In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐1357
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
SCOTT C. REDMAN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 1:16‐cr‐00079‐1 — Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 11, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 17, 2018
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK AND BARRETT, Circuit Judges and
STADTMUELLER, District Judge. *
STADTMUELLER, District Judge. From September 2015 until
his arrest in February 2016, Scott Redman posed as a psychi‐
atrist at a Chicago medical clinic using the name and license
number of Dr. Julian Lopez Garcia. He “treated” patients
* Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
2 No. 17‐1357
who suffered from a variety of mental illnesses, and he “pre‐
scribed” a variety of controlled substances. Redman is not a
doctor; indeed, he did not attend school past the tenth grade.
A jury found Redman guilty of wire fraud, aggravated
identity theft, furnishing false and fraudulent material in‐
formation in documents required under the federal drug
laws, and distributing controlled substances. The district
court sentenced Redman to 157 months’ imprisonment for
these offenses.
On appeal, Redman does not contest his convictions, but
he claims that the district court erred in determining the ap‐
propriate sentence. Finding no error in Redman’s sentence,
we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. HISTORY
Scott Redman identified himself as Dr. Julian Lopez Gar‐
cia when he responded to an advertisement for an open psy‐
chiatry position at Clarity Clinic, a downtown Chicago men‐
tal health clinic. He submitted a curriculum vitae in which he
claimed to have attended the University of Connecticut for
undergraduate and medical school, as well as a residency,
and that he was licensed to practice medicine in the state of
Illinois. In mid‐September 2015, Redman interviewed with
the clinic owner, Dr. Pavan Prasad, to whom he recited the
lies listed on his curriculum vitae. At the close of the inter‐
view, Dr. Prasad offered him a job.
Redman initially declined the offer, but at the end of Oc‐
tober 2015, he reached out to Dr. Prasad and accepted a con‐
tract position at Clarity Clinic as a psychiatrist. Prior to
commencing employment, Redman provided falsified doc‐
umentation of his credentials: an employment application,
No. 17‐1357 3
payroll application, I‐9 Employment Eligibility Verification
form, W‐9 form, photograph of an Indiana driver’s license
with Redman’s picture, photocopy of an Illinois medical li‐
cense, photocopy of a medical school diploma, a residency
certificate for training in psychiatry, and a photocopy of a
social security card.
He enlisted the help of online counterfeiting services
(“fakediplomanow.com,” for example) to create some of
these falsified documents. Each bore the name of Julian
Lopez Garcia. In addition, Redman submitted an online
Drug Enforcement Administration Form 224 using false in‐
formation to obtain a DEA registration number, thereby en‐
abling him to prescribe controlled substances. He obtained
malpractice insurance by using false information as well.
During his approximately two‐and‐a‐half months of em‐
ployment at Clarity Clinic, Redman “treated” patients with a
combination of therapy and controlled substances. He issued
approximately 92 prescriptions for controlled substances to
57 patients. Unsurprisingly, the government’s trial presenta‐
tion included evidence that Redman made errors in his prac‐
tice, particularly with respect to prescriptions.
In one instance, Redman prescribed 5 milligrams of a
particular controlled substance, benzodiazepine, for which a
normal dosage is in the range of .5 milligrams. Dr. Prasad
testified that any dosage of benzodiazepine for the particular
patient to whom Redman prescribed it was concerning be‐
cause of the patient’s previous history of addiction. Another
patient, whom Redman diagnosed with two mental illnesses
treatable with two prescription medications, testified at trial
that she later saw a real doctor who determined she had
4 No. 17‐1357
been completely misdiagnosed and changed her medica‐
tions.
The clinic attributed Redman’s mistakes to his being a re‐
cent graduate, a “little rusty” on fundamentals that he
would eventually correct. At trial, Dr. Prasad testified that
he thought Redman was doing a “decent job.” By the end of
his time at Clarity Clinic, Redman was seeing nearly a dozen
patients a day.
Dr. Prasad also testified that Redman often reminisced
about his days in residency, and that Redman attended pro‐
fessional functions at which he would chat with other physi‐
cians about his experience and interest in certain areas of
medicine.
Local authorities, and later the federal government, were
alerted to Redman’s scheme when the real Dr. Julian Lopez
Garcia reported that someone had used his State of Illinois
medical license number to obtain a DEA registration number
in his name. Redman was charged in a ten‐count indictment
with three counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), one count of furnishing false and
fraudulent material in an application filed under Title 21 of
the United States Code in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(a)(4)(A), and four counts of distributing a controlled
substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Redman pro‐
ceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury on all counts.
The probation officer who prepared Redman’s presen‐
tence investigation report recommended grouping the wire
fraud counts together with the false statements count, pur‐
suant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. All counts for distribution of a
No. 17‐1357 5
controlled substance were also grouped. The aggravated
identity theft count was not grouped.
