FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 10, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-2100
JOSE ANGEL YANEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 1:06-CR-2153-WJ)
Scott M. Davidson, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gregory J. Fouratt, United States Attorney, (Laura Fashing, Assistant United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Jose Yanez-Rodriguez entered a guilty plea, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of reentering the United States after previous deportation,
in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). Yanez-Rodriguez was ultimately
sentenced to 144 months of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised
release. He contends on appeal: (1) the government breached its plea agreement
to recommend that a sentence at the lower end of the United States Sentencing
Guideline (“Guideline”) range is appropriate; (2) the Guideline range was
incorrectly calculated; and (3) the district court’s upward variance was
substantively unreasonable.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I
On September 3, 2006, Yanez-Rodriguez was found in Santa Teresa, New
Mexico, by U.S. Border Patrol Agents. Yanez-Rodriguez admitted he was a
Mexican citizen and that he was in the United States illegally. A records check
revealed Yanez-Rodriguez had been deported from the United States after a
conviction of aggravated sexual battery in Kansas, and that he had not received
permission to reenter the United States.
Yanez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to the charged offense on October 25,
2006, pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement contemplated Yanez-
Rodriguez’s receiving a reduction of up to 3 levels from his total offense level for
acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, although the parties
recognized that the stipulation for acceptance of responsibility was not binding on
the district court. Yanez-Rodriguez reserved his right to appeal his sentence if it
was outside the applicable Guideline range, or if the sentence was not imposed in
2
conformity with his plea agreement. The government also agreed “to recommend
that a sentence at the lower end of the Sentencing Guideline range is appropriate.”
ROA Vol. 1 Doc. 14 at ¶ 12.
Subsequent to Yanez-Rodriguez’s guilty plea, the probation office prepared
a presentence report. The presentence report determined that Yanez-Rodriguez’s
base offense level was 8, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). The presentence report
also applied a 16-level increase, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii),
because Yanez-Rodriguez was convicted of felony aggravated sexual battery
before he was deported from the United States. The presentence report then
applied a 3-level reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which gave Yanez-Rodriguez a total offense level
of 21.
The presentence report also detailed Yanez-Rodriguez’s prior criminal
history, which included prior convictions dating to 1978. 1 The convictions
included: two convictions for misdemeanor theft, misdemeanor attempted
burglary of a vehicle, two convictions for misdemeanor illegal entry, escape of a
federal prisoner, illegal reentry after previous deportation, misdemeanor narcotics
offense, misdemeanor unlawful deprivation of property, misdemeanor criminal
1
In addition to his convictions, Yanez-Rodriguez was arrested six times
between 1982 and 1987. Of these, he was arrested three times for deportation
proceedings, once for retail theft, once for battery and assault, and once for
resisting or obstructing a peace officer.
3
trespass, misdemeanor destruction of property, misdemeanor simple assault,
aggravated sexual battery, misdemeanor battery, and second degree burglary.
Regarding Yanez-Rodriguez’s aggravated sexual battery conviction, the
presentence report stated:
[O]n March 23, 1988, the defendant was with a group of men who
chased and caught a 14-year-old girl while she was walking through a
park. The young female victim reported she was held down by several
men while the defendant forcibly had sex with her. When a witness
came upon the scene the victim began yelling for help. At that time the
defendant and the attackers fled. The defendant was arrested in the
park a short time after the incident. It should be noted that the
defendant was originally charged with Rape; however, at the time of the
plea, the charge was amended to Aggravated Sexual Battery, a class D
felony in the State of Kansas, which is punishable by up to 10 years
imprisonment. Further, according to the victim’s impact questionnaire,
she reported that after the rape, she was informed by her doctor that she
had a venereal disease. The victim also reported that the rape caused
her to attend weekly counseling sessions. There was no information to
indicate how long the victim attended counseling.
ROA Vol. 2 at ¶ 31. The presentence report also stated that Yanez-Rodriguez was
sentenced to 3 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the offense, served 2 years, and was
then released and deported to Mexico in 1990.
The presentence report applied 3 criminal history points, all of which were
imposed for Yanez-Rodriguez’s most recent conviction of second degree burglary
from 1991. After that conviction, Yanez-Rodriguez was sentenced to 15 years in
prison, and served 10 years before being released and deported to Mexico in
September 2000. Yanez-Rodriguez’s other prior convictions were not counted for
purposes of his criminal history points, because the sentences for those prior
4
convictions were imposed more than 15 years before he committed the offense in
this case, and his incarceration for the earlier convictions did not extend into the
15-year period. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e) (defining the applicable time period for
the computation of criminal history points for prior sentences). Yanez-
Rodriguez’s 3 criminal history points established a criminal history category of II.
Based on a total offense level of 21, and a criminal history category of II, the
advisory sentencing range used by the district court was 41 to 51 months’
imprisonment.
