United States v. Smalls

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

May 3, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-2126
PAUL OTHELLO SMALLS,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 06-CR-2403-RB)

Richard C. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney (Gregory J. Fouratt, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Jerry Daniel Herrera, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Where a declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)

provides for the admissibility of “[a] statement which . . . at the time of its making

. . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a

reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true.” The issue in this interlocutory appeal, presented to

us pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, is whether the district court abused its discretion

in excluding as inadmissible hearsay, and thus as outside the scope of Rule

804(b)(3), the entirety of an accomplice’s nontestimonial statement to a fellow

inmate implicating the accomplice and Defendant Paul Othello Smalls in a murder.

In holding that the district court abused its discretion, we remain mindful that “[t]he

question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always whether the statement was sufficiently

against the declarant’s penal interest ‘that a reasonable person in the declarant’s

position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true,’ and this

question can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.”

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603–04 (1994) (emphasis added).

Philip Gantz was assisting federal drug enforcement officials in their

investigation of narcotics trafficking in Roswell, New Mexico. Prison officials at

the Doña Ana County Detention Center in Las Cruces, New Mexico, found Gantz

dead in his four-man overflow “cell” within the medical unit on the morning of

December 30, 2004. Gantz shared the unit with fellow detainees Glenn Dell Cook,

Walter Melgar-Diaz, and Defendant Smalls. Following an investigation, a federal

grand jury indicted the three men on one count of retaliating against an informant

and one count of conspiracy to commit the same in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513,

one count of tampering with an informant and one count of conspiracy to commit the

2
same in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, and one count of killing a person aiding a

federal investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1121. The indictment alleged

Defendant Smalls “held Gantz’s legs down,” Cook “held Gantz’s arms and torso

down,” and Melgar-Diaz “held a plastic bag over Gantz’s face,” together resulting

in Gantz’s death by strangulation. 1 Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 41. After the Government

indicated it would not seek the death penalty, Melgar-Diaz pleaded guilty under a

sealed plea agreement. The district court severed the trials of Defendant Smalls and

Cook as a result of an out-of-court statement Cook made to a confidential informant

(CI), also an inmate at the detention center, implicating both himself and Defendant

Smalls in the murder. 2

1
An autopsy “determined that the death was caused by strangulation,
specifically by pressure being placed on Mr. Gantz’s neck, cutting off blood flow to
his brain. Dr. Nine, a pathologist at the Office of the Medical Investigator, opined
that more than one person would have been required to kill Mr. Gantz.” Aplt’s App.
vol. I, at 116; vol. II, at 290.
2
Although the district court’s severance order is not part of the record on
appeal, we take judicial notice of it under Fed. R. Evid. 201 as it appears of record
in United States v. Smalls, No. 06-CR-2403-RB-1, Memorandum Opinion and Order
(D.N.M. May 7, 2008) (Doc. # 280). Relying on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968) and its progeny, the district court reasoned the admission into evidence
of a recorded statement in which Cook incriminated both himself and his alleged
cohorts before a CI would violate Defendant Smalls’ right to confrontation. In
Bruton, the Court held that defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation where his accomplice’s confession, made to a postal inspector during
an interrogation, was introduced at their joint trial. The Court explained that a
limiting jury instruction was insufficient under the facts of the case to cure any
prejudice to that defendant. As will become apparent from our opinion, Bruton is
consistent with the present state of Sixth Amendment law because the accomplice’s
confession, unlike Cook’s statement, was testimonial, rendering it inadmissible
(continued...)

3
Prior to the indictment, CI had informed investigators that he spoke with Cook

on more than one occasion about Gantz’s murder. Cook told CI that he, Defendant

Smalls, and Melgar-Diaz had murdered Gantz. According to the district court: “[CI]

stated that Mr. Cook constantly talked about the murder over a two-month period and

finally told him the whole story. Defendant Cook told [CI] that they killed Mr.

Gantz because he was a snitch.” United States v. Cook, No. 06-CR-2403-RB-2,

Sealed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion to

Suppress, at 2 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2008) (Doc. # 438), rev’d, F.3d , 2010 WL

1268529 (10th Cir. 2010). 3 Agents subsequently fitted CI with a recording device

and placed him in a cell alone with Cook, who at the time was awaiting sentencing

on an unrelated drug conviction. At the behest of agents, CI engaged Cook in

conversation by mentioning to him a recent newspaper article about an FBI

investigation into Gantz’s murder. When CI expressed concern that someone

2
(...continued)
against the defendant absent an opportunity for cross-examination. Notably,
however, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause upon which it is premised,
does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements. See infra Part II.A. & B.; see
also United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed, No. 09-8948 (Feb. 2, 2010); United States v. Avila Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004,
1009 (8th Cir. 2009).
3
The district court’s suppression order is part of the record on appeal, Aplt’s
App. vol. I, at 116, but page two of that order has been omitted inadvertently. Thus,
we take judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201 of that omitted portion of the record.

4
involved in the murder might “flip,” the following exchange occurred: 4

COOK: Yeah, but you know what though nigger, . . . that’s the
easiest case to beat right now dog. I’d rather have that
than this case [i.e., drug conviction] I got.
[CI]: But you sure ain’t nobody can’t say nothin’?
COOK: Naw! If they do, we all involved, homie. That’s the good
thing. It ain’t like just one of us...
[CI]: No, I’m sayin’ what happened?
COOK: We killed the mother fucker.
[CI]: No, I’m sayin’ well how did this whole shit just go down,
my man?
COOK: Oh, cause he was snitchin’, homie.
[CI]: Who was the ring leader?
COOK: The Mexican dude [i.e., Melgar-Diaz].
[CI]: So the Mexican dude...plotted everything.
COOK: (UI [unintelligible], voices overlap)
[CI]: Or was it even plotted?
COOK: Really, it wasn’t even no plot, homie. It’s like this nigger
snitched, naw. Everybody around him, you wussy, he was
what, what, what...so you know how we’d planned...
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: ...you know how me and you (UI ) pushin’ (UI)...me and
“D” talkin’ about let’s get this, let’s get the bag on this
nigger.
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: So we had a bag...so we was like what ya’ll wanna do?
I’m all hell I, everybody like fuck, come on. We was just
playin’ really right...we was like one, two, three, go. Put
it over his head homie and, and come out to be a...and then
it come out to be a mother fuckin’ murder, homie
[CI]: So ya’ll put the bag over his head?
COOK: (laughing)
[CI]: Who put the bag over the head?

4
The excerpts are from a transcription of the recorded conversation between
CI and Cook. Excepting the spaced ellipses, bracketed materials, and tri-starred
breaks, the excerpts are reproduced as they appear in the transcript, which is found
in duplicate in the record. See Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 50-73; vol. II, at 265-288. The
sound recording, also a part of the record, is consistent with the transcription.

5
COOK: The Mexican dude.
[CI]: And what’d you do?
COOK: Held his hands.
[CI]: And what did the black dude [i.e., Defendant Smalls] do?
COOK: He held his feet.[ 5]
***
[CI]: Was it a hit, dog?
COOK: Like a...grudge (UI)?
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: Yeah real, I mean...alright, look, this is what it was...see
the Mexican...the Mexican, it had been a big thing with the
Mexicans cause he’d been on PC [protective custody]...it,
all the Mexicans been tryin’ to get in the room on him.
[CI]: So what, he told on somebody then...
COOK: Yeah. He told on that nigger that shot that little kid.
[CI]: Oh!
COOK: ‘member?
[CI]: Yeah. The cat “Di” stomped on.
COOK: Yeah!
[CI]: Alright. Alright.
COOK: See he told on them so there’s been a big hit for the last year or
something on him. That’s why they wouldn’t take a trip ‘cause
they know he’d been in PC all, all snitch status.
[CI]: Did the black dude know that?
COOK: We all knew that. Nurses...everybody in P...everybody in,
in the, in the, in the, in the whats–a–thing knew...
everybody in medical knew.

