F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 17, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-5094
TRUNG HUU TRUONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 03-CR-174-H)
Robert Ridenour, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Barry L. Derryberry,
Research and Writing Specialist, with him on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Robert T. Raley, Assistant United States Attorney (David E. O’Meilia, United
States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
Trung Huu Truong was charged with possessing and distributing
pseudoephedrine knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it would be used
to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), and with
possessing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine knowing, intending or having
reasonable cause to believe that they would be used to manufacture
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(6). A jury convicted him on
both counts. Mr. Truong appeals his conviction, arguing the evidence was
insufficient to support it, and appeals his sentence on various grounds. We
conclude the evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Truong’s conviction, and
therefore do not reach issues related to his sentence.
I.
There is no dispute in this case that the defendant, Mr. Truong, sold very
large quantities of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine to various people on numerous
occasions. The question is whether he knew, or had reason to believe, that the
substance he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. The
government bore the burden of proving such knowledge beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because of the nature of the question, we recount the facts of the case in
detail.
On the evening of July 19, 2001, Officer Donnie Deramus of the Tulsa
Police Department saw Shane McLain, whom he knew to have an expired driver’s
license, leave a Texaco station and drive away in a truck. Officer Deramus pulled
Mr. McLain over and arrested him. Mr. McLain had left the Texaco station
2
carrying two styrofoam cups with lids and straws; a search of the truck incident to
Mr. McLain’s arrest revealed that one of the cups contained a sealed, unmarked
pill bottle. Officer Deramus opened the bottle, discovering what appeared to him
to be pseudoephedrine or ephedrine pills. Mr. McLain identified a Mr. Truong,
who worked in the Texaco station, as the person who had sold him the pills.
The next night, Officer Deramus and other officers returned to the Texaco
station and confronted Mr. Truong, who admitted to having sold a thousand-count
bottle of pseudoephedrine to Mr. McLain the night before. The only
pseudoephedrine on display in the store was a single box filled with bags of six
sixty-milligram tablets, but when Officer Deramus asked Mr. Truong if there was
any other pseudoephedrine in the store, Mr. Truong pointed down behind the cash
register. There were ten unmarked bottles in the area Mr. Truong indicated, each
of which contained one thousand approximately 50 milligram pseudoephedrine
pills. Officer Deramus asked Mr Truong if he sold pseudoephedrine, and Mr.
Truong indicated that he had sold one of the large bottles to Shane McLain for
$300. Officer Deramus asked for permission to search the store, which Mr.
Truong gave. Officer Deramus then asked if there was any more pseudoephedrine
or ephedrine in the store, and Mr. Truong directed him to a storage closet, which
contained $2921 in a cigar box, numerous small containers of ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine, and twelve large unlabeled bottles, similar to the ten bottles
3
under the counter. All told, there were 43,200 pseudoephedrine and ephedrine
pills in the storage room, as well as “other items of inventory.” 1
Mr. Truong was arrested and transported to a police station, where he
signed a waiver form and gave a statement. Mr. Truong told the police he had
obtained the large bottles of pseudoephedrine from a man who brought them to
the store periodically, and who would permit Mr. Truong to pay for the drugs
after he had sold them. Mr. Truong said he did not know the man’s name or how
to contact him, but that the man would come to the store every month or so. Mr.
Truong admitted to the police that he did not keep records of the sales he made of
pseudoephedrine. Mr. Truong also informed the police that he did not know the
purpose to which the pills would be put after he sold them.
Three government witnesses testified at trial that they had purchased large
quantities of pseudoephedrine from Mr. Truong. Shane McLain testified that he
began purchasing pseudoephedrine from Mr. Truong in the winter of 2000, buying
flats containing twelve sixty-count bottles of pseudoephedrine for $300. Mr.
McLain bought the flats once a week or every other week and purchased a single
1
The extent to which the storeroom held other items of inventory is not
altogether clear from the record. On cross-examination, Officer Deramus
responded in the affirmative when defense counsel asked if the storeroom held
“other items of inventory . . . cigarettes, pop, and so on.” R. Vol. V 119. On re-
direct, however, when asked if there were “cartons of cigarettes, cartons of cups,
cartons of other wares” in the storeroom, Officer Deramus replied that there were
not. Id. at 126.
4
flat fifteen to twenty times. Mr. McLain also testified to purchases of multiple
flats: two flats two or three times; three flats two or three times; five flats five or
six times. All sales were cash sales, although on a few occasions Mr. Truong
“fronted” Mr. McLain the pills, allowing him to take the pills and pay for them
later.