Yanez-Rodriguez’s sentencing proceedings in the present case were lengthy
and involved. After receiving the presentence report, Yanez-Rodriguez filed a
sentencing memorandum, wherein he requested a downward departure based on
his “mental and emotional conditions, lack of guidance as a youth, and diminished
capacity.” Id. Vol. 1, Doc. 19 at 4. In that memorandum, Yanez-Rodriguez also
sought a downward variance based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
and requested a sentence of 24 months. In support of his request for a lower
sentence, Yanez-Rodriguez described his troubled childhood, being sexually
molested as a child, his decision to leave his home and live on the streets at age
12, and his abuse of alcohol, drugs, and inhalants. Yanez-Rodriguez did not
object to the calculation of the advisory Guideline sentencing range, nor did he
object to any factual statement in the presentence report.
At the first sentencing hearing, Yanez-Rodriguez argued in support of his
5
motion for a downward departure and downward variance. The district court
invited the government to respond to Yanez-Rodriguez’s request for a below
advisory Guideline sentence, and the government stated:
[T]his defendant’s criminal history is awful, and in fact, he has 12
convictions for which he received no criminal history points, including
what appears to be the brutal rape of a 14-year-old girl; that, while the
defendant may have some diminished mental capacity or some sexual
issues, he clearly is a menace to society, and the government is not
seeking in any way an upward departure in terms of criminal history
category. In fact, we’re precluded from doing that by the Plea
Agreement, but I would suggest a downward departure is probably not
appropriate in this case.
...
So I would suggest I don’t have any objection to him going to the
medical prison, but I would suggest that a sentence at the low end of the
guideline range would be appropriate given the defendant’s extensive
criminal history. . . .
Id. Vol. 3 at 15. The district court then denied Yanez-Rodriguez’s request for a
downward departure and downward variance and informed the parties that it was
contemplating a sentence above the advisory Guideline range. 2 Yanez-Rodriguez
requested the district court order a full psychological examination, to which the
prosecutor and district court agreed. The district court ordered a full
psychological examination, including an examination of Yanez-Rodriguez’s
competency and whether he suffered from any mental disease or defect.
2
The district court denied the request for a downward departure, and then,
after considering the § 3553(a) factors, determined that, if anything, those factors
warranted a departure or variance above the advisory Guideline range, based on
Yanez-Rodriguez’s “extensive, serious, and sometimes violent criminal history.”
Id. Vol. 3 at 24.
6
After completion of the psychological examination, Yanez-Rodriguez
renewed his motion for a downward departure and/or variance based on the
psychologist’s findings. The government then filed a sentencing memorandum in
which it reiterated its opposition to Yanez-Rodriguez’s request for a sentence
below the advisory Guideline range. At the conclusion of that sentencing
memorandum, the government stated:
[T]he United States respectfully requests that this Court conclude that
a sentence within the advisory guideline range of 41 to 51 months
would be reasonable. The United States opposes Yanez[-Rodriguez]’s
request for a deviation from the advisory sentencing guideline range.
The United States takes no position on the Court’s proposal to impose
a sentence above the advisory sentencing guideline range.
Id. Vol. 1, Doc. 29 at 6.
At the second sentencing hearing, the psychologist failed to appear as
scheduled. The following exchange was had between the district court and the
government’s counsel (“AUSA”):
THE COURT: . . . I indicated a concern that perhaps the sentence
should be above the guidelines, but I think I need to be specific and to
put[] the defendant on notice of what I’m contemplating, although
again, after listening to [the psychologist], I may––I may not be
inclined to do anything.
Now, Mr. [AUSA], the government’s position is that the
guideline sentence is a reasonable sentence; is that right?
[AUSA]: Yes, Your Honor, and in fact, [defense counsel] reminded me
today that we do have a Plea Agreement in this case, and I am bound by
that agreement.
THE COURT: Sure.
7
[AUSA]: And in fact, I’m bound to not only––to not only recommend
a guideline sentence but to recommend the low end of the guidelines,
and that’s part of our agreement.
THE COURT: Which would be Offense Level 21, Category II; is that
right?
[AUSA]: Yes, that’s correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I just wanted to, you know—
[AUSA]: We do oppose [Yanez-Rodriguez]’s request for a downward
departure and—
THE COURT: Or a variance—
[AUSA]: Yes.
THE COURT: —below the low end of the guidelines.
[AUSA]: Exactly. Yes, Your Honor.
Id. Vol. 4 at 6-7.
The district court denied Yanez-Rodriguez’s request to resolve the case that
day without hearing from the psychologist. The district court stated:
I’m a little torn as far as how to go on this, and so I recognize that, even
if the guide––if there’s a sentence within the guidelines and it’s on the
high end of the guidelines, the appellate waiver would still apply. I’m
not bound by the government’s [recommendation] to a sentence on the
low end of the applicable guideline range, and so I’m considering a
whole host of things, but I did want to hear from [the psychologist].
Id. at 11.
After the second sentencing hearing, the district court gave written notice
to Yanez-Rodriguez that it was contemplating a sentence above the advisory
8
Guideline sentencing range. The notice stated that the district court was
contemplating an upward departure on the ground that Yanez-Rodriguez’s
criminal history category under-represented his criminal history. The notice also
stated that it was considering an upward variance because “a lengthy sentence
may be necessary in order to protect the public from further crimes of this
Defendant and to comply with the other purposes of paragraph (2) of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).” Id. Vol. 1, Doc. 31 at 3. Yanez-Rodriguez subsequently filed
objections to some of the factual statements in the presentence report relating to
some of his convictions and arrests, but he did not object to the factual statements
related to his conviction for aggravated sexual battery or second degree burglary.
