F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
August 21, 2007
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A P PE A L S
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
T E N T H C IR C U IT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4042
TR AV IS L. WILK EN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
A ppeal from the U nited States D istrict C ourt
for the D istrict of U tah
(D .C . N o. 2:04-C R -695-D B )
Submitted on the briefs: *
Sharon Preston, Salt Lake City, Utah, for D efendant-Appellant.
Brett L. Tolman, United States Attorney, and Diana Hagan, Assistant United
States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before B R ISC O E , E B E L , and M cC O N N E L L , Circuit Judges.
E B E L, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G ). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Travis L. W ilken pled guilty to the crime of
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. M r. W ilken now appeals his sentence of 235 months’
imprisonment on grounds that the district court incorrectly calculated the United
States Sentencing Guidelines range (the “Guidelines range”) for his offense and
that the length of the sentence imposed was unreasonable.
W e first hold that M r. W ilken did not waive his right to appeal his
sentence, despite language to the contrary in his plea agreement, because
statements made by the district court during his plea colloquy created ambiguity
as to whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary. However, upon considering
the merits of M r. W ilken’s appeal, we conclude that he has failed to demonstrate
that his sentence was unreasonable and that any error in calculating the
Guidelines range for his offense w as harmless. W e therefore A FFIRM M r.
W ilken’s sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
According to uncontested facts from the presentence report (“PSR”)
prepared by the United States Probation Office in this case, a confidential
informant (“CI”) working for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
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arranged to sell a pound of methamphetamine to M r. W ilken on the evening of
September 27, 2004. Utah H ighway Patrol (“UHP”) troopers stopped M r.
W ilken’s pickup truck en route to the C I’s residence to consummate the sale. M r.
W ilken admits that, during this stop, he drove away from the troopers as they
were asking for his identification; however, he disputes the government’s
allegation that this flight occurred “at a high rate of speed with one of the
troopers still halfw ay in the driver’s door.” Later that evening, UHP troopers
located M r. W ilken walking down M ain Street in W oods Cross, Utah, and placed
him under arrest. The troopers found $11,200 in currency, a digital scale, and
15.9 grams of methamphetamine in his possession, and M r. W ilken subsequently
admitted that “at least some of that drug would have been distributed, sold, or
shared with friends and/or associates had it not been seized.”
B. T he Plea A greem ent and W aiver of A ppeal
M r. W ilken was charged with one count of possessing with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine, and one count of possessing with intent to distribute
5 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 846. Pursuant to a plea agreement reached with the government,
M r. W ilken pled guilty only to the latter count, and the government moved to
dismiss the former count at sentencing. The plea agreement also contained a
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statement of M r. W ilken’s right to appeal his sentence and a purported waiver of
that right:
8. I know there is no appellate review of any law ful sentence imposed
under a plea of guilty. I also know I may appeal the sentence imposed
upon me in this case only if the sentence is imposed in violation of law
or, in light of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the sentence is
unreasonable. . . .
10. Fully understanding my limited right to appeal my sentence, as
explained above, and in consideration of the concessions and/or
commitments made by the United States in this plea agreem ent, I
knowingly, voluntarily and expressly waive my right to appeal any
sentence imposed upon m e, and the manner in which the sentence is
determined, on any of the grounds set forth in Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3742 or on any ground w hatever, except I do not waive
my right to appeal (1) a sentence above the maximum penalty provided
in the statute of conviction as set forth in paragraph 2 above.
At a change of plea hearing, the court ascertained that M r. W ilken had reviewed
the written plea agreement. However, in asking M r. W ilken whether he
understood the waiver of appeal contained in that agreement, the court described
the waiver in significantly different terms than appeared in the written agreement:
T HE C OURT : W hen you plead guilty you waive the right to appeal any
law ful sentence. So unless a sentence is imposed above the statutory
maximum, which in this case is life, or if it’s in violation of the factors
listed in the statute, you won’t have a right of appeal. Do you
understand that?
T HE W ITNESS [M r. W ilken]: I do.
T HE C OURT : Unless it falls into those other categories, you won’t be
able to appeal the sentence . . . .
(Emphasis added). Later during the same hearing, the court reiterated the same
point in more general terms:
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T HE C OURT : Also you’re agreeing to waive any appeal or collateral
attacks as we discussed earlier and as outlined in this agreement; is that
true?
