United States v. Smithers

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 93-1584

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DILLARD JACKIE SMITHERS,
a/k/a "Jackie", Jr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

(July 18, 1994)

Before GOLDBERG, HIGGINBOTHAM, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

We reverse Dillard Jack Smithers' convictions for assisting

and conspiring in his brother's escape and remand for a new trial.

We grapple with the concept that at some point an escape is

complete and assisting the fleeing felon may constitute the crime

of harboring a fugitive but not assisting the escape.

I.

Jimmy Smithers escaped from the Federal Correctional

Institution in Seagoville, Texas. Despite the reality that for

federal prisoners escape often may be little more than turning off

the television and walking away, the crime remains that of escape.

In April 1992, Jimmy Smithers' wife, Libby, began liquidating her
property and left her Texas home. While away, she executed a power

of attorney authorizing Dillard Jack Smithers, Jimmy's brother, to

sell what remained. Jack sold almost everything in Libby's house

and sent her money from the sales.

On August 24, 1992, Jack and Libby visited Jimmy at

Seagoville. The next morning, Libby and her daughter went to the

house of Cathy Curry, Jack's longtime girlfriend, to pick up a

flatbed truck belonging to Jimmy. Jack was there, although he

usually worked at that time, and backed the truck out for Libby.

That evening, Jack and Curry went to the house where Libby was

staying, where Jack helped load Libby's suitcase and some tools

into his van. Libby told her daughter that she was going on a

canoe trip and then left in Jack's van.

On August 26 Jimmy walked away from a work detail and drove

away in a truck containing clothes and money. He soon left that

truck and then, either in the flatbed truck or another vehicle,

picked up Libby and drove north. In Oklahoma, they stopped to buy

a travel trailer for $3,000 cash, and were seen driving his flatbed

truck.

On December 15, 1992, U.S. Marshals executed a search warrant

on Curry's house and recovered a receipt for an express mail

package sent to "Libby Shull" in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, a small town

near the Canadian border. During questioning, Curry said that Jack

told her she should not send anything else because that was "the

quickest way for them to get caught." The marshals also searched

2
Jack's home and found a sketch allegedly showing positions for

Jimmy's getaway vehicles.

U.S. Marshals captured Jimmy and Libby in Bonners Ferry on

December 15, 1992. In their trailer, marshals found money bands

that had held cash. They also found a calendar and expense book

indicating that Jack had sent the couple $200 after the escape.

Jack Smithers was charged in two counts of a four count

indictment that also named Jimmy, Libby, and Curry. Count 1

charged Jack with conspiring1 to commit the crimes of escape,2

assisting an escape,3 and harboring or concealing a fugitive.4

Count 3 charged him with the substantive offense of assisting an

escape. Jimmy and Libby pled guilty to the offenses for which they

were charged, while Jack and Curry went to trial.

At trial, Jack conceded that he had sent Jimmy and Libby money

after the escape, and that he had known their location but had not

disclosed it to law enforcement officers. The court instructed the

jurors that these acts, standing alone, could not constitute the

crime of harboring and concealing. The jury found Jack Smithers

and Cathy Curry guilty on Counts 1 and 3. Jack received an 18

month prison sentence. This appeal followed.

II.

1
18 U.S.C. § 371.
2
18 U.S.C. § 751.
3
18 U.S.C. § 752(a).
4
18 U.S.C. § 1072.

3
 Smithers argues that the trial court erred by not instructing

that the crime of aiding an escape ends once immediate active

pursuit of the escapee ends,5 citing the Ninth Circuit case of

United States v. Vowiell.6 He contends that the jury could have

based his conviction on events after his brother eluded pursuit in

Texas. The government counters that Vowiell conflicts with United

States v. Bailey,7 in which the Supreme Court held that the crime

of escape is a continuing crime.8 Because escape is a continuing

crime, argues the government, any aid to a known fugitive is

criminal as well.