Various enhancements were applied in the calculation for
the offense level for each group, and the combined adjusted
offense level was 31. Coupled with a criminal history catego‐
ry of II, Redman’s sentencing Guidelines range was 121 to
151 months’ imprisonment, with a mandatory two‐year con‐
secutive term of imprisonment for the aggravated identity
theft count.
At sentencing, Redman objected to enhancements for the
monetary loss amount, the number of victims, the use of so‐
phisticated means, his conscious or reckless disregard for the
risk of death or injury to patients, his abuse of trust, and the
involvement of vulnerable victims. The district court over‐
ruled his objections, adopted the Guidelines calculation as
presented in the presentence report, and imposed a sentence
of 157 months’ imprisonment.
II. ANALYSIS
Redman’s appeal challenges the district court’s applica‐
tion of only two of the above‐noted enhancements, both ap‐
plied to the offense level for the grouping of counts for wire
fraud and false statements: a two‐level enhancement for use
of sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), and
a two‐level enhancement for conduct that involved a con‐
scious or reckless disregard of a risk of death or serious
bodily injury under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A).
We review the district court’s interpretation of the sen‐
tencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear
error. United States v. Fletcher, 763 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.
2014). The determinations that Redman’s conduct involved
6 No. 17‐1357
sophisticated means and posed a conscious or reckless risk
of serious bodily injury are findings of fact, and we therefore
review for clear error. United States v. Wayland, 549 F.3d 526,
528 (7th Cir. 2008) (sophisticated means); United States v.
Vivit, 214 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2000) (risk of serious bodily
injury). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if, based
upon the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
v. Gallardo, 497 F.3d 727, 740 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Chamness, 435 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2006)).
A. Sophisticated Means
We turn first to Redman’s challenge to the “sophisticated
means” enhancement. Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) calls for a two‐
level upward adjustment if the offense “involved sophisti‐
cated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or
caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.”
The application note for this subsection defines “sophis‐
ticated means” as:
especially complex or especially intricate of‐
fense conduct pertaining to the execution or
concealment of an offense. For example, in a
telemarketing scheme, locating the main office
of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating
soliciting operations in another jurisdiction or‐
dinarily indicates sophisticated means. Con‐
duct such as hiding assets or transactions, or
both, through the use of fictitious entities, cor‐
porate shells, or offshore financial accounts al‐
so ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.
No. 17‐1357 7
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, Cmt. 9(B); see also United States v. Stitman,
472 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2007) (Guidelines application
notes are binding authority). The note’s list of examples is
not exhaustive; it “reflects that a wide range of criminal con‐
duct might be deemed sophisticated.” United States v. Allan,
513 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2008).
The district court found application of the sophisticated
means enhancement was appropriate based on the “ample
evidence showing that the defendant caused the creation of
a substantial amount of paperwork, including fake diplo‐
mas, fake resumes, and fake unauthorized licenses and
made government filings in order to further and conceal his
elaborate scheme.” (Docket #105 at 16).
Redman insists that his conduct was not more complex
than typical fraud. See United States v. Ghaddar, 678 F.3d 600,
602 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he adjustment for sophisticated
means is warranted only when the conduct shows a greater
level of planning or concealment than a typical fraud of its
kind.”) (internal quotation omitted). He argues, for example,
that the falsified documents were obtained from a decidedly
unsophisticated website. Further, his scheme was not pro‐
longed, the only other people he involved were the anony‐
mous individuals behind the websites hawking fake docu‐
ments, and discovery of his scheme did not require a private
investigator.
The facts of this case clearly warrant application of the
sophisticated means enhancement. Redman’s scheme paral‐
lels conduct that we have previously deemed “sophisticat‐
ed.” See, e.g., United States v. Anobah, 734 F.3d 733, 739 (7th
Cir. 2013) (defendant used straw purchasers and created
false loan applications and false documents to support the
8 No. 17‐1357
misinformation in the false loan applications); Allan, 513
F.3d at 716 (defendants used fictitious business entities, doc‐
tored fax headers, and fashioned phony e‐mail addresses to
resemble legitimate contact information); United States v. Ret‐
tenberger, 344 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2003) (defendants sub‐
mitted falsified documents to insurers and the federal gov‐
ernment to obtain disability benefits); cf. United States v. Wu,
81 F.3d 72, 73–74 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding sophistication un‐
der § 2T1.1(b)(2), the analog of § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) in tax fraud
cases, where defendant falsified business records, used false
names, and provided misleading tax information).
Rettenberger is particularly apposite. Rettenberger, along
with his wife, defrauded insurers and the Social Security
Administration by pretending, in writing and in interviews,
that he was disabled. Rettenberger, 344 F.3d at 705. As we
noted in that case, “[f]ooling a skilled neurologist and 14 in‐
surers requires intricate maneuvers.” Id. at 709. Redman’s
conduct required planning and deception sophisticated
enough to fool Dr. Prasad and the clinic’s patients and in‐
volved devious maneuvers at least as intricate as those in
Rettenberger.
