F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
MAR 31 1999
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 98-5088
THAO DINH LE,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. CR-97-84-H)
Mark D. Lyons (Kevin Danielson with him on the briefs), Lyons & Clark, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Neal B. Kirkpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen C. Lewis, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellee.
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
On December 12, 1997, after the district court denied his motion to
suppress evidence, Thao Dinh Le pled guilty to the following offenses:
(1) possessing firearms while being a user of unlawful controlled substances, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); (2) possessing unregistered destructive
devices, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); and (3) carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Le
now appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 2, 1997, pursuant to a state search warrant issued June 27, 1997
(“the state warrant”), which authorized a search of Le’s residence for
methamphetamine, officers of the Tulsa Police Department (TPD) entered Le’s
residence. Because the state law enforcement officers had some reason to believe
that explosives and other weapons might be present at the residence, they had
previously notified a TPD K-9 bomb-sniffing squad and agents from the federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that their services might be
required at some point during the search. Upon entering the residence, officers
discovered methamphetamine and other controlled substances, as well as a
stockpile of explosives and other assorted military-style ordnance, including the
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following: four different varieties of rifle grenades; a Claymore mine; hand
grenades; smoke grenades; five different types of machine guns; plastic
explosives, TNT, and detonating cord; and a grenade launcher. Upon discovering
the explosives, TPD officers called in the K-9 team and the ATF agents. TPD
officers did not seize the explosives, but they did seize controlled substances,
several firearms, and other assorted items.
Later that day, based on the explosives and weapons that they had seen
while at Le’s residence with the TPD officers, federal agents obtained a federal
search warrant to again enter Le’s residence, this time to search for and seize
explosives (“the federal residence warrant”). This warrant was executed in the
evening hours of July 2, and federal agents seized the explosives and heavy
weapons discovered earlier in the day.
At about the same time that the TPD officers were executing the state
warrant, a combined force of TPD officers and ATF agents stopped Le as he was
driving his truck through Tulsa. The purpose of this stop was to execute a search
warrant, issued June 27, 1997, for samples of Le’s blood and hair (“the blood and
hair warrant”). This warrant contained an unusual provision which ordered Le, if
he refused to provide the samples, to appear before the district court to show
cause why he had not complied with the warrant. During this stop, Le was
arrested and taken into custody, and the samples were taken.
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Also during the day on July 2, ATF agents executed another federal
warrant, also issued June 27. This warrant (“the first federal business warrant”)
authorized agents to search Le’s business, Cadre Supplies, Inc., for records and
documents relating to firearms transactions. During the execution of this warrant,
agents seized stacks of documents, including log books, phone message books,
and other records. While on the business premises, agents discovered boxes of
weapons and weapon parts, and they contacted an agent of the U.S. Department of
Defense, who came to the business and examined the weaponry to determine if
the items were stolen military equipment. The Defense agent determined that
many of the weapons were indeed stolen. However, no weaponry was seized at
the business on July 2.
On August 4, 1997, ATF agents executed yet another search warrant for
Le’s business (“the second federal business warrant”), this one issued on August
4 and authorizing a search for machine guns, silencers, grenade hulls, night vision
equipment, and other assorted weaponry seen at the business by the agents who
executed the July 2 search. While at the business on August 4, agents seized
many such items.
Soon after the initial searches and seizures, a federal grand jury returned a
nine-count indictment against Le, based upon the evidence gleaned from the
various searches of Le’s residence and business. Le was charged with the
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following offenses: (1) possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(j); (2) unlawful possession of machine guns, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o); (3) possession of firearms while being a user of unlawful controlled
substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); (4) possession of stolen
explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 842(h); (5) possession of unregistered
destructive devices, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); (6)-(8) three counts of
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (9) possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation
of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
Le then filed a motion to suppress evidence and two supplemental motions
to suppress evidence, challenging all five of the warrants issued in this case. Le
challenged the state warrant on four grounds, claiming that (1) insufficient
probable cause existed in the warrant’s underlying affidavit; (2) under Oklahoma
law, which he asserted controlled the question, the search was impermissible
because the affidavit did not state the last time that contraband was observed at
Le’s residence; (3) the warrant itself was not sufficiently particular, because it
made no mention of the explosives found in the house and seized; and (4) the
officers exceeded the permissible scope of the warrant.
Le challenged the federal residence warrant on the ground that, because it
made mention of only one type of explosive device, it was not particular enough,
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and on the ground that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. Le also
challenged the first federal business warrant, arguing that the warrant’s affidavit
did not convey to the magistrate sufficient probable cause, that the warrant was
not sufficiently particular, and that the officers executing the warrant exceeded
the warrant’s scope. In his motions to suppress, Le also challenged the second
federal business warrant, but apparently abandoned this challenge by stipulation
with the government. 1
1
The district court, in its order disposing of Le’s motion to suppress,
declined to address Le’s objections to the second federal business warrant and the
federal residence warrant, because “[t]he suppression issues with respect to these
search warrants were resolved by stipulation between” the parties. Appellant’s
App. at 18 n.2. The district court’s assertion that these issues were resolved by
stipulation is only partially correct. Le’s attorney, when asked by the judge to
make his argument relating to the second federal business warrant, stated as
follows:
Your Honor, I don’t believe there’s anything further we need to offer
at this point. [The prosecutor] and I have talked, and as there’s
nothing at this point that was seized during the August 4th search
warrant that is the subject of a prosecution at this point, . . .
[argument on this issue is] not going to be helpful at this time, so I
don’t think a stipulation is necessary.
Tr. of Hearing on Motions, October 17, 1997, at 249. The government argues
that, by making this statement, Le withdrew his objections to the second federal
business warrant, or at least admitted that any objections Le had to that warrant
were moot. We agree, and, like the district court, decline to address any
objections to this warrant.
However, the district court’s statement that Le’s objections to the federal
residence warrant were also waived is not supported by the record. Indeed, the
(continued...)
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Finally, Le challenged the blood and hair warrant on the ground that the
executing officers had neglected to inform him of the warrant’s unusual provision
allowing him an audience before the district court in the event he refused to
comply with the warrant.
On December 9, 1997, the district court issued an order disposing of Le’s
various objections to the search warrants. The district court granted Le’s motion
to suppress evidence gleaned from the execution of the blood and hair warrant,
ruling that Le should have been apprised of his right to appear before the district
court. However, the district court denied, either on the merits or as moot due to
stipulation, Le’s motion as to the other four warrants.
