Vincent Hall v. Duron Burney

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6566

VINCENT JOHN HALL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

DURON BURNEY, Officer; MAXTON POLICE; TOWN OF MAXTON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:10-cv-00184-BO)

Submitted: October 31, 2011 Decided: November 18, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Vincent John Hall, Appellant Pro Se. Ronnie Monroe Mitchell,
MITCHELL, BREWER, RICHARDSON, ADAMS, BURGE & BOUGHMAN,
Fayetteville, North Carolina; Andrew James Santaniello, CLAWSON
& STAUBES, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), Vincent John Hall

filed a pro se complaint against Officer Duron Burney, the Town

of Maxton, North Carolina, and the Maxton Police Department,

alleging that he was shot by Burney on his own property. * He

claimed that the Town of Maxton had hired Burney part-time and

failed to properly train him. Hall sought damages for medical

expenses and pain and suffering. The district court granted

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Hall failed to state

a claim against any of the Defendants. Hall timely appealed,

claiming that the district court erred by dismissing his action

and by denying his motion to amend his complaint. We affirm in

part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC,

634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011). “The purpose of a Rule

12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.”

*
Hall, a private citizen, filed his complaint on a
standardized form ordinarily used by prisoners filing civil
actions pursuant to § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The
district court found that Hall failed to state a claim under
Bivens. Because Hall clarified in his informal appellate brief
that his complaint sought relief under § 1983, we do not address
his claims under Bivens.

2
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must give the

defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

93 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

While a pro se litigant’s pleadings are “to be liberally

construed,” id. at 94, the facts alleged must “raise a right to

relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S.

544, 555, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard does not

equate to a probability requirement, but it requires “more than

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). Where the motion to dismiss involves “a civil rights

complaint, we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs

alleged and must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to

a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief

under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the

facts alleged.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district

court that the Maxton Police Department was not subject to suit

under § 1983. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

3
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). We therefore affirm the

district court’s dismissal of the claims against the police

department.

Turning to Hall’s claim against Burney, “[t]he Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures

includes the right to be free of ‘seizures effected by excessive

force.’” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2006)),

petition for cert. filed (Oct. 11, 2011) (No. 11-458). We

conclude that Hall’s allegations, albeit brief, that Burney, a

police officer, entered his property and shot him was adequate

to give Defendants notice of, and was sufficient to establish a

plausible claim of, excessive force.

Regarding Hall’s claim against the Town of Maxton,

“inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983

liability,” but “only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

police come in contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388 (1989). While mere negligence is insufficient to

expose a municipality to liability under § 1983 for failure to

train, Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 1994), a

local governing body’s failure to adequately train its officers

can be so egregious as to warrant a finding that it amounts to a

4
policy or custom for which the municipality should be held

responsible. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-90.

On the record before us, we cannot state with

certainty that Hall is not entitled to relief on his claim

against the Town of Maxton under any plausible legal theory. It

is at least possible that Hall can establish through discovery a

pattern of conduct by officers indicating a lack of training and

that such a lack of training resulted in the injuries Hall

alleges he sustained.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred

by granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against

Burney and the Town of Maxton and therefore vacate this portion

of the district court’s order. Ultimately, Hall’s claims may

not be successful, but the validity of his claims cannot be

determined until the facts surrounding his allegations are

developed. See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243 (stating that “a Rule

12(b)(6) motion does not resolve contests surrounding the facts,

the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses”

(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)).

In addition, Hall sought to amend his complaint to add

Maxton Police Captain Tammy Deese and Mayor Gladys Dean as

Defendants. His proposed amended pleading alleged that they

were liable for the inadequate police training. The district

court denied the motion to amend as futile.

5
“A plaintiff may amend his complaint one time as a

matter of course before the defendant files a responsive

pleading.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). We review for abuse of

discretion the denial of a motion to amend a complaint. Pub.

Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 313

n.3 (4th Cir. 2009).

“[T]he doctrine of futility only applies when the