In March 2000, Mr. McLain and Brandi Rosencutter, another prosecution
witness, found a 1000-count pseudoephedrine bottle in an abandoned house and
took it to Mr. Truong to see if he could obtain the larger bottles. Mr. Truong did
so, and Mr. McLain began to buy the large bottles for $420 each, purchasing one
bottle at a time on two occasions, two bottles twice, three bottles once, five
bottles two or three times, eight bottles once, and ten bottles twice. Although Mr.
Truong did not “front” Mr. McLain the larger bottles, when Mr. McLain did not
have the full amount to buy the larger bottles, Mr. Truong would allow him to pay
the remaining amount later.
These sales took place under unusual circumstances. While Mr. McLain
initially made his purchases during the day, he later began to buy pills shortly
after the store closed. Mr. McLain would knock on the locked door of the store
after the exterior lights had been turned off, and Mr. Truong would admit him and
sell him pills. Mr. McLain invariably paid cash for the pills, the sales were not
rung into the cash register, and Mr. McLain did not receive a receipt. When Mr.
5
McLain purchased soft drinks or cigarettes in addition to the pseudoephedrine, the
other items were rung into the cash register. The bottles did not have price tags
on them. On one occasion, Mr Truong packaged Mr. McLain’s purchase so as to
conceal its nature; the night Mr. McLain was arrested, Mr. Truong placed a single
large bottle of pseudoephedrine in a styrofoam cup with a lid and straw. These
measures do not appear to have been the product of any explicit agreement to
conceal Mr. McLain’s purchases; Mr. McLain testified that he “couldn’t say that
[he] and [Mr. Truong] really ever had a conversation” about anything. R. Vol. V
154.
Shane McLain’s nephew, Kevin McLain, also testified that he bought
pseudoephedrine from Mr. Truong. He began by buying two or three packets of
“tear-outs” once or twice a week, and after a few weeks progressed to buying
whole boxes of the tear-out packages for $90. He continued to buy the whole
boxes once a week for five or six months and then began to buy the thousand-
count bottles, buying four or five in the month before Mr. Truong’s arrest.
Like his uncle, Kevin McLain made his purchases under unusual
circumstances. Neither the whole boxes nor the large bottles were on display in
the store. He made his purchases when no one else was in the store and
invariably paid cash. The large bottles did not have labels or prices on them. He
did not receive receipts for purchases of the large bottles, although he sometimes
6
received receipts for the whole boxes. Kevin was unsure if sales for the large
bottles were rung into the cash register. On the four or five occasions on which
he bought a large bottle, Mr. Truong placed the bottle in a styrofoam cup with a
lid and sometimes a straw.
Like his uncle, Kevin McLain did not discuss the manner in which he made
his purchases with Mr. Truong:
Q. When you made these purchases, was there anybody else in the
store?
A. No.
Q. Was that by design?
A. I wouldn’t ever come into—I wouldn’t ever go in the store while
people was in there. I would wait, you know, until everybody left
before I went in to ask, to ask him for them.
Q. Well, why is that?
A. Because I was paranoid. I was high. Just, it’s something I did.
Not wanting to get into any trouble.
R. Vol. V. 244. Kevin McLain never discussed his secretive behavior or the
reasons for it with Mr. Truong; indeed, his testimony cast doubt on Mr. Truong’s
ability to understand such a conversation should either of the McLains have
attempted it:
Q. And did you have a conversation or did the defendant tell you
about these [large] bottles?
A. He just said he had the thousand lot pretty much. There wasn’t a
real conversation about it. He said he didn’t have the tear-out box
but he had those.
Q. And he was speaking in English?
A. He was trying to, yeah. . . .
Q. Did he understand you?
A. I’m not sure if he did or not.
7
R. Vol. V. 248–249.
Mr. Truong also sold pseudoephedrine to Shane McLain’s friend, Brandi
Rosencutter. Ms. Rosencutter testified that Shane McLain introduced her to Mr.