Following the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress, Le entered
into a plea bargain. The government agreed to dismiss six of the charges, and Le
pled guilty to ( 1) possessing firearms while being a user of unlawful controlled
substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); (2) possessing unregistered
destructive devices, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); and (3) carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). On the first two counts, Le was sentenced to terms of 70
1
(...continued)
government concedes in its brief that “the record is not clear that the government
and Le reached a stipulation regarding that warrant.” Appellee’s Br. at 2. Thus,
our discussion below will include analysis of Le’s objections to the federal
residence warrant.
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months’ imprisonment, with the terms to run concurrently. On the third count, Le
was sentenced to a term of 60 months’ imprisonment, with the term to run
consecutively to the two concurrent 70-month sentences.
Under the terms of the plea agreement, Le also “agree[d] to forfeit and
otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during
the investigation of any of the acts alleged” in the indictment, “including acts to
which the defendant is not pleading guilty.” Appellant’s App. at 112. Before
sentencing, Le filed a motion requesting that the government return the property
seized in the searches. The district court denied this motion by minute order on
April 13, 1998.
Le now appeals from the decisions of the district court. First, advancing
the same arguments that were denied by the district court, Le appeals from that
portion of the district court’s December 9, 1997, order which denied his motion to
suppress. Le also appeals from the district court’s April 13, 1998, minute order
which denied his motion for return of seized property.
DISCUSSION
I. The Search Warrants
We first address Le’s objections to the search warrants. “When reviewing a
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we accept its factual findings
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unless clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” United States v. Hargus , 128 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1526 (1998). It is the province of the trial court to assess
the credibility of witnesses at the suppression hearing and to determine the weight
to be given to the evidence presented, and we must give such determinations due
deference. Id. However, “[t]he ultimate determination of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment . . . is a question of law which we review de novo,
considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
A. The State Warrant
Le raises several issues with respect to the state warrant. First, he claims
that it violated state standards governing admissibility, and that therefore the
evidence yielded therefrom should be inadmissible. Second, he argues that
sufficient probable cause was not set forth in the affidavit to satisfy either federal
or state standards. Third, he argues that the warrant lacked particularity because
it failed to mention the explosives that TPD officers had reason to believe were
present at the residence. Finally, he argues that the executing officers exceeded
the scope of the warrant. We address each of these arguments in turn.
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1. The Legal Standard
As an initial matter, Le argues that state law standards, rather than federal
constitutional standards, should govern the admissibility of evidence seized
pursuant to the state warrant, even though his case is a federal prosecution.
Often, this question is merely academic due to the fact that many state statutes
and constitutional provisions are interpreted co-extensively with their federal
counterparts. See , e.g. , People v. Luttenberger , 784 P.2d 633, 639 (Cal. 1990)
(stating that California “appl[ies] federal standards to decide whether relevant
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant must be excluded”). However, in
some instances states have chosen to interpret their own constitutional guarantees
more strictly than similar federal constitutional provisions. Oklahoma, for
instance, has state law requirements that are, in one aspect relevant to this case,
more exacting than federal standards.
Oklahoma courts require that search warrant affidavits state clearly the
specific dates on which contraband or evidence of a crime was observed on the
premises to be searched. Morris v. State , 617 P.2d 252, 252 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980) (stating that “[w]hen officers seek a search warrant based on information
from a confidential informant, it is required that they be able to say when the
informant obtained his information”). Federal courts, by contrast, which apply a
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“totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,” do not specifically require such
information. Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
It is, however, well established in this circuit that “in federal prosecutions
the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment protected rights
must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of
state police officers.” 2
United States v. Miller , 452 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir.
1971). We have reaffirmed this principle many times since Miller . See , e.g. ,
United States v. Callwood , 66 F.3d 1110, 1112 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Morehead , 959 F.2d 1489, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
Miles , 772 F.2d 613, 615-16 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding the validity of an
Oklahoma state search warrant, using the federal totality of the circumstances
test, even though “[t]he affidavit did not state on what date the informant claimed
2
Nearly every circuit to address the issue is in accord. See United States v.
Bell, 54 F.3d 502, 503-04 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613,
616 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1433-37 (6th Cir.
1994); United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 907 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pforzheimer,
826 F.2d 200, 202-04 (2d Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d
1384, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1993). One commentator has stated that the argument
that state law should provide the standards for admissibility of evidence in federal
prosecutions “has not prevailed,” and that “if either federal or state officers
conduct a search which is illegal under the law of the state where undertaken, the
fruits thereof are not constitutionally barred from evidence in federal courts.” 1
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(c), at 146-47 (3d ed. 1996) (citing
cases). For a discussion of this issue’s contorted judicial history, see Kenneth J.
Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law ,
22 Ga. L. Rev. 667 (1988).
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to have seen the transaction with the stolen guns in the appellant’s home”). The
basis for this principle is that “the exclusionary rule is only concerned with
deterring [federal] Constitutional violations.” United States v. Wright , 16 F.3d
1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1994). Therefore, “[t]he fact that the arrest, search, or
seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards
developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended.” Id. Le’s argument
for the applicability of state law standards simply cannot withstand scrutiny.
Thus, the district court was correct to apply federal constitutional principles
to the issue at hand. The specific requirements of Oklahoma law, such as the
requirement that the affidavit state the specific dates on which criminal activity
was observed on the premises to be searched, are only parts of the totality of the
circumstances which federal courts must consider in determining whether the
affidavits underlying state search warrants are sufficient. See United States v.
Richardson , 86 F.3d 1537, 1544 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that federal courts are to
“conduct an independent inquiry . . . apply[ing] federal law” into the
reasonableness of a search, but that federal courts “are not prohibited from
considering state law, although such consideration may not enlarge nor diminish
federal law” (citation omitted)).
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2. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
When reviewing a magistrate’s finding of probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant, we “must consider the totality of the circumstances and
determine whether the affidavit established the probability that evidence of
criminal activity would be located in the desired search area.” United States v.
Wittgenstein , 163 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 1998) . A magistrate’s
determination that probable cause exists is entitled to “great deference,” and “we
ask only whether the issuing magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for determining
probable cause existed.” Id. at 1172 (quoting Lawmaster v. Ward , 125 F.3d 1341,
1348 (10th Cir. 1997)); see Gates , 462 U.S. at 238-39. Applying this standard,
we conclude that the magistrate’s decision was proper.
The affidavit presented to the state magistrate in this case contained the
following information. The affiant, TPD Officer James Comstock, stated that he
had received information from two different confidential informants, both of
whom provided essentially the same information. The first informant stated that
Le was selling several varieties of drugs from his residence, and that “he had seen
a considerable amount of [methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana] at [Le’s]
residence on numerous occasions, and had bought cocaine and methamphetamine
from [Le], over one-hundred, (100), times in the past couple of years.”