Smithers has the stronger position. The predecessor of the

current statute defined both the offense of assisting escape and

the offense of harboring and concealing a fugitive.9 Cases

5
The requested instruction said: "The crime of aiding an
escape terminates once the escapee has reached temporary safety.
When physical control over the escape has ended by flight beyond
immediate active pursuit, the escape is complete. After that point
in time, aid to the fugitive is no longer aiding the escape,
although it may be evidence of harboring and concealing."
6
869 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1989).
7
100 S. Ct. 624 (1980).
8
Id. at 636.
9
The statute provided:

Whoever shall rescue or attempt to rescue, from the
custody of any officer or person lawfully assisting him,
any person arrested upon a warrant or other process
issued under the provisions of any law of the United
states, or shall, directly or indirectly, aid, abet, or
assist any person so arrested to escape from the custody
of such officer or other person, or shall harbor or
conceal any person for whose arrest a warrant or process
has been so issued, so as to prevent his discovery and
arrest, after notice or knowledge of the fact that a

4
interpreting that statute distinguished the levels of culpability

required by its different clauses, noting that the statute made

"any degree of assistance . . . criminal in the matter of aiding an

escape, but when dealing with preventing detection of a fugitive,

Congress used more limited language . . . ."10 The move from

assisting to harboring and concealing occurred when the escapee

eluded immediate pursuit.11

Subsequent amendments12 split that statute into two parts. The

language about assisting escape moved to 18 U.S.C. § 752,13 and the

language about harboring and concealing moved to 18 U.S.C. § 1072.14

warrant or process has been issued for the apprehension
of such person, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 246 (1940 ed.).
10
United States v. Shapiro, 113 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1940).
11
United States v. Orth, 252 F. 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1918). See
also Shapiro, 113 F.2d at 893. See generally Wayne R. LaFave &
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.9(a) (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing the development of the offense of "accessory after the
fact").
12
The Reviser's Notes for both section 752 and 1072 indicate
that the new statutes "consolidate" provisions formerly codified in
several places.
13
The relevant provision reads: "Whoever rescues or attempts
to rescue or instigates, aids or assists the escape, or attempt to
escape, of any person . . . committed to the custody of the
Attorney General or to any institution or facility by his
direction, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of .
. . conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . ."
14
"Whoever willfully harbors or conceals any prisoner after his
escape from the custody of the Attorney General or from a Federal
penal or correctional institution, shall be imprisoned not more
than three years."

5
Courts continued to recognize that acts such as failing to disclose

a fugitive's location and giving small amounts of financial

assistance to a fugitive do not constitute the crime of harboring

and concealing.15 Further, the new harboring and concealing statute

requires that the act of harboring or concealing a fugitive occur

"after his escape" from custody, underscoring the statement in

earlier cases that harboring begins once immediate pursuit has

ended.

United States v. Bailey does not undermine that distinction.

Bailey and the cases it cites hold that a fugitive asserting a

defense of duress or necessity cannot remain away once the events

forcing his absence from custody end. For example, when a prisoner

scales the wall because others forced him to do so, the offense of

escape is committed when the duress has ended and the prisoner

fails to return, even though it was not committed when the prisoner

went over the wall.16 In this practical sense the offense is said

to be continuing. That construction of section 751, in the context

of analyzing the defenses of duress and necessity, does not define

the term "escape" in sections 752 and 1072. Applying it to those

statutes would read section 1072 out of existence, because it would

then be impossible to harbor a fugitive "after his escape."17

15
See, e.g., United States v. Stacey, 896 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir.
1990) (citing United States v. Magness, 456 F.2d 976, 978 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Fox, 416 F.2d 940, 941 (7th Cir. 1969)).
16
100 S.Ct. at 636.
17
See State v. Martinez, 781 P.2d 306 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989)
(distinguishing New Mexico harboring and concealing statute from
the federal one because of this language in the federal statute).

6
 The government points to the difficulty of determining when

immediate active pursuit has ended. But this determination is no

more difficult than the fact-intensive inquiry Bailey requires as

to when a defense of necessity or duress ceases to be good.18 This

criticism is better directed to Congress.

III.

Because we find that the requested instruction was

substantively correct, we next ask whether the charge given to the

jury substantially covered the requested instruction, and whether

failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired

Smithers' ability to present a given defense.19 Smithers contends

that omitting the instruction kept him from defending himself by

offering innocent explanations for his activity before the escape.