5
According to the district court:

There were only four individuals in the locked cell: the white man who
died, a Hispanic man, Mr. Melgar-Diaz, and two black men, Mr. Cook
and Mr. Smalls. The statement referring to “the black dude” was made
by Mr. Cook. Although the statement does not implicate Mr. Smalls on
its face, because the only other black man in the cell was Mr. Smalls,
the reference to “the black dude” could only mean Mr. Smalls.

Smalls, No. 06-CR-2403-RB-1, Memorandum Opinion and Order dated May 7, 2008,
at 11–12.

6
***
[CI]: Yeah. So really nobody can’t say nothin’...
COOK: Nah huh...
[CI]: ...cause everybody took part in the murder.
COOK: Yeah, that’s why I ain’t worried. I could see if I was the
only one, or he was the only one, but he, we all had
something to do with it, so we all can’t say nothin’. And
they can’t...I’m gonna tell you now, homie...they, they
don’t, they, even if the feds do pick it up, they ain’t got
enough evidence to get it through ju...grand jury.
[CI]: Sure don’t, they need somebody help.
COOK: They ain’t got, they, grand jury got to have something off
the top first. They ain’t got no weapon...they ain’t got
nobody sayin’ nothin’...they ain’t got no ev...they ain’t got
nothin ho...
[CI]: That’s my idea see, so they still gotta come up with more
than that.
COOK: Yeah. They still gotta, they gotta come with the whole
nine on this shit. And see right now they’s looking toward
the Mexican, that’s why I ain’t gonna say nothin’.
[CI]: Mmm hmm.
COOK: I’m already knowin’ it’s lookin’ toward him ‘cause if the
Mexicans involved he snitch on, that’s what the detectives
told me. We know you ain’t got nothin’ to do with it, but
just tell us what happened. I ain’t telling ya’ll shit, I ain’t
had nothin’, I don’t know what happened. That’s my story
and I’m stickin’ to it, all the way to the end, homie. I ain’t
even gonna make up no stories no more.
***
[CI]: What you gonna say, what you gonna say just in case they
indict your ass, bro. What you gonna say to your lawyer?
Cause it’s what you say to your lawyer they really, you
know what I’m sayin’?
COOK: I don’t know, I ain’t gonna say nothin’. I’m gonna tell
him the same thing I told them [the detectives]. Man if
anything happened to that dude, I was asleep. So he ain’t
gonna have nothin’ to run on me. If he ever try to go
behind my back, he couldn’t.
***
COOK: They can’t do nothin’.
[CI]: ...I mean...not unless you talk to somebody.

7
COOK: They can’t do nothin’, homie.
[CI]: You ain’t told nobody about it?
COOK: I ain’t told nobody but ya’ll. Ya’ll are the only people,
homie...and, and, and, and to tell you the truth, I ain’t did nothin’
(laughs).
[CI]: (UI, voices overlap)
COOK: (laughing) So, so shit. I don’t give a fuck what they say.
[CI]: And you’re sure that, that black guy got rid of the bag?
COOK: Hell, I got rid of the mother fucker.
[CI]: You got rid of the bag?
COOK: (makes noise to simulate toilet flushing)
[CI]: Okay.
COOK: Down in the toilet. If they wanna (UI, voices overlap)
[CI]: You’re positive?
COOK: I know. I sat there and watched the mother fucker go.
And it blew up. You know how it, the bag blew up...
[CI]: Yeah, yeah the air.
COOK: ......it blew up. It blew up, and I hit him again. (simulates
punching noise)...stuffed it down in there...and got rid of
it. Boom, it’s gone. They ain’t got nothin’...the only the
thing now, it’s gettin’ hectic ‘cause, ‘cause if momma
don’t fittin’ to get that money, homie. That’s why.
***
COOK: But, see I’m gonna tell you like this though...they can’t
really...if it was to make it to trial, homie...for the simple
fact they...it, when it, when it first happened, they said it
was ah...ah...he died of a asthma attack.
[CI]: Mmm hmm.
COOK: Okay, so if he died of a asthma attack...that’s what the,
any lawyer that’s gonna be half way decent gonna hit him
off with, did he struggle? He had no struggle in him...he
had no noth...‘member I told you about that?
***
COOK: They ain’t got nobody, if they never did anything, they
would be gettin’ on the stand on me.
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: They can’t, ‘cause if they do, you...okay, if that’s ‘cause
I did, then you did this, and we....okay, so what?
[CI]: Yeah, everybody had a part.
COOK: Yeah, so then what? Can’t nobody just get up there and
say no, he did it.

8
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: Plus they ain’t gonna do it anyway, homie.
[CI]: Now, if there’s a trade off...
COOK: No...
[CI]: And see the Mexican, he actually, you know what I’m
sayin’, put the bag over the head...
COOK: Yeah.
[CI]: ...and you helped holdin’ on so...
COOK: Yeah. So I’m justa accessory anyway. But ain’t nobody
gonna say nothin’ I ain’t gonna worry about that shit, dog
(UI, voices overlap).
***
COOK: But what can they do? . . . They can’t do nothin’. That
was a clean one right there. That’s what you call clean,
homie.
[CI]: You sure, right...
COOK: Clean.
[CI]: ...isn’t no evidence behind.
COOK: Clean. If, if it is evi–we was all in the room. What
evidence could it be, my nigger?
[CI]: I don’t know.
COOK: Nothin’! They already said from the gate, he ain’t had no
stroke. They had to come back...oh, and found, the only
way they found he was ah...sh...ah...ah...
[CI]: Suffocated.
COOK: Suffocated is do the autopsy.
[CI]: Mmm hmm.
COOK: So that mean everything on the, on, on, on the
ah...evidence thing, the crime scene no good. You see
what I’m sayin’?
[CI]: No prints on him, nothin’...(voices overlap).
COOK: Nothin’. Nothin’. They can’t do none of that, homie.
Ain’t no prints, ain’t no none of that dog.

Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 52–56, 61–62, 65–66; vol. II, at 267–271, 276–77, 280–81.

Based on the recording of the conversation and the testimony of a prison official who

surreptitiously observed the encounter, the district court characterized the foregoing

communication between Cook and CI as “amiable:”

9
The conversation occurred at a normal to low volume and in the tone of
two people who were familiar with each other and who were friends.
While the two individuals were standing at a distance apart when the
conversation began, they eventually moved close to each other and even
leaned on a partition and sat as they spoke. There was no hesitancy in
their words indicating any caution in speaking or any fear of the other
person. The two smiled at various times during the conversation.

Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 117.

The Government moved the district court for a pre-trial order admitting Cook’s

“jailhouse confession” into evidence at Defendant Smalls’ trial. The Government

asserted Cook’s out-of-court statement was nontestimonial hearsay offered to prove

the truth of the matter asserted but admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) as

a statement against Cook’s penal interest. The district court assumed Cook’s

statement was nontestimonial and, as such, the question of its admissibility against

Defendant Smalls lay outside the Sixth Amendment’s “‘core concerns.’” 6 Aplt’s

App. vol. I, at 88 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).

