UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
STUART VANDERHURST,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 98-1408
COLORADO MOUNTAIN COLLEGE
DISTRICT, a Colorado junior college
district; COLORADO MOUNTAIN
COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, a
Colorado junior college board of
trustees,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER
Filed May 9, 2000
Before BRISCOE, REAVLEY *, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on appellants’ petition for rehearing with
suggestion for rehearing en banc. The panel grants in part rehearing for the
narrow purpose of adding footnote 6. Accordingly, a revised published opinion is
attached to this order. The panel otherwise denies the petition.
Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, Senior Judge, United States Court of
*
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
The suggestion for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of
the court who are in regular active service as required by Fed. R. App. P. 35. As
no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court
requested that the court be polled, the suggestion is denied.
Entered for the Court
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk of Court
By:
Keith Nelson
Deputy Clerk
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 9 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
STUART VANDERHURST,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 98-1408
COLORADO MOUNTAIN COLLEGE
DISTRICT, a Colorado junior college
district; COLORADO MOUNTAIN
COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, a
Colorado junior college board of
trustees,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 97-B-563)
John G. Roberts, Jr., of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P, Washington, D.C. (Alexander E.
Dreier, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P.; Daniel R. Satriana, Jr., of Hall & Evans, L.L.C.,
Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for Appellants.
Bradley C. Bartels, Colorado Education Association, Denver, Colorado, (Martha
R. Houser, Gregory J. Lawler, Sharyn E. Dreyer, and Cathy L. Cooper, Colorado
Education Association, with him on the brief) for Appellees.
Before BRISCOE, REAVLEY *, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stuart R. Vanderhurst, a former professor at Colorado Mountain College
Junior College District (the “College”), sued the College for terminating his
employment on the basis of allegedly inappropriate classroom conduct and
comments. Vanderhurst claimed, inter alia, that the College violated his First
Amendment right to free speech and breached his employment contract and he
sought relief respectively under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state common law. At the
close of Vanderhurst’s case-in-chief and again at the close of all the evidence, the
College unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law on both the First
Amendment and contract claims. The jury eventually returned a verdict in favor
of Vanderhurst on both claims. The College now appeals from the district court’s
denial of its Rule 50 motions on the two claims. This court exercises jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The College’s appeal on the First Amendment claim presents the following
issues: (1) whether the speech for which Vanderhurst was terminated garnered
constitutional protection; (2) whether the district court erred by submitting to the
Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, Senior Judge, United States Court of
*
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
jury the question whether the termination reasonably related to the College’s
legitimate pedagogical concerns; and (3) whether the district court should have
answered that question in favor of the College. Because the College failed to
adequately raise these issues before the district court, it has waived appellate
review of its arguments. This court thus affirms the judgment on the First
Amendment claim. On the contract claim, the College contends the terms of
Vanderhurst’s employment contract and its Policy Manual preclude his ability to
prosecute that claim in court. In light of our resolution of the First Amendment
claim and the structure of the district court judgment, this court need not address
the merits of that argument. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1973, Vanderhurst began working as Veterinary Head of the College’s
Veterinary Technology Program (the “Program”), becoming Program Director in
1978. After a one year leave of absence, Vanderhurst returned to the program as
a professor, teaching clinical pathology, anaesthetic nursing, radiology, and
veterinary medical nursing, and further serving as a clinician to the program’s
animals.
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In the late 1980’s, an internal conflict arose among faculty within the
Program. An adversarial relationship also developed between Vanderhurst and
the College administration. In 1991, the College suspended Vanderhurst during a
portion of the fall semester because he sexually harassed students and a female
faculty member in the Program.
In the fall semester of 1995, a number of students in Vanderhurst’s Clinical
Pathology and Anaesthetic Nursing classes complained that he utilized an
inappropriate teaching style and made offensive comments during class time.
Specifically, the students lodged the following allegations against Vanderhurst: he
discussed the presence of tampons in a sewer plant while lecturing about animal
parasites; he referred to human anal and oral sex and male orgasms during a
lecture about the transmission of parasites; he used the terms “big dog,” “big
chair,” and “floaters and sinkers” to describe feces; he made comments insulting
to blondes; he called a female student “rose bud”; he degraded a student by
discussing an incident in which she was bitten by a pig; he intimated that students
were “dumb”; he inappropriately referred to comments made in student
evaluations; he made negative comments about another instructor in the Program
and withheld class lecture material from her; he discussed matters unrelated to
course content during class time; he intimidated and humiliated students; and he
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allowed sophomore students to address his freshman Clinical Pathology class
about their course evaluations.