T HE W ITNESS : Yes.
(Emphasis added). The court then confirmed that M r. W ilken voluntarily agreed
to plead guilty and had been “able to consult with [his] attorney about the
decision to plead guilty and about this agreement,” accepted M r. W ilken’s guilty
plea, and directed him to sign the agreement.
C. The PSR
M r. W ilken’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 32 pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4), based on the quantity of methamphetamine and cash in
his possession at the time of his arrest. The PSR adjusted this upwards by 2
levels under U .S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for obstruction of justice, citing the government’s
allegation that, during the traffic stop prior to his arrest, M r. W ilken “sped off in
his vehicle with the UHP trooper standing half-way in the driver’s door” and
subsequently “engaged in a high speed pursuit with police.” The offense level
was further increased under the “career offender” provision at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,
which prescribes an offense level of 37 where the statutory maximum sentence for
the offense at issue is life imprisonment. 1 Finally, the PSR reduced the offense
1
Enhancement under the career offender provision of the Guidelines
requires, inter alia, that “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1(a). Though it listed M r. Wilken’s prior convictions, including at least tw o
(continued...)
-5-
level by 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,
producing a total offense level of 34. The PSR also noted that M r. W ilken’s
criminal history would normally be in category V based on his prior convictions;
however, because he met the criteria for a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)
categorically prescribed a criminal history category of VI.
Thus, based on a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of
VI, the Guideline range for M r. W ilken’s sentence as calculated in the PSR was
262 to 327 months. The PSR also listed the statutory limitations on his sentence,
which provide for a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of
life imprisonment. 2
Prior to sentencing, M r. W ilken filed several written objections to the PSR
and requested a sentence below its calculated Guideline range. He first argued
that the PSR erred by counting two of his prior convictions, described in
paragraphs 38 and 39 of the PSR, separately for purposes of calculating his
1
(...continued)
felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, the PSR did not specify
upon which of these his career offender status was predicated.
2
Typically, a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for possession with
intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine carries a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence of five years and a maximum term of 40 years’
imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). However, the government here
filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), demonstrating that M r.
W ilken had previously been convicted for a felony drug offense, thus increasing
the statutory mandatory minimum to 10 years and the maximum term to life
imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).
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criminal history score; according to M r. W ilken, these convictions resulted from
“related” cases (as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2), and therefore should have
counted as only one point on his criminal history score. M r. W ilken conceded,
however, that even so construed, his criminal history still qualified him for career
offender status under U .S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
Second, M r. W ilken argued that the PSR erred in applying the two-level
enhancem ent for reckless endangerment pursuant to U .S.S.G. § 3C1.2 because
there was insufficient proof of the government’s allegation that he drove away
from the traffic stop at high speed with an officer halfway inside the doorway of
his vehicle. W hile M r. W ilken admitted that he drove away in an attempt to
evade the police, he denied that he did so at high speed or that he endangered
officers or anyone else, conduct which he argued fails to warrant enhancement
under § 3C1.2. M r. W ilken claimed that he sought as evidence videotapes of the
traffic stop from the Highway Patrol vehicles involved, but that the government
informed him that the tapes had been lost.
M r. W ilken also argued that one of his prior convictions, a misdemeanor
conviction for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, should not have
been counted in his criminal history score because he was not represented by
counsel during court proceedings and pled guilty “just to get the case behind
him.” Thus, he contended, a criminal history score which included two points for
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this conviction would “substantially over-represent[] the seriousness of [his]
criminal history.”
Finally, M r. W ilken argued that the PSR’s application of U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1’s career offender provision was inappropriate in his case because his prior
controlled substance offenses were relatively minor and mostly confined to a one-
year period of time. He also noted more generally that the United States
Sentencing Commission has itself been critical of the career offender provision’s
efficacy when applied to non-violent drug offenders. Thus, he requested that the
sentencing court decline to apply career offender status and instead impose a
sentence of ten years, the mandatory minimum statutory sentence available for his
present offense.