Nonetheless, the district court analyzed the admissibility of Cook’s statement under

the framework of the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as set

forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The district court focused its analysis,

consistent with Roberts, on the question whether Cook’s statement fit “within a

firmly rooted hearsay exception” or otherwise showed “particularized guarantees

6
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

10
of trustworthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The district court relied extensively

on the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999)

(plurality), which, in turn, relied on the Roberts’ framework to “make explicit . . .

that accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a

firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our

Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.” Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134. Lilly “‘was premised

on the basic understanding that when one person accuses another of a crime under

circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the

accusation is presumptively suspect and [absent “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness”] must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination.’” Id. at

132 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)). 7 Based on the foregoing,

the district court held Cook’s statement inculpating both himself and Defendant

Smalls fell outside a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. According to

the district court, the context in which Cook made his statement confirmed that it

was untrustworthy and unreliable:

[T]he context of Mr. Cook’s statement renders it inadmissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). Mr. Cook was an accomplice who
was interrogated by an agent of the government while in custody,

7
In Lilly, as in Lee, the statement at issue was that of an accomplice made
during a custodial interrogation. “In Lee, the Supreme Court held that the custodial
statement of a nontestifying accomplice is presumptively unreliable and therefore
inadmissible, but that the state can rebut this presumption by demonstrating
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123,
1127 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Lee 476 U.S. at 543).

11
rendering his statement presumptively unreliable. Moreover, Mr. Cook
attempted at various points in his statement to exculpate himself, to
downplay the death as not intentional, and to shift much of the blame
for the death of Mr. Gantz to his co-defendants. Thus, any portion of
Mr. Cook’s recorded out-of-court statement that inculpates Mr. Smalls
is clearly inadmissible hearsay.

Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 92-93.

II.

We review the district court’s ultimate decision that the entirety of Cook’s out-

of-court statement was inadmissible as against Defendant Smalls only for an abuse

of discretion. We “will not disturb an evidentiary ruling absent a distinct showing

that it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or an erroneous conclusion

of law or manifests a clear error in judgment.” United States v. Contreras, 536 F.3d

1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). “A district court by definition

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United States, 518

U.S. 81, 100 (1996). As we shall see, because the district court proceeded under an

outdated and erroneous view of the law, its findings and conclusions as to the

statement’s unreliability, clouded by an improper characterization of the nature of

Cook’s statement, are beside the point. In short, the district court’s analysis of the

Government’s pre-trial motion failed to conform to the standard of admissibility for

nontestimonial hearsay set by Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)–whether Cook’s “statement

was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest ‘that a reasonable person in the

declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be

12
true’” – and manifested a clear error of judgment. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603–04.

Pointedly, Roberts was no longer good law when the district court made its

decision in this case, rendering Lilly a dead letter and eviscerating not only the

presumption of unreliability, but the entire foundation upon which the district court’s

order rested. Roberts said:

[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

Our narrative of Roberts’ demise begins with Crawford, which criticized the

Roberts standard as both under and overinclusive. 8 The standard was underinclusive

or too narrow because it failed to exclude the admission of all ex parte testimonial

statements, and thus “failed to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations.”

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. The standard was overinclusive or too broad because

it required “close constitutional scrutiny” of nontestimonial hearsay “far removed

from the core concerns of the Clause.” Id. Crawford resolved the problem of

8
Crawford addressed the admissibility of a wife’s statement, made during a
police interrogation, that her husband, the defendant, had not stabbed the victim in
self-defense. At trial, the wife invoked the marital privilege and refused to testify.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38–40.

13
underinclusiveness by holding the Confrontation Clause constituted an absolute bar

to the admissibility of a testimonial hearsay statement where the declarant was

unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-

examine the declarant. Id. at 59. For the time being, however, the Court declined

to “definitively resolve” the problem of overinclusiveness, namely the issue of

whether the Confrontation Clause left the admissibility of nontestimonial statements

solely to the law of hearsay. Id. at 61.

Two terms later, the Court in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006),

squarely confronted the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause had any

application to nontestimonial hearsay statements, or, in other words, whether any

portion of Roberts remained good law. 9 In Davis, the Court placed the question of

the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay statements entirely outside the confines

of the Confrontation Clause and rendered Roberts academic:

The answer to the . . . question was suggested in Crawford, even if not
explicitly held:

“The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this focus
[on testimonial hearsay]. It applies to ‘witnesses’ against
the accused – in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’
1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language (1828). ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically ‘a

9
In Davis, the Court addressed the character of two statements. The first
involved a statement made to a 911 operator during the course of a domestic
emergency. The second involved a statement made in response to police questioning
at the secured scene of a domestic disturbance. Neither declarant was available as
a witness at trial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–21.

14
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.’ Ibid. An accuser who
makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not.” 541 U.S., at 51.

A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional
provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its “core,” but its
perimeter.

Davis, 547 U.S. at 823–24.

Regrettably, we have been slow to come into compliance with the Court’s

controlling precedent. In United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2007),

a decision subsequent to both Crawford and Davis, we erroneously concluded, with

nary a cite to the latter case, that district courts still should analyze the admissibility

of nontestimonial hearsay statements under the pre-Crawford rubric of Roberts.

Ramirez, 479 F.3d at 1247; cf. United States v. Nash, 482 F.3d 1209, 1217–20 (10th

Cir. 2007) (holding the admission of out-of-court hearsay statements violated the

Confrontation Clause without first addressing whether those statements constituted

testimonial or nontestimonial hearsay); contra United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d

151, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that after Davis, “the Confrontation Clause

does not bar . . . nontestimonial statements, whatever their guarantees of

trustworthiness”). Yet just sixteen days prior to our opinion in Ramirez, the

Supreme Court in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) again explained:

Roberts had held that the Confrontation Clause permitted the admission
of a hearsay statement made by a declarant who was unavailable to
testify if the statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability, either

15
because the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or
because there were “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”
relating to the statement in question. 448 U.S., at 66.
***
Crawford . . . overruled Roberts and held that “[t]estimonial statements
of witnesses absent from trial” are admissible “only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine [the witness].” 541 U.S., at 59.

Bockting, 549 U.S. at 412–13 (emphasis added). Bockting reiterated that Crawford

overruled Roberts because the latter’s test for the admissibility of hearsay was

both too narrow and too broad. “[T]he Roberts test was too ‘malleable’ in permitting

the admission of ex parte testimonial statements.” Id. at 414. More importantly for

our purpose, “Roberts potentially excluded too much testimony because it imposed

Confrontation Clause restrictions on nontestimonial hearsay not governed by that

Clause.” Id. at 413–14. In the end, the Court made clear that Crawford overruled

Roberts in its entirety:

With respect to testimonial out-of-court statements, Crawford is
more restrictive than was Roberts, and this may improve the accuracy
of factfinding in some criminal cases. . . . But whatever improvement
in reliability Crawford produced in this respect must be considered
together with Crawford’s elimination of Confrontation Clause
protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court
nontestimonial statements. Under Roberts, an out-of-court
nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could
not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability.
Under Crawford, on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no
application to such statements and therefore permits their admission
even if they lack indicia of reliability.

Id. at 419–20 (emphasis added).