The College allegedly believed that this purported conduct violated policies
set forth in the College’s Policy Manual, including policies governing ethics,
commitment to the student, commitment to the public, and sexual harassment. As
a consequence, the College notified Vanderhurst on December 14, 1995 that it
was considering terminating his employment for neglect of duty, failure to meet
or comply with reasonable written or published standards or directives, and other
good and just cause. Vanderhurst was then suspended without pay while the
College proceeded to carry out the recommended dismissal.
The Policy Manual provides that a faculty member may challenge the
College’s decision to terminate employment through four distinct levels of
grievance review. Level I allows the grievant to meet with his immediate
supervisor in an attempt to resolve the matter informally. If the grievance is not
resolved at Level I, the faculty member may initiate a Level II review, at which a
Peer Review Committee (“PRC”) examines the entire record and may receive
other relevant materials and take testimony from parties and witnesses. The PRC
then issues a report which includes findings of fact, conclusions, and
recommendations. If still unsatisfied, the faculty member may pursue a Level III
review by the College President or designee, who reviews the record from the
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prior proceedings, meets with the grievant, and may undertake additional
inquiries. The President or designee then issues a written decision. Although
normal grievances end with the Level III decision, a faculty member challenging a
dismissal decision is entitled to a Level IV review by the Board of Trustees (the
“Board”). Both the faculty member and the President or designee may testify, call
and cross-examine witnesses, and present evidence at the Level IV hearing.
Based on that hearing, the record from the prior hearings, and all other relevant
records, the Board then issues its written decision.
On February 14, 1996, at a Level I Supervisor Review hearing, Vanderhurst
grieved the College’s decision to dismiss him, but the decision was upheld.
Vanderhurst then pursued a Level II Peer Review grievance hearing. After
conducting extensive evidentiary hearings, the PRC issued its decision on May
27, 1996. In its findings of fact, the PRC stated that the only meritorious
allegation of misconduct was the one claiming Vanderhurst had allowed
sophomore students to address his class about course evaluations. The PRC thus
recommended that Vanderhurst not be terminated because the College had failed
to show a violation of policies or other good and just cause for dismissal. In July,
however, Vanderhurst was informed that the College disagreed with the PRC’s
recommendation and would proceed with the termination.
-6-
Vanderhurst continued to challenge the College’s dismissal decision at a
Level III grievance hearing. The President’s designee reviewed the evidentiary
record from the PRC Hearing and issued independent factual findings based on
that review, some of which were inconsistent with those made by the PRC. The
designee concluded that Vanderhurst had violated College policies, retaliated
against another faculty member whose previous complaints had led to the 1991
disciplinary action, and disregarded earlier warnings about his offensive conduct
and language. Consequently, the President upheld the decision to terminate
Vanderhurst’s employment. After a final Level IV grievance review, the Board
unanimously approved a resolution affirming the termination.
Vanderhurst then brought suit in state court against the College, the Board,
and several College administrators in their individual capacities. The College
removed the case to federal district court. Vanderhurst’s complaint alleged, inter
alia, that the College had breached his employment contract by terminating his
employment without proper grounds and had deprived him of his rights to free
speech and academic freedom by dismissing him for exercise of those rights, thus
violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
These two claims proceeded to trial in September of 1998. At the close of
Vanderhurst’s case-in-chief, the College moved for judgment as a matter of law
on both the First Amendment and breach of contract claims, pursuant to Rule 50
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion on
both claims. The College renewed its Rule 50 motion on both claims at the close
of all the evidence, but the district court again denied that motion.
The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Vanderhurst on both
claims. Although the jury specifically found that Vanderhurst had sustained
damages of $557,100 on each claim, the parties had stipulated that Vanderhurst
could only recover once. The district court thus awarded Vanderhurst $557,100
in total damages. The district court also ordered that Vanderhurst receive
attorney’s fees for his First Amendment claim upon filing an appropriate motion.
The College now appeals from the district court’s denial of its Rule 50 motions on
both the First Amendment and contract claims.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter
of law. See Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999). A court
should grant a defendant judgment as a matter of law “[i]f there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis . . . with respect to [the plaintiff’s] claim . . . under
the controlling law.” Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th
Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). In evaluating a Rule 50 motion, this court
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examines all the evidence admitted at trial, construing that evidence and the
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Kinser, 184 F.3d at 1267.