D. Sentencing
A t sentencing, M r. Wilken verbally reasserted his argument for a below-
Guidelines sentence of ten years, and the court acknowledged his written
objections to the PSR. The court accepted M r. W ilken’s argument that his
criminal history score overstated his actual criminal history slightly and
accordingly decreased his criminal history score by one category, but declined to
depart or vary from the remainder of the Guidelines calculations in the PSR:
I find that the obstruction of justice points are appropriately
calculated and considered when looking at what the guidelines suggest
the sentence should be considered to be, and I find that the presentence
report in all other respects is appropriately calculated. I do find that the
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career offender calculations are appropriate in this case. I will
recognize that the criminal history overstates the defendant’s criminal
history slightly and I am going to ignore the guidelines requirement to
move the defendant to a category six. I will keep him in a category
five. That has the consequence only of moving him . . . to a criminal
history category of five rather than six, yielding a sentencing guideline
range of 235 to 293 months, which I find appropriate in this case.
The sentence will be at the low end of that range, 235 months in
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . .
The court also agreed to recommend placement in an intensive drug rehabilitation
program, noting M r. W ilken’s claim that “methamphetamine is the root of all of
[his] problems.” Finally, the court reiterated its belief that the Guidelines’ career
offender provision was appropriately applied to M r. W ilken. “Under these
circumstances I find that you qualify as a career offender, not to mention you
have endangered the lives of your children for years now. I don’t see anything
yet that has given you enough incentive to stop a very, very dangerous practice.”
Judgment was entered on M r. W ilken’s sentence on February 6, 2006. M r.
W ilken filed a timely notice of appeal the following day.
II. D ISC U SSIO N
A. V alidity of M r. W ilken’s w aiver of appeal
W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v.
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1322 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[W ]e have statutory
subject matter jurisdiction under § 1291 over sentencing appeals even when the
defendant has waived his right to appeal in an enforceable plea agreement.”). W e
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begin by addressing the predicate issue of whether M r. W ilken waived his right to
appeal; if so, we must dismiss his appeal without reaching its merits, see id. at
1328.
O ur review of an appellate waiver is governed by the three-part inquiry we
articulated in Hahn: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the
waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in
a miscarriage of justice . . . .” Id. at 1325.
M r. W ilken’s primary argument against enforcement of his waiver
implicates both the first and second prongs of the Hahn analysis: he argues that,
although the language of his plea agreement contained a clear waiver of his right
to appeal, the scope of that waiver became ambiguous after the sentencing court’s
statements and therefore, at the time he pled guilty and signed the plea agreement,
any waiver of his right to appeal an unreasonable sentence was not knowing or
voluntary. W e agree that the sentencing court’s explanation of the waiver
differed substantially from that in the written plea agreement: while the written
waiver left M r. W ilken with the right to appeal only “a sentence above the
maximum penalty provided in the statute of conviction,” the court explained to
M r. W ilken that he also had the right to appeal a sentence imposed “in violation
of the factors listed in the statute,” thus significantly narrowing the scope of the
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waiver. 3 The question here is whether that statement, made during the plea
colloquy just prior to M r. W ilken’s signing the plea agreement and entering a plea
of guilty, introduced ambiguity so as to preclude our finding that the waiver of his
right to appeal an unreasonable sentence was knowing and voluntary.
W e have previously held that a sentencing court’s “statements made after
the entry of the appeal waiver and the district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea
cannot overcome the plain language of the appeal waiver” to create ambiguity
where none exists in the written plea agreement. United States v. Arevalo-
Jimenez, 372 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Hahn,
359 F.3d at 1328 n.14); see also United States v. Fisher, 232 F.3d 301, 304 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“M ost of the circuits that have considered whether a district judge’s
post-sentence advice as to appellate rights renders ineffective an otherwise
enforceable waiver of such rights have ruled that the w aiver remains valid.”). M r.
W ilken’s argument, however, presents us with a different question, one we have
3
It is unclear precisely which statute the court intended to reference. M r.
W ilken asserts that the court’s statement “can only be construed to mean 18
U.S.C. § 3742,” which allows for appeal of all “unreasonable sentences, whether
they fall within or outside the advisory Guidelines range.” United States v.
Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2006). A colorable argument
could also be made, however, that the court meant to refer to the sentencing
factors enumerated at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). W e need not concern ourselves w ith
this distinction, since M r. W ilken’s arguments on appeal concern the calculation
and reasonableness of his sentence and are therefore cognizable under either
interpretation.