Truong in early 2001 and that she began to buy between five and six sixty-count
bottles a few times a week. Ms. Rosencutter corroborated Shane McLain’s story
of finding a thousand-count bottle in an abandoned house and testified that she
went with Mr. McLain to show the bottle to Mr. Truong. A few weeks after she
showed Mr. Truong the bottle, she began to buy one or two of the large bottles
once or twice a week. She continued to make these purchases for approximately
six months, buying, at her estimate, 150 bottles in total. When Mr. Truong was
out of the large bottles, Ms. Rosencutter testified that she sometimes bought flats
of sixty-count bottles, estimating that she purchased sixty flats during the same
period she was buying the larger bottles. When nothing else was available, she
also purchased 48-packet boxes of pseudoephedrine and hundred-count bottles.
Ms. Rosencutter’s purchases were attended by the now-familiar litany of
suspicious circumstances. The bottles were not labeled and had no price tags.
The large bottles and flats of smaller bottles were not on display. Ms.
Rosencutter never received a receipt and always paid cash. Purchases of
pseudoephedrine were not rung into the cash register but other purchases made at
the same time were. There is one new element in Ms. Rosencutter’s account,
8
however; Ms. Rosencutter stated that Mr. Truong “to some extent” told her not to
make her purchases when other customers were in the store:
A. If there was people there, he didn’t want to sell them to us. You
know, while there was other people there in the store, we would wait.
Then if there was people behind the counter with him, he would—he
wouldn’t, you know, he would let us know not to let them know what
we were doing.
Q. And how would he do that?
A. At one point he told me not to ah—
Q. Do you recall what he said?
A. Just if he had customers or if there was people behind the counter
that not to buy from them because, you know, he was the only one to
buy from.
Q. Did he ever make any signals of [sic] gestures to you to come
back or wait until other customers were gone?
A. Not very often, we mostly—I mostly knew what to do, you know,
if there were too many people there, I would just come back.
Q. After you were told once, you knew what to do?
A. Yes.
R. Vol. V. 299–300. Normally Mr. Truong would put the bottles in a plain brown
bag, but once or twice he put them in a white styrofoam cup with another cup on
top of it, but without a straw.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the defendant moved for a judgment
of acquittal, arguing that the prosecution had offered no evidence to prove Mr.
Truong knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the pseudoephedrine he sold
would be used to make methamphetamine. The trial court reserved ruling on the
motion, and denied it without reasons when the defendant renewed the motion at
the close of his own case.
9
At the close of the evidence, the prosecutor requested a “deliberate
ignorance” instruction, which would permit the jury to infer knowledge from acts
purposefully taken by the defendant to avoid learning that the pseudoephedrine he
sold was likely used to manufacture methamphetamine. See United States v.
Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2000). After a lengthy discussion,
which occupies more than ten pages in the transcript, the district court declined to
deliver the instruction on the ground that “there is no record that establishes or
that forms the basis for, indicates conduct that includes deliberate acts to avoid
actual knowledge of the operant facts.”
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of the indictment.
II.
We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo, but view the evidence,
as well as the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it, in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257,
1261–62 (10th Cir. 2000). An inference is reasonable “if the conclusion flows
from logical and probabilistic reasoning.” United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860,
865 (10th Cir. 1995). We do not second-guess the jury’s determination as to the
weight or credibility of the evidence presented at trial. United States v. Yoakam,
116 F.3d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997). Our deference to the jury’s evaluation of
the evidence is not unlimited, however; the evidence supporting a guilty verdict
10
must raise more than the mere suspicion of guilt, and the jury’s inferences must
be “more than speculation and conjecture in order to be reasonable.” United
States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 794 (10th Cir. 1997). We must therefore
chart our course between the permissible inferences the jury may draw from the
evidence before it and mere speculation, affirming the verdict if “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in
original).
The procedural posture of this case limits our consideration of the evidence
to that presented in the government’s case in chief. Mr. Truong moved for a
judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 at the close of the prosecution’s case and the
trial court reserved its ruling. When a trial court reserves ruling on a motion for
judgment of acquittal, its ultimate ruling on the motion must be based on the
evidence as it stood when the ruling was reserved. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b).
Appellate review is similarly limited in scope. See Advisory Committee Notes to
1994 Amendments (“[T]he trial court is to consider only the evidence submitted
at the time of the motion in making its ruling, whenever made. And in reviewing
a trial court's ruling, the appellate court would be similarly limited.”); accord
United States v. Finn, 375 F.3d 1033, 1037 (10th Cir. 2004). We must therefore
disregard the evidence, discussed by the government in its brief, that was
11
introduced after the Rule 29 motion.
III.