Appellant’s App. at 41. This source also stated that Le “has a gun store” which
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“sells fully automatic fire arms” and that Le “keeps some of these weapons and
ammunition at his residence.” Id. The source stated that, because of Le’s access
to weapons, he “was scared of any repercussions that might occur should [he]
assist officers in any other way.” Id. at 41-42.
The second source corroborated the first, stating that “he has worked for
[Le] in the past, and has bought methamphetamine and cocaine from [Le] on
numerous occasions from both [Le’s] residence and from [Le’s] gun shop,” and
that “he has seen [Le] to have in his possession . . . a kilogram of cocaine.” Id. at
42. This source also stated that he was “scared of [Le] because of his access to
automatic weapons.” Id.
In an effort to corroborate the information received from the two
confidential sources, Comstock ascertained that Le did indeed live at the address
given by both sources; that Le did indeed have a gun shop at the address given by
both sources; and that the gun shop was licensed by the federal government to sell
firearms, including machine guns and silencers. 3
In addition, on June 13, 1997,
3
Le makes much of the fact that Comstock, in the affidavit, states that “Le
owns Cadre Arms” and “Le has a Class III federal firearms license and can sell
automatic weapons.” Appellant’s App. at 42. He argues that he does not actually
own the gun shop, Cadre Supplies, Inc., and notes that Cadre Supplies, Inc.,
rather than Le in his individual capacity, is the actual federal firearms licensee.
In his brief, Le asserts that because some of the corroborating facts are “false,”
the affidavit must be devoid of probable cause. Appellant’s Br. at 37. We think
Le overstates the inaccuracies in the affidavit. While Le may not have “owned”
(continued...)
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Comstock collected the trash that Le left at his curb, and discovered a “used
ziploc baggie with a white powder residue inside of it.” Id. A field test revealed
that the white powder in the baggie was methamphetamine. Id. On June 27,
1997, Comstock again collected Le’s trash, and found two small baggies, similar
to the one found on June 13, but these two baggies had been washed clean. Id.
We think that the information in the affidavit, taken as a whole, supports
the magistrate’s finding that probable cause existed to issue the warrant. The
affidavit contained information provided by two different informants whose
stories were remarkably consistent. “[C]onsistency between the reports of two
independent informants helps to validate both accounts.” United States v.
Schaefer , 87 F.3d 562, 566 (1st Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Fulgham ,
143 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the magistrate’s finding of
probable cause was supported by, among other things, the “reciprocally
corroborative” consistency in the information provided by two separate
3
(...continued)
Cadre Supplies, Inc., he was so essential to the business that soon after Le was
incarcerated “[t]he business . . . closed up.” Tr. of Hearing on Motions, October
3, 1997, at 107 (statement of Le’s attorney, arguing that Le should be released on
bond so that the business could remain solvent). And while the federal firearms
license was not in Le’s individual name, it was in the name of a corporation of
which he was an essential part. We are satisfied that any inaccuracies contained
in the affidavit’s corroborating statements are insubstantial, and that the
statements do corroborate the informants’ assertions that Le was involved in the
purchase and sale of heavy weapons.
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informants); United States v. Pritchard , 745 F.2d 1112, 1121 (7th Cir. 1984)
(stating that “[b]y telling consistent yet independent stories, the informants
provide ‘cross-corroboration,’ and enhance the reliability of the application as a
whole” (citations omitted)). Also, it was against the penal interest of the
informants to provide this type of information to the police, a factor we have
considered indicative of reliability. See United States v. Sturmoski , 971 F.2d
452, 457 (10th Cir. 1992).
In addition, Officer Comstock corroborated the informants’ information,
first by ascertaining that Le was involved in a business that bought and sold
firearms and thus had access to heavy weapons, and second by searching Le’s
refuse and discovering traces of methamphetamine on June 13. Le argues that
Comstock’s discovery of methamphetamine in Le’s trash on June 13 is “stale”
evidence and too far removed from the July 2 search to be probative of criminal
activity at the residence. Appellant’s Br. at 39-40. However, “the determination
of whether information is stale depends on the nature of the crime and the length
of criminal activity, not simply the number of days that have elapsed between the
facts relied upon and the issuance of the warrant.” United States v. Myers , 106
F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 2446 (1997). Where the
offense in question is “ongoing and continuing[,] . . . the passage of time is not of
critical importance.” Sturmoski , 971 F.2d at 457.
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In this case, both informants stated that Le’s narcotics operation was a
continuing and ongoing activity. Both stated that they had purchased drugs from
Le “on numerous occasions,” Appellant’s App. at 41, 42, and the first informant
stated that such purchases had been occurring over a two-year period, id. at 41.
With regard to an ongoing criminal enterprise such as the one Le was involved in,
a search warrant affidavit can contain information that is more than a few days
old. Indeed, we have upheld a magistrate’s finding of probable cause in cases
involving ongoing criminal operations where the gap between the receipt of the
probative information and the issuance of the warrant was two-and-one-half
weeks, see Miles , 772 F.2d at 616, and even five months, see Myers , 106 F.3d at
939. In this case, we cannot conclude that a lapse of only fourteen days between
Comstock’s corroboration and the issuance of the warrant, and another lapse of
five days between the issuance of the warrant and its execution, renders evidence
of Comstock’s discovery fatally stale. The issuing magistrate was entitled to
consider evidence of Comstock’s search of Le’s trash.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances presented to the issuing
magistrate, we think that probable cause existed for the issuance of the state
warrant. The combination of the informants’ reciprocal corroboration and
Comstock’s corroborative efforts “reduced the chances of a reckless or
prevaricating tale, [and] thus provid[ed] a substantial basis for crediting” the
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informants’ assertions. Gates , 462 U.S. at 244-45 (citations omitted). Taken
together, all of the facts and corroborative information contained in the affidavit
were sufficient to give the magistrate a “substantial basis” upon which to
conclude that there was “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
[would] be found” at Le’s residence. Id. at 238.
3. Particularity of the Warrant
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants “particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Le argues that the state warrant failed to meet this requirement
because it authorized a search only for “methamphetamine” and “fruits [and]
instrumentalities” of methamphetamine transactions. Appellant’s App. at 47. The
warrant made no mention of the explosives, machine guns, and other assorted
ordnance that TPD officers suspected might be stored at Le’s residence, and
which those officers in fact found at the residence. Le argues that the
government’s failure to include explosives and related items in the warrant turned
the state warrant into an invalid general warrant.