At the third sentencing hearing, the psychologist was present to testify. On
direct examination, the psychologist testified that Yanez-Rodriguez was
competent, but that he suffered from severe psychological problems. Id. Vol. V
at 24-25, 29-30. The government cross-examined the psychologist, and Yanez-
Rodriguez contends several of the government’s questions were asked “in an
effort to influence the district court to impose a sentence in excess of the
Sentencing Guideline range.” Aplt. Br. at 4. Yanez-Rodriguez points out that the
government asked the psychologist whether he found that Yanez-Rodriguez “will
repeatedly violate societal norms as a result of the fact that he mis-perceives
events and doesn’t anticipate the consequences,” to which the psychologist
answered: “That’s correct.” ROA Vol. 5 at 31. The government also asked the
9
psychologist whether Yanez-Rodriguez exhibited “antisocial behavior,” to which
the psychologist answered “That’s correct, sir.” Id.
The government then questioned the psychologist about a Kansas
Department of Corrections report, which the government contended was
completed while Yanez-Rodriguez was in custody “on the charge of having raped
a very––a young girl.” Id. at 35. The government took the psychologist through
the findings from the report, which detailed Yanez-Rodriguez’s behavioral
problems, avoidance of responsibility, improper emotional reactions, trouble with
interpersonal relationships and the law, religious difficulties, and inability to form
appropriate societal relationships. Id. at 35-39. The government concluded its
cross-examination with: “And it’s someone like that . . . who can’t separate
reality from fantasy, who doesn’t anticipate consequences, who will repeatedly
violate societal norms, who acts on impulse with less information than is
necessary to make an appropriate decision, and who is suffering a serious
disruption of their sexual identity, could that person pose a danger to other
people?” The psychologist answered, “Yes.” Id. at 39.
After the psychologist’s testimony, the district court asked the government:
“[D]oes the government wish to state anything further regarding what is a
reasonable sentence as to this defendant?” The government responded:
Yes, Your Honor. I just want to be very clear about that. The
government opposes [defense counsel’s] request for a downward
departure or for a deviation pursuant to Booker. Beyond that, the
10
government, the government’s position, consistent with the Plea
Agreement, is that the government recommends a sentence at the low
end of the advisory guideline range as calculated by the Probation
Office, and I am bound by that agreement, so that is my
recommendation. I did cross-examine [the psychologist]. I do not
believe the defendant is entitled to any type of a deviation, but beyond
that, my position is that he should receive a sentence at the low end of
the range.
Id. at 47. Defense counsel and the district court then discussed that neither the
probation office nor the government recommended anything other than a low-end
Guideline sentence. Id. at 54.
At the fourth and final sentencing hearing on April 8, 2008, the district
court denied Yanez-Rodriguez’s renewed request for a downward departure
and/or variance. The district court found that a Guideline sentence would be
unreasonable and an upward variance was appropriate. Yanez-Rodriguez’s
defense counsel then spoke, reminding the district court of the government’s plea
agreement and arguing for a within-Guideline sentence. The government was
then invited by the district court to speak:
[AUSA]: Your Honor, as the Court’s aware, there is a Plea Agreement
in this case, and the government must recommend the low end of the
guidelines it is pursuing.
THE COURT: Sure.
[AUSA]: I would like to say, however––and this is not an argument in
any way as to what the sentence should be imposed. I have the utmost
admiration for the Court in this case; I mean, the tremendous amount of
work that the Court has put into this case. And I know that this Court
has a very busy criminal docket, but I am––my admiration for the
Court’s willingness to work so hard to try and achieve what it feels is
11
a just sentence is tremendous.
And I will tell you that this case has prompted us to change some
of the policies in our office with regard to the issuance of a non-fast-
track plea agreement. This case alone has prompted that change, and
so I also want to express admiration for [defense counsel]. I know he’s
had a tiger by the tail, and I know that he’s doing everything that he
can, and I have the utmost respect for him as well.
THE COURT: No, I––and I would like to say, Mr. [defense counsel],
I’ve been very impressed with the quality of advocacy for Mr. Yanez-
Rodriguez. And also, Mr. [AUSA], and I understand, you know, it’s a
high-volume court, and you know, oftentimes––I mean no criticism
towards the government that, you know, in terms of whether it’s fast
track or a plea agreement on these illegal reentry cases. They come at
you fast and furious, and but this is one that it’s not a––a typical for, I
think, for obviously, this record indicates that.
[AUSA]: I understand, Your Honor, and again, based on this case alone,
we have revised the policy.
Id. Vol. 5 at 30-31. The court then imposed a sentence of 144 months’
imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release.
II
A. Breach of the Plea Agreement
Yanez-Rodriguez did not object in the district court to any alleged breach
of the plea agreement by the government. However, “[t]his circuit has held that a
defendant does not waive his right to appeal a claim that the government has
breached a plea agreement when he fails to object to the breach before the district
court.” United States v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2000). In
addition, even though Yanez-Rodriguez’s plea agreement contained a waiver of
the right to appeal his sentence, “an appellate waiver is not enforceable if the
12
Government breaches its obligations under the plea agreement.” United States v.
Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2008).
We review de novo whether the government has breached a plea
agreement. 3 United States v. VanDam, 493 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007). In
interpreting a plea agreement, we rely on general principles of contract law,
United States v. Cachucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), and therefore
“look to the express language in the agreement to identify both the nature of the
government’s promise and the defendant’s reasonable understanding of this
promise at the time of the entry of the guilty plea,” VanDam, 493 F.3d at 1199.
“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split as to
whether an un-objected-to, alleged breach of a plea agreement is entitled to de
novo review or limited to plain error review. See Puckett v. United States, 129 S.
Ct. 29, 2008 WL 647140, at *1 (Oct. 1, 2008) (granting writ of certiorari to
determine: “Whether a forfeited claim that the government breached a plea
agreement is subject to the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.”).
However, our precedent requires de novo review. See VanDam, 493 F.3d
at 1199 (“This Court reviews de novo the question of whether the government has
breached a plea agreement, even when the defendant fails to preserve this
objection below.” (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Werner, 317 F.3d
1168, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003))). We need not delay our ruling in this case to await
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Puckett because regardless of which standard the
Supreme Court chooses, we are applying here the standard that is more beneficial
to the defendant.
13
(1971). “That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its
impact.” Id. We construe any ambiguities in the plea agreement against the
government as the drafter of the agreement. Cachucha, 484 F.3d at 1270.
The specific language from the plea agreement that Yanez-Rodriguez
claims was breached was the government’s promise “to recommend that a
sentence at the lower end of the Sentencing Guideline range is appropriate.”
ROA Vol. 1 Doc. 14 at ¶ 12.
1. Government’s Statement to District Court in its Sentencing
Memorandum
Yanez-Rodriguez contends the government first breached the plea
agreement when it stated in its sentencing memorandum that it “took no position”
on the district court’s proposal to vary upward from a Guideline sentence. Yanez-
Rodriguez argues that the plea agreement prohibited the government from
“remaining neutral” to a sentence above the Guideline range. Aplt. Br. at 26.
At the first sentencing hearing, Yanez-Rodriguez requested a psychological
examination, in support for his request for a downward departure and/or variance.
After completion of the psychological examination, Yanez-Rodriguez renewed his
motion for a downward departure and/or variance based on the psychologist’s
findings. The government then filed a sentencing memorandum in which it
reiterated its opposition to Yanez-Rodriguez’s request for a sentence below the
advisory Guideline range. At the conclusion of that sentencing memorandum, the
14
government stated:
[T]he United States respectfully requests that this Court conclude that
a sentence within the advisory guideline range of 41 to 51 months
would be reasonable. The United States opposes Yanez[-Rodriguez]’s
request for a deviation from the advisory sentencing guideline range.
The United States takes no position on the Court’s proposal to impose
a sentence above the advisory sentencing guideline range.
ROA Vol. 1, Doc. 29 at 6. At the second sentencing hearing, the government
reminded the district court of its plea agreement promise, and recommended a
sentence at the low end of the Guideline range. Id. Vol. 4 at 7.
Although the sentencing memorandum mis-stated the government’s promise
from the plea agreement by requesting the district court to sentence Yanez-
Rodriguez within the 41 to 51 month range rather than at the lower end of that
range, the government forcefully and adequately informed the district court, at the
next opportunity, and repeatedly thereafter, that it was recommending a sentence
at the lower end of the advisory Guideline range. At the second sentencing
hearing, which was one week after the government submitted its sentencing
memorandum, the government stated that it was “bound to not only––to not only
recommend a guideline sentence but to recommend the low end of the guidelines .
. . .” Id. The government repeated its plea agreement position at the third
sentencing hearing and at the final sentencing hearing. Id. Vol. 5 at 47. In
addition, the government’s mis-statement in its sentencing memorandum of
requesting a within-Guidelines sentence rather than a low-end Guidelines
15
sentence came after the government informed the district court of its
recommendation for a low-end Guideline sentence at the first sentencing hearing.
Id. Vol. 3 at 15.
As a result, the government did not breach the plea agreement. It is clear
from the totality of the events surrounding the sentencing memorandum that the
government’s position was a low-end advisory Guideline sentence for Yanez-
Rodriguez. The record shows that the district court repeatedly received the
government’s recommendation for a low-end Guidelines sentence, which was
what the plea agreement required.
2. Government’s Cross-Examination of the Psychologist
Yanez-Rodriguez alleges the government next breached the plea agreement
when it cross-examined Yanez-Rodriguez’s psychologist at the third sentencing
hearing. Aplt. Br. at 20. Yanez-Rodriguez requested the psychologist’s
examination and testimony in support of his motion for a downward departure
and/or variance. After conclusion of direct examination of the psychologist, the
government cross-examined the psychologist about the basis of his opinion, and
whether his opinion was consistent with a prior psychological evaluation of
Yanez-Rodriguez.
It is true that the government aggressively defended against Yanez-
Rodriguez’s motion for a downward departure and/or variance. For example, in
its cross-examination of the psychologist, the government highlighted the fact that
16
Yanez-Rodriguez was a danger to other people, and would repeatedly violate
societal norms. ROA Vol. 5 at 31. The government highlighted the fact that
Yanez-Rodriguez had been charged with raping a young girl, and showed no
remorse when convicted of this crime. Id. at 35-36.