16
Needless to say, the Roberts standard, as applied to both testimonial and

nontestimonial hearsay statements, plainly had been overruled when the district court

issued its 2009 order relying on that standard to deny the admissibility of the entirety

of Cook’s statement in this case. Indeed, a panel of this Court so recognized in

Garrison v. Ortiz, 2008 WL 4636723, at **2 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished), when

it rejected as “not good law” Ramirez’s holding that district courts should approach

the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay statements under the Roberts standard,

and stated “it is clear that the trustworthiness test established in Roberts has been

overruled.” (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 325

(6th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 09-8948 (Feb. 2, 2010) (recognizing that

Davis held the Confrontation Clause has no bearing on nontestimonial hearsay

statements and Roberts no longer applies to such statements); see also United States

v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 201 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the Roberts

standard once used to determine the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay

statements did not survive Crawford); United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094,

1099 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (same); but see United States v. Pursley, 577

F.3d 1204, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (referring to Crawford and Davis in passing as

“partial[ly] overruling” Roberts); see generally 5 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird

C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8.130, at 173 (3d ed. 2007) (“Roberts appears

to be a dead letter after the Court’s decisions in Crawford and more recently in Davis

and Bockting.”).

17
B.

As the district court recognized, if Cook’s statement were testimonial this

would be an easy case. Because Cook presumably will invoke his Fifth Amendment

right to remain silent at Defendant Smalls’ trial and be unavailable to testify, and

because Defendant Smalls has had no prior opportunity to cross-examine Cook

about the latter’s hearsay statement, the Confrontation Clause would bar its

admissibility: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of

reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution

prescribes: confrontation.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. Unfortunately for

Defendant Smalls, the current state of the law as applied to the present facts dictates

what the district court assumed, i.e., that Cook’s statement is nontestimonial. 10

Once again our narrative begins with Crawford, wherein the Court left “for

another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”

Id. at 68. The Court, however, recognized “testimony” as “typically a solemn

declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some

fact.” Id. at 51 (quotations and brackets omitted). The Court distinguished the

“formal statement to government officers,” which is testimonial, from the “casual

remark to an acquaintance,” which is nontestimonial. Id. The Court acknowledged

10
At oral argument, Small’s counsel conceded the point: “I’m willing to go
forward and accept that Judge Brack’s memorandum is that it is nontestimonial.
That’s fine.”

18
that “[w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior

testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to

police interrogations.” Id. at 68.

Subsequently in Davis, the Court spoke to the nature of testimonial statements

in the specific context of police interrogations. The Court again declined to attempt

“to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements – or even all

conceivable statements in response to police interrogation – as either testimonial or

nontestimonial.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. In holding that statements made to a 911

operator during the course of a domestic emergency were nontestimonial while

similar statements made to police at the secured scene of a domestic disturbance

were testimonial, the Court reasoned:

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. [Statements] are testimonial when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecutions.

Id. The Court acknowledged that “even when interrogation exists, it is in the

final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that

the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” Id. at 822–23 n.1. The Court

added it did not intend to imply “that statements made in the absence of any

interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers were no more willing to

19
exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended

questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.” Id.; see

United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1302–03 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding as

testimonial a declarant’s statement “How did you guys find us so fast?” made to

arresting officers). Nonetheless, the Court recognized “that formality is indeed

essential to testimonial utterance,” but not a “high degree” of such: “It imports

sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses.”

Davis, 547 U.S. at 830–31 n.5 (emphasis added).

In Summers, a decision post-Crawford but pre-Davis, we held “a statement is

testimonial if a reasonable person in the position of declarant would objectively

foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a

crime.” 11 Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302 (emphasis added). Upon close inspection,

Summers’ definition of “testimonial” appears somewhat in tension with Davis’

11
In United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007), we
opined that Davis “lends credence to this court’s interpretation of ‘testimonial’
posited in [Summers].” See also Pursley, 577 F.3d at 1223 (“We have interpreted
Davis as validating our preexisting definition of ‘testimonial evidence.’”). Summers’
definition appears to arise out of a formulation tendered to the Court in Crawford by
amici National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. According to that
definition, testimonial statements are “‘statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statements would be available for use at a later trial.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
In Davis, the Court explained that “[o]ur opinion in Crawford set forth various
formulations of the core class of testimonial statements, but found it unnecessary to
endorse any of them.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (quotations, brackets, and citation
omitted).

20
strictures, and perhaps overly broad for two reasons. First, Summers’ definition does

not require the district court to account for the “essential” element of formality

which is necessary to render a statement testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830–31 n.5

(stating “formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance”). Second, Summers’

definition does not require the district court to consider a statement in terms of its

“primary purpose.” Id. at 822 (recognizing not every statement made in response

to interrogation is testimonial). For example, a reasonable person providing

information to a 911 operator in the course of an emergency may well foresee that

her statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime, but that

is not the primary purpose for which the declarant makes the statement: “A 911 call

. . . and at least the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is

ordinarily not designed primarily to establish or prove some fact, but to describe

current circumstances requiring police assistance.” Id. at 827 (quotations and

brackets omitted).

Synthesizing Crawford and Davis, we might today formulate a definition of

a testimonial statement which reads: a formal declaration made by the declarant that,

when objectively considered, indicates the primary purpose for which the declaration

was made was that of establishing or proving some fact potentially relevant to a

criminal prosecution. Or, to better conform to the current state of Tenth Circuit

precedent, we might say: A formal statement is testimonial if a reasonable person

in the position of the declarant would objectively foresee that the primary purpose

21
of the statement was for use in the investigation or prosecution of a crime. See

Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302. As we recognized in Summers, “‘[t]he proper inquiry

. . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused.’” Id. at

1302 n.9 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)). And

the standard by which a court measures the declarant’s intent is an objective one.

See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302.

Fortunately, we need not now resolve the apparent tension between Davis

and Summers, or tender a definitive definition of “testimonial,” because Cook’s

statement is nontestimonial regardless of which of the foregoing definitions we

apply. In Davis, the Court expressed the view that “statements made unwittingly to

a Government informant” or “statements from one prisoner to another” are “clearly

nontestimonial.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 825 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.

171, 181–84 (1987) and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87–89 (1970) (plurality)). 12

Similarly, beginning with then Judge Sotomayor’s opinion for the Second Circuit in

United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), our sister circuits have relied

on definitions of “testimonial” akin to that which we tendered in Summers to hold

12
In Bourjaily, a confidential informant clandestinely recorded a conversation
with the declarant, in which the latter implicated the defendant in a drug deal.
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 173–74. In Dutton, a prisoner, an alleged accomplice in a
murder, stated to another prisoner that if not for the defendant, “we wouldn’t be in
this now.” Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77. In both cases, the Court held that although the
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the admission of the
declarant’s out-of-court hearsay statement implicating the defendant did not violate
the Confrontation Clause.

22
“a declarant’s statements to a confidential informant, whose true status is unknown

to the declarant, do not constitute testimony within the meaning of Crawford.”

Saget, 377 F.3d at 229 (Sotomayor, J.); accord Johnson, 581 F.3d at 325 (recognizing

that a declarant’s statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant wearing a

wire is not testimonial); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2008)

(same); United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); United

States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v.

Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).