Le grounds his argument in the reasoning of Coolidge v. New Hampshire ,
403 U.S. 443 (1971). In that case, a plurality of the Supreme Court set forth the
contours of the “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
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requirement. The plurality stated that an officer could seize an item for which he
had no warrant when that item is found in plain view and (1) the officers are
lawfully in a position to observe the item; (2) the discovery of the item is
inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the searching officers that the
item is evidence of a crime or contraband. Coolidge , 403 U.S. at 468-71
(plurality opinion); Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Especially relevant here is the second requirement set forth in
Coolidge : the inadvertence requirement. The Coolidge plurality made clear that
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement dictates that police obtain a warrant
for items that they know about and intend to seize: “If the initial intrusion is
bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object, though the
police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the
express constitutional requirement of ‘Warrants . . . particularly describing . . .
[the] things to be seized.’” Coolidge , 403 U.S. at 471 (plurality opinion) (citing
U.S. Const. amend. IV).
However, because the inadvertence requirement to the plain view exception
was announced by only a plurality of the Court, there was some question as to
whether the requirement was binding precedent. See Texas v. Brown , 460 U.S.
730, 737 (1983) (plurality opinion) (stating that, even though the inadvertence
requirement had generally been applied by lower courts, it “has never been
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expressly adopted by a majority of this Court” and that it was “not a binding
precedent”). In 1990, a majority of the Court finally held that inadvertence “is
not a necessary condition” of “legitimate ‘plain-view’ seizures.” Horton , 496
U.S. at 130. The Court stated that “[t]he fact that an officer is interested in an
item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not
invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of
a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 138. 4
In the case before us, the government concedes that TPD officers had some
knowledge of the existence of explosives and heavy weapons at Le’s residence
prior to executing the state warrant. Tr. of Hearing on Motions, October 17,
4
In support of his contention that the warrant was not sufficiently
particular, Le cites three pre- Horton cases. United States v. Sanchez , 509 F.2d
886 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Carney , 356 F. Supp. 855 (M.D. Tenn.
1973); United States v. Tranquillo , 330 F. Supp. 871 (M.D. Fla. 1971). Each of
these cases is inapposite. First, to the extent that these cases rely on the
inadvertence prong of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, they
have been superseded by Horton . In addition, as the government correctly notes,
Sanchez and Carney , cases in which federal officers without their own warrants
actually accompanied warranted state officers on a search of a suspect’s house
and conducted their own separate searches of the premises, have been
distinguished in a post- Horton Sixth Circuit case on facts very similar to the case
at hand . See United States v. Bonds , 12 F.3d 540, 570-72 (6th Cir. 1993)
(upholding a search warrant where, as in this case, the federal officers did not
actually participate with the state officers in the search, and were only called in
after the state officers, conducting a valid search, discovered contraband in plain
view). Finally, in Tranquillo , the district court found evidence of bad faith on the
part of the government, a finding which was central to its holding. No such
evidence is present in this case.
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1997, at 222 (government counsel stating that “Judge, I think I can shorten this by
saying we will stipulate that Officer Comstock had knowledge prior to his
arresting [Le], that there . . . could be explosives located in the house”). Indeed,
Officer Comstock stated that he “had been told” that there were explosives in the
house, but that he “did not know [that] for a fact,” and that TPD officers did not
seek a search warrant for explosives prior to July 2 because, until that date, they
had no corroborating information to back up the claims of informants that
explosives and weapons were present at Le’s residence. Tr. of Hearing on
Motions, September 11, 1997, at 65, 69, 79. Comstock also stated that because
TPD officers suspected that there might be explosives at the residence, out of an
abundance of caution for officer safety they notified a K-9 team from the TPD
bomb squad and told them to be on standby. Id. at 47.
Upon entering Le’s residence pursuant to the state warrant for drugs, TPD
officers discovered drugs, weapons, and explosives. The search warrant return
indicates that TPD officers seized several varieties of drugs and weapons, but did
not seize the heavy weaponry and explosives. Appellant’s App. at 49-51. Later
that day, based on what the TPD officers and the federal agents, who had been
called in when explosives were discovered, had seen at the residence, a second
warrant was issued for Le’s residence, authorizing federal agents to search for
explosives.
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We think the actions of law enforcement officers in waiting to seize the
explosives until after the issuance of the second warrant was lawful and even
commendable behavior. It likely would have been permissible in this case for the
officers to have simply seized the explosives without obtaining the second
warrant. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly endorsed such actions, stating
that “if [an officer] has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a
suspicion concerning the second [item], whether or not it amounts to probable
cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize the second item from
seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first.” Horton , 496 U.S. at
139. Here, however, the officers took the extra precautionary step of waiting to
seize the explosives until after the second warrant for explosives had been issued.
In sum, we cannot conclude that the officers’ behavior was unlawful. We
think it clear that the inadvertence requirement is no longer a necessary condition
for a legal “plain view” seizure. Under current Supreme Court precedent, a police
officer may, if on the premises pursuant to a valid warrant or under an exception
to the warrant requirement, seize items which immediately appear to be evidence
or contraband of a crime. Here, law enforcement officials acted with due regard
for both officer safety and the Fourth Amendment by calling in the K-9 team and
the ATF agents only after explosives were discovered in plain view during a
lawful search for drugs, and by waiting to seize those explosives until after a
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second warrant, this one for explosives, had been issued. In this case, we cannot
conclude that the state warrant was infirm merely because it did not specifically
authorize a search for explosives. The explosives were discovered because they
were in the plain view of the TPD officers legally on the premises. Accordingly,
the state warrant meets the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.
4. Scope of the Search
Le next argues that the officers who executed the state warrant grossly
exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing several items not specifically
mentioned in the warrant, and that the remedy for this alleged violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights should be a blanket suppression of everything seized
pursuant to the state warrant.
We begin our analysis by noting that “the general rule,” where executing
officers exceed the scope of a warrant, “is that ‘only the improperly seized
evidence, not all of the evidence, must be suppressed, unless there was a flagrant
disregard for the terms of the warrant.’” Hargus , 128 F.3d at 1363 (quoting
United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency , 965 F.2d 868, 875 (10th Cir.
1992)). In the vast majority of cases, “a search is not invalidated merely because
some things are seized that are not stated in the warrant.” Id. “This is
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particularly true when the non-specified items are not admitted into evidence
against the defendant.” Id.
In very rare cases, however, we have applied the unusual remedy of blanket
suppression. In United States v. Medlin , 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988), for
instance, we ordered a blanket suppression of all items seized pursuant to a
federal warrant authorizing a search for “firearms.” Id. at 1195. In that case,
local officers who did not possess a separate warrant entered the residence with
the federal officers, and the local officers seized “667 items of property none of
which were identified in the warrant authorizing the search.” Id. at 1196. We
held that the officers, by seizing so many items not mentioned in the warrant,
exhibited a “flagrant disregard” for the terms of the warrant and actually
“transformed” the otherwise valid warrant “into a general warrant.” Id. at 1199.