However, nothing in the express language of the plea agreement prohibits
the government from defending against a below-Guidelines sentence. The plea
agreement required the government to recommend a sentence at the lower end of
the applicable Guidelines sentencing range. The plea agreement contained no
language prohibiting the government from defending against a downward
departure and/or variance. The plea agreement did not address this circumstance;
and the government’s defense against a downward departure and/or variance is
not against the spirit of the agreement.
In cross-examining the psychologist, the government did not imply or state
that it was recommending anything other than a sentence at the lower end of the
Guideline range. The government, after cross-examination, stated:
The government opposes [defense counsel’s] request for a downward
departure or for a deviation pursuant to Booker. Beyond that, the
government, the government’s position, consistent with the Plea
Agreement, is that the government recommends a sentence at the low
end of the advisory guideline range as calculated by the Probation
Office, and I am bound by that agreement, so that is my
recommendation. I did cross-examine [the psychologist]. I do not
believe the defendant is entitled to any type of a deviation, but beyond
that, my position is that he should receive a sentence at the low end of
the range.
17
Id. at 47. The government was clear that the purpose of its cross-examination was
to defend against the district court applying a downward departure and/or
variance to Yanez-Rodriguez’s sentence. We have stated that “[a] plea agreement
may be breached when the government’s attorney is not only an unpersuasive
advocate for the plea agreement, but, in effect, argues against it.” Cachucha, 484
F.3d at 1270 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). 4 Through its questioning,
the government did not argue against the plea agreement, but argued only against
a downward departure and/or variance. Although it is true that the “government
owes the defendant a duty to pay more than lip service to a plea agreement,” id.
(internal quotation omitted), there are no ambiguities in the plea agreement at
issue here, and the government complied with the express terms of the plea
agreement.
Moreover, it is unreasonable for Yanez-Rodriguez to think the government,
based on the plea agreement’s promise to recommend a sentence at the lower end
of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range, would not defend against a
downward departure and/or variance. There is nothing in the plea agreement that
4
This case is factually distinguishable from Cachucha. In Cachucha, the
government agreed to recommend a sentence within the advisory guideline range.
484 F.3d at 1270. The government, at sentencing, then argued that a guidelines-
based sentence was “way too low,” and “incredibly low.” Id. The government
also stated that there were “problems” with a Guidelines sentence, and that the
Guidelines sentence “did not make sense.” Id. We found a breach of the plea
agreement based on this conduct. Id. at 1271. The government’s arguments here
were not arguments against the sentence it had agreed to recommend.
18
would reasonably lead Yanez-Rodriguez to believe the government would stand
mute if he argued for a downward departure or variance. See United States v.
Scott, 469 F.3d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 2006) (“It is well settled that we must
interpret the agreement according to the defendant’s reasonable understanding of
its terms.”).
3. Government’s Reference to Policy Changes and Praise to District
Court for its Effort to Achieve a Just Sentence
Yanez-Rodriguez next argues the government breached the plea agreement
through its statements at the fourth and final sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. at 28-
33. At that hearing, the district court denied Yanez-Rodriguez’s request for a
downward departure and downward variance. The district court then found that a
Guideline sentence would be unreasonable and an upward variance was
appropriate. It should be emphasized that at this point, the district court had
already ruled that it would not impose a Guideline sentence, and would impose an
upward variance.
Yanez-Rodriguez’s defense counsel then spoke, reminding the district court
of the government’s plea agreement and arguing for a within-Guideline sentence.
The government was then invited by the district court to speak, and at that point,
the government told the district court that policy within the U.S. Attorney’s
Office had been changed as a result of this case, and praised the district court for
its effort to impose a “just” sentence. ROA Vol. 5 at 30-31. The court then
19
imposed its sentence.
Yanez-Rodriguez relies on a First Circuit case, United States v. Gonczy,
357 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004), in support of his argument that the government’s
comments praising the district court “undercut” the government’s promise in the
plea agreement to recommend a sentence at the low end of the sentencing
guideline range. In Gonczy, the First Circuit found a violation of a plea
agreement when the government recommended a sentence in accordance with its
agreement, and then made a lengthy substantive argument against the defendant’s
character. Id. at 53-54.
Our present case is distinguishable from Gonczy. In the present case, the
government repeatedly, over the course of four sentencing hearings, stated its
recommendation of a low-end advisory Guideline sentence. The government’s
statements at the sentencing hearing merely praised the district court for the time
it took to address Yanez-Rodriguez’s sentence, and advised the district court of a
change in policy—although the government’s reference to a policy change was
vague. The government made no substantive arguments against Yanez-Rodriguez
in its closing statements to the district court, as the government did in Gonczy.
The government repeatedly stated its recommendation of a low-end Guideline
sentence. Its statement at the final sentencing hearing was nothing more than
complimenting the district court and defense counsel for their hard work on
Yanez-Rodriguez’s case, and an implied assurance that the district court would
20
not have to expend that amount of time in the future.
