United States v. Vera-Flores

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 7, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-1128
FED EL V ERA-FLO RES,

Defendant-Appellant.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D .C . N O. 05-C R-465-M SK )

Vicki M andell-King, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Raymond P. M oore,
Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant.

James C. M urphy, Assistant United States Attorney (Troy A. Eid, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before M U RPH Y, B AL DOC K, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.

M U RPH Y, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction

Defendant-Appellant Fedel Vera-Flores pleaded guilty to one count of

possession of a firearm by an illegal alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(5)(A). He received a sentence of twelve months and one day, to be

followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal, Vera-Flores alleges the

United States breached its obligation under the plea agreement not to oppose a

below-Guideline sentence. He also challenges the sentence imposed by the

district court.

During the pendency of V era-Flores’ appeal, this court learned V era-Flores,

a citizen of M exico who was in the United States illegally at the time of his

arrest, had served his term of imprisonment and been deported. Because this

court determines V era-Flores’ removal from the United States moots his appeal,

we do not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.

II. Background

Vera-Flores claims he entered the United States illegally in June 2005 to

work and visit his son and grandson in G rand Junction, Colorado. Vera-Flores’

arrest resulted from an October 14, 2005, Drug Enforcement Agency search of his

son’s home in connection with the son’s suspected illegal drug activity. 1 During

1
It is undisputed that the suspected illegal drug activity did not involve or
implicate Vera-Flores.

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the search, federal agents discovered a semi-automatic handgun in the bedroom

occupied by Vera-Flores.

Vera-Flores was apprehended by police officers during his evening drive

home from work on October 14 and w aived his M iranda rights. W hen questioned

about the handgun, Vera-Flores admitted he had purchased the gun during his stay

in Grand Junction. He admitted he knew he could not legally purchase or register

a gun and also acknowledged he had been aware of the risk that the gun was

stolen. Three days after Vera-Flores’ arrest, the Bureau of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement filed a detainer for removal proceedings.

Vera-Flores pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by an

illegal alien in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). In exchange for Vera-

Flores’ guilty plea, the United States agreed to a two-point reduction under the

advisory Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility and a one-point

reduction for timely notifying the government. The United States further agreed

not to oppose V era-Flores’ request for an outside-the-heartland downward

departure under the Guidelines or his request for a below-G uidelines sentence.

At sentencing, Vera-Flores requested a downward departure based on

aberrant behavior, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20, and for conduct outside the

heartland of the Guidelines, pursuant to U .S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Vera-Flores also

asked the district court to consider a sentence below the Guidelines based on his

personal history and characteristics and the need to impose a sentence not greater

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than necessary to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). W hen asked

for its position on the requested sentencing departures, the United States said it

did not object. W hen asked whether it “conced[ed]” a non-Guidelines sentence

would be appropriate, however, the government said it would “not concede that.”

The court interpreted the government’s statement as “not oppos[ing] a downward

departure under the guidelines but oppos[ing] imposition of a non-guidelines

sentence.” The court further stated its belief that there is a rebuttable

presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable. It placed on Vera-Flores

the burden of rebutting the propriety of a Guidelines sentence.

In determining Vera-Flores’ sentence, the court declined to accept either of

V era-Flores’ proffered grounds for departure. It also declined to impose a below -

Guidelines sentence. Based on Vera-Flores’ total offense level of thirteen and his

lack of criminal history points, the court calculated a Guidelines sentence of

twelve to eighteen months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Vera-Flores to

twelve months, followed by three years’ supervised release. Vera-Flores

subsequently requested, and the court imposed, a sentence of twelve months and

one day to qualify Vera-Flores for good-time credit.

Vera-Flores filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Vera-Flores asserts

the U nited States breached the plea agreement by failing to concede that a below -

Guidelines sentence would have been appropriate and by failing to correct the

district court’s misapprehension that the United States opposed a below-

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Guidelines sentence. Vera-Flores further alleges the district court abused its

discretion by misinterpreting the prerequisites for the aberrant behavior departure

and by declining to apply the outside-the-heartland departure. Finally, Vera-

Flores challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the manner

in which the district court arrived at its decision to impose a within-Guidelines

sentence.

Vera-Flores completed his term of incarceration during the pendency of this

appeal and was removed from the United States by the Bureau of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement. This court issued an order to show cause w hy the case

should not be dismissed as moot, either because Vera-Flores’ deportation

rendered the appeal moot or because of the lack of a concrete possibility the

district court would impose a lesser term of supervised release on remand.

In his briefing on the mootness issue, Vera-Flores argues the appeal is not

moot because any errors in sentencing could be corrected on remand by a reduced

term of supervised release. The United States, in response, acknowledges that a

favorable appellate decision has the potential to yield a reduced term of

supervised release, but argues that the record, which is devoid of any discussion

about the appropriate term of supervised release, does not suggest any “concrete

possibility” that a lesser supervised release term would be imposed on remand.

The United States also argues that Vera-Flores has not met the burden of

demonstrating that sufficient collateral consequences would arise from a

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favorable decision because his deportation has rendered his supervised release

term a practical nullity. In reply, Vera-Flores contends the government is only

speculating as to whether there is a concrete possibility of a reduced term of

supervised release on remand and asserts that, because he does not face a lifetime

bar to lawful reentry into the United States, his situation is distinguishable from

that of defendants whose sentencing appeals have been held moot by other courts.

III. Discussion

Before addressing the merits of an appeal, a court must be satisfied that it

has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Article III of the United States

Constitution imposes a strict requirement that federal court jurisdiction extends

only to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III

requires a party seeking relief to have “suffered, or be threatened with, an actual

injury traceable to the [appellee] and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

decision [by the appeals court].” United States v. M eyers, 200 F.3d 715, 718

(10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). W here judicial relief

will not remedy the appellant’s injury, “the appellant can no longer satisfy the

Article III case or controversy jurisdictional requirement and the appeal is moot.”

Id.

In this circuit, under ordinary circumstances, a defendant who has served

his term of imprisonment but is still serving a term of supervised release may

challenge his sentence if his unexpired term of supervised release could be

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reduced or eliminated by a favorable appellate ruling. United States v. Castro-

Rocha, 323 F.3d 846, 847 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by

Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. 625 (2006). A defendant in this situation satisfies

the Article III case or controversy requirement because the defendant’s liberty is

affected by ongoing obligations to comply with supervised release conditions and

restrictions. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)

(discussing limits of probationer’s liberty).

This case, however, presents a different situation. Vera-Flores served his

sentence and has been deported. Although legally subject to a three-year term of

supervised release, Vera-Flores is presumably in M exico. W hile outside the

United States, Vera-Flores has no obligation to report to a probation officer and is

not under the supervision or control of the U nited States Probation Office. In

short, Vera-Flores’ liberty is in no way affected by any sentencing error allegedly

comm itted by the district court because Vera-Flores’ deportation has eliminated

all practical consequences associated with serving a term of supervised release. 2

2
Because Vera-Flores’ claim regarding the government’s breach of the plea
agreement relates solely to sentencing, this court construes his claim as a
challenge to the length of his sentence rather than to his conviction. Vera-Flores
nowhere disputes the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent nature of his plea or
asserts the plea itself is invalid. Vera-Flores’ only challenge is to whether the
government was obligated to clarify that it did not oppose the imposition of a
below-G uidelines sentence. Furthermore, although Vera-Flores attempts in his
reply brief on the mootness issue to characterize his plea bargain claim as a
challenge to his conviction, he admits that the appropriate remedy would be a
reduction in his term of supervised release rather than the invalidation of the plea
(continued...)

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Vera-Flores does not, therefore, have an actual injury likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision, even assuming arguendo that Vera-Flores states valid

claims on appeal which would be likely to result in the modification or

elimination of his supervised release term on remand. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523

U.S. 1, 7 (1998).

Furthermore, as in the parole-revocation context, this court cannot presume

that collateral consequences arise from any alleged sentencing errors. See

Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14 (declining to presume collateral consequences flow from

allegedly improper parole revocation); M eyers, 200 F.3d at 722 (holding

defendant failed to show sufficient collateral consequences arising from

revocation of supervised release and resulting reimprisonment after term of

reimprisonment had been completed). W here direct injury is absent and there is

no presumption that collateral consequences arise from erroneous district court

action, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating sufficient collateral

consequences to avoid dismissal for mootness. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14–16;

M eyers, 200 F.3d at 718. Vera-Flores has not met this burden. Vera-Flores

2
(...continued)
agreement. Under different circumstances, where, for example, the voluntariness
of the plea itself is at issue, the defendant’s challenge would properly be
considered a challenge to the defendant’s conviction and the mootness analysis
would likely be different, even in a situation where the defendant has been
deported. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12 (1998) (presuming continuing
collateral consequences of a conviction sufficient to meet the Article III case or
controversy requirement even after a defendant has completed his term of
imprisonment).

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asserts that the possibility he could lawfully reenter the United States at some

future time distinguishes his situation from those of defendant aliens who are

barred for life from lawful reentry into the United States and whose sentencing

appeals have been held moot. 3 See, e.g., United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41,

55–56 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Hernandez-Baide, 146 F. App’x 302, 304

(10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); United States v. M ercurris, 192 F.3d 290, 294 (2d

Cir. 1999). In support of this contention, Vera-Flores cites the court-imposed

condition of his supervised release which requires him, in the event he law fully

reenters the United States during his three-year period of supervised release, to

report to the nearest United States probation office within seventy-two hours of

reentry. Although Vera-Flores does not elaborate upon the significance of this

condition of his supervision, we construe the reference as an argument that, were

Vera-Flores to obtain the Attorney General’s permission to apply for lawful

reentry during the pendency of his three-year term of supervised release and were

he actually admitted during that time period, he would be forced to serve out the

remainder of his supervised release term under the supervision of the United

States Probation Office. Because this hypothetical scenario is, at best, “remote

3
Because he initially entered the country illegally and was removed upon
completion of his term of imprisonment, Vera-Flores is subject to a ten-year bar
from the date of his removal before he can apply for lawful reentry into the
United States, unless he applies for and receives permission from the Attorney
General to apply for readmission earlier. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(I) &
(iii).

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and unlikely to occur[,]” such a speculative collateral consequence is insufficient

to save Vera-Flores’ appeal from mootness. 4 Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8; see

generally Richard D . Steel, Steel on Immigration Law § 11:35 (2d ed. 2006),

available at W L STEEL § 11:35 (discussing factors A ttorney General considers in

exercising discretion to grant permission for early application for reentry, as well

as procedure and fee for filing request for permission to apply).

IV. Conclusion

Because this court determines Vera-Flores has sustained no actual injury

which this court can remedy and because Vera-Flores has failed to demonstrate

the presence of collateral consequences arising from any alleged errors the

government or the district court made during Vera-Flores’ sentencing proceeding,

this court concludes V era-Flores’ removal has rendered his appeal moot. This

appeal is, therefore, DISM ISSED.

4
Because this court concludes V era-Flores has failed to demonstrate
sufficient collateral consequences to avoid dismissal, we do not reach the
argument recently relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Rosenbaum -
Alanis, 483 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2007) and advanced by the U nited States here
as an alternative justification for a mootness dismissal. In Rosenbaum-Alanis, the
court held the deported defendant’s inability to appear in court for resentencing
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 precluded the court from
affording relief. Id.

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