United States v. Smith

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
January 4, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-5085
CLYDE DWAYNE SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 00-CR-150-H)

Barry L. Derryberry, Research and Writing Specialist, Office of the Federal
Public Defender (Paul D. Brunton, Federal Public Defender with him on the brief)
for Defendant-Appellant.

Leena M. Alam, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O’Meilia, United
States Attorney, and Kevin Danielson, Assistant United States Attorney, with her
on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before O’BRIEN, BALDOCK, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
 This appeal presents the interesting question of how to interpret the United

States Sentencing Guidelines when the application notes suggest a broader

interpretation than the plain language.

I.

Defendant Clyde Smith pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and

ammunition after former conviction of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)

calculated his base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(2) of the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, which provides for a base offense level of 24, “if the defendant

committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two

felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). The PSR relied on two prior felony

convictions, one of which was an Oklahoma conviction for receiving or acquiring

proceeds derived from illegal drug activity. Mr. Smith objected to the

classification of his prior conviction as a controlled substance offense.

The district court overruled Mr. Smith’s objection, finding that “certainly it

aids and abets a drug transaction, that somebody concealing proceeds or holding

proceeds of that transaction knowing that it was derived from that transaction.”

The district court then found that Mr. Smith’s offense level of 21, after a 3-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and his criminal history category of V,

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produced a guidelines range of 70-87 months of imprisonment. The court

imposed a sentence of 78 months. Mr. Smith timely filed this appeal challenging

his sentence, and we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

Unlike statutes, regulations, or any other legislative directives of which we

are aware, courts are bound (but for their newly-discovered discretion pursuant to

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005)) not only by

the language of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, but also by

“‘interpretative and explanatory commentary to the guideline’ provided by the

Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Robertson, 350 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th

Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir.

1995)). “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a

guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or

is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v.

United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). Resolution of this case revolves around

the relation between Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2(b) and its explanatory notes.

The Guideline defines “controlled substance offense” as

an offense under federal or state law, punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, that prohibits the manufacture,
import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance
(or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled

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 substance (or a counterfeit substance) with the intent to manufacture,
import, export, distribute, or dispense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). The application note to section 4B1.2 explains that the

definition also encompasses crimes for aiding and abetting, conspiring, and

attempting to commit a controlled substance offense. Id. cmt. n.1.

The Oklahoma statute under which Mr. Smith was convicted provides:

It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to receive or
acquire proceeds and to conceal such proceeds, or engage in
transactions involving proceeds, known to be derived from any
violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act . . .
or of any statute of the United States relating to controlled dangerous
substances as defined by the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act.

63 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-503.1(A). On its face, the Oklahoma statute does not

involve “ the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a

controlled substance.” Nor is the Oklahoma statute one that prohibits aiding and

abetting, conspiring, or attempting to commit the crime of manufacturing,

importing, exporting, distributing, or dispensing a controlled substance – although

some of the acts encompassed within the Oklahoma statute might also be

chargeable under an aiding or abetting, conspiracy, or attempt charge.

If we gave Guideline § 4B1.2(b) a strict and narrow interpretation, we

would therefore be forced to conclude that violations of 63 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-

503.1(A) do not fall within it. That was the approach taken by this Court in

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United States v. Wagner, 994 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. 1993). The issue in

Wagner was whether possession of a listed precursor chemical constituted a

controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2(b). We concluded that the phrase

“offense under federal or state law” refers “directly to the charged offense, not

the charged offense and all relevant conduct.” Id. We found that possession of a

listed precursor chemical did not constitute a controlled substance offense under

this interpretation because the charged offense was not, “by its plain terms, a

federal or state law that prohibits the manufacture or possession of a controlled

substance.” Id. at 1475.

The United States Sentencing Commission did not approve of our decision

in Wagner. Rather than amend the text of the Guideline or of Commentary note

1, 1 however, the Commission simply added one more example of an included

offense to the application note. Now, the application note states that

1
The Commission might, for example, have amended the Guideline to read
something like:
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by a term of imprisonment of
more than one year, that involves the manufacture, import, export, distribution,
or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with the intent
to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.