Finally, that Redman’s scheme only lasted a couple of
months and involved a primitive counterfeiting website
does not, in this case, diminish its sophistication. See Ghad‐
dar, 678 F.3d at 602 (“[N]ot all of [the defendant’s] actions
needed to be elaborate for the adjustment to apply; it is
enough that, as the district court found, his actions when
viewed as a whole constituted a sophisticated scheme.”).
Redman’s conduct involved a series of complicated and
elaborate theatrics to commit and conceal his criminal con‐
No. 17‐1357 9
duct. The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Redman’s scheme involved sophisticated means.
B. Conduct Involving Conscious or Reckless Risk of Death or
Serious Bodily Injury
We turn next to Redman’s challenge to the application of
the enhancement for placing patients at risk of death or seri‐
ous injury. Section 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) calls for a two‐level up‐
ward adjustment if the offense involved “the conscious or
reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury.”
“Serious bodily injury” is a phrase of general applicabil‐
ity used frequently throughout the Guidelines and means
“injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted
impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as
surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.1, Cmt. 1(L). Actual injury need not occur for the en‐
hancement to apply. Vivit, 214 F.3d at 921.
In applying this enhancement, the district court empha‐
sized that Redman’s patients, who had serious psychiatric
problems, relied on him to diagnose and treat their illnesses.
Redman had absolutely no training to equip him to do that.
His conduct, both in what he did to treat patients and what
he might have missed because of his lack of training, put his
patients at risk.
Similarly, the government argues on appeal that the risk
of addiction and even death from mis‐prescribed medica‐
tions, along with the risk that a misdiagnosis of a patient
with a serious mental illness could lead to serious harm to
the patient or others, falls squarely within the standard for
“serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, Cmt. 1(L).
10 No. 17‐1357
The real Dr. Julian Lopez Garcia penned a letter that was
read at sentencing, stating that “[e]very time a prescription
is written, the physician has to weigh the benefits, risks, ad‐
verse reaction profile and potential benefit for the patient.
Also, the doctor has to prescribe a precise dose and evaluate
possible interactions with other medications. It is a complex
process but if done incorrectly can have serious implications
in the health of a patient and can even cause their demise. …
Mr. Redman put every patient’s life at stake when he reck‐
lessly decided to treat and write prescriptions under my
name.” (Docket #105 at 9).
Redman argues that, despite his lack of medical training
or credentials, he was capable of acting as a psychiatrist and
prescribing controlled substances in a way that did not cause
a risk of serious injury. He made a similar argument at his
sentencing hearing, noting that 150 years ago, there were no
formal licensing requirements for medical treatment provid‐
ers and those providers were nonetheless competent to do
their jobs.
This argument strains credulity. Of course, Redman not
only lacks the requisite credentials, he lacks any training or
knowledge about the practice of medicine. And, as the dis‐
trict court aptly noted, Redman’s crimes did not occur 150
years ago. Redman committed his crimes at a time when ed‐
ucational and licensing requirements were in place to protect
patients from potential harm from unqualified people like
Redman.
Indeed, Redman’s conduct was more egregious than that
of other defendants whose conduct we have found warrant‐
ed this enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 41 F.
App’x 1, 4 (7th Cir. 2002) (defendant podiatrist prescribed
No. 17‐1357 11
painkillers and anxiety medications to patients who did not
need them); Vivit, 214 F.3d at 920 (defendant physician failed
to perform physical examinations on patients who visited
him following automobile accidents and failed to perform
certain basic diagnostic tests, such as taking blood pressure,
on other patients who later proved to be at risk). Unlike
Vivit and Jimenez, Redman is not a trained and licensed
medical professional who performed his duties with crimi‐
nal negligence. He is a high‐school dropout fraudster.
Finally, Redman argues that the district court erred by re‐
lying on “speculation” in determining whether Redman’s
conduct involved the conscious or reckless risk of death or
serious bodily injury. He points to the judge’s observation at
sentencing that “no one knows the long‐term harm caused
by [Redman’s] actions.” (Docket #105 at 17). But Redman’s
argument misses the mark, because the enhancement applies
in cases involving a risk of serious injury, not proof of actual
injury. Although it is true that sentencing determinations
must be based on “reliable evidence, not speculation or un‐
founded allegations,” United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394,
400 (7th Cir. 2010), the district court in this case relied on
ample evidence that Redman exposed his “patients” and
others to the risk of tragic harm.
The district court did not clearly err by concluding that
Redman recklessly created a serious risk of bodily injury.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the district
court’s application of the sentencing enhancements about
which Redman complains. Accordingly, the decision of the
district court is AFFRIMED.