The government does not dispute that Smithers would have been

prejudiced if he was unable to argue this defense. Rather, the

government contends that the charge substantially covered Smithers'

requested instruction because it did not expressly allow the jury

to convict for assisting escape on acts taken after immediate

pursuit ended. This argument fails because part of the definition

of the crime of assisting escape is that it cannot occur after

18
See Bailey, 100 S. Ct. at 635-36 (noting that an
indispensable element" of a duress or necessity defense is proof of
"a bona fide effort to return to custody as soon as the claimed
duress or necessity has lost its coercive force").
19
United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Grissom, 645 F.2d 461, 464-65 (5th Cir. Unit A May
1981).

7
immediate pursuit ends. An instruction need not affirmatively

misstate an offense to be erroneous.

The dissent suggests that the charge obviated the need for

Smithers' instruction because it required the jury to find that he

"aided in the escape of Jimmy Arnold Smithers," and specified that

his assistance took place "in or about August 1992 and continuing

through at least on or about August 26, 1992."23 The words "in or

about" and "at least on or about" imply that the assistance could

have taken place at any time, and do not preclude the jury from

finding that aid to the escape occurred after the escape took

place. Further, having the court specify the dates when assistance

could occur invades the province of the jury by taking from it the

fact-intensive question of when an escape ends.

In a similar vein, the government contends that the closing

arguments about the charge advanced Smithers' interpretation of the

law. Closing argument is part of the totality of circumstances

considered in deciding if an omitted instruction has substantially

impaired a defendant's ability to advance a particular defense.24

The arguments in this case, however, do not compensate for the lack

of instruction.25 The prosecution never addressed the issue except

to make a cryptic reference to "assistance pre-escape," which did

not foreclose the jury from finding that assistance also took place

23
The charge is reproduced in footnote 2 of the dissent.
24
Rubio, 834 F.2d at 449.
25
See United States v. Stowell, 953 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Burroughs, 876 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir.
1989).

8
post-escape. Smithers' lawyer briefly summarized his theory and

then, acknowledging that it was "rather technical," told the jury

that it might "have to read the charge again and study it some

more." The charge, of course, made no reference to his theory.

Curry's lawyer explained the same theory by urging that "everything

but harboring and concealing was over after August 26 according to

the government's indictment" when the indictment did not draw such

a conclusion. We view this somewhat confused argument as being

caused by, rather than filling, a gap in the charge.

The government also contends that an erroneous instruction on

an element of an offense can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,

if, given the factual circumstances of the case, the jury could not

have found the defendant guilty without making the proper factual

finding as to that element.26 That rule does not apply to the

verdict form used in this case, because we cannot tell from the

jury's answers how it evaluated the evidence about Smithers'

actions before the escape.27

The flaw with this conviction also undermines the conspiracy

conviction. The general verdict form allowed conviction for

conspiracy to commit any one of several offenses. The jury did not

have proper guidance as to one.28 We thus reverse the conspiracy

26
United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1521 (5th Cir. 1992).
27
See Burroughs, 876 F.2d at 370. See also United States v.
Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1989).
28
See Griffin v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 466, 474 (1991)
(noting that "legal error" includes the situation where "a
particular theory of conviction . . . fails to come within the
statutory definition of the crime").

9
conviction because it rested on legally insufficient grounds.29

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

29
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957).

10
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The issue before us is whether the district court abused its

discretion in failing to submit Smithers' proposed instruction.30

Both the proposed instruction and the instruction which was given31

30
Smithers requested the following jury instruction:

The crime of aiding an escape terminates once the escapee has
reached temporary safety. When physical control over the escapee
has ended by flight beyond immediate active pursuit, the escape is
complete. After that point in time, aid to the fugitive is no
longer aiding the escape, although it may be evidence of harboring
and concealing.
31
The trial court submitted in pertinent part the following jury
instructions:

To assist you in determining whether there was a conspiracy to (1)
effect the escape of Jimmy Arnold Smithers from the Federal
Correctional Institution at Seagoville, Texas; (2) instigate, aid,
and assist, and attempt to instigate, aid, and assist, and attempt
to instigate, aid and assist, the escape of Jimmy Arnold Smithers;
and (3) willfully harbor and conceal prisoner Jimmy Arnold Smithers
after his escape from the custody of a federal correctional
institution, I will now explain to you the elements of these object
offenses. . . . The second object of the conspiracy charged in
count 1 is instigating, aiding, and assisting escape, or attempting
to do so. The elements of this crime are set out in instructions in
count 3 below. . . . The third object of the conspiracy charged in
count 1 is willfully harboring and concealing. The elements of this
crime are:
First: That one or more persons harbored and concealed Jimmy
Arnold Smithers after his escape from the custody of the
Federal Correctional Institution at Seagoville, Texas, as
charged in the indictment; and
Second: That Jimmy Arnold Smithers was in federal custody and
departed from the Federal Correctional Institution at
Seagoville, Texas without permission.

The term "harbor" commonly means to give refuge to, shelter, lodge,
care for, or protect. The term "conceal" commonly means to hide;
secrete; or keep out of sight, discovery, or knowledge. The term
"custody" means the detention of an individual by virtue of lawful
process or authority.

Under these definitions, to "harbor" or "conceal" requires some
affirmative act of providing aid to a prisoner to avoid detection or
apprehension. Thus, failure to disclose a prisoner's location or

11
state that at some point an escape ends.3 Thus, the issue is not

giving financial assistance to an escaped prisoner could not,
standing alone, constitute harboring or concealing.
The Charge in Count 3 of the
Indictment
(Instigating, Aiding and
Assisting Escape)
Count 3 of the indictment charges that in or about August 1992 and
continuing through at least on or about August 26, 1992, in the
Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere,
defendants Lizbeth Shull Smithers and Dillard Jack Smithers, Jr.,
aided and abetted by each other and by others, knowingly and
willfully aided and assisted in the escape of Jimmy Arnold Smithers
from Seagoville Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville, Texas,
after he had been committed to the custody of that institution by
direction of the Attorney General, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 752(a) and 2.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 752(a) provides in pertinent
part:

Whoever . . . instigates, aids or assists the escape . . . of
any person . . . committed to the custody of the Attorney
General or to any institution or facility by his direction,
shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of . . . [a]
conviction of any offense, be [guilty of an offense against
the United States].
Thus, § 752(a) makes it a crime for any person to instigate, aid or
assist in the escape of any person who is in federal custody. For
you to find defendant Dillard Jack Smithers, Jr. guilty of the crime
of aiding and assisting an escape, you must be convinced that the
government has proven each of the following four elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First: that defendant Jimmy Arnold Smithers was in federal
custody;
Second: that defendant Jimmy Arnold Smithers was in such
custody at an institution or facility where he was confined by
the direction of the Attorney General for conviction of an
offense;
Third: that defendant Dillard Jack Smithers, Jr. instigated,
aided or assisted in the escape of Jimmy Arnold Smithers; and
Fourth: that defendant Jimmy Arnold Smithers knew he did not
have permission to leave federal custody.
The term "custody" means the detention of an individual by virtue of
lawful process or authority.
Also, in your consideration of count 3, the defendant Dillard Jack
Smithers, Jr. may be found guilty if you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the offense himself or caused its commission
through or with others (see instructions on aiding and abetting
below) (emphasis added).

12
the continuity of the escape,4 but the more troublesome question))at

what point does an escape end. The majority opinion concludes that

the tension between 18 U.S.C. § 752(a) (assisting an escape) and 18

U.S.C. § 1072 (harboring or concealing a fugitive) requires an

additional instruction to the jury))that an escape ends when the

escapee reaches "temporary safety" that is,5 at the completion of

"immediate active pursuit."6 I disagree.

