United States v. Thibodeaux

                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                      FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT



                           No. 99-40585



                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                Plaintiff-Appellant,


                              VERSUS


                      MARK ERVIN THIBODEAUX,

                                                Defendant-Appellee.




          Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Eastern District of Texas


                           May 8, 2000
Before WIENER, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

     The Government appeals the sentence imposed on Mark Ervin

Thibodeaux following a guilty plea conviction.       We dismiss the

appeal.

                 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

     Thibodeaux pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement

to one count of felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Initially, the Government believed that two of

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Thibodeaux’s prior convictions had occurred on the same date and

counted as a single conviction.         Based on that understanding, the

plea agreement stated that Thibodeaux faced a possible maximum

sentence of ten years in prison.            The Government subsequently

determined that the two convictions had occurred on different dates

and contended that Thibodeaux should be sentenced to the mandatory

fifteen year sentence provided in § 924(e)(1), irrespective of the

plea    agreement.    The   district      court,   disagreeing      with   the

Government, sentenced Thibodeaux to ten years’ imprisonment and

three years’ supervised release.

          II. APPROVAL FOR GOVERNMENT’S APPEAL OF SENTENCE

       The Government appealed Thibodeaux’s sentence. The Government

may file a notice of appeal for review of an otherwise final

sentence if, inter alia, the sentence was imposed in violation of

law or was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the

sentencing guidelines.      See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).      However, “[t]he

Government may not further prosecute such appeal without the

personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General,

or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor General.”

See id.    Thibodeaux contends that this appeal should be dismissed

because the    Government   has   not    demonstrated   that   it    has   the

requisite authority to further prosecute this appeal.               Although

afforded an opportunity to file a reply brief after this issue was

raised, the Government has not responded to Thibodeaux’s § 3742(b)


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concerns by briefing the issue or by including in the record proof

that it has in fact received authority to further prosecute the

appeal.

       This circuit has not stated expressly that the Government must

demonstrate compliance with, or include in the record on appeal

proof of compliance with, § 3742's approval requirement.                       The

circuits which have addressed the issue have not spoken with one

voice concerning when or how the Government must document § 3742

approval.     Compare, e.g., United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328

(6th Cir. 1990)(holding that, while approval is not jurisdictional,

in the exercise of its supervisory authority the Sixth Circuit

requires written proof of compliance dated not later than notice of

appeal and filed not later than filing of the brief to avoid

dismissal) with United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1446 n.9

(9th   Cir.    1992)(holding    that    written   proof      of    authorization

submitted with Government’s reply brief was sufficient to avoid

dismissal of appeal) and United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170,

172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994)(stating that § 3742(b)’s requirement is not

jurisdictional     and   that   the    court   would   not    be    divested    of

jurisdiction if the Government failed to secure § 3742(b) approval

for appeal).

       Section 3742 creates a comprehensive system for appellate

review of sentences.      S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 155 (1984), reprinted

in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3338.           Congress designed the statute to


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focus the appellate courts’ attention on those sentences for which

review is crucial to the proper functioning of the sentencing

guidelines and to provide a means to correct erroneous and clearly

unreasonable sentences.     Id.   Congress determined that government

appeals of sentences below the applicable guideline range were

necessary to this system.    Congress found:

     If only the defendant could appeal his sentence, there
     would be no effective opportunity for the reviewing
     courts to correct the injustice arising from a sentence
     that was patently too lenient. This consideration has
     led most Western nations to consider review at the behest
     of either the defendant or the public to be a fundamental
     precept of a rational sentencing system, and the
     Committee considers it to be a critical part of the
     bill’s sentencing structure. The unequal availability of
     appellate review, moreover, would have a tendency to skew
     the system, since if appellate review were a one way
     street, so that the tribunal could only reduce excessive
     sentences but not enhance inadequate ones, then the
     effort to achieve greater consistency might well result
     in a gradual scaling down of sentences to the level of
     the most lenient ones. Certainly the development of a
     principled and balanced body of appellate case law would
     be severely hampered.

Id. at 151, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3334.          Congress imposed the

restriction at issue in the present case in order to assure that

appeals are not routinely filed for every sentence below the

guidelines. Id. at 154, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3337; see also United

States v. Long, 911 F.2d 1482, 1484 (11th Cir. 1990).    The language

of the statute does not mention that the approval must be in

writing or that approval must be filed in the record of the case on

appeal.

     When presented with the appropriate case, this circuit may

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well choose to exercise its supervisory authority to set out

requirements    of   timing   or   form   to   guide   the   government   in

demonstrating its compliance with § 3742(b).           However, we decline

to develop any bright-line rules in a case in which the Government

wholly defaulted the question.       The Government failed to respond,

either factually or legally, to Thibodeaux’s contention that the

appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with the dictates

of § 3742.     It has long been the rule in this circuit that any

issues not briefed on appeal are waived.        See Yohey v. Collins, 985

F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).          Even though lack of Justice

Department authority to appeal is an issue raised by the appellee

as an affirmative defense to the Government’s appeal, that rule

nonetheless informs our decision in this case. Because there is no

evidence that the Government ever received § 3742 approval for this

appeal, no statement by the Government that it sought or received

approval and no analysis that might form the basis for determining

that approval was not necessary in spite of the mandatory language

of the statute, we dismiss this appeal.

     APPEAL DISMISSED.




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