The statutes under which Mr. Truong was convicted contain an unusually
specific mens rea requirement: they prohibit possessing and distributing
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine only when it can be proved that the defendant
knew, intended, or had reasonable cause to believe it would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2),843(6). It is not
sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant knew, intended, or had
reasonable cause to believe that the substance would be abused or would be used
illegally. Nor is it sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant was
negligent or reckless with respect to the risk that the ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.
United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1985). The government
must prove the defendant was aware, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the
substance would be used for the specific purpose of manufacturing
methamphetamine. 2
2
The government has not specifically argued that the conviction could be
sustained under a theory of “deliberate ignorance.” See, e.g., United States v.
Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that a jury instruction
that “knowledge can be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded himself to
the existence of a fact” is appropriate when the government presents evidence
“showing the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning the truth”); United
(continued...)
12
On the face of the statute, it might appear that the mens rea element of
these offenses could be either subjective or objective – that a defendant could be
convicted upon proof of actual knowledge or intent (subjective) or upon proof
that a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances should have known (had
“reason to believe”) that the substance would be used to manufacture
methamphetamine (objective). Two circuits have so held. See United States v.
Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[c]onsistent with the text of the
statute, the [challenged jury] instruction incorporates both subjective and
objective considerations. . . . [The defendant] had reasonable cause to believe if
she actually knew facts that would alert a reasonable person that the
pseudoephedrine would be used to make methamphetamine.”); United States v.
Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005). But this Circuit has interpreted the
“reasonable cause to believe” standard of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2) and § 843(6) as
“akin to actual knowledge.” United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th
Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir.
2
(...continued)
States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405, 1409-1412 (10th Cir. 1991). At trial, the
district court denied the government’s request for a “deliberate ignorance”
instruction on the ground that the record did not support it. R. Vol. VII 502-512.
The government does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Any such argument is
therefore waived.
13
2005) (approving jury instruction stating the reasonable cause to believe inquiry
“is entirely subjective, the inquiry is not to be viewed from the perspective of a
hypothetical reasonable person”). 3 In order to convict in this case, therefore, the
prosecution had to offer evidence sufficient to allow the jury to infer that Mr.
Truong had actual knowledge, or something close to it, that the pseudoephedrine
and ephedrine he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.
Ordinarily, the government satisfies this burden by introducing evidence
that the defendant had received an official notification or warning regarding the
substance, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“the DEA routinely visits convenience stores in [defendant’s] area to issue [red]
notices . . . warn[ing] that pseudoephedrine can be diverted to criminal drug
production and informs recipients about the state and federal laws regarding sales
of these products.”); Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1265 (DEA videotaped meeting in which
defendant was shown a DEA “red notice” explaining that criminals make
purchases of large quantities of pseudoephedrine in order to manufacture
methamphetamine); or by using an undercover agent to engage in conversation
with the defendant regarding the connection between the substance and the
3
The Eight Circuit has criticized our interpretation on the ground that it
“would effectively equate reasonable cause to believe with actual knowledge and
thereby render the ‘reasonable cause to believe’ phrase redundant.” Galvan, 407
F.3d at 957.
14
manufacture of methamphetamine. See, e.g., Buonocore, 416 F.3d at 1126 (DEA
recorded controlled buy in which purchaser said “the meth cooks must be cookin
like crazy” and “I must have had a run, there’s a bunch of meth cooks in town,
that’s what their [sic] using them for”). A defendant’s own actions or words may
also reveal his knowledge that he is selling precursors that will be converted into
a methamphetamine.
The government presented no such evidence in this case. The government
offered no direct evidence regarding Mr. Truong’s subjective state of knowledge
as to the conversion of pseudoephedrine into methamphetamine. Indeed, the only
testimony presented in the government’s case in chief addressing Mr. Truong’s
awareness of the connection between the drugs he sold and the manufacture of
methamphetamine was Officer Deramus’s testimony that Mr. Truong told the
police he did not know the purpose to which the pseudoephedrine he sold would
be put. No law enforcement agent testified that Mr. Truong had received notice
of the fact that pseudoephedrine can be used to make methamphetamine. None of
the government witnesses testified to any conversations with Mr. Truong
regarding methamphetamine. Indeed, two of the three purchasers testified that
they had had no conversations with Mr. Truong on any subject at all, and Kevin
McLain’s testimony suggested that Mr. Truong’s English might have been
inadequate to have such a conversation even if it had been attempted. Nor did the
15
government present evidence that knowledge of the connection between
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine and the manufacture of methamphetamine was so
widespread among persons of Mr. Truong’s circumstances that his knowledge
could be inferred. Indeed, the only evidence at trial regarding public knowledge
that methamphetamine can be manufactured from pseudoephedrine was Officer
Deramus’s testimony that not everyone knows of the relationship between the two
drugs.