B. Plain Error in Calculating Sentencing Guideline Range
Yanez-Rodriguez next contends that the district court procedurally erred
when it calculated his Guideline sentencing range. Generally, “[a] defendant who
waives appellate rights in a plea agreement may not appeal his sentence.” United
States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2008). However, an
appeal that falls outside the scope of the waiver is reviewable. Id. Yanez-
Rodriguez did not waive his right to appeal a sentence outside of the Guideline
range and therefore we may review his appeal of the proper calculation of the
Guideline sentencing range.
Yanez-Rodriguez, however, did not object to the calculation of his
Guideline sentencing range in the district court. “Ordinarily, when a claim of
error was not raised below, we review only for plain error.” United States v.
Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006). “Plain error occurs when
there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which
(4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” 5 Id. at 1222 (internal quotation omitted).
5
Yanez-Rodriguez cites a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Meraz-
Enriquez, 442 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that the alleged error
in calculating Yanez-Rodriguez’s Guidelines sentence was automatically plain
error. See Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d at 332 (“The erroneous imposition of a
sixteen-level enhancement would affect the defendant’s substantial rights and the
(continued...)
21
Yanez-Rodriguez argues that the district court erred when it calculated his
total offense level of 21. The total offense level was partially based on a 16-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for previous deportation after a
felony conviction for a crime of violence––a forcible sex offense. We review de
novo a district court’s determination that a prior offense qualifies as a “crime of
violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). United States v. Romero-
Hernandez, 505 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2007).
Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), a sentencing court must increase a
defendant’s offense level by 16 levels “[i]f the defendant previously was deported
. . . after . . . a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence.” The
Guidelines define “crime of violence” as “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor .
. . or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iii). 6
5
(...continued)
integrity of judicial proceedings, and the only question here is whether this
imposition was in error.”). Because we conclude that the district court did not err
when it calculated Yanez-Rodriguez’s Guidelines sentence range, we need not
address the determination whether the alleged error was plain error.
6
“‘In interpreting a guideline, we look at the language in the guideline
itself, as well as the interpretative and explanatory commentary to the guideline
provided by the Sentencing Commission.’” Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d at 1085
(quoting United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2004)).
22
When a defendant contests whether a prior conviction is a crime of
violence, the sentencing court is generally required to follow the “categorical
approach” as adopted in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). See
also United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005). The
categorical approach requires the sentencing court to look “only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those
convictions.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation omitted). But when an
examination of the statute reveals that the statute “reaches a broad range of
conduct, some of which merits an enhancement and some of which does not,
courts resolve the resulting ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial records.”
United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005). At
this stage, the analysis is referred to as the “modified categorical approach.”
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S. Ct. 815, 819 (2007); Batrez
Gradiz v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007).
Following the categorical approach here, we look first to the language of
the statute to determine whether Yanez-Rodriguez was convicted of a crime of
violence. Because we conclude that the particular section of the Kansas statute at
issue prohibits conduct that is categorically a crime of violence under § 2L1.2,
our analysis ends with the language of the statute and we do not proceed to apply
the modified categorical approach.
Yanez-Rodriguez was convicted under the 1988 version of Kansas statute §
23
21-3518, which defined aggravated sexual battery as: “sexual battery, as defined
in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-3517 and amendments thereto, against a person under 16
years of age.” Section 21-3517 defined sexual battery as “the unlawful,
intentional touching of the person of another who is not the spouse of the offender
and who does not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desires of the offender or another.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3517 (1988).
Yanez-Rodriguez argues that the 16-level enhancement was not applicable,
based on two Fifth Circuit cases, which he contends found that later versions of
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3518 are not a crime of violence for purposes of the 16-level
enhancement: United States v. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2006) and
United States v. Matute-Galdamez, 111 F. App’x 264 (5th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished). These cases both hold that a sexual offense must require the use
of physical force to qualify as a forcible sex offense. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d
at 333; Matute-Galdamez, 111 F. App’x at 265-66. We have rejected this
approach, however.
In Romero-Hernandez, we evaluated a Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §
18-3-404(a), which we characterized as prohibiting “nonconsensual sexual contact
that is not necessarily achieved by physical force.” 505 F.3d at 1087. We stated
that the Colorado statute did “not require the use of physical force against the
victim apart from the force inherent in the unlawful contact itself.” Id. at 1087
n.3. We determined that the statute, which did not require physical compulsion,
24
qualified as a forcible sex offense based on the common meanings of the words
“sex offense” and “forcible,” and the Guideline comment, which did not define
the term “forcible sex offense” using the modifier “physical.” See id. at 1089
(“Thus, a sex offense may be committed by means that do not involve ‘physical’
force, yet the offense may still be ‘forcible.’”).
We determined that “a ‘forcible’ sex offense need not be accomplished by
means of physical compulsion,” and then analyzed “whether nonconsensual
sexual contact, such as that prohibited by the Colorado statute, is necessarily
‘forcible’.” Id. We concluded that “[w]hen an offense involves sexual contact
with another person, it is necessarily forcible when that person does not consent.”
Id. As a result, we held that the statute was “categorically a crime of violence.”
Id.