All this leaves no doubt as to the legal character of Cook’s statement. Cook’s

recorded statement to CI, known to Cook only as a fellow inmate, is unquestionably

nontestimonial. In its order denying the statement’s admissibility in toto, the district

court erroneously characterized the encounter between Cook and CI as a custodial

interrogation spawning a purportedly unreliable statement: “Mr. Cook was an

accomplice who was interrogated by an agent of the government while in custody,

rendering his statement presumptively unreliable.” Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 93. In

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the Supreme Court established, albeit in

the context of an alleged Miranda violation, that a conversation between an

incarcerated suspect and an undercover agent does not constitute a custodial

interrogation. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 295–97. We cannot properly label Cook’s

encounter with CI as a custodial interrogation because “[t]he essential ingredients

of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion are not present when an

23
incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow

inmate.” Id. at 296; see Cook, F.3d at , 2010 WL 1268529, at *5.

Nor may we properly label CI’s “questioning” of Cook outside a custodial

context as interrogation under any generally accepted definition or in any formal

sense of that term. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary of the English

Language (1961) (defining “interrogate” as “to question typically with formality

. . .”); Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 (observing that “[t]he inquiries of a police operator in

the course of a 911 call are interrogation in one sense, but not in a sense that

qualifies under any conceivable definition”). As we very recently explained in the

companion case of Cook, F.3d at , 2010 WL 1268529, at *7:

Here, there is no question that Cook spoke freely with the cooperating
informant, was not coerced, and the circumstances surrounding their
conversation were nothing akin to police interrogation. In our view,
such casual questioning by a fellow inmate does not equate to ‘police
interrogation,’ even though the government coordinated the placement
of the fellow inmate and encouraged him to question Cook.

But whether we properly may label CI’s encounter with Cook as an interrogation in

some remote sense is beside the point because Davis establishes that not every

statement made in response to an interrogation is testimonial. Rather, only “in some

instances” does interrogation “tend to generate testimonial responses.” Davis, 547

U.S. at 822–23 n.1 (emphasis added).

We focus our attention not on the nature of CI’s questions, but on the nature

of Cook’s responses, because as the Supreme Court teaches in Davis, “even when

24
interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the

interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” Id.

(emphasis added); cf. Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 270 (suggesting that “[t]he intent of the

police officers or investigators is relevant to a determination of whether a statement

is ‘testimonial’ [but] only if it is first the case that a person in the position of the

declarant reasonably would have expected that his statements would be used

prosecutorially”). To such end, we first observe that Cook’s statement was not,

even to the slightest degree, a formal declaration. Cook’s statement thus lacks the

formality “essential to testimonial utterance.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 830–31 n.5.

Moreover, Cook did not make his statement to CI for the “primary purpose” of

establishing or proving facts relevant to a criminal prosecution. See id. at 822, 827.

Obviously, Cook would not have shared what he did had he known the Government

was recording his statement or that his cellmate was a CI. See Watson, 525 F.3d at

589; Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 269. Objectively viewed from Cook’s standpoint, his

statement was much more akin to casual remarks to an acquaintance than formal

declarations to an official. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Cook in no sense intended

to bear testimony against Defendant Smalls; Cook in no manner sought to establish

facts for use in a criminal investigation or prosecution. See Summers, 414 F.3d at

1302 & n.9. Cook boasted of the details of a cold-blooded murder in response to

“casual questioning” by a fellow inmate and apparent friend. Cook, F.3d at ,

2010 WL 1268529, at *7. Cook’s statement is undoubtedly nontestimonial under any

25
legitimate view of the law.

Because “[o]nly [testimonial] statements . . . cause the declarant to be a

‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause,” Davis, 547 U.S. at 821,

and because Cook’s statement is nontestimonial, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) determines

its admissibility, subject, of course, to Rule 403’s balancing test. See United States

v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 192–93 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (explaining that the only

question pertinent to the admissibility of a nontestimonial statement is whether

it meets the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence). As we just explained,

the Confrontation Clause simply does not apply to nontestimonial statements and

thus “permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.” Bockting, 549

U.S. at 420. To be sure, Fed. R. Evid. 802 renders hearsay, defined in Rule 801 as

an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted,” generally inadmissible precisely because it is considered unreliable. See

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598. The hearsay rule, however, has long been subject to

exception. Because certain hearsay statements are less subject to legitimate claims

of unreliability, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide for their admissibility. One

exception to the hearsay rule is an out-of-court statement against the declarant’s

penal interest. Such a statement is “not excluded by the hearsay rule [even] if the

declarant is unavailable as a witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b). Subsection (b)(3)

defines a statement against penal interest as follows: “A statement which . . . at the

26
time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability

. . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the

statement unless believing it to be true.” 13 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). “Rule 804(b)(3)

is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable

people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements

unless they believe them to be true.” Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599. In other words,

“[t]he circumstantial guaranty of reliability for declarations against interest is the

assumption that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves

unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.” Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory

committee’s notes.

Consistent with this “commonsense notion” and “circumstantial guaranty” of

reliability, the Court in Williamson construed the meaning of “statement” within

13
According to the plain language of Rule 804(b)(3), only the admissibility
of “[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused” requires the presence of “corroborating circumstances [that]
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)
(emphasis added); see Jordan, 509 F.3d at 202 n.6. Prior to the demise of Roberts,
many of our sister circuits also held the same sort of “corroborating circumstances”
were necessary under Rule 804(b)(3) to establish the reliability of a self-inculpatory
statement. This is not surprising given that the “confusion arose during the period
when [all] statements against penal interest were thought to implicate Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and therefore required ‘particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness,’ or a showing that this hearsay exception was ‘firmly rooted.’”
United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990) (“To be admissible under the
Confrontation Clause [as interpreted in Roberts], hearsay evidence used to convict
a defendant [had to] possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent
trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.”).

27
Rule 804(b)(3) to “cover only those declarations or remarks within the confession

that are individually self-inculpatory.” 14 Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599. The Court

rejected the view “that an entire narrative, including non-self-inculpatory parts (but

excluding the clearly self-serving parts . . . ) may be admissible if it is in the

aggregate self-inculpatory.” Id. at 601. Rather, in the Court’s opinion:

[T]he most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow
admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made
within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. The
district court may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that
a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession
and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else.

Id. at 600–01. The Court noted “[t]he fact that a statement is self-inculpatory does

make it more reliable,” but “the fact that a person is making a broadly self-

inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession’s non-self-

inculpatory parts.” Id. at 600. In directing district courts to exclude self-exculpatory

portions of otherwise self-inculpatory statements, the Court moreover explained:

“Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely to

make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory,

statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements.” Id.

14
At issue in Williamson was the admissibility of statements the declarant
made after he had been arrested for cocaine trafficking. The statements, made during
a custodial interrogation, indicated the cocaine belonged to Williamson. Williamson,
512 U.S. at 596–97.

28
The Court accurately observed that the “‘arrest statements of a codefendant

have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation

to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s statements

about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay

evidence.’” Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 541). But even

at a time when Roberts had not yet been overruled and the law of hearsay and right

to confrontation remained blurred, the Court stopped well short of endorsing the

proposition that Rule 804(b)(3) renders an accomplice’s statement implicating a

defendant in a crime presumptively unreliable regardless of the circumstances.