"Smithers argues that the trial court erred by not instructing

that the crime of aiding an escape ends once immediate active

3
The district court instructed the jury that in order to convict Jack
Smithers of Count 1 (third object of the conspiracy, harboring and concealing)
it had to find "[t]hat one or more persons harbored and concealed Jimmy Smithers
after the escape . . . ." See supra note 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1072 ("Whoever
willfully harbors or conceals any prisoner after his escape from the custody of
the Attorney General or from a Federal penal or correctional institution,
. . . .") (emphasis added). In contrast, the district court instructed the jury
that in order to convict Jack Smithers of Counts 1 (second object of the
conspiracy, assisting an escape) and 3 (assisting an escape), it had to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, he "instigated, aided or assisted in the escape of
Jimmy Arnold Smithers." See supra note 2 (emphasis added).
4
I agree with the majority, that from the prospective of one who
assists or harbors an escapee, that "United States v. Bailey does not undermine"
the distinction that harboring occurs "after the escape." See slip op. at 6;
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) ("[W]e think it clear beyond
peradventure that escape from federal custody as defined in § 751(a) is a
continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return
to custody as well as for his initial departure."); slip op. at 6 ("In this
practical sense the offense [under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (escape)] is said to be
continuing.").
5
I question whether instructing a jury that "an escape terminates once
the escapee has reached temporary safety" is factually equivalent to instructing
it that the escape is complete "when physical control over the escapee has ended
by flight beyond immediate active pursuit." But see infra note 6. The former
focuses on the escapee (reaching temporary safety); while the latter, on the
pursuer (immediate active pursuit). The purposed instruction is confusing at
best.
6
See United States v. Vowiell, 869 F.2d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 1989)
("The crime of aiding an escape terminates once the escapee has reached temporary
safety: `When the physical control has ended by flight beyond immediate active
pursuit the escape is complete. After that aid to the fugitive is no longer
aiding his escape.'") (quoting Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566, 568 (4th Cir.
1918) (citations omitted)). But see supra note 5 (Is reaching "temporary safety"
factually equivalent to the completion of "immediate active pursuit"?).

13
pursuit of the escapee ends, . . . ." Slip op. at 3-4. Thus,

"[h]e contends that the jury could have based his conviction on

events [which occurred in late October and November 1992]7 after

his brother eluded pursuit in Texas." Id. at 4. In his brief,

Smithers states:

During closing argument, Dillard Jack Smithers' counsel
conceded that his client sent Jimmy and Libby Smithers
money, and failed to disclose their location to law
enforcement. The trial court instructed the jurors that
these acts, standing alone, could not constitute
harboring and concealing an escapee. However, in order
that the jury not erroneously conclude that these acts
constitute aiding the escape, Dillard Jack Smithers
requested that the trial court instruct the jurors that
the crime of aiding an escape terminates once the escapee
has reached a point of temporary safety.8

Appellant's Brief at 8 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the

operative instruction which we must examine is not the instruction

on the third object of the conspiracy))harboring and concealing

"after his escape"))but rather, the second object))assisting "in the

escape."9 See supra note 2.

Important to this analysis is that the district court

correctly instructed the jury on the charges contained in Counts 1

(second object of the conspiracy) and 3 of the indictment and

7
See Record on Appeal vol. 6, at 38-39, 120-21.
8
Thus, Smithers concedes, to the extent there is any evidence of
harboring and concealing an escapee, the trial court's instruction to the
jury))that "failure to disclose a prisoner's location or giving financial
assistance to an escaped prisoner could not, standing alone, constitute harboring
or concealing"))correctly limited the jury's consideration on that object of the
conspiracy. See supra note 2.
9
Furthermore, since the first object of the conspiracy))escape))was
directed at the acts of Jimmy Smithers, see Record on Appeal Vol. 2, at 379-80,
the only object of the conspiracy on which Jack Smithers could have been
convicted, given his concession on harboring and concealing, is the second
object))assisting Jimmy's escape.

14
limited the jury's considerations to events occurring "in or about

August 1992 and continuing through at least on or about10 August 26,

1992", the date of Jimmy's escape.11 See id. Moreover, all of the

parties understood the court's instruction to limit the evidence to

events on or before August 26 and argued that understanding to the

jury.12

Secondly, the trial court instructed the jury that it must

find, beyond a reasonable doubt, "that defendant Dillard Jack

Smithers, Jr. instigated, aided or assisted in the escape of Jimmy

Arnold Smithers." See id. Thus, to the extent that Smithers

contends "[t]he jury may nevertheless have concluded that there was

10
The district court further instructed the jury:

You will note that the indictment charges that the offenses were
committed `on or about' certain dates. The proof need not establish
with certainty the exact date of an alleged offense. It is
sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that an offense was committed on a date reasonably
near the date alleged.