In such cases, we stated, blanket suppression is appropriate. Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Foster , 100 F.3d 846 (10th Cir. 1996), we
held that blanket suppression was again the proper remedy, where state officers
acting pursuant to an otherwise valid warrant seized over 60 items not mentioned
in the warrant, including VCR machines and video equipment, a socket set, a pair
of green coveralls, a riding lawn mower, three garden tillers, several stereo
systems, two microphones, several televisions, a drill, a camera tripod, a BB gun,
a camera, a metal rod, a clock radio, and a screwdriver set. Id. at 848 n.1. One of
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the executing officers in that case even testified at the suppression hearing that
the officers had simply taken anything of value in the house, and that this was the
usual method employed by police in this particular county. Id. at 850-51 nn.5-6.
Citing Medlin , we held that these officers had also exhibited a flagrant disregard
for the terms of the warrant, and we suppressed everything seized pursuant to the
warrant.
The only other federal appellate case of which we are aware in which
blanket suppression was the remedy applied is United States v. Rettig , 589 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1978). In that case, after obtaining the search warrant through less-
than-forthright means, executing officers seized “some 2,288 items,” including
numerous U.S. government publications, credit card applications, bank brochures,
medical and dental records, and many other documents. Id. at 421. The Ninth
Circuit held that “[a]s interpreted and executed by the agents, this warrant became
an instrument for conducting a general search,” and suppressed all evidence
discovered in the search. Id. at 423.
Keeping in mind the rule that blanket suppression is an extreme remedy,
almost wholly absent from the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of other circuits,
we must determine whether the officers executing the state warrant so flagrantly
exceeded its scope that blanket suppression is a justifiable remedy. The state
-25-
warrant, which we have already determined to be validly issued, authorized a
search for the following:
methamphetamine, fruits, instrumentalities, monies, records, to
include telephone number information on possible associates related
to the sale of controlled dangerous drugs, financial records, (bank
records, checking, savings and business account information), that
demonstrate the above subject is deriving profit from the sale of
methamphetamine or any other controlled dangerous drugs and
dispersement [sic] of assets which are drug related, proof of
residency, drug related notations.
Appellant’s App. at 47. In connection with the execution of this warrant, TPD
officers confiscated some 78 items, including two plastic baggies full of
methamphetamine; several pill bottles containing prescription painkillers; several
varieties of ammunition; various firearms and gun parts, including a pellet gun; a
grenade launcher; a hunting knife; several holsters; one green armor vest; a
scanner, monitor, and camera; $710 in U.S. currency; one gold chain; one brown
wallet; a bank bag; a night scope; a black address book; a cellular phone; a key
chain and assorted keys; and two briefcases containing assorted documents.
Any argument Le might make that the TPD officers exceeded the scope of
the warrant by seizing the firearms and ammunition is fatally flawed. The guns
and ammunition were discovered pursuant to a valid warrant-based search for
methamphetamine, and were in the plain view of the searching officers. Also,
Officer Comstock testified that he and the other TPD officers were aware that it
was a federal offense for a user of drugs to possess a firearm. See Tr. of Hearing
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on Motions, September 11, 1997, at 56-57; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); United
States v. Smith , 899 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.) (upholding a plain
view seizure of guns by state officers because the state officers were aware that
the possession of the guns by the defendant was a violation of federal law). Thus,
the guns and the ammunition were properly seized, because they were in plain
view of officers legally at the residence, and it was immediately apparent to the
officers that the firearms were evidence of a crime. Horton , 496 U.S. at 136-37.
Le argues, however, that the seizure of the pellet gun, the gun parts, the pill
bottles, the gold chain, the holsters, and several other items shows that the TPD
officers flagrantly disregarded the scope of the warrant. While some of these
items may arguably have been improperly seized, the officers did not exhibit a
“flagrant disregard” for the terms of the warrant. Medlin , 842 F.2d at 1199. The
remedy for any improper seizure here would be suppression of the items
improperly seized, not blanket suppression of all items seized, including those
lawfully taken.
We need not remand for a specific determination of which items were
lawfully seized, because we have determined that the methamphetamine and
firearms, the only items taken as a result of the execution of the state warrant for
which Le was prosecuted, were lawfully seized.
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B. The Federal Residence Warrant
Le also challenges the federal warrant issued later in the afternoon of
July 2, based on what TPD officers, the K-9 team, and the ATF agents had seen at
the residence earlier that day, authorizing federal agents to search the house for
explosives. Le argues that this warrant was not sufficiently particular, in light of
the fact that its underlying affidavit specifically mentioned only one type of
explosive device, and that the warrant itself did not specifically refer to any
particular types of explosive devices; Le also argues that the executing officers
exceeded the scope of the warrant.
1. Particularity of the Warrant
When federal agents went to a U.S. Magistrate Judge on the afternoon of
July 2 to request a federal search warrant for Le’s residence, they were already
aware of some of the specific types of explosives stockpiled in Le’s garage.
Indeed, at least one ATF agent had personally viewed the explosives and heavy
weaponry when he was called in, for officer safety reasons, during the TPD
search for drugs. Still, the affidavit submitted to the magistrate judge specifically
mentioned only one type of explosive device discovered in the residence—HE
M383 explosive grenades. Appellant’s App. at 66. The warrant signed by the
magistrate judge authorized a search for
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[a]ny explosives, explosive materials and parts that can be readily
converted into destructive devices, any combination of parts either
designed or intended for use in converting any device into a
destructive device capable of expelling a projectile by the action of
an explosive or other propellant, any and all firing mechanisms to
include grenade launchers, launchers and/or any device designed for
use as a weapon, as a signaling pyrotechnic, lin throwing, safety, or
similar device.
Appellant’s App. at 71. Le argues that because the federal agents had more
specific information at the time they asked the magistrate judge for a warrant, the
warrant should have been more specific.
In general, a warrant meets the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement “when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the
things authorized to be seized.” United States v. Harris , 903 F.2d 770, 775 (10th
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Consistent with this standard, we have sustained
warrants phrased in “[b]road and generic terms of description” in certain cases,
for instance in searches for drugs and related paraphernalia, because the nature
and characteristics of some criminal operations do not easily lend themselves to
specific descriptions of things to be seized. Richardson , 86 F.3d at 1544; see also
United States v. Janus Indus. , 48 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995); Harris , 903
F.2d at 775. This is because even warrants phrased in generic terms can, under
some circumstances, still “‘allow the executing officers to distinguish between
items that may and may not be seized.’” United States v. Finnigin , 113 F.3d
-29-
1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Leary , 846 F.2d 592, 602
(10th Cir. 1988)).