B. The First Amendment Claim
The College challenges the denial of its Rule 50 motions regarding
Vanderhurst’s First Amendment claim on three grounds: (1) the district court
should have ruled as a matter of law that the speech for which Vanderhurst was
terminated fell entirely outside the First Amendment’s protection; (2) the district
court committed reversible error by submitting to the jury a question of
law–whether Vanderhurst’s termination reasonably related to the College’s
legitimate pedagogical concerns; and (3) the district court should have answered
that question in favor of the College.
1. Whether Speech Was Protected Under First Amendment
The College contends that the district court should have granted its Rule 50
motions on the First Amendment claim because the speech for which it terminated
Vanderhurst is entirely unprotected under the First Amendment. The College first
argues that much of Vanderhurst’s speech constituted profanity, which a college
professor has no First Amendment right to utter in the classroom. Additionally,
the College asserts that the speech at issue concerned course content at odds with
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the College’s established curriculum, and a teacher enjoys no First Amendment
right to determine the educational content of a course.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the United States Supreme Court held
that a New York statute which required the termination of teachers for
“treasonable” or “seditious” acts or utterances committed or made inside or
outside the classroom ran afoul of teachers’ First Amendment rights. 385 U.S.
589, 597, 604 (1967). The Court thus recognized that teachers do enjoy some
First Amendment protection in their classroom speech, stating, “[Academic]
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Id. at 603. Two
years later, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the
Court delivered its now-famous pronouncement regarding speech in our nation’s
public schools: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Indeed, it is widely recognized that teachers’ classroom speech is entitled
to some First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005,
1012 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Fowler v.
Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987); Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980). In Miles v. Denver Public Schools,
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however, this court implicitly acknowledged that not every word spoken by a
teacher in a public school classroom falls within the protections of the First
Amendment. See 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991). The Miles court noted that
whether a teacher’s speech is constitutionally protected is the first inquiry in the
test “for determining whether an adverse employment decision violates a public
[school teacher’s] first amendment rights.” 1 Id.
The College maintains that because Vanderhurst’s speech was profane and
because it amounted to an attempt to communicate course content at odds with the
College’s chosen curriculum, his speech was not constitutionally protected. It
thus asserts that this court can rule in its favor without even engaging in the First
Amendment analysis established in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
which probes whether the adverse employment action reasonably related to the
school’s legitimate pedagogical interests. See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). This
suggested approach, however, ignores the analytical dictate of Miles. In Miles,
this court stated, “In determining whether Miles has satisfied the initial burden of
1
Under Miles, the second question in the test for determining if a school’s
adverse employment action against a teacher violated the teacher’s First
Amendment rights is whether “the protected speech motivated the adverse
employment action.” Miles v. Denver Public Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir.
1991). The employee bears the burden of demonstrating both of these elements.
See id. If the employee satisfies that burden on both elements, the employer must
then establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the
adverse employment action even if the employee had not made the controversial
statements. See id.
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showing his classroom expression is constitutionally protected, we look to the
Supreme Court’s decision in . . . Kuhlmeier . . . .” Miles, 944 F.2d at 775. The
Miles court then proceeded to determine whether, under the test established in
Kuhlmeier, the actions taken against Miles reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical interest. See id. at 775-79. Concluding that the school’s actions
against Miles were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests, this
court finally stated, “Miles has [thus] not shown that his classroom comments . . .
were constitutionally protected.” Id. at 779.
The College is therefore incorrect to bifurcate as separate arguments (1)
that Vanderhurst’s speech was not constitutionally protected, and (2) that his
termination was reasonably related to the College’s legitimate pedagogical
concerns. Under the analytical rubric of Miles, the College’s two separate
contentions address the same issue; in other words, whether Vanderhurst’s
termination reasonably related to the College’s legitimate pedagogical interests is
the test for determining whether his speech fell within the ambit of First
Amendment protection. Cf. Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 23
(1st Cir. 1999) (utilizing the Kuhlmeier test to determine whether a high school
teacher’s distribution of lewd materials to a student were protected by the First
Amendment). But see Edwards v. California Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“We do not find it necessary to determine whether the district court’s
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instruction adequately defined ‘reasonably related to a legitimate educational
interest’ standard because, as a threshold matter, we conclude that a public
university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be
taught in the classroom.” (emphasis added)).