See id. at 371.
11
I disagree with the majority's view that events occurring in late
October and November 1992 are reasonably near "at least on or about August 26,
1992". See also infra note 12 and accompanying text.
12
See Record on Appeal vol. 8, at 49 (Smithers' attorney stated in
closing argument: "Assisting the escape means assisting the escape from the
institution. Don't confuse that with harboring and concealing. The bottom line
I submit is that you should only convict Smithers if you believe that he knew
about it in advance, the escape in advance or assisted it in advance or according
to an instruction you will find in the conspiracy charge if he joined a
conspiracy with full knowledge of its scope and all of that was done in
furtherance of the conspiracy."); id. at 62-63 (Curry's attorney stated: "And
everything but harboring and concealing was over after August 26 according to the
government's indictment. The escape was on the 26th. All over after the 26th
except the harboring and concealing."); id. at 71 (The prosecutor argued: "Been
a lot of language about Jimmy Smithers leaving the federal penitentiary at
Seagoville. He escaped. He escaped with the assistance of these two defendants.
And the assistance pre-escape, here is some of the items. . . . The liquidation,
the loading of the blue van, the visitation, the chicken scratch map, the blue
van again because it mysteriously appears back at Papa Bear's, the telephone
calls, look at those telephone bills, at the patterns that they present to
you.").

15
sufficient evidence that he conspired to aid the escape by

improperly considering evidence of assistance rendered after the

escapee reached a point of temporary safety," Appellant's Brief at

14, the trial court correctly limited the jury's consideration to

those events surrounding Jimmy's escape on or about August 26.13

Moreover, Smithers concedes "[arguing] in his closing

statement that the jury should only find that he aided the escape

if he rendered assistance to the escapee prior to the escape,"

although he maintains that "without the requested instruction the

jury was free to disregard [this argument]." Appellant's Reply

Brief at 4 (citation omitted). Given the instruction which the

trial court gave on assisting the escape, the jury was not free "to

disregard" Smithers' argument.

I also disagree that Smithers' proposed instruction, see supra

note 1, is a correct statement of the law. This added definition

has no statutory or legislative history support and very little

common law support.14 Had Congress desired to define that exact

13
To the extent, however, that Smithers argues that evidence that he
"sent Jimmy . . . money, and failed to disclose [his] location" is irrelevant to
the conspiracy or substantive count of assisting the escape, he is mistaken:
This evidence is, at least, relevant to prove "motive, . . . intent, plan,
knowledge, . . . , or absence of mistake or accident." See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
14
Orth cites "2 Wharton, Cr. L. 2606; 1 Russell on Crimes, 467; 10
R.C.L. 579; Smith v. State, 8 Ga. App. 297, 68 S.E. 1071; State v. Ritchie, 107
N.C. 857, 12 S.E. 251," Orth, 252 F. at 568, while Vowiell cites, "Orth v. United
States, 252 F. 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1918); see Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure
§ 1370 (1957) (assistance after completion of escape makes one guilty as an
accessory after the fact and not as a party to the offense of escape); 4
Wharton's Criminal Law §§ 664-665 (1981) (emphasizing departure, rather than
absence, from legal custody as hallmark of escape and prison breach); see also
United States v. Randolph, 261 F.2d 234, 237 (7th Cir. 1958) (distinguishing
aiding an escape from post-escape concealment under Illinois law)." Vowiell, 869
F.2d at 1268. None of the cited authority supports the conclusion that Congress
intended to define "after the escape" in this manner.

16
point when an escape ends, it clearly knew how to do so: The

majority demands more precision than the applicable statute

requires. Furthermore, the language of the proposed instruction

is, at best, confusing. See supra note 5. Accordingly, the

district court did not abuse its discretion by not submitting

Smithers' proposed instruction.15

Respectfully, I dissent.

15
See United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 447 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that in deciding whether the district court abused its discretion by not
giving a requested instruction, we must determine whether the requested
instruction: (1) is a correct statement of the law; (2) was substantially given
in the charge as a whole; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial, the
omission of which seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present a given
defense effectively).

17