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never squarely faced: whether the sentencing court’s mischaracterization of an
appellate waiver during a plea colloquy, prior to signing of the plea agreement or
entry of a guilty plea, can create a material ambiguity as to an otherwise
unambiguous waiver in the plea agreement. See United States v. Salazar, 188
Fed. Appx. 787, 790 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (noting that the instant
issue “appears to be an unsettled question”), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1017 (2007).
Our precedent, though not addressing this question directly, provides
guidance by directing this court to look “primarily to two factors” in determining
whether an appellate waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily: (1) the
language of the plea agreement, and (2) the plea colloquy required by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 4 United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204, 1207
(10th Cir. 2007); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. W e have thus clearly contemplated an
explanatory role for the plea colloquy, although our prior opinions have addressed
this role in the context of clarifying the particulars of a defendant’s appellate
waiver, rather than obfuscating them. See United States v. Chavez-Salais, 337
F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plea colloquy is a “way in
4
The relevant portion of Rule 11 requires that the sentencing court, prior to
acceptance of a guilty plea, address the defendant personally to “inform the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, . . . the terms of any
plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the
sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). In addition, the court must also
“determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or
promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2).
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which the content of a defendant’s w aiver of appeal rights can be made known to
him”).
Nevertheless, logic indicates that if w e may rely on the sentencing court’s
statements to eliminate ambiguity prior to accepting a waiver of appellate rights,
we must also be prepared to recognize the power of such statements to achieve
the opposite effect. If it is reasonable to rely upon the court’s words for
clarification, then we cannot expect a defendant to distinguish and disregard those
statements of the court that deviate from the language of a particular provision in
a lengthy plea agreement — especially where, as here, neither the government nor
defense counsel apparently noticed the error at the time. Assuming that M r.
W ilken understood the court’s statements as broadening his right of appeal under
the waiver — an understanding the court’s language clearly supports — he
certainly could not be faulted for relying upon the court’s explanation, rather than
his own understanding, as the definitive construction of the agreement he would
almost immediately sign.
This immediacy, without objection or time to consult with counsel, is a
further factor supporting our conclusion that the sentencing court’s statements
created ambiguity in M r. W ilken’s w aiver. Had either party’s counsel objected to
the court’s statement or sought clarification, then the court could have amended
its statement and resolved any ambiguity. Alternatively, if an adequate interval
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had occurred after the court’s statements but prior to the entry of a guilty plea or
signing of the agreement during which M r. W ilken could have consulted with
counsel regarding any confusion over the scope of the appellate waiver, then
arguably counsel would have cleared up any ambiguity. But here, neither
clarification nor an opportunity therefor was offered between the court’s
erroneous statements and M r. W ilken’s signing of the plea agreement. 5
W e are thus left with ambiguity existing at the time M r. W ilken signed his
plea agreement and pled guilty: the written agreement enumerates a broad waiver
of his appellate rights, but the court’s statements during the plea colloquy
describe a much narrow er waiver. Under such uncertain circumstances, we must
construe the waiver narrowly, “according to . . . what the defendant reasonably
understood when he entered his plea.” Chavez-Salais, 337 F3d at 1172; see id. at
1173 (“Like most waivers, a defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal . . . is to be
construed narrowly.”); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325 (“In determining a waiver’s scope,
we will strictly construe appeal waivers and any ambiguities in these agreements
5
The sentencing court did inquire, prior to M r. W ilken’s signing of the plea
agreement and his guilty plea, whether he had “been able to consult with [his]
attorney about the decision to plead guilty and about this [plea] agreement,” to
which M r. W ilken responded “Yes, I have.” This exchange failed to cure the
ambiguity, however, because it indicates only that M r. W ilken was able to consult
his attorney prior to the court’s erroneous description of the appellate waiver; it
does not ascertain that M r. W ilken had the opportunity to receive any advice after
the ambiguity arose, or that he understood that he would be bound by the written
agreement rather than the court’s verbal interpretation of it.
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will be read against the Government and in favor of a defendant’s appellate
rights.”). As a result, we cannot conclude that M r. W ilken’s w aiver of his right to
appeal an allegedly unreasonable sentence was knowing and voluntary, and we
therefore hold that M r. W ilken did not waive his right to bring the instant appeal. 6
See Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d at 1174. W e therefore proceed to consider the merits
of his appeal.