2. Whether Termination Reasonably Related to Legitimate
Pedagogical Concerns
In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court established an analytical framework for
determining when a public high school’s restrictions on school-sponsored student
speech violates those students’ First Amendment rights: “educators do not offend
the First Amendment by exercising . . . control over . . . student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 484 U.S. at 273. This court in Miles extended
that holding to a school’s control over the classroom speech of a public high
school teacher. See 944 F.2d at 777. This court has not decided, however,
whether that same analytical approach should be applied to a college or
university’s ability to restrict the classroom speech of a professor. On appeal,
both Vanderhurst and the College embrace the Kuhlmeier approach as the proper
means to analyze Vanderhurst’s First Amendment claim. This court will thus
assume for purposes of this appeal that the analytical framework established in
Kuhlmeier is indeed appropriate to this case; we need not decide definitively,
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however, whether that framework does in fact govern a public college or
university’s control over the classroom speech of a professor or other instructor. 2
In the instant case, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the
interests embodied in the College’s sexual harassment policy and code of ethics
and stated as the reasons for terminating Vanderhurst did constitute legitimate
pedagogical concerns. Additionally, the district court determined that neither the
sexual harassment policy nor the code of ethics are unconstitutionally vague.
Finally, in granting the College’s Rule 50 motion on Vanderhurst’s equal
protection claim, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the College did
not act in a discriminatory or vindictive manner in firing Vanderhurst. Given
these three rulings, the College contends that the district court was required to
rule as a matter of law that the termination was reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical interests. Specifically, the College first asserts that whether the
termination reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests is a question of
law which the district court erroneously submitted to the jury. The College then
2
Not all courts have adopted the Kuhlmeier framework as the proper
means to assess a college or university’s restriction of in-class speech by an
instructor. See, e.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-76 (11th Cir. 1991)
(utilizing a unique balancing test); Scallett v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011
(W.D.Va. 1990) (applying the Pickering balancing test to a university’s control
over an instructor’s speech, rather than the Kuhlmeier test, because the interests
discussed in Kuhlmeier justifying allowance of greater speech restriction in
secondary schools are not at stake to the same degree in higher education).
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maintains that had the district court made this determination, instead of allowing
the jury to do so, the court should have ruled in its favor. Vanderhurst counters
that the College waived its right to press these two related arguments on appeal
because it failed to articulate them in its Rule 50 motions.
This court generally will not entertain arguments on appeal which the
appellant failed to raise before the district court. See Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d
323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). More specifically, “[a Rule 50] motion for judgment
as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence preserves for review only
those grounds specified at the time, and no others.” Correa v. Hospital San
Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1196 (1st Cir. 1995). Finally, Rule 51 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states, “No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the
grounds of the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
At the close of Vanderhurst’s case, the College orally moved for judgment
as a matter of law on the First Amendment claim, stating simply, “we believe that
there has been insufficient evidence to show that Dr. Vanderhurst was terminated
for the exercise of any First Amendment protected rights . . . .” The College thus
rested its initial Rule 50 motion upon the broad contention that Vanderhurst’s
speech was not protected under the First Amendment. After extensively
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discussing whether Vanderhurst’s speech was constitutionally protected, the
district court denied the motion, concluding that sufficient factual disputes
existed about the controversial speech which the jury needed to resolve before the
court could issue a legal ruling. At that time, however, the district court
addressed the First Amendment claim within the analytical framework of
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983) and not under the Kuhlmeier and Miles approach. 3 The College was
also then operating under the belief that Connick/Pickering, rather than Kuhlmeier
and Miles, provided the appropriate analytical framework for the First
Amendment claim. 4 Indeed, the College’s pretrial motions, which argued within a
3
The Connick/Pickering analysis requires the court to determine if the
speech was protected first by ascertaining whether the speech touched upon a
matter of public concern, and second, by balancing the public employer’s interests
in controlling its work environment and fulfilling public responsibilities against
the employee’s interest in the speech. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 574 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 150-54 (1983).
4
For example, in its summary judgment motion, the College argued
exclusively within the context of Connick/Pickering. Although that motion did
discuss Miles, but not Kuhlmeier, it did so only for the proposition that the
College had substantial interests as recognized by Miles, which should weigh in
its favor under a Connick/Pickering balancing. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that between filing that summary judgment motion and making its initial
Rule 50 motion, the College ever attempted to shift the court’s analytical focus
away from Connick/Pickering and onto Kuhlmeier.