As an alternative, it might have amended Commentary note 1 to explain that the
definition also encompasses conviction for conduct that could be charged on a theory of
aiding and abetting, conspiring, or attempting to commit a controlled substance offense.

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“[u]nlawfully possessing a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a controlled

substance . . . is a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, app. C,

amend. 568.

This presents an interpretive difficulty. The language of the Guideline

itself still looks as categorical as ever, but it is apparent that the Commission does

not read it that way. If it did, then possession of a listed chemical with intent to

manufacture a controlled substance would not be included. Moreover, several

other examples listed in the explanatory note similarly suggest a broader

interpretation of the Guideline. These include possession of a prohibited flask or

equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, maintaining any

place for the purpose of facilitating a drug offense, and using a communications

facility in committing, causing, or facilitating a drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2

app. C. By including these examples in the application note, the Sentencing

Commission necessarily implies that the phrase “offense under federal or state

law” encompasses more than a strict reference to the terms of the statute of

conviction. Although a strict reading of the language of the Guideline appears

narrower than the application notes may suggest, we cannot say (and the parties

do not argue) that the notes so far depart from the language of the Guideline that

they are “inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of [the] guideline.”

See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38. Indeed, one Court of Appeals has adopted a broad

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definition of “controlled substance offense” as including any crime that

“facilitates” a controlled substance offense. United States v. Shabazz, 233 F.3d

730, 733 (3d Cir. 2000)). We need not go that far; the application notes can be

understood as including within the Guideline convictions for conduct that could

have been charged as a controlled substance offense, or as aiding and abetting,

conspiring, or attempting to commit a controlled substance offense. In any event,

our interpretation of the definition of “controlled substance offense” in Wagner is

no longer consistent with the amended sentencing guidelines.

We must therefore assess Mr. Smith’s conviction under 63 Okla. Stat. Ann.

§ 2-503.1(A) in light of an interpretation of the Guideline informed by the

application notes. Where, as here, the statutory language defining the underlying

offense is ambiguous or broad enough to criminalize some acts that fall within the

Guideline and some that do not, then we must look to the charging documents, the

judgment, the plea agreement, plea colloquy, and other findings of fact adopted

by the defendant upon entering the plea. See Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct.

1254, 1259-60 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); cf.

United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 764 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying this

approach to determine whether a prior offense qualifies as a crime of violence).

As noted above, the Oklahoma statute under which Mr. Smith was convicted

provides:

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 It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to receive or
acquire proceeds and to conceal such proceeds, or engage in
transactions involving proceeds, known to be derived from any
violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act . . .
or of any statute of the United States relating to controlled dangerous
substances as defined by the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act.

63 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-503.1(A). S ome but not all conduct prohibited by the

Oklahoma statute falls within the guidelines definition, as fleshed out by the

interpretive notes. For example, a person who knowingly receives proceeds from

an illegal drug sale might well be engaged in the distribution of a controlled

substance. Therefore, we must look to the charging documents, plea agreement,

and plea colloquy to determine whether Mr. Smith’s prior Oklahoma conviction

constituted a controlled substance offense. The information charged Mr. Smith

with “unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully, while acting in concert [with

another], receiving money derived from one Pat Dunlop during a drug

transaction.” Appellee Addendum of Ex., Ex. 1, Information. During the plea

colloquy, Mr. Smith admitted that he received fifty dollars in drug money from

selling cocaine at an apartment complex in Tulsa County. Both the information

and the plea colloquy therefore demonstrate that Mr. Smith distributed a

controlled substance. Consequently, he committed a controlled substance offense

under § 4B1.2(b) of the guidelines. Because Mr. Smith’s conviction for receipt of

proceeds derived from illegal drug activity was his second controlled substance

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offense, the district court properly found that his base offense level was 24. See

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the

district court.

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