B. M erits
1. C alculation of the G uidelines range including the reckless
endangerm ent p rovision at U .S.S.G . § 3C 1.2 7
In determining whether the district court correctly calculated the applicable
Guidelines range, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo.” U nited States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir.
2006) (per curiam). Even where we find an error in calculating the Guidelines
6
Because we cannot conclude that M r. W ilken knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to bring this appeal and thus we decline to enforce the waiver on
this ground, we need not address his alternative argument that enforcement of the
waiver w ould result in a miscarriage of justice.
7
The PSR referred to the adjustment under § 3C1.2 as an “Adjustment for
Obstruction of Justice,” and both M r. W ilken and the court adopted this
nomenclature when referring to this adjustment. Section 3C1.2, however, is
entitled “Reckless Endangerment D uring Flight”; it is the preceding provision, §
3C1.1, which is entitled “Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice.”
W e therefore diverge from the district court and refer to the § 3C1.2 adjustment
as alleging reckless endangerment, rather than obstruction of justice.
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range, however, we need not vacate and remand the sentence if the error was
harmless. See United States v. Graham, 466 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2006).
M r. W ilken challenges only one aspect of the district court’s calculation of
the Guideline range for his sentence: its application of the reckless endangerment
adjustment at U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, based on the government’s allegation that he
drove away from a traffic stop that preceded his arrest at high speed, “with [a]
UHP trooper standing half-way in the driver’s door” of his vehicle. He argues
that the court erred in approving the PSR’s application of the two-level
enhancement to his base offense level over his objection, because the government
failed to produce evidence of the conduct supporting it. 8
M r. W ilken appears to have a valid point. “A t sentencing, the district court
may rely on facts stated in the presentence report unless the defendant objected to
them. W hen a defendant objects to a fact in a presentence report, the government
must prove that fact at a sentencing hearing by a preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Keifer, 198 F.3d 798, 800 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, M r. W ilken
objected to the PSR’s application of the reckless endangerment enhancement,
admitting that he drove away during the traffic stop but “den[ying] that one of the
8
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 provides for a two-level increase in a defendant’s
offense level calculation “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk
of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a
law enforcement officer.”
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officers was half-way in his vehicle when he drove away or that he engaged in a
high-speed chase — and thus den[ying] that his conduct created a substantial risk
of serious bodily injury to the officers or anyone else.” M r. W ilken claims he
requested videotape evidence from the patrol cars involved in the stop, but the
government informed him that “the tapes were apparently lost by the police
agency.” The record contains no evidence offered by the government to
overcome this objection, and M r. W ilken’s admission merely that he fled the
traffic stop is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support enhancement under §
3C1.2. United States v. Conley, 131 F.3d 1387, 1390 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Not
every flight from a crime scene . . . will constitute reckless endangerment under §
3C1.2.”). Thus, it appears that the district court erred by simply adopting the
PSR ’s application of § 3C1.2 over M r. W ilken’s objection. See United States v.
Farnsw orth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996) (“W e repeatedly have held that a
district court may not satisfy its obligation [to make a finding as to controverted
factual allegations regarding sentencing] by simply adopting the presentence
report as its finding.”).
However, as it turned out, the § 3C1.2 enhancement had no effect on M r.
W ilken’s sentence. Once the court determined, based on facts unrelated to those
underlying the reckless endangerment enhancement, that M r. W ilken qualified as
a career offender, its previous offense level calculations became irrelevant; §
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4B1.1 categorically prescribes an offense level of 37 and a criminal history
category of VI to career offenders convicted of an offense carrying a maximum
statutory sentence of life imprisonment.
M r. W ilken does not argue that the district court substantively erred in its
factual findings or legal determination related to his qualification as a career
offender under § 4B1.1. Indeed, he concedes that his criminal history contained
the two previous controlled substance felony convictions necessary to trigger §
4B1.1, and therefore that the career offender enhancement “was properly applied
in a technical sense” by the district court. Thus, because § 4B1.1 controlled the
Guidelines range for his sentence, any error in the district court’s application of §
3C1.2 was harmless. See United States v. M ontgomery, 439 F.3d 1260, 1263
(10th Cir. 2006) (“Harmless error is that which did not affect the district court’s
selection of the sentence imposed.” (quotation omitted)); United States v.