Importantly, the Court recognized “[t]here are many circumstances in which Rule

804(b)(3) does allow the admission of statements that inculpate a criminal

defendant,” including “the confessions of arrested accomplices . . . if they are truly

self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.” 15 Id. at

15
The Court’s position is consistent with the Rule Advisory Committee’s view
that “by no means” must “all statements implicating another person be excluded from
the category of declarations against interest:”

Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be determined from
the circumstances of each case. Thus, a statement admitting guilt and
implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be
motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail
to qualify as against interest. . . . On the other hand, the same words
spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would
have no difficulty in qualifying.

Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee’s notes.

29
603 (emphasis added). “[A] declarant’s statement is not magically transformed from

a statement against penal interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the

declarant names another person or implicates a possible co-defendant.” Id. at 606

(Scalia, J., concurring).

Perhaps the best (but not only) examples of “truly self-inculpatory” statements

admissible against third persons arise in cases of conspiracy. The Court provided the

following explanation, apropos to the present state of affairs:

For instance, a declarant’s squarely self-inculpatory confession – “yes,
I killed X” – will likely be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) against
accomplices who are being tried under a co-conspirator liability theory.
Likewise, by showing that the declarant knew something, a self-
inculpatory statement can in some situations help the jury infer that his
confederates knew it as well. And when seen with other evidence, an
accomplice’s self-inculpatory statement can inculpate the defendant
directly.

Id. at 603 (citation omitted). The Court further commented that “[e]ven statements

that are on their face neutral may actually be against the declarant’s interest.” 16 Id.

“A statement obviously can be self-inculpatory (in the sense of having so much of

a tendency to subject one to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not

make it without believing it to be true) without consisting of the confession ‘I

16
An example of a facially neutral yet admissible statement against penal
interest that the Court employed was “‘Sam and I went to Joe’s house.’”
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603. The Court explained that this statement, which clearly
implicates third persons, “might be against the declarant’s interest if a reasonable
person in the declarant’s shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and Sam would
implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam’s conspiracy.” Id.

30
committed X element of crime Y.’” Id. at 606 (Scalia, J., concurring). By the same

measure, “other statements that give the police significant details about the crime

may also, depending on the situation, be against the declarant’s interest.” Id. at 603.

The Court explained that “whether a statement is self-inculpatory . . . can only be

determined by viewing it in context:” “The question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always

whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest” as the

Rule objectively defines that phrase. Id. (emphasis added). And that depends not

only on the contextual wording of the statement itself but also on the circumstances

under which it was made. See id. at 603-04; accord Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 267

(“Viewed in context, many statements, even those that do not amount to an

admission of a crime or an element of a crime, constitute statements ‘against penal

interest’ for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3).”).

Justice Holmes cogently recognized nearly a century past that “no other

statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder.” Donnelly v. United

States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This surely is as true

today as it was in Justice Holmes’ time, regardless of whether such statement is

offered to implicate or exonerate the accused. See Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222,

1231 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002). We may safely surmise that from time immemorial, only

on the rarest occasion, if ever, has one of sound mind–even one of sound mind who

is not particularly honest–falsely confessed a murder to an apparent acquaintance or

friend. The question whether any parts of Cook’s statement within his extended

31
conversation with CI are admissible into evidence at Defendant Smalls’ trial as

sufficiently against Cook’s penal interest, notwithstanding the fact that such parts

also implicate Defendant Smalls in a murder, admits of only one answer.

By this point, the reader is well familiar with the circumstances surrounding

Cook’s statement, and we need not restate them here to once again emphasize the

point that Cook most certainly was not seeking to curry favor with authorities in

recounting the specifics of Gantz’s murder to CI or seeking to shift or spread blame

to his alleged co-conspirators so as to engender more favorable treatment from

authorities. See United States v. US Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195, 1209

(11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a co-conspirator’s statement made to a confidant

obviated “any concern that [the declarant] was attempting to curry favor with

the government by shifting blame to another individual”). As the district court’s

findings regarding the nature of the encounter between Cook and CI suggest, Aplt’s

App. vol. I, at 117, Cook responded to CI’s questions as though he believed the two

were engaged in casual conversation–nothing more. From Cook’s standpoint, this

was indeed the case, and that makes all the difference, providing a “circumstantial

guaranty” of reliability not found in statements, arrest, custodial or otherwise,

knowingly made to law enforcement officials. Cook spoke freely and openly to

CI, all the while unknowingly rendering nontestimonial evidence bearing upon all

aspects of the murder–agreement, act, intent, motive, and coverup. As we recently

observed in Cook, “the circumstances surrounding their conversation were nothing

32
akin to police interrogation.” Cook, F.3d at , 2010 WL 1268529, at *7. Cases,

like those on which the district court relied, holding that statements implicating

accomplices and made in the context of such interrogation are unreliable simply have

no application here. In those cases, “[h]aving been caught for a criminal offense, the

suspects were simply trying to shift the primary responsibility to others.” United

States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 506 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lilly, Lee, and

Williamson).

Next we turn from the circumstances surrounding the making of Cook’s

statement to the statement itself. Rather than carefully analyzing Cook’s statement

in accordance with Rule 804(b)(3) and Williamson to separate Cook’s admissible

from his inadmissible remarks, the district court, without ever discussing any

particular parts of his statement, simply concluded based on its aforesaid erroneous

view of the law that “the context of Mr. Cook’s statement renders it inadmissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).” Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 92–93. The

district court, without explanation, simply opined that Cook “attempted at various

points in his statement to exculpate himself, to downplay the death as not intentional,

and to shift much of the blame for the death of Mr. Gantz to his co-defendants.”

Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 93. The court’s conclusion–in effect a decision that no part of

Cook’s statement was sufficiently against his penal interest such “that a reasonable

person in declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing

it to be true”–cannot withstand careful scrutiny under even the most deferential

33
standard of review. 17

Not surprisingly, our review of Cook’s extended statement as previously set

forth herein reveals some instances where Cook arguably seeks to exculpate himself,

at least to the extent that his comments might serve to mitigate punishment. See

supra at 5–9. For instance, while plainly confessing to the murder and describing

precisely how it occurred, Cook stated that Melgar-Diaz was the “ring leader” (which

in any event bears upon the crime of conspiracy). A breath later, he said “[r]eally,

it wasn’t even no plot, homie.” Shortly thereafter, Cook suggested that he and his

cohorts “was just playin’ really” when they placed the bag over Gantz head and held

him down. So that the reader may view Cook’s comments in the proper context, we

repeat the relevant sequence here:

[CI]: But you sure ain’t nobody can’t say nothin’?
COOK: Naw! If they do, we all involved, homie. That’s the good
thing. It ain’t like just one of us...
[CI]: No, I’m sayin’ what happened?
COOK: We killed the mother fucker.

17
Because our careful review of Cook’s statement, considered in its entirety,
and the circumstances under which it was made, admits of only one conclusion,
namely that portions of his statement were sufficiently against his penal interest
and thus admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), we need not now decide whether a
determination that a statement is or is not sufficiently against a declarant’s penal
interest presents a question of law reviewable de novo, a question of fact reviewable
for clear error, or a mixed question reviewable for an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1215 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that a
determination of whether a statement is against a declarant’s penal interest is
“purely” a question of law, but that consideration of a statement’s reliability based
on the surrounding circumstances “requires a review of findings of fact and a review
of the trial court’s application of a legal standard to the facts”).