Like the Colorado statute at issue in Romero-Hernandez, the statute here
precludes nonconsensual sexual contact that is not necessarily achieved by
physical force. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3517 (1988) (defining sexual battery as
“the unlawful, intentional touching of the person of another who is not the spouse
of the offender and who does not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires of the offender or another”). And, based on the
precedent established in Romero-Hernandez, a conviction under a statute is a
“forcible sex offense” when the statute prohibits nonconsensual sexual contact
with another person. As a result, similar to our holding in Romero-Hernandez,
25
we conclude that Yanez-Rodriguez was convicted of a crime of violence, based
on his conviction for a forcible sex offense, because Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3517 is
categorically a crime of violence. The district court did not err in applying the
16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
C. Upward Variance/Substantive Reasonableness
Finally, Yanez-Rodriguez contends the district court erred by varying
upward from the Guideline sentencing range. Aplt. Br. at 48. We review the
district court’s variance from the advisory Guideline range through application of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 7 factors for substantive reasonableness, utilizing the
7
Section 3553(a)(2) states:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence . . . .
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider––
...
(2) the need for the sentence imposed––
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
© to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective
(continued...)
26
abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th
Cir. 2008). A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that
is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States
v. Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). We must
consider the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of deviation from
the sentencing Guideline, but we may not apply a presumption of
unreasonableness. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). This court:
may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference
to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,
justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the appellate court
might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.
Id. We must “afford substantial deference to district courts” in abuse of
discretion review. United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2008).
District courts have broad discretion to consider particular facts in
fashioning a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even when those facts are
already accounted for in the advisory guidelines range. See United States v.
Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts have broad
discretion to consider individual characteristics like age, employment, and
criminal history in fashioning an appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
even when disfavored under the Guidelines or already accounted for in another
7
(...continued)
manner[.]
27
part of the calculation.” (internal citations omitted)). With these principles in
mind, we turn to Yanez-Rodriguez’s sentence.
At the final sentencing hearing, the district court varied upward from the
advisory Guideline range of 41 to 51 months, imposing a sentence of 144 months’
imprisonment. The district court discussed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors at
length:
And I will now proceed to go to the sentencing factors. First, the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the illegal reentry offense to
which the defendant pled guilty is punishable for a period of up to 20
years in prison, and it has one of the harshest enhancement schemes in
the sentencing guidelines, and I’ll refer to 8 U.S.C., Section 1326(a)
and (b), and then also, U.S. Sentencing Guideline Section 2L1.2. The
potential penalties associated with the illegal reentry offense that this
defendant has committed, in my view, signal clear congressional intent
that this is a serious crime and not merely a regulatory offense or
anything in the nature of a simple illegal reentry.
Now, in terms of the history and characteristics of this defendant
...
ROA Vol. 6 at 12-13. The district court then went through each paragraph of the
criminal history section in the presentence report, noting each of Yanez-
Rodriguez’s prior offenses, the characteristics of each, and whether Yanez-
Rodriguez received criminal history points for the offense. Id. at 13-17.
The district court continued:
This defendant’s criminal history indicates either arrests or
convictions in four states: Chicago, [Illinois], Kansas, Texas, and New
Mexico; and as I alluded to earlier, he would clearly be in Criminal
History Category VI but for the fact that most of the decade of the
1990s were spent in the Texas Department of Corrections. Therefore,
28
much of the convictions for––that he would have otherwise received
criminal history points on were beyond the time period for which they
can be counted.
This criminal history clearly, in my view, indicates the defendant
is a violent and brutal criminal, and I’ll note that, while he has a tragic
background, nevertheless, he had––it’s resulted in such that he is a
brutal and violent criminal who preys on other individuals.
Now, the sentence, there’s a need for the sentence imposed to, A,
reflect the seriousness of the offense. I’ve already indicated that
Congress has determined that this type of offense, the maximum term
of imprisonment is up to 20 years, and the 16-level enhancement under
the guidelines for this defendant’s illegal reentry is one of the most
significant guideline enhancements. So obviously, in the eyes of the
Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, this is a
serious offense.
The sentence imposed also must promote respect for the law. It
is quite clear to me from this defendant’s lengthy criminal history and
his numerous, numerous deportations, that this defendant has absolutely
no respect for the laws of the United States or, for that matter, the laws
of the State of Illinois, Kansas, Texas. Although there’s no indication
he has criminal history out of New Mexico state court, I would surmise
he has no respect for any law.
There’s also the need for the sentence to be imposed to provide
just punishment for the offense. Again, given this defendant’s lengthy
criminal history, the seriousness of the offense, the total lack of respect
for the law, and the need to provide punishment for the offense, all of
those factors warrant a sentence above the guidelines.
The next factor is to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct. All the sentences that have been imposed by prior courts as
to this defendant have not resulted in any deterrence to him, but a
sentence above the guidelines, in my view, will satisfy this factor of
affording adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.
The next factor is to protect the public from further crimes of this
defendant, and that is, in my view, a critically paramount factor,
because this defendant’s criminal history strongly indicates the
29
likelihood, the strong likelihood of recidivism and the likelihood that
there will be further law violations and further innocent people will be
victimized by the defendant.