We have previously sustained a generically phrased warrant in an
explosives case. See Finnigin , 113 F.3d at 1187; see also United States v. Faul ,
748 F.2d 1204, 1219 (8th Cir. 1984) (sustaining a search warrant in an explosives
case where the warrant authorized a search for “any and all firearms, ammunition,
grenades, crossbows, rocket launchers, and other explosive devices”). In
Finnigin , on facts similar to the case before us here, where the officers had some
specific knowledge of the type of explosive devices thought to be on the
premises, we stated that a warrant authorizing a search for “[a]ny and all unlawful
explosives, components or materials thereof” was “sufficiently particular to
properly ‘allow the executing officers to distinguish between items that may and
may not be seized.’” Finnigin , 113 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Leary , 846 F.2d at 602).
The warrant issued in this case, worded almost identically to the warrant
condoned in Finnigin , authorizing a search for “any explosives, explosive
materials and parts,” is therefore sufficiently particular to allow the searching
officers to distinguish between items that may or may not be seized, even though
the officers may have had more specific information regarding the type of some of
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the explosive devices. The federal residence warrant does not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement. 5
2. Scope of the Search
Next, Le argues that the federal agents who executed the federal residence
warrant so grossly exceeded the scope of the warrant as to manifest a flagrant
disregard for the warrant’s terms, thus converting the warrant into an unlawful
general warrant. Le argues, therefore, that all evidence discovered pursuant to
this warrant should be suppressed, citing Medlin and Foster .
The search was clearly not the type of search condemned in Medlin and
Foster . During the course of the search, federal agents confiscated approximately
50 items, only eight of which can, even under an interpretation of fact and law
highly favorable to Le, be considered unrelated to explosives. Those eight items
include a furniture receipt, a video receipt, an envelope addressed to Rachell
Harper, and several flares. Appellant’s App. at 73-74. Even assuming, arguendo,
that the seizure of those eight items was entirely unlawful, such action does not
5
This conclusion is reinforced by the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement, which would have allowed the TPD officers to seize the explosives
when they were executing the state warrant earlier on July 2. It would be
incongruous to hold that items which could properly have been seized earlier in
the day are immunized from seizure later in that same day as a result of federal
officers taking an extra precautionary step to make sure that their seizure of the
items comported with constitutional procedure.
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come close to the type of flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant found in
our prior cases. Thus, Le’s remedy would be suppression of the wrongfully
seized items, not a blanket suppression order.
In any event, Le’s argument is moot because Le was never prosecuted for
possessing any of the eight items. He was prosecuted for possessing drugs, guns,
and explosives, all of which were seized lawfully. Thus, we decline to remand
the case to the district court for a meaningless determination of whether the eight
items were unlawfully seized.
C. The First Federal Business Warrant
Finally, Le challenges the first federal business warrant, issued June 27 and
executed July 2, on the grounds that the magistrate did not have probable cause to
issue the warrant, 6
that the warrant was insufficiently particular, and that the
executing officers exceeded the scope of the warrant.
6
We note that Le’s argument that there was insufficient probable cause to
issue the first federal business warrant is not well-developed. Le mentions this
argument in one of the headings of his brief, but provides no argument or
authorities in support of his position. Appellant’s Br. at 42. In his reply brief, in
response to the government’s charge that the argument was abandoned, Le
concedes that the body of his brief ignored the issue but nevertheless asserts that
the argument is preserved for appellate review, although even in his reply brief Le
does little to support his contention. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16. While the
argument is scantily supported, we think that because it was presented to the
district court in the first instance, see Tr. of Hearing on Motions, October 17,
1997, at 243-44, and was mentioned in Le’s brief, we may address it.
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1. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
The affidavit underlying the first federal business warrant is the same
affidavit used to procure the blood and hair warrant and, in many ways, is similar
to the affidavit underlying the state warrant. The affidavit contains information
obtained by TPD Officer Comstock, and states that Comstock interviewed one Jay
Riseling, a former employee of Cadre Supplies, Inc. 7
Riseling informed
Comstock that his duties at Cadre Supplies, Inc. included maintenance of the
business’s firearms transaction records, and that while so employed he had made
“numerous false and fictitious entries which were made in order to conceal the
identity of the persons supplying and/or receiving the firearms from authorities
and/or to avoid having to pay the applicable federal firearms taxes.” Appellant’s
App. at 58. Riseling also asserted that he had seen Le in possession of
considerable amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana, and had
purchased such drugs from Le “on numerous occasions in the past couple of
years.” Id. at 57. Riseling told Comstock that Le purchased cocaine in
increments of 10 to 30 kilograms, and that Le appeared to be “heavily addicted to
7
From the language employed in the affidavit, it appears that Riseling may
be the unnamed second source in the state warrant’s affidavit, although, if this is
the case, the reasons for including his name in this affidavit while excluding it
from the other affidavit are unclear from the record.
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prescription pain medication as well as cocaine and methamphetamine, which he
usually ingests by injection on a daily basis.” Id.
The affidavit also relates Comstock’s efforts to corroborate Riseling’s
account, including Comstock’s discovery of methamphetamine residue in Le’s
trash. According to the affidavit, federal ATF agents also attempted to confirm
Riseling’s account by searching national ATF licensing records and ascertaining
that Le, doing business as Cadre Supplies, Inc., “is a federally licensed firearms
dealer, and is additionally, specifically licensed to deal in machine guns and
silencers.” Id. at 58. The affidavit concluded by stating that federal agents
believed, based on the information contained therein, “that evidence of false
and/or fictitious entries may be obtained from the required firearms transaction
records, tangible or intangible, for Le’s business.” Id. Based on the affidavit, a
U.S. Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search for the firearms
transaction records of Cadre Supplies, Inc.
We think this affidavit contains sufficient indicia of probable cause to meet
the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in Gates . First, many of
Riseling’s statements, such as his admissions that he purchased drugs from Le and
that he intentionally falsified federal firearms records, are against his penal
interest, a factor we have considered indicative of reliability. See Sturmoski , 971
F.2d at 457. Second, this affidavit contains more information about the informant
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than the state warrant’s affidavit does. Here, the magistrate is told the
informant’s name and that the informant worked for Le, and is told in detail what
kinds of duties the informant performed for Le while in his employ. This kind of
information sets forth the basis for the informant’s knowledge, and would have
satisfied one of the prongs of the old Aguilar-Spinelli test. See Aguilar v. Texas ,
378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (stating that “the magistrate must be informed of some
of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were”). In Gates , the Supreme Court made
clear that such “basis of knowledge” information is “highly relevant in
determining the value” of an informant’s account. Gates , 462 U.S. at 230.
Finally, officers were able to corroborate significant details contained in
Riseling’s account. Comstock discovered drug residue in Le’s trash, and federal
agents confirmed, through a check of a national database, that Le, doing business
as Cadre Supplies, Inc., was a federally licensed firearms dealer who was licensed
to deal in machine guns and silencers and therefore had access to heavy weapons.