34
[CI]: No, I’m sayin’ well how did this whole shit just go down,
my man?
COOK: Oh, cause he was snitchin’, homie.
[CI]: Who was the ring leader?
COOK: The Mexican dude.
[CI]: So the Mexican dude...plotted everything.
COOK: (UI [unintelligible], voices overlap)
[CI]: Or was it even plotted?
COOK: Really, it wasn’t even no plot, homie. It’s like this nigger
snitched, naw. Everybody around him, you wussy, he was
what, what, what...so you know how we’d planned...
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: ...you know how me and you (UI ) pushin’ (UI)...me and
“D” talkin’ about let’s get this, let’s get the bag on this
nigger.
[CI]: Yeah.
COOK: So we had a bag...so we was like what ya’ll wanna do?
I’m all hell I, everybody like fuck, come on. We was just
playin’ really right...we was like one, two, three, go. Put
it over his head homie and, and come out to be a...and then
it come out to be a mother fuckin’ murder, homie.
[CI]: So ya’ll put the bag over his head?
COOK: (laughing)
[CI]: Who put the bag over the head?
COOK: The Mexican dude.
[CI]: And what’d you do?
COOK: Held his hands.
[CI]: And what did the black dude do?
COOK: He held his feet.

Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 52–54; vol. II, at 267–69.

Though initially indicating Melgar-Diaz was the “ring leader,” the excerpt

reveals Cook promptly backed off from that portrayal. Moreover, throughout the

relevant portions of his statement, Cook rather than seeking to shift blame repeatedly

opined that because all three men were involved in Gantz’s murder, none of them

could say anything. See Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 52; vol. II, at 267 (“[W]e all involved,

35
homie. That’s the good thing. It ain’t like just one of us.”); vol. I, at 55; vol. II, at

270 (“I could see if I was the only one, or he was the only one, but he, we all had

something to do with it, so we all can’t say nothin’.”); vol. I, at 65; vol. II, at 280

(Can’t nobody just get up there and say no, he did it.”). Similarly, Cook spoke of

“how we planned . . . [to] get the bag on this nigger” because “this nigger snitched,”

directly after he commented on the lack of a “plot.” As for Cook’s comment that the

three men “was just playin’ really,” any suggestion that Gantz’s murder was an

accident, or as the district court said “not intentional,” is a gross misreading of

Cook’s statement in context. The events as Cook reported them to CI belie any such

notion. Cook repeatedly boasted that, due to the lack of available evidence, he was

not concerned about a possible criminal prosecution. His remark “[b]ut what can

they do? . . . They can’t do nothin’. That was a clean one right there. That’s what

you call clean, homie. . . . Clean. If, if it is evi – we was all in the room. What

evidence could it be, my nigger?”, is hardly that of a man involved in an accidental

death. Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 66; vol. II, at 281. Rather, the remark illustrates Cook’s

defiant attitude as also illustrated by his comment: “If I was worried my nigger, they

can bring that shit on, but they ain’t gonna have nothin’ . . . .” Aplt’s App. vol. I,

at 64; vol. II, at 279. Cook went so far as to suggest, if not outright acknowledge,

that Gantz’s death was the result of a crime: “[E]verything on the, on, on, on the,

ah...evidence thing, the crime scene no good. You see what I’m sayin’? . . .

Nothin’. Nothin’. They can’t do none of that, homie. Ain’t no prints, ain’t no none

36
of that dog.” Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 66; vol. II, at 281.

Apart from these three arguably exculpatory, or perhaps non-self-inculpatory,

comments, the preceding excerpt itself plainly speaks to a conspiracy to commit

murder, an act of murder, and a motive for murder. 18 While Cook stated he did not

personally hold the bag over Gantz’s head or hold down Gantz’s legs (those Cook

said were the respective tasks of Melgar-Diaz and Defendant Smalls), Cook, as an

alleged co-conspirator, was certainly legally responsible for those acts. See Watson,

525 F.3d at 587; Johnson, 509 F.3d at 202. “Blaming one’s self and someone else

does not necessarily reduce a statement’s trustworthiness . . . .” Watson, 525 F.3d

at 588; see also Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir.1996) (upholding

the admission of an accomplice’s statement implicating himself and two other men

in a murder). These comments as to how precisely Gantz’s murder occurred

are undoubtedly against Cook’s penal interest and, coupled with the circumstances

of their making, trustworthy to the extent required by Rule 804(b)(3). And that

makes them sufficiently against Cook’s penal interest, rendering them admissible

under Rule 804(b)(3).

18
CI’s questions and comments do not constitute hearsay within Fed. R. Evid.
801’s definition because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, but rather are offered to establish their effect on Cook and provide context
for his statement. See Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1434 (10th
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that statements offered for their effect on the listener are not
hearsay). Thus, Fed. R. Evid. 802 does not bar their admission.

37
Of course, Williamson tells us that neither self-exculpatory nor non-self-

inculpatory portions of a statement are admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) as against

penal interest. Rather, Rule 804(b)(3) “cover[s] only those declarations or remarks

within the confession that are individually self-inculpatory.” Williamson, 512 U.S.

at 599. Thus, Cook’s remarks suggesting Meglar-Diaz was the “ring leader,” “there

wasn’t even no plot,” and “we was just playin’ really” may need to be extracted from

the self-inculpatory parts of the foregoing excerpt before those parts may be deemed

admissible. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600–01 (explaining the “mere proximity”

of self-exculpatory to self-inculpatory statements does not render the former more

trustworthy). Nonetheless, we can reach but one conclusion in this case: Much of

the foregoing excerpt is sufficiently against Cook’s penal interest such that no

reasonable person would say those things without believing them to be true. Under

the circumstances presented, a reasonable person would not falsely admit to

participating in Gantz’s murder aware of the possibility, however slight, that such

admission could subject him to criminal prosecution and punishment. See United

States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1215 (11th Cir. 2008). 19

19
We use the extended excerpt set forth in part II.C. only as an example. We
do not intend to pass upon the question of whether other parts of Cook’s statement,
considered in context, may also be sufficiently against his penal interest and thus
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). Instead, we leave that question to the district court
to decide in the first instance.

38
Neither do two of Cook’s other arguably exculpatory comments render his

statement inadmissible in its entirety. Immediately prior to describing in some detail

how he sought to cover up the murder by flushing the bag down the toilet, Cook

laughingly remarked “and to tell you the truth, I ain’t did nothin’ (laughs).” Aplt’s

App. vol. I, at 61; vol. II, at 276. That Cook would find his comment amusing is

scarcely surprising given just moments before, Cook told CI that his “story” was that

he played no part in Gantz’s murder and knew nothing about it because he was

asleep: “I don’t know what happened. That’s my story and I’m stickin’ to it, all the

way to the end, homie. I ain’t even gonna make up no stories no more.” Aplt’s App.

vol. I, at 56; vol. II, at 271. Finally, in response to CI’s comment that “there’s a

tradeoff” because Cook only “helped holdin’ on,” Cook remarked: “Yeah. So I’m

justa accessory anyway.” Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 65; vol. II, at 280. While Cook’s

remark is an inaccurate statement of the law because 18 U.S.C. § 2 has abolished the

common law distinction between principals and accessories, his remark from a

layman’s perspective is unremarkable. It simply reinforces Cook’s prior statement

that Melgar-Diaz was the co-conspirator who held the bag over Gantz’s head

while Cook held his hands and Defendant Smalls held his feet. Cook’s remark does

absolutely nothing to negate or lessen his aforementioned role in the self-described

murder.