Sherwin, 271 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that it was
unnecessary for this court to address the district court’s erroneous application of a
§ 3C1.2 enhancement because on remand, the sentence imposed would not
change). 9
9
M r. W ilken argues that, even if the error had no effect on his sentence, it
is not harmless because it will affect the security designation assigned to him by
the B ureau of Prisons. Precedent is clear, however, that we determine w hether a
sentencing error is harmless with reference only to the sentence imposed.
W illiams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1992) (“[R]emand is required
(continued...)
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W e therefore decline to vacate or remand M r. W ilken’s sentence based on
error in the calculation of the appropriate Guidelines range.
2. R easonableness of the sentence
Having found no reversible error in the district court’s calculation of the
Guidelines range, we review the resulting sentence for “reasonableness.” K ristl,
437 F.3d at 1053. A sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines
range is accorded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, which is “a
deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may rebut by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other
factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Id. at 1054; see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2456, 2462 (2007) (holding that “a court of appeals may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the
Sentencing Guidelines”). M r. W ilken argues that the district court’s imposition
9
(...continued)
only if the sentence was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
Guidelines.” (quotation omitted, emphasis added)); M ontgomery, 439 F.3d at
1263 (“Harmless error is that which did not affect the district court’s selection of
the sentence imposed.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. M arshall, 432 F.3d
1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (“If the sentencing error does not affect the sentence
that would have been imposed by the district court, it does not affect substantial
rights.”); see also United States v. Brown, 221 F.3d 1336, 2000 W L 876382 at
*14 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (holding that errors in a PSR’s Guideline
calculations that do not affect the defendant’s sentence are harmless even if they
affect the defendant’s Bureau of Prisons classification).
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of a 235-month sentence based, in part, on application of the career offender
enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, was unreasonable.
a. Presumption of reasonableness
As an initial matter regarding our standard of review, we are faced with the
vexatious question of whether the presumption of reasonableness accorded to a
within-Guidelines sentence applies in this case. The Guidelines range as
calculated in the PSR, based on M r. W ilken’s status as a career offender, was 262
to 327 months’ imprisonment. However, at sentencing, the court agreed with M r.
W ilken that his criminal history score “overstates [his] criminal history slightly”
and therefore, rather than applying criminal history category VI as prescribed by §
4B1.1, applied category V. Based on this change, the court recalculated M r.
W ilken’s sentencing range to be 235 to 293 months and imposed a sentence at the
bottom of this revised range.
The court, however, did not state the basis for its divergence from the
criminal history category set out in § 4B1.1. The court might have intended to
depart from the Guidelines range based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b), which provides
for a downward departure of one criminal history category “[i]f reliable
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially
over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history . . . .”
Alternatively, the court might have meant to grant a variance based on the
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sentencing factors at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which require the sentencing court to
consider “the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the need for the
sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” and “to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” A ccordingly, we are
unable to determine whether the court’s divergence from the sentences prescribed
by § 4B1.1 represents a “departure” or a “variance” from the Guideline range.
See United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen
a court reaches a sentence above or below the recommended Guidelines range
through application of Chapters Four or Five of the Sentencing Guidelines, the
resulting increase or decrease is referred to as a ‘departure.’ W hen a court
enhances or detracts from the recommended range through application of §
3553(a) factors, however, the increase or decrease is called a ‘variance.’”).
This distinction is important because it is potentially determinative of our
standard of review. As previously stated, we apply a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness when review ing a sentence that “falls within the properly
calculated Guidelines range.” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1053. It is well settled that
when a district court varies from the Guidelines range based only on non-
Guideline § 3553(a) factors, the resulting sentence lies outside of the “properly
calculated Guidelines range” and therefore is not presumed to be reasonable. See,
e.g., United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2006)
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(holding that a sentence based on a variance from the Guidelines range, invoking
the § 3553(a) factors, is not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, though it
is not presumptively unreasonable), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2935 (2007).
