies to the violation of § 922(a)(1)(A)—with which
Sanchez is charged—the "willfully" requirement of the catch-all §
924(a)(1)(D) applies here. Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 312; United
States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 504 U.S.
944, 112 S.Ct. 2285, 119 L.Ed.2d 210 (1992).
Thus, the context within which subsection (D)'s "willfully"
requirement must be interpreted includes the other subsections—(A)
through (C)—of § 924(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit interpreted
subsection (D)'s willfully requirement in light of these other
subsections in Obiechie. Pointing out that subsections (A) through
(C) specify "knowingly" as the scienter requirement for the
offenses to which they apply, while only subsection (D) specifies
"willfully", the court reasoned that "knowingly" must therefore be
contrasted with and shape the meaning of "willfully." Then,
further noting that the "knowingly" standard does not require
knowledge of the law, but only that the defendant intended to do
the act that is proscribed by law, the Obiechie court concluded
that because "willfully" must signify a higher mens rea standard
than "knowingly," it must necessarily require knowledge of the law.
Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 315 (must mean an "intentional violation of a
known duty") (emphasis added); accord Hayden, 64 F.3d at 130
("[I]t is difficult to understand what more the "willfully'
language could require, if not knowledge of the law."); United
States v. Hern, 926 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir.1991) (assuming that
"willfully" in § 924(a)(1)(D) means "intentional violation of a
known legal duty").
We agree with the reasoning and result in Obiechie.1
Accordingly, we too conclude that in order for the Government to
prove the offense of willfully dealing in firearms without a
license under §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D), it must prove that
the defendant acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement.
In doing so, we do not ignore "the venerable principle that
ignorance of the law is no excuse," Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at ----, 114
S.Ct. at 663, but simply recognize that "Congress may decree
otherwise," see id., and conclude that it has done so in §
924(a)(1)(D).2
1
In agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, we necessarily
disagree with the Second Circuit's contrary interpretation of §
924(a)(1)(D) in Collins. In Collins, the Second Circuit, without
noting the "willfully" requirement's statutory context, looked
straight to the statute's legislative history to guide its
interpretation. Based on its reading of the legislative history,
the Second Circuit concluded that the willfulness requirement did
not contemplate knowledge of the law, but required the Government
to prove only that "the defendant intended to commit an act which
the law forbids." Collins, 957 F.2d at 76. This analysis
ignores the effect of Congress's use of "knowingly" in the
adjacent subsections of the statute on the meaning of "willfully"
in § 924(a)(1)(D), a point that, as did the Obiechie court, we
think is critical to a proper interpretation.
2
Although we re-emphasize that the meaning of "willfully"
always must be ascertained with reference to the specific
statutory language in which it appears, we note that our
understanding of that term as it is used in § 924(a)(1)(D) is
consistent with our understanding of how "willfully" is used in
other statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Macko, 994 F.2d
1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1993) ("willfully" in Trading with the
Enemy Act requires proof that defendants knew of and
intentionally violated embargo); United States v. Adames, 878
F.2d 1374, 1377 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Frade, 709
F.2d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir.1983) (" "[W]illfully' ... generally
connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty.").
In so holding, we wish to avoid raising more questions than we
answer. Jury confusion in applying various mens rea
standards—particularly the appropriate "willfulness" standard—may
often reflect imprecision in appellate courts' formulations of
those standards which then are embodied in correspondingly
imprecise jury instructions. With that in mind, we will attempt
concreteness here. To prove a willful violation of § 922(a)(1)(A),
the Government must prove that a defendant (1) knew that he was
required to have a license in order to deal in firearms, (2) knew
that he did not have the requisite license, and (3) nonetheless
voluntarily, intentionally engaged in the business of dealing in
firearms, knowing that such conduct violated the licensing
requirement.
There remains the question whether, though without this
degree of precision, the district court's instruction here
sufficiently conveyed the essence of this formulation of the
willfulness requirement.
After listing the other elements of a § 922(a)(1)(A)
violation, the district court defined "willfully" as follows:
The word "willfully" ... means that the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do
something the law forbids. That is, with bad purpose either
to disobey or disregard the law. The government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez was in the business of
dealing in firearms and that he was aware that his conduct was
illegal and that he deliberately conducted the business of
dealing in firearms.
Although much of this definition comes from some of this court's
definitions of "willfully" as it is used in other statutes, see,
e.g., Phillips, 19 F.3d at 1577 ("Willfully" can mean acting with
"a "bad purpose' to disobey or disregard the law"), we conclude
that it does not suffice as an instruction on the offense at issue
here. Critically, the instruction would have allowed the jury to
convict Sanchez without ever having concluded that he knew of the
licensing requirement. While the instruction does require proof
that Sanchez knew "his conduct was illegal," this is not enough.
Knowledge of the general illegality of one's conduct is not the
same as knowledge that one is violating a specific rule—here, the
prohibition against unlicensed dealing in firearms.3 See Adames,
878 F.2d at 1377 (defendant's awareness of generally unlawful
nature of her actions cannot sustain finding of specific intent).
Accordingly, we conclude that the instruction did not communicate
the correct understanding of § 924(a)(1)(D)'s scienter requirement.
By permitting the jury to convict Sanchez without finding the
required form of willfulness in his conduct, it necessarily
prejudiced his defense so that vacatur of his conviction and remand
for a new trial is required as to Count 1.4 See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S.