On remand, the district court should proceed consistent with this opinion and

first determine what parts of Cook’s extended confession are sufficiently against

39
his penal interest and therefore admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The

court should then subject those selected statements not only to Rules 401 and 402’s

relevancy requirements, but also to Rule 403’s balancing test. See Sprint/United

Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (“[Q]uestions of relevance

and prejudice are for the District Court to determine in the first instance.”). In

determining whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs a

relevant statement’s probative value, the district court should remain mindful of our

admonition in United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001):

Unfair prejudice in the Rule 403 context means an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one. The district court has considerable
discretion in performing the Rule 403 balancing test. However,
exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 that is otherwise admissible under
the other rules is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly.

(quotations and citations omitted).

REVERSED and REMANDED. 20

20
The dissent’s analysis of this case misstates the law and warrants little
response. Suffice to say that as inferior federal court judges we are not at liberty to
decide cases on the basis of what we think the law should be. Rather, we are bound
to decide cases on the basis of what the law is. The dissent’s suggestion that we
“misinterpret[] the Confrontation Clause,” and “enable[] the government to use lies
and ruses to skirt the Constitution” and “evade the[] law[] through trickery and
subterfuge” are cutting words to a court bound by a constitutional oath to uphold the
law consistent with the plain dictates of Supreme Court precedent. The law has long
condoned in numerous instances the use of “trickery and subterfuge” by confidential
informants and undercover agents to obtain confessions and other evidence of crime.
As our opinion well explains, where the admissibility of a nontestimonial statement
under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) is at issue, the only question is the likely veracity of
such statement “that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (emphasis
added).

40
09-2126, United States v. Smalls

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

An accused’s right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him

ought not be subverted by subterfuge and trickery. Mr. Cook’s statement was set up

by the government and designed to constitute testimony. A reasonable person, aware

of the true situation, would know that.

I would thus hold that admitting a custodial confession that blames a

co-defendant, where the co-defendant will be unable to confront the declarant,

violates both the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence’s hearsay

rule.

First, the Confrontation Clause forbids the use of this testimony. If Mr. Cook

and Mr. Smalls were tried together, the Confrontation Clause would bar using the

confession against Mr. Smalls. United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968)

(cited with approval, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004)). To avoid

such a violation, the district court severed their trials. The government claims that

severance solved any Confrontation Clause problems. But this is absurd. Severance

does not cure Mr. Smalls’s inability to cross-examine Mr. Cook.

Testimony need not result from formal interrogation. Rather, confessions

elicited by governmental agents are sufficiently formal “when the circumstances

objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary

purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant

to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Here, the government surreptitiously induced Mr. Cook to testify against himself and

others so that the government may prosecute them for a past murder. Any declarant

with full knowledge of the facts would reasonably assume the government could and

would use his words in investigation and prosecution.

The Founders enacted the Confrontation Clause to address exactly this

situation. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 & n.4. They despised the civil law practice in

which the government elicits ex parte confessions from incarcerated accomplices,

uses them in court against an accused, and does not allow the accused to confront the

declarants in court. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43, 49-50. “Involvement of government

officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique

potential for prosecutorial abuse — a fact born out time and again through history

with which the Framers were keenly familiar.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. These

constitutional concerns are present whether or not the declarant knows that the

government is tricking him into admitting his involvement and at the same time

manufacturing “testimony” against another. To accurately and objectively judge this

situation, therefore, a court must consider all the circumstances — including that the

government tricked the declarant and tampered with his reasonable expectations.

The court today, however, misinterprets the Confrontation Clause and renders

it blind to such tactics. By limiting the objective inquiry solely to information

known to the declarant when he spoke, the court enables the government to use lies

and ruses to skirt the Constitution. To the extent other circuits agree with today’s

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holding — that government agents may obtain testimonial evidence by tricking a

declarant, and then introduce it against an accused without allowing the accused to

cross-examine the declarant — they reason wrongly and violate the rights of the

accused. Cf. Davis, 547 U.S. at 826 (disapproving of police evasions of the

Confrontation Clause).

The majority also likens this case to precedents concerning entirely different

situations. Bourjaily v. United States, a conspiracy case pre-dating Crawford,

concerned the admission of a statement unwittingly made to an informant during and

in furtherance of a conspiracy. 483 U.S. 171 (1987); see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).

Admitting that statement “did not violate the Confrontation Clause for the . . . reason

that it was not (as an incriminating statement in furtherance of the conspiracy would

probably never be) testimonial.” Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6

(2008); see also United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (admitting

a co-conspirator’s non-custodial statement that agents had elicited). Likewise, in

Dutton v. Evans, remarks heard by a passive cellmate, who was not a government

agent and who did not elicit any information, were not testimony. 400 U.S. 74,

87-89 (1970).

Radically different and much more serious, in this case (1) Mr. Cook’s listener

was an authorized informant; (2) no court has found by a preponderance of the

evidence that Mr. Cook made the statement during or in furtherance of a conspiracy;

(3) the interrogation took place in jail, after the commission of the crime; (4) the

-3-
informant actively solicited detailed information for use in investigation and

prosecution; and (5) this was not an offhand remark nor a friendly chat.

Second, the district court correctly held that the Federal Rules of Evidence

exclude this confession as hearsay. Fed R. Evid. 802. The court disagrees, holding

that the “statement against interest” exception applies. Fed R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

Under this exception, the hearsay rule does not exclude purely self-inculpatory

statements. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599-600, 603 (1994). Self-

exculpatory statements do not fall under this exception. See Ct. Op. at 28. They are

too unreliable to be admitted, even if mixed with elements of self-inculpation,

because “[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth,

especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory

nature.” Id. at 599-600. “This is especially true when the statement implicates

someone else.” Id. at 601.

Mr. Cook’s confession, while inculpating himself in some ways, was not

purely inculpatory. He did not take full and sole responsibility for the crime.

Rather, he minimized his participation. He equivocated and gave excuses for himself

like, “We was just playin’.” Mr. Cook cast primary responsibility on Mr.

Melgar-Diaz and Mr. Smalls, and claimed that he himself was “justa accessory.”

Statements shifting blame to others are not truly self-inculpatory. Id. at 603. Mr.

Cook’s confession does not fall under the “against interest” exception, in no small

part because a “reasonable person in [his] position might even think that implicating

-4-
someone else would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability.” Id. at 604.

Supreme Court cases surviving Crawford buttress this conclusion. No hearsay

exception firmly roots accomplice confessions inculpating another. Lilly v. Virginia,

527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (plurality opinion) (cited with approval, Crawford, 541

U.S. at 56, 58); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986) (cited with approval,

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58-59). Courts exclude accomplices’ blame-spreading

confessions because they are inherently untrustworthy. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133-34,

137-38. What would give such confessions reliability — that they were so far

against one’s penal interest that no reasonable person would make them — is not

present when a declarant furthers, or at least thinks he is furthering, his own interests

by minimizing his participation and spreading guilt. Id. at 131-32.

Mr. Smalls has the right to confront Mr. Cook if the government uses Mr.

Cook’s confession against him. The Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of

Evidence’s ban on hearsay evidence exist to prevent convictions based upon

untrustworthy and unchallengeable evidence. The court today allows the government

to evade these laws through trickery and subterfuge. In so doing, this court enables

the government to convict Mr. Smalls on an unconstitutional basis.

I thus would exclude Mr. Cook’s statements and affirm the district court.

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