In sum, the totality of the circumstances contained in this affidavit afforded
the magistrate a “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”
Id. at 238-39 (citations and alteration omitted).
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2. Particularity of the Warrant
Next, Le argues that the first federal business warrant was not sufficiently
particular, because it did not articulate a specific crime and because it used rather
general terms to describe the items to be seized. The affidavit did not mention a
specific criminal statute that officers suspected had been violated, but it did
contain Riseling’s assertion that “he made numerous false and fictitious entries
which were made in order to conceal the identity of the persons supplying and/or
receiving the firearms from authorities and/or to avoid having to pay the
applicable federal firearms taxes.” Appellant’s App. at 58. The accompanying
warrant authorized a search for “[a]ny and all tangible or intangible firearms
transaction records for Thao Dinh Le doing business as Cadre Supplies, Inc.
and/or any and all other tangible or intangible records pertaining to firearms
transactions.” Id. at 56. Le asserts that this warrant does not give the executing
officers a clear enough picture of the crimes under investigation, and authorizes
an unduly broad search into his business records.
First, we are satisfied that the warrant and its accompanying affidavit
adequately described the criminal activity under investigation. We have sustained
a warrant which did not limit the search to any alleged violation of a particular
criminal law in a case where the warrant’s affidavit contained information
indicating that the suspect was engaged in a “marijuana trafficking operation.”
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Harris , 903 F.2d at 774-75. This case is similar. Although the warrant itself does
not specifically mention a particular criminal activity, the affidavit states that Le
may have been engaged in fraudulently altering his business’s federal firearms
transaction records in an attempt to hide the identity of firearms purchasers from
federal authorities and in an attempt to avoid paying federal firearms taxes. This
description of suspected criminal activity is specific enough to give the executing
officers adequate guidance, when searching the business, to be able to
“distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.” Leary , 846 F.2d at
602.
Next, we address Le’s contention that the first federal business warrant was
not particular enough because it used general terms to describe the items to be
searched for. It is true that a warrant authorizing seizure of every single business
record possessed by a business may be overbroad. See Voss v. Bergsgaard , 774
F.2d 402, 405-06 (10th Cir. 1985). We have even held that a warrant authorizing
a search of an export business for all documents relating to “the purchase, sale
and illegal exportation of materials in violation of the” federal export laws was
overbroad, because in the context of a search of an export business the limitations
in the warrant’s authorization “provide[d] no limitation at all.” Leary , 846 F.2d
at 601. However, as discussed above, we have repeatedly stated that even
generally phrased warrants are valid when they are phrased “‘as specific[ally] as
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[the] circumstances and [the] nature of the activity under investigation permit.’”
Janus Industries , 48 F.3d at 1554 (citing United States v. Wicks , 995 F.2d 964,
973 (10th Cir. 1993)).
It is difficult to imagine how the first federal business warrant could have
been phrased more specifically. Cadre Supplies, Inc. is a firearms dealership
which buys and sells virtually nothing but firearms, ammunition, parts, and
accessories. A request to search for documentary evidence of fraudulent firearms
transactions will by definition entail at least a viewing of a large portion of the
documents generated by a firearms dealership. But this does not necessarily mean
that the warrant is impermissibly broad. The difference between a valid warrant
and an overbroad warrant lies in whether the government could have phrased the
warrant more specifically, not in whether the business is small enough to sell only
one type of commodity.
Here, Le was suspected of continuous violations of the federal firearms
laws, not simply violations relating to a particular transaction or to a particular
type of weapon. Officers could not, therefore, have taken the steps we required in
Leary . 846 F.2d at 604-05 (requiring that a warrant be limited, if possible, to the
specific transaction under suspicion and to specific companies under suspicion).
Furthermore, the warrant, by authorizing a search for documents relating to
firearms transactions, did provide a meaningful limitation. The warrant did not
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authorize seizure of every financial document in the business, such as balance
sheets and other accounting documents. Indeed, the executing officer testified at
the suppression hearing that no financial documents were taken from the business.
Tr. of Hearing on Motions, October 17, 1997, at 198. In any event, the mere fact
that the business sells little other than firearms cannot operate to defeat the
validity of the search warrant in this case. For instance, if the business were a
general retailer which sold many different types of items, a warrant, premised on
sufficient probable cause, authorizing a search for “any and all firearms
transaction records” would likely be considered sufficiently limited and therefore
not overbroad. A similar warrant will not be held invalid merely because the
business which it authorizes agents to search is a smaller business confined to the
purchase and sale of only one type of commodity. See United States v. Scherer ,
523 F.2d 371, 376 (7th Cir. 1975) (sustaining a search warrant for a firearms
dealership which authorized seizure of both the guns and the firearms records
possessed by the business).
In the drug context, we have held that a generic warrant authorizing a
search for all documents related to drug transactions may come within the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement. See United States v. Wicks , 995 F.2d
964, 967, 973-74 (10th Cir. 1993) (warrant authorized a search for “currency . . .
books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers, and other papers relating to the
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transportation, ordering, sale and distribution of controlled substances”); United
States v. Sullivan , 919 F.2d 1403, 1424 n.31 (10th Cir. 1990) (warrant authorized
a search for “records, receipts, papers, instrumentalities, and documents related to
an on-going suspected criminal enterprise in the trafficking of and conspiracy to
distribute, controlled dangerous substances, including but not limited to, phone
records and bills, utility bills and/or receipts, address books, records, photographs
. . . , documents and receipts of travel, diaries, all monies, receipts, records and
documents which show unusual, or suspect monetary transactions”); Harris , 903
F.2d at 774-75 (warrant authorized a search for “travel records and receipts . . .
bank safe deposit records . . . currency . . . stocks, bonds, or other securities . . .
gold silver and/or jewelry . . . books, records, memorandum, notes, bank records,
investment records, or any other documents evidencing the obtaining, secreting,
transfer, and/or concealment of assets and/or money obtained through illegal
means”). Indeed, courts have noted that, in some instances, searching officers
must be able to examine nearly every document possessed by a suspected
criminal, if only to determine whether the documents contain evidence of criminal
activity. One court stated that “a warrant authorizing seizure of records of
criminal activity permits officers to examine many papers in a suspect’s
possession to determine if they are within the described category,” and that
“allowing some latitude in this regard simply recognizes the reality that few
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people keep documents of their criminal transaction in a folder marked ‘drug
records.’” United States v. Riley , 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990); see also
Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (stating that “[i]n searches
for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least
cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers
authorized to be seized”); Kitty’s East v. United States (In re The Matter of the
Search of Kitty’s East) , 905 F.2d 1367, 1374-75, 1374 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990)
(sustaining a warrant to search nearly every business record on the premises of an
adult entertainment establishment, distinguishing Voss and Leary , and stating that
“[e]vidence of conspiracy is often hidden in the day-to-day business transactions
among the involved entities; therefore, it seems reasonable that the government
would need to examine the documentation of these transactions to investigate a
conspiracy”).