3
For example, a seller may know that his dealing in firearms
is illegal because he is a convicted felon and, as such, may not
even possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Supp.1996).
However, such a seller—if he did not also know that he was
required to have a license to conduct his firearms business—would
not be guilty of a willful violation of § 922(a)(1)(A), even
though he was aware that his firearms dealings were illegal.
4
Sanchez sought reversal and dismissal of this count for
insufficiency of the evidence to convict him under a proper
application of § 922(a)(1)(A) or, "at least, for a new trial."
Remand for a new trial is the appropriate remedy where, as here,
the insufficiency of evidence is accompanied by trial court error
whose effect may have been to deprive the Government of an
opportunity or incentive to present evidence that might have
supplied the deficiency. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33,
42, 109 S.Ct. 285, 291-292, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (remand for
new trial proper where erroneous admission of evidence may have
deterred Government from presenting other evidence that could
have supplied deficiency); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528
(9th Cir.1995) (remand for new trial where erroneous jury
at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 663.
III.
Sanchez also argues that his conviction on Count 1 should be
vacated because the Government based its proof that he sold any
guns at all entirely on his own confession, which, he claims, was
not corroborated by any other evidence. In view of our vacatur and
remand of this count on other grounds for a new trial in which
additional evidence may be presented, we will not address this
assignment of error.
IV.
Sanchez also claims that certain of the Government's
statements in its rebuttal closing argument violated his due
process and rule-based rights and, accordingly, require a reversal
of his convictions on all counts. First, he claims that the
Government grossly distorted the facts in evidence. Second, he
contends that the Government's rebuttal closing violated
Fed.R.Crim.P. 29.1 because it did not merely respond to the
defense's closing, but introduced a new theory of the case. We
have carefully reviewed the challenged portions of the Government's
rebuttal closing and find no merit in these claims of error. The
instructions made missing evidence not apparently necessary);
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir.1995) (same).
Such situations are different from those in which the
insufficiency of evidence is inexplicable for any reason
other than that it was not available or that, if available,
it was not produced by the Government. In the latter
situations, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires dismissal to
protect against the Government oppression that would result
from allowing a "second bite" when the first bite was a full
and fair one. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct.
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
prosecutor was well within the bounds of propriety in arguing to
the jury that the most reasonable inference from the evidence of
Sanchez's impecunious state was that prospective purchasers from
him were fronting the money for his gun purchases, at odds with his
statement to Government agents that he financed the purchases
without any prior arrangements for resale. The argument was a
proper attack on the credibility of Sanchez's contrary account to
the agents. Nor was there any violation of Rule 29.1, which
confines the scope of any argument by the Government in reply to
defense closing argument to that which does "rebut." Sanchez's
contention is that the Government's rebuttal closing which raised
for the first time the "fronted-purchases" argument violated this
scope restriction. But it did not, being properly responsive to
defense counsel's closing argument that Sanchez was unaware of any
illegality in what he was doing. See United States v. Sarmiento,
744 F.2d 755, 765 (11th Cir.1984) (Rule 29.1 does not prevent the
introduction of new theories in rebuttal so long as they are
responsive to defense closing).
V.
Finally, Sanchez contests the district court's failure to
reduce his offense level by two points for "acceptance of
responsibility" under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Because we have vacated
Sanchez's conviction on Count 1, we will consider his sentencing
arguments only as they relate to his convictions for making false
statements on ATF forms, Counts 2 through 10.
"The district court's determination of whether a defendant is
entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a
finding of fact that is entitled to great deference on appeal and
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." United States v.
Kendrick, 22 F.3d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir.1994); United States v.
Chukwura, 5 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied --- U.S.
----, 115 S.Ct. 102, 130 L.Ed.2d 51 (1994); see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
app. note 5 ("The sentencing judge is in a unique position to
evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility"). Because we
find no clear error here, we affirm the district court's denial of
the § 3E1.1 reduction.
In explaining his denial of Sanchez's requested reduction, the
district court noted "I went over the objections [to the PSI], and
I agree with the Government that the defendant is not entitled" to
the § 3E1.1 reduction. We interpret this statement as an adoption
of the Government's reasoning in its Response in Opposition to
Defendant's Objections to the Presentence Report (Response), which
was filed on the day of the sentencing hearing. In the Response,
the Government pointed out that Sanchez had not, in his signed
statement or otherwise, admitted that he knew he was acting
illegally. Instead, Sanchez had "put the government to its burden
of proof at trial" by contesting the crucial factual element of his
intent as to all charges. See § 3E1.1 app. note 2 ("This
adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the
government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential
factual elements of guilt....") Indeed, Sanchez maintained
throughout the trial that he had never intentionally lied on the
4473 Forms, but that his use of a "residence address" where he no
longer lived was due to the form's vagueness. Thus, the Government
concluded that Sanchez's statement to the ATF and his arguments at
trial were inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.
The district court implicitly adopted this reasoning in
denying Sanchez's requested reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Because we cannot say that this was clear error,
we affirm Sanchez's sentence as to Counts 2 through 10.
VI.
Having found that the district court's erroneous instruction
as to the "willfulness" element of § 922(a)(1)(A) constituted
reversible error, we vacate Sanchez's conviction and sentence on
Count 1 and remand that count for a new trial. We affirm his
convictions and sentences on all other counts.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part FOR NEW TRIAL.