Interestingly, Vanderhurst’s motion in opposition to the College’s summary
judgment motion did argue within the framework of Kuhlmeier and Miles. It does
not appear, however, that the College or the district court ever picked up on this
suggested approach prior to the time the College filed its “trial brief,” the day
after it made its initial Rule 50 motion.
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Connick/Pickering analysis, likely induced the district court to adopt just such an
approach. Due to the College’s position when it made that initial Rule 50 motion
regarding the proper analytical framework, it did not argue then that the district
court should decide as a matter of law that Vanderhurst’s termination reasonably
related to the College’s legitimate pedagogical interests.
The following day, the College filed a “trial brief,” which finally urged the
district court to analyze Vanderhurst’s First Amendment claim under the
analytical rubric of Kuhlmeier and Miles rather than under the framework set out
in Pickering and its progeny. After advocating such an analytical approach, the
College’s brief stated, “Defendants have demonstrated in evidence adduced
during Plaintiff’s case-in-chief that his classroom comments implicated the three
pedagogical interests outlined in Miles.” The College did not argue in that brief
that it would be improper for the jury to resolve the issue of whether the
termination reasonably related to the College’s legitimate pedagogical concerns,
nor did it even request that the district court answer this question as a matter of
law. Indeed, nowhere in the trial brief did the College either refer to Rule 50 or
request any form of relief. Rather, it seems that the College’s intent in filing the
brief was merely to refocus the trial court on what the College now considered the
proper mode of analysis for Vanderhurst’s First Amendment claim, i.e., the
analytical structure set out in Kuhlmeier and Miles.
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After the close of all the evidence, the district court held a jury instruction
conference. During the conference, the district court stated that the proper
analysis required answering two questions: “whether there are shown to be
legitimate pedagogical interests, and secondly, whether the actions taken by the
school are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests.” The court then
declared that the first inquiry presented a question of law, which it answered in
the affirmative. The court stated that it would submit the second question to the
jury. The district court then continued this discussion, stating, “And if I
determined that [the] defendants’ pedagogical interests in this case stated as a
basis for the termination are legitimate, that’s no longer a factor for the jury to
consider here. What they’re considering is the reasonableness of the action in
termination.” The College simply responded, “Okay.” 5 After further discussion
5
This colloquy reveals the litigants’ misunderstanding of the question
whether the termination reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests.
That question does not ask whether the specific adverse employment action taken,
here, termination, was a reasonable one in light of the teacher’s alleged
transgression. That decision is left to the institution itself, and a federal court
should play no role in judging the reasonableness of the sanctions which a school
levies against its employees. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 779 (“[W]e will not interfere
with the authority of the school officials to select among alternate forms of
discipline.”). Rather, an adverse employment action reasonably relates to a
school’s legitimate pedagogical interests if the employee’s conduct prompting the
sanction, as perceived in good faith by the school, in some way violated or
vitiated those legitimate pedagogical concerns. In this case, therefore, the
question is whether the speech that the College in good faith believed
Vanderhurst uttered violated the College’s sexual harassment policy or code of
ethics, which embodied legitimate pedagogical concerns. Regardless of this
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about other aspects of the relevant jury instruction, the district court read the
finalized version, to which the College responded, “That’s fine, your Honor.”
Significantly, at no time before, during, or after this conference did the College
object to the submission to the jury of the question whether the termination
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns or even state that it viewed
this as a legal inquiry. Quite to the contrary, the College’s own statements during
this colloquy reveal that the College, like the district court, viewed the question
as one for the jury.
Finally, after the jury instruction conference ended, the College renewed its
Rule 50 motion, merely stating, “On the [First Amendment] claim we would
incorporate the reasoning in Miles, in Bishop v. Aronov, and also in . . . Edwards
v. California University of Pennsylvania . . . .” The College articulated no
specific arguments to support its renewed Rule 50 motion. The district court then
denied the motion, to which the College responded, “I would just like to reserve
that issue as to the submission of the academic freedom First Amendment claim . .
. .” Again, the College failed to state any specific reasons for objecting to the
submission of the First Amendment claim to the jury.
apparent misunderstanding, the College’s response to the court’s discussion does
demonstrate that the College viewed the question as one properly within the
province of the jury.
