Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Chenango County (Sullivan, J.), entered March 19, 2008, which granted respondent’s application, in two proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, for modification of a prior order of visitation.
Petitioner (hereinafter the mother) and respondent (hereinafter the father) have two children (born in 1993 and 1995). Pursuant to a May 2007 order of custody, entered on agreement by the parties, the parties continued to have joint custody of their two children, with the primary residence of the children being with the father and the mother having visitation, among other
Both the mother and Law Guardian argue that the stipulated order should be vacated because the settlement was reached only after Family Court disclosed to the parties portions of what the child stated during the Lincoln hearing.2 Undoubtedly, what transpires at a Lincoln hearing as a general rule is confidential and “the child’s right to confidentiality should remain paramount absent a direction to the contrary” (Matter of Hrusovsky v Benjamin, 274 AD2d 674, 676 [2000] [citation omitted]; see Matter of Lincoln v Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270, 272-273 [1969]). While the court’s disclosure of what transpired at the Lincoln hearing was unfortunate—and should not have occurred—we cannot say that it constitutes a basis for disturbing an order based upon an otherwise valid agreement between the parties.
The mother appeals from an order that “was entered upon the consent of the parties, the terms of which were clearly set forth on the record” (Matter of Sterling v Dyal, 52 AD3d 894, 895 [2008]; see Matter of Moore v Moore, 56 AD3d 982, 983 [2008]). Almost three months passed after Family Court conducted the Lincoln hearing before the parties agreed to the stipulation. At no time during that period, or on the court date when the terms of the stipulation were entered into the record,
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs.
1.
The mother’s petition alleged that the father was utilizing excessive corporal punishment upon the children. The father’s petition alleged that the mother was routinely failing to send the youngest child to school without explanation or justification.
2.
The Law Guardian argues that it was error for Family Court to conduct the Lincoln hearing before the fact-finding hearing was held on the petitions. To this extent, we note that at the initial appearance on the petitions, the Law Guardian represented that the child was “fairly adamant about [wanting] an opportunity to speak with [the court],” and neither the Law Guardian nor any other party indicated that when the Lincoln hearing was scheduled, it should be delayed.