There’s also the factor to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner. I’m not sure if that really
applies except for the fact that I do intend to recommend that the
defendant be mentally and psychologically evaluated by the Bureau of
Prisons for the most appropriate setting considering the psychological
and mental issues that the defendant has that were identified by [the
psychologist who previously evaluated Yanez-Rodriguez and testified
at the third sentencing hearing].
There is a factor that the sentence should avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records found
guilty of similar conduct. I will note that, you know, the guidelines
generally––a guideline sentence generally satisfies that factor, so I
suppose that, by imposing a sentence above the guidelines, there’s
certainly the argument that––that there is a sentencing disparity; that is,
a greater sentencing disparity as to this defendant, but again, no single
factor is dispositive, and I think the other factors support a sentence
above the guidelines.
Id. at 17-19. The district court then quoted at length portions of the
psychologist’s testimony which the district court felt supported a sentence above
the Guideline range. Id. at 20-25. The district court highlighted the
psychologist’s opinion that Yanez-Rodriguez was not likely to be law-abiding in
the future and Yanez-Rodriguez’s negative impact on the 14-year-old victim of
the sexual battery conviction. Id.
Yanez-Rodriguez concedes that the district court explained why it wanted
to vary upward from the Guidelines, but argues that the district court’s
explanation of the § 3553(a) factors failed to adequately explain the basis for the
30
extent of the upward variance. (With a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment,
the sentence was 93 months above the high end of the guidelines range.) Yanez-
Rodriguez contends that the district court’s alleged failure means the sentence
imposed was “devoid of rational support and is an abuse of discretion.” Aplt. Br.
at 49-50.
In support of his argument, Yanez-Rodriguez cites United States v.
Walker, 284 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2002). In Walker, the district court departed
upward in calculating the defendant’s Guideline sentence. Id. at 1171. We found
error because the district court did not justify its 7-level upward departure. Here,
the district court varied upward, and adequately explained both the basis for
varying and the need for the extensive variance. Although it is true that the
district court did not specifically address each § 3553(a) factor in terms of why
each factor justified the extent of the variance, it is clear from reading the district
court’s lengthy explanation that it fully and adequately explained why it varied as
it did. In addition, Walker was decided pre-Gall. In Gall, the Supreme Court
noted that it is “uncontroversial that a major [variance] should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one.” 128 S. Ct. at 597. We have
stated, however, that our purpose post-Gall is merely to determine whether “the
district court’s proffered rationale, on aggregate, justifies the magnitude of the
sentence.” United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 837 (10th Cir. 2008).
Yanez-Rodriguez also cites United States v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
31
1999), in support of the argument that the district court erred by using Yanez-
Rodriguez’s childhood abuse as a variance factor, rather than using it as a basis
for downward departure. See id. at 84 (holding that a defendant’s mental and
emotional condition stemming from abuse suffered during childhood can be taken
into account at sentencing when it is “extraordinary”). Yanez-Rodriguez’s
argument is again foreclosed by precedent from this circuit. In Pinson, we
affirmed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment, which was 135 months above
the applicable guideline range, because, in part, the sentence was “the product of
the district court’s belief that [the defendant] posed a danger to the public.” 8 542
F.3d at 836.
As in this case, the district court’s conclusion on this point in Pinson was
supported by the expert testimony of a psychologist. Id. at 837. We noted that
district courts should hesitate to use an upward variance to increase the
incarceration time for defendants who might pose a risk to the public because of
their mental health problems, but did not foreclose the use of this factor as an aid
at sentencing. Id. at 838-39 (“The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that district
8
In addition to Pinson, we affirmed a substantial variance in another case
when the district court adequately stated its justification and consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1304-05 (10th
Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s upward variance to a 120-month sentence
from a Guideline top sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment based on the district
court’s lengthy justification considering the individualized application of each of
the § 3553(a) factors).
32
courts have wide discretion in choosing the factors it considers during sentencing.
See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 601-02. This is even true when, as here, the factor is a
discouraged one under the guidelines.”). In addition, the district court used a
wide range of factors in determining Yanez-Rodriguez’s upward variance and
ultimate sentence. Yanez-Rodriguez’s mental illness was not the sole factor used
by the district court to justify its upward variance.
In this case, the district court painstakingly went through each § 3553(a)
factor, stating, where applicable, how the factor supported an upward variance.
The district court was especially troubled by Yanez-Rodriguez’s previous harm to
his victim, by Yanez-Rodriguez’s repeated violations of state and federal laws,
and by the expert opinion of the psychologist that Yanez-Rodriguez was likely to
offend again if he was unsupervised. Where, as here, the district court decides to
vary from the Guideline sentencing range after a careful, reasoned, and reasonable
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion.
Accordingly, while this court could conclude a different sentence was
reasonable, we cannot exercise the discretion of the district court and “decide de
novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence
reasonable.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602; United States v. Muñoz-Nava, 524 F.3d
1137, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008). Affording the district court due deference on its
determination that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify the variance and the
33
extent of the variance, we find that the district court’s decision was “reasoned and
reasonable,” not an abuse of discretion. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602; Muñoz-Nava,
524 F.3d at 1149.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
34
United States v. Yanez-Rodriguez
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2009-02-10
Citations: 555 F.3d 931
Copy Citations