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This record reveals that the College never argued before the district court,
as it does now on appeal, that the question whether the termination reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical interests is not a question for the jury, but
instead a question of law for the court. The College had ample opportunity to
make the court aware of its opposition to submitting this question to the jury.
Nevertheless, in its motion for summary judgment, in its initial Rule 50 motion, in
the trial brief, during the jury instruction conference, and in its renewed motion, it
failed to do so. Not only did the College fail to object to the submission of this
question to the jury, during the instruction conference the College explicitly
agreed with the district court that the question belonged to the jury. Pursuant to
Rule 51, the College’s failure to object to the giving of this instruction renders
fatal its argument that the submission of this question to the jury warrants reversal
of the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Because the College never objected to
the submission of this question to the jury or stated that the question required a
legal determination by the court, this court concludes that the College waived its
appellate argument that the submission of this question to the jury warrants
reversal of the judgment. 6
6
The College contends that, despite its failure to object to the instruction,
Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. , 168 F.3d 1228, 1232
(10th Cir. 1999) requires this court to reverse the judgment because the giving of
a legal question to the jury constitutes plain error. We disagree. Unlike the
instruction in Poindexter , the question of whether Vanderhurst’s termination
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Having reviewed the entire record surrounding the College’s Rule 50
motions and having concluded that the College never argued against submitting to
the jury the question whether Vanderhurst’s termination reasonably related to the
College’s legitimate pedagogical interests, this court is uncertain as to the
specific grounds upon which the College did base those motions, particularly the
renewed motion. The initial Rule 50 motion was predicated upon the argument
that under a Pickering analysis, the speech for which Vanderhurst was terminated
was not constitutionally protected. In making its renewed Rule 50 motion, the
College merely offered an entirely vague reference to Miles without articulating
any specific argument to support its motion. The College’s nebulous presentation
could not have alerted the district court that the reasonable relationship issue was
being tendered for its review. This court therefore concludes that the College
also waived for appellate review the argument that the district court should have
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests, though perhaps itself a
legal one, does implicate factual findings. Before a court can answer the
question, a jury must first make findings regarding the relevant speech. See
supra note 5. Poindexter , therefore, is not controlling here. Furthermore, in the
instant case the jury made no such findings, in part because the College failed to
argue that the question was a legal one and request that the jury make the
relevant predicate findings. Both because we lack those findings and the College
did not include the entire trial transcript in the record on appeal, this court cannot
conclude that the giving of the instruction “seriously affected the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co. , 738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984) (quotation
omitted). As a consequence, there is no plain error.
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granted its renewed Rule 50 motion because Vanderhurst’s termination reasonably
related to the College’s legitimate pedagogical concerns.
Because the College waived for appellate review its arguments challenging
the judgment on Vanderhurst’s First Amendment claim, we must affirm that
judgment.
C. The Contract Claim
This court will not “undertake to decide issues that do not affect the
outcome of a dispute.” Griffin v. Davies, 929 F.2d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1991).
Although Vanderhurst prevailed on both his First Amendment and contract claims
and the jury found he had sustained $557,100 in damages on each claim, the
parties stipulated that he could only recover once. Reflecting that stipulation, the
district court’s judgment awarded Vanderhurst damages of only $557,100. That
award remains intact because we affirm the judgment on the First Amendment
claim. This court thus need not address the appeal on the contract claim, and we
decline to do so. 7
7
This court generally avoids reaching constitutional issues when it can
resolve an appeal on other grounds. See United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d
1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, however, the district court
ordered that Vanderhurst receive attorney’s fees for his First Amendment claim
upon filing an appropriate motion. At oral argument, both parties agreed that
Colorado law would not similarly allow Vanderhurst to recover attorney’s fees for
his contract claim. To avoid affecting the district court’s order pertaining to
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because the College failed to articulate before the district court those
arguments which it now presents on the First Amendment claim, this court
AFFIRMS the judgment on that claim. In light of the structure of the district
court’s final judgment, we decline to address the merits of the College’s argument
on the contract claim. Thus, the judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado is hereby AFFIRMED.
REAVLEY, J., concurs in the result only.
attorney’s fees, this court therefore needed to resolve the College’s challenge to
the First Amendment claim rather than to the contract claim.
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Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2000-04-11
Citations: 208 F.3d 908
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion