The plaintiffs, Van Allen and Mickel, copartners, as assignees of Stephens Brothers, copartners, commenced this action in the superior court for Lewis county, seeking recovery from the defendants, Post, Montgomery and Greenleaf, as copartners, of compensation for the logging and delivery of logs by Stephens Brothers at the mill of the defendants, and also seeking recovery of damages because of alleged loss of profits in being prevented by the defendants from hauling from their mill to cars for shipment lumber which was to be manufactured from the logs by the defendants’ mill. These claims of recovery were sought under a contract entered into by Stephens Brothers and the defendants and thereafter assigned by Stephens Brothers to the plaintiffs, as it is alleged, with the consent and approval of the defendants, so as
The evidence introduced upon the trial was such as to warrant the jury in believing, as they evidently did believe, the following facts to be thereby established: In March, 1920, appellants were copartners. They then owned and operated a sawmill on the shores of a small lake near Tenino. A contract was then entered into between appellants and Stephens Brothers by which Stephens Brothers were to log and deliver in the water at appellants’ mill the merchantable timber on a certain nearby specified tract of land, for which work appellants were to pay Stephens Brothers at the rate of $6 per thousand feet. Stephens Brothers were also to haul the lumber manufactured from the logs at appellants ’ mill to cars for shipment, for which work appellants were to pay Stephens Brothers at the rate of $3.25 per thousand feet. The logging work and the hauling of the lumber manufactured therefrom was proceeded with by Stephens Brothers until near December 31,. 1920. Practically all of the logs which had then been delivered at the mill had about that time been manufactured into lumber and hauled to cars by Stephens Brothers. For all of this logging and hauling work Stephens Brothers had become fully compensated at about that time. Appellants then ceased the operation of the mill for a time, evidently because of flood water conditions.
Upon the completion of the logging by Stephens Brothers, there was at the mill approximately 75,000 feet of the logs which were logged and delivered by Stephens Brothers after December, 31, 1920; that is, after they had been fully compensated for previous logging work, so that there then became due to Stephens Broth
About the time of the completion of this logging work, appellants again commenced the operation of their mill, proceeding to manufacture those logs into lumber, and thereafter respondents hauled such manufactured lumber to cars in pursuance of the contract, for which work they were paid the sum of $188.50. Having in mind that the agreed contract price for this hauling of lumber was $3.25 per thousand feet, a very simple computation tells that the amount of lumber so hauled by respondents must have been 58,000 feet. All the lumber which respondents claim to be entitled to haul and to be compensated for hauling- was, in any event, only the lumber to be manufactured from the final 75,000 feet of logs, less the 58,000 feet which they did haul and were compensated therefor in the sum of $188.50. So if respondents were entitled to damages for loss of profits, it was only loss of profits they would have made in hauling 17,000 feet, and for this they are claiming, by their evidence, loss of profits only to the extent of $1 per thousand feet; manifestly only $17, though more was claimed in their complaint. We are making these detailed observations touching the loss of profit contentions to show of what small moment in this controversy the question of loss of profits is, to Avhich so much argument has been ad
About the time of the transfer of the Stephens Brothers’ logging and hauling contract to respondents, there was incorporated by appellants the “Centralia Millwork and Supply Company,” which was the exact partnership name under which appellants had been and were then doing business as copartners. This corporation, it may be conceded for purposes of argument, succeeded to the business of the partnership, but there is no evidence that thereby appellants as copartners were relieved of liability to pay Stephens Brothers or respondents, their assignees, for the logging and delivery of the 75,000 feet of logs at the mill.
All of the contentions here made in behalf of appellants are made only to the end that they be awarded a new trial. Let us notice each of these contentions in order that we may see to which branch of the case each of them has practical application; that is, whether applicable to the question of respondents’ right of recovery as assignees of Stephens Brothers for logging work, as to which the contract became fully executed; or to the question of damages for loss of profits because of respondents being prevented from hauling lumber to be manufactured from the remaining small amount of logs. (1) It is first contended that the court erred in refusing to allow appellants to prove that respondents made a new contract with the newly organized corporation, Centralia Millwork and Supply Company, of such nature as would negative the claim of respondents that they had the right to complete the performance of the original Stephens Brothers’
We may observe that, as to most of these claims of error, it is difficult- for us to discern in this somewhat involved record any substantial support. However, we have seen that the loss of profits claimed by respondents is only the loss of profits they would have earned in hauling the lumber to be manufactured from approximately 17,000 feet of remaining logs at a dollar per thousand. We have also seen that the logging and delivery of the 75,000 feet of logs for which respondents, as assignees of Stephens Brothers, were entitled to receive compensation at the rate of $6 per thousand, entitled respondents to receive such compensation, with interest thereon, in practically the exact sum awarded by the jury, rendering it highly probable that the jury did not award respondents any amount for loss of profits. This seems to pretty effectually demonstrate that the claims of error here made in behalf of appellants, even if technically well founded, were without substantial prejudice. So we conclude, in view of the small amount of the claimed loss of profits to which these claims of error relate, and the probability under all the circumstances that the jury did not award any recovery for loss of profits, that the ends of justicé do not call for a new trial of this case.
The judgment is- affirmed.