However, it is less clear whether a sentence based on a departure that is
itself recognized under the Guidelines is considered a within-Guidelines sentence
for purpose of applying a presumption of reasonableness on review. Fortunately,
this determination is not necessary to our resolution of this case, for the result is
the same either way; even without the benefit of a presumption of reasonableness,
we nevertheless conclude that M r. W ilken’s sentence is reasonable. W e therefore
reserve for another day the question of w hether a presumption of reasonableness
applies to a sentence that departs, in either direction, from the applicable
Guideline range under § 4B1.1.
b. Unreasonableness based on the efficacy of § 4B1.1
In attempting to show that his sentence was unreasonable, M r. W ilken
argues that the United States Sentencing Commission, the body responsible for
creating the Sentencing Guidelines, “has acknowledged that the career offender
provision, as it applies to drug trafficking offenses, does not effectively serve the
sentencing goals” of § 3553(a). The Sentencing Commission, in a 2004 report,
noted that offenders who qualified for § 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement
based only upon prior drug offenses displayed lower recidivism rates than those
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career offenders who were so classified based on prior crimes of violence, and
concluded that the use of prior drug offenses to qualify offenders under § 4B1.1
had “unwarranted adverse impacts on minority groups without clearly advancing a
purpose of sentencing.” U. S. Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of
Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How W ell the Federal Criminal Justice
System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform at 134 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf [hereinafter “Sentencing
Commission Report”].
Be that as it may, the fact remains that Congress has not yet been persuaded
to remove prior drug offenses as qualifiers for the career offender provision, and
“a sentence is not rendered unreasonable merely because of a district court’s
refusal to deviate from the advisory guideline range” based on disagreements w ith
the policies underlying a particular Guideline provision. United States v.
M cCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 988
(2007). Indeed, in M cCullough we considered and rejected a very similar
argument regarding the disparity in the Guidelines between crack cocaine and
powder cocaine — a disparity, we note, of which the Sentencing Commission
expressed similar disapproval in the same report cited by M r. W ilken. See
Sentencing Commission Report at 131-32 (noting that “the Commission has
repeatedly recommended that the quantity thresholds for crack cocaine be revised
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upward,” and that this change “would dramatically improve the fairness of the
federal sentencing system”). In M cCullough, we thus held that a district court
does not err by refusing to depart or vary downw ard based on the Guidelines’
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine. 457 F.3d at 1171.
The same reasoning applies to M r. W ilken’s disagreement with the policy
underlying § 4B1.1 in this case. W hile there may exist cogent arguments against
the inclusion of prior drug offenses under § 4B1.1, a district court does not err by
declining to depart or vary from a within-Guidelines sentence on this ground. See
United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.3d 1298, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 2007) (M cConnell, J.
concurring) (discussing the perceived inequities of § 4B1.1 as applied based only
on prior drug offenses, but recognizing that application of § 4B1.1 in such a
context is “reasonable” under Tenth Circuit precedent). W e therefore cannot hold
his sentence unreasonable based on such a broad policy disagreement.
c. Unreasonableness based on M r. W ilken’s criminal
history
M r. W ilken also argues, based more specifically on the facts of his case,
that his criminal history does not warrant the sentence enhancement resulting
from his being labeled a career offender under § 4B1.1. He notes that he
proceeded pro se in pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge of possession of
marijuana and argues that this prior conviction should therefore not have
contributed to his criminal history score. He also contends that, although the PSR
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listed three felony convictions for drug offenses in his criminal history, two of
these convictions occurred in “related cases” and should therefore be treated as a
single sentence; thus, he “only had two previous offenses that qualified him for
application of” § 4B1.1.
It is not clear that M r. W ilken’s characterization of his prior convictions as
“related” is accurate, as the record does not demonstrate that any of the prior
convictions listed in the PSR occurred on the same occasion, were part of a single
comm on scheme or plan, or were consolidated for trial or sentencing. See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c) (defining the “two prior felony convictions” required for
career offender status to require that the convictions be counted separately under
§ 4A1.1’s criminal history provisions); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. 3 (defining
“related cases,” which are not counted separately for purposes of criminal history,
as those resulting “from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) w ere
part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or
sentencing”).
In any case, even if we were to adopt M r. W ilken’s version of his criminal
history, the two prior felony convictions for drug offenses that he accepts are still
sufficient to support the district court’s application of the career offender
enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (requiring a career offender to have, inter
alia, “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
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controlled substance offense”). As M r W ilken concedes that this represents the
“minimum number of offenses triggering the provision,” we fail to see how his
characterization of his criminal history in any way indicates that application of §
4B1.1 would be unreasonable.