These authorities amply demonstrate that the first federal business warrant,
which authorized a search for documents relating to firearms transactions, was not
unconstitutionally overbroad. The warrant gave executing officers as clear a
notion as could have been expected under the circumstances what types of
criminal activity were suspected, and which documents might contain evidence of
those crimes. Le’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
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3. Scope of the Search
Next, Le argues that the federal agents who executed the first federal
business warrant grossly exceeded the scope of that warrant by searching for
items not named in the warrant. Le again argues that the proper remedy is a
blanket suppression of all items seized pursuant to the first federal business
warrant.
Pursuant to the first federal business warrant, agents seized “miscellaneous
ATF records [and] log books,” “phone message books,” “miscellaneous
correspondence, [and] firearms related documents.” Appellant’s App. at 63. Le
argues that some of the firearms transaction documents seized by the agents
contained no evidence of fraud, and therefore were not covered by the warrant
and were improperly seized. Le further asserts that agents improperly seized
documents, such as phone message logs, which have no apparent connection to
firearms transactions. Also, Le argues that agents conducted an overbroad search
for other items not named in the warrant, such as weapons and firearms, which
were not actually seized on July 2.
Le’s argument that too many firearms transaction documents were seized is
foreclosed by United States v. Hargus , 128 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied , 118 S. Ct. 1526 (1998). In that case, officers suspected that the defendant
was engaged in criminally fraudulent activities, and obtained a warrant to search
-42-
the defendant’s business for ten specific types of records. Officers found two file
cabinets full of documents, and ascertained that each drawer contained some of
the documents covered by the warrant. Rather than undertake a lengthy on-site
sorting procedure, officers simply seized both file cabinets in their entirety. We
upheld the seizure, stating that
the officers’ conduct did not grossly exceed the scope of the warrant.
Their conduct was motivated by the impracticability of on-site
sorting and the time constraints of conducting a daytime search
warrant. The officers were authorized to seize ten broad categories
of records, and those records were present in every drawer of both
file cabinets. No item not specified in the warrant was admitted
against [the defendant] at trial. Under these circumstances the
officers did not grossly exceed the warrant in concluding they did not
need to examine at the site every single piece of paper in both
cabinets.
Id. at 1363.
Similarly, officers in this case, suspecting fraudulent firearms transactions,
were authorized to search for and seize all of Cadre Supplies, Inc.’s firearms
transaction records. Certainly, officers could not tell merely by looking at the
face of a particular firearms document whether it involved a fraudulent
transaction. In such a case, officers were surely justified in taking all the
firearms transaction documents, and examining them later to ascertain which ones
evidenced fraud. Their actions in seizing some documents which were later
determined to be unrelated to fraudulent activity cannot be evidence of a flagrant
disregard for the terms of the warrant.
-43-
Likewise, the agents’ decisions to (1) call for an officer of the Department
of Defense to determine if some of the weaponry seen in plain view was stolen,
and (2) seize the phone message books are also not evidence of a flagrant
disregard for the terms of the warrant. Even assuming, arguendo, that Le is
correct in asserting that such decisions were beyond the scope of the warrant, a
proposition that is by no means obvious, 8
the agents’ actions did not constitute the
type of flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant which justified blanket
suppression in Medlin , Foster , and Rettig . Le’s only remedy for any excesses in
8
For instance, there is a plausible argument that the military equipment
could have been seized under the plain view doctrine. Agent Ward, the ATF
agent who executed the first federal business warrant, testified that the weapons
“appeared to be stolen to me . . . because of their brand new pristine boxed
condition with military lot numbers on them.” Tr. of Hearing on Motions, Oct.
17, 1997, at 214. This may have given him probable cause, under Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987), to believe that the weapons were stolen and
to seize them under the plain view doctrine. Alternatively, there is an argument
that the agents viewed the weapons, including their accompanying lot numbers,
while searching for firearms transaction documents. Ward testified that there was
“the possibility [that] there could have been [] ATF form[s]” in the weapons
boxes because Le “had machine guns boxed up with paperwork.” Tr. of Hearing
on Motions, Oct. 17, 1997, at 216. In Hicks, the Supreme Court stated that
“[m]erely inspecting those parts of the [item in question] that came into view
during the [lawful] search would not have constituted an independent search,
because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent’s privacy
issues.” Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325.
We do not decide these issues here; we point out only that it is certainly not
obvious that the agents’ actions on July 2 were beyond the scope of the warrant,
and that even if they were, they were not so grossly unlawful as to constitute
flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant.
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the July 2 search of his business would be a remand to the district court to
determine which items, if any, not mentioned in the warrant were searched and/or
seized, and whether any of those items should be suppressed. Because Le was
never prosecuted for the explosives seen at the business on July 2 and seized on
August 4, or for any evidence found in the phone message logs, such a remand
would be meaningless.
II. Forfeiture
Finally, Le argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for
return of property, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e). The district court
denied this motion because Le expressly agreed to “forfeit and otherwise waive
any ownership right he might possess in all items seized” during the execution of
the various warrants. Appellant’s App. at 112. Le now argues that the district
court’s decision was improper because Cadre Supplies, Inc. also has an ownership
interest in some of the property, and, because the corporation was not party to the
plea agreement, it has not waived its rights in the seized items.
Le’s assertion may or may not be correct. In either case, it is beside the
point. The party who filed the Rule 41(e) motion below, and who argues the issue
here on appeal, is not Cadre Supplies, Inc. in its corporate capacity, but rather
Thao Dinh Le in his personal capacity. The district court was entirely correct in
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denying Le’s motion because Le, the party who filed the motion contesting
forfeiture, relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property.
See United States v. Grover , 119 F.3d 850, 851-52 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a claimant who, in connection with a plea agreement, executed a “Forfeiture
Agreement” in which he agreed to surrender the proceeds of his property to the
government, had “relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property” and
could not contest the forfeiture); see also United States v. Real Property
Described in Deeds , 962 F. Supp. 734, 737 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that a
defendant who had waived his rights to the property as part of a plea agreement
had no standing to contest the government’s forfeiture of the property).
Therefore, we are compelled to affirm the district court’s decision with regard to
the forfeiture of the seized property.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Le’s convictions are AFFIRMED. We also
AFFIRM the district court’s decision denying Le’s motion for return of seized
property.
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