URPI-SANCHO

Court: Board of Immigration Appeals
Date filed: 1970-07-01
Citations: 13 I. & N. Dec. 641
Copy Citations
1 Citing Case
Combined Opinion
                                                 Interim Decision #2066




                        MATTER OF URPI-SANCHO

                      In Deportation Proceedings
                                A-48822222
                 Decided by Board September 15, 1970

An alien admitted as a nonimmigrant student who was convicted of a single
 petty offense involving moral turpitude for which she was imprisoned, is
 not by reason of such conviction precluded by the provisions of section
 101 (f) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act from establishing good
 moral character during the period required for establishing eligibility for
 voluntary departure under section 244 (e) of the Act. [Matter of Neely
 and Whylie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 864, overruled insofar as it deals with the
 privilege of voluntary departure.]
CHARGE:

  Order : Act of 952—Section 241 (a) (9) [8 U.S.C. 1251 (a) ( 9 ) ] —Nonimmi-
                         grant student—Failure to maintain status.


   This case presents an appeal from a decision of a special in-
quiry officer denying the respondent's application for the privi-
lege of voluntary departure, and ordering her deportation to
Costa Rica.
   The respondent is a 21-year-old unmarried native and citizen of
Costa Rica, who has resided in the United States since her ar-
rival at Miami, Florida, on or about September 28, 1969. She was
admitted as a nonimmigrant student to attend the University Of
Miami, and was authorized to remain in this country until Sep-
tember 27, 1970.
   Early in February, 1970, the respondent interrupted her stud-
ies at the University of Miami, allegedly for one semester only.
She has stated that a Service officer advised her that, in view of
the short period involved, an application for a status change was
unnecessary.
   On February 19, 1970, the respondent was arrested for shop-
lifting. She was tried in the Miami, Florida, Municipal Court, on
February 24, 1970, and was sentenced, on the charge of theft of
goods of the total value of $48.23, to imprisonment in the city jail

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 Interim Decision #2066
  for five days, and was fined $300. She did not pay the fine, and
  served 15 days in the city jail. While she had pleaded guilty to
  the charge, she now maintains that the articles which were found
  in her handbag had been placed there by a friend who had accom-
  panied her.
    The special inquiry officer found that the respondent had not
  maintained her student status, that she had failed to comply with
 the conditions of her admission as a nonimmigrant student, and
  that her deportability had been established by clear, convincing,
  and unequivocal evidence. He then found the respondent ineligible
  for the privilege of voluntary departure, and cited Matter of
 Neely and Whylie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 864 (BIA, 1966), as the basis
 for his decision. There we had sustained the Service appeal, had
 found each respondent deportable, and had added that, in view of
 the recent conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, each
 respondent was statutorily ineligible for the relief of voluntary
 departure, under section 101 (f) (3), since good moral character
 could not be established for the five-year period required under
 section 244 (e). Apparently, the fact that the crime involved was
 a petty offense was overlooked.
    We hereby overrule our decision in Matter of Neely and Why-
 lie, supra, insofar as it deals with the privilege of voluntary de-
 parture.
    Good moral character for at least five years immediately pre-
 ceding an alien's application for voluntary departure under
subsection (e) of the section 244 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act is a prerequisite for a grant of voluntary departure
under that subsection. Section 101 (f) of the Act lists eight
classes of aliens who shall not be regarded as persons of good
moral character. Persons described in paragraph (9) of section
212(a), that is, generally speaking, aliens who have been con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude, are included in the
third class of persons who are precluded from establishing good
moral character. Section 101(f) (3). However, petty one-time of-
fenders are specifically excepted in paragraph (9) of section
212(a), with the result that conviction of just one petty offense
involving moral turpitude will not make an alien excludable
under that section. It follows that, under section 101 (f) (3), such
a conviction of a petty offense involving moral turpitude cannot
preclude an alien from establishing good moral character in a
 deportation proceeding. We so held in Mutter of M—, 7 1. & N.
Dec. 147 (BIA 1956).

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                                           Interim Decision #2066
    The fact that a person is not within one of the eight classes
 listed under section 101(f) does not preclude a finding that, for
 other reasons, the person is, or was, not of good moral character.
 Section 101(f), last sentence. In other words, where specific con-
 duct does not preclude a finding of good moral character under
 the enumerated categories of section 101(f), that same conduct
 may nevertheless be considered in making a determination on
 good moral character in accordance with the provisions of the
 last sentence of section 101 (f). Matter of L D—E—, 8 I. & N.
 Dec. 399 (BIA, 1959); Matter of Turcotte, 12 I. & N. Dec. 206
 (BIA, 1967).
    In the case now before us, the special inquiry officer correctly
found that the respondent was deportable, for even a petty of-
fense involving criminal conduct constitutes a violation of an al-
 ien's nonimmigrant status and renders the alien deportable.
Matter of A—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 762 (BIA, 1955). The exception
to the general rule, in certain student cases (see Matter of C—, 9
I. & N. Dec. 100 (BIA, 1960) ), does not apply here, since the spe-
cial inquiry officer found that the respondent had not maintained
her student status, and since, moreover, the respondent's convic-
tion had resulted in her actual incarceration.
    The special inquiry officer followed our holding, now overruled,
in Matter of Neely and Whylie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 864 (BIA, 1966),
and found the respondent ineligible for voluntary departure. We
shall remand this matter to him so that he can determine whether
or not the respondent should be granted the privilege of volun-
tary departure under section 244(e) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.
   Voluntary departure is a privilege and a matter of grace. Mat-
ter of Turcotte, 12 I. & N. Dec. 206 (BIA, 1967). While statutory
eligibility is a prerequisite to a grant of voluntary departure, an
alien does not discharge his burden of establishing good moral
character merely by showing that a particular act in violation of
the law does not preclude a finding of good moral character.
Matter of Turcotte, supra. At a new hearing this respondent
should be given the opportunity to show that, in spite of her re-
cent conviction of a petty offense, she has been a person of good
moral character for the required five-year period. Section 244 (e).
The special inquiry officer will then determine whether or not
good moral character has been established, and whether or not
voluntary departure shall be authorized.
   ORDER: It is ordered that this matter be and hereby is re-
manded to the special inquiry office for further proceedings in ac-
cordance with this opinion.

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