Further undercutting M r. W ilken’s argument is the fact that the district
court, at the sentencing hearing, “recognize[d] that the [PSR’s] criminal history
overstates [M r. W ilken’s] criminal history slightly,” and therefore granted a
downward adjustment from § 4B1.1’s provision of criminal history category VI,
opting instead to keep M r. W ilken in category V. M r. W ilken thus received a
sentence that took into account the relative lack of severity of his criminal
history. 1 0
W e therefore hold that M r. W ilken’s sentence is not unreasonable based on
his criminal history and his qualification as a career offender under § 4B1.1.
d. The district court’s explanation of the sentence
Finally, M r. W ilken briefly brings what we construe as a procedural
challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court’s
10
W e disagree with M r. W ilken’s contention that the court’s decision to
reduce his criminal history score did not take into account his argument that
certain of his prior offenses were related. The court’s explanation indicated that
it based the adjustment on over-representation of M r. W ilken’s criminal history
generally, not on any particular conviction therein. W e therefore understand the
court to have heard M r. W ilken’s arguments regarding his criminal history and
addressed them with the dow nw ard adjustment from category VI to category V .
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stated reason for applying § 4B1.1’s career offender provision and imposing a
235-month sentence was not supported by the record. Because M r. W ilken did
not object on this ground at the sentencing hearing, we review this claim only for
plain error. See United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3043 (2007). “Plain error occurs where there is (1)
error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at
1222 (quotation omitted).
At the end of the sentencing hearing, after pronouncing sentence, the court
stated:
Under these circumstances I find that you qualify as a career offender,
not to mention you have endangered the lives of your children for years
now. I don’t see anything that has given you enough incentive to stop
a very, very dangerous practice.
M r. W ilken focuses on the statement that he “endangered the lives of [his]
children,” alleging that this statement is unsupported by the record. To the
contrary, we find ample support in the record for this statement. The PSR
describes a charge pending against M r. W ilken at the time of his trial indicating
that his two sons, aged 6 and 8, were found during a raid of his home along with
methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and chemicals used to manufacture
methamphetamine. At the sentencing hearing, M r. W ilken’s attorney conceded
that due to his client’s use of methamphetamine, “his judgment was totally
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w recked and his children’s lives [were] wrecked.” Indeed, during his own
statements at the sentencing hearing, M r. W ilken indicated that he was aware of
the effects of his drug abuse on his children: “I have never had any intention of
hurting anybody or endangering my kids’ lives. I guess I just didn’t realize the
power the drugs had over me. . . . There is [sic] a lot of things I w ould do over if
I could.”
W e also do not read the court’s statement as providing endangerment of his
children as the sole reason for the sentence imposed. The court stated, “I don’t
see anything that has given you enough incentive to stop a very, very dangerous
practice,” emphasizing the recurring nature of M r. W ilken’s drug abuse and
troubles with the law and noting that none of his previous sentences had
apparently been sufficient to deter his behavior. This reasoning is well supported
by M r. W ilken’s criminal history and is itself sufficient to explain the imposition
of career offender status. See, e.g., Pruitt, 487 F.3d at 1310 (“W hen a defendant
faces a sentence for her fourth drug-related conviction, it is reasonable to infer
that she is not easily deterred from engaging in unlawful conduct.”).
W e therefore do not find the district court’s statement of its reasons for
imposing a 235-month sentence to constitute error, let alone plain error.
III. C O N C L U SIO N
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For the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that M r. W ilken’s waiver of
his appellate rights w as knowing and voluntary and we therefore decline to
enforce that waiver. On the merits of his appeal, we agree that the district court
initially miscalculated M r. W ilken’s criminal history by applying an enhancement
for reckless endangerment pursuant to § 3C1.2 over his objection, without
evidence of conduct sufficient to support this enhancement; however, we
conclude that this error was harmless in light of the court’s concededly proper
application of the career offender provision at § 4B1.1, which ameliorated the
effects of the previous error. Finally, we hold that a 235-month sentence was
reasonable given M r. W ilken’s criminal history.
Accordingly, M r. W ilken’s sentence is AFFIRM ED.
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United States v. Wilken
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2007-08-21
Citations: 498 F.3d 1160
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