To be sure, as Mr. Truong admits in his brief, the government presented an
abundance of evidence from which a jury might reasonably infer that Mr. Truong
knew that his customers “were up to no good.” Defendant Br. 13. The huge
quantity and clandestine circumstances of the sales would surely have put any
reasonable person on notice that something nefarious was going on. Mr. Truong
repeatedly sold pseudoephedrine after his shop closed or when there were no
other customers, from which a jury might reasonably infer that Mr. Truong did
not wish these sales to be observed. There was ample evidence that the
purchasers wished the sales to be secret, which supports the inference that their
intended use was illicit. The fact that Mr. Truong purchased the drugs outside
ordinary channels from an unknown person, and sold them without the usual
packaging and labeling indicates that he was complicit. Repeated cash sales made
without generating any records could also support a reasonable inference that Mr.
16
Truong was attempting to avoid discovery. Finally, a jury could infer from the
act of concealing pill bottles in styrofoam cups that Mr. Truong knew selling
large quantities of pseudoephedrine was not an innocent activity.
But the unusually specific mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
843 requires more. Presumably because of the large-scale legitimate use of
pseudoephedrine as a cold remedy, and a concern about not imposing
unreasonable duties or risk of criminal liability on the pharmacies and
convenience stores that sell this common product, Congress limited the reach of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 843 to sellers with the actual knowledge or intent (or, in
this Circuit, something “akin to actual knowledge”) that it would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. In the trial below, the government presented
substantial evidence that Mr. Truong was attempting to conceal his sales of
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, and knew or had reason to believe the
transactions had an illicit character; but it presented no evidence that Mr. Truong
knew that his purchasers would use the substance to manufacture
methamphetamine. For all we know from the evidence presented to the jury in
the government’s case in chief, Mr. Truong may have thought that ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine are themselves subject to abuse or that his purchasers were
addicted to over-the-counter medications. He could have thought that he and his
customers were evading taxes, or that the products were contraband for some
17
reason beyond his ken. While such motives would hardly redound to Mr.
Truong’s credit, they are not punishable by the statutes under which he was
convicted.
IV.
The prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury
could have reasonably inferred Mr. Truong knew or had reasonable cause to
believe the drugs he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. We
therefore REVERSE his conviction as unsupported by sufficient evidence.
18
04-5094, United States v. Truong
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur. Although the question is very close for me, I can accept the
panel’s view that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Truong
actually knew that the pseudophedrine he was selling was destined for
methamphetamine manufacturing. I add a few words, however, in the hope that
they may help avoid error in the future.
It seems to me that there was ample evidence to convict Mr. Truong if the
jury had been properly instructed. Mr. Truong’s surreptitious conduct in selling
the pseudophedrine would certainly permit a rational juror to infer beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knew the purchasers were using the drug for some
unlawful purpose and that if he did not know the specific purpose, he was
willfully avoiding that knowledge. The criminal law is not devoid of common
sense. “‘(T)he rule is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but then
deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in
ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.’” United States v. Jewell, 532
F.2d697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (quoting Glanville Llewely Williams,
Criminal Law: The General Part, s 57 at 157 (2d ed. 1961) (parenthesis in
original)). If the jury had been given a deliberate-ignorance instruction, the
verdict could be sustained.
Indeed, the prosecution requested such an instruction, but the district court
denied the request. We recently affirmed a conviction on the ground that there
was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict by a properly instructed jury,
without our determining whether the evidence supported a verdict based on the
instructions actually given, when the prosecution, as here, had unsuccessfully
sought the proper instructions. See United States v. Williams, 376 F.3d 1048
(10th Cir. 2004). But in this case the government has not argued a deliberate-
ignorance theory on appeal, so we need not decide whether Williams applies. (We
also need not address whether, in the event there was sufficient evidence under a
deliberate-ignorance theory, we must remand for a new trial for the jury to decide
guilt or innocence under that theory.)
Therefore, with considerable misgivings about the outcome here, I join
Judge McConnell’s opinion.
-2-
United States v. Truong
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2005-10-17
Citations: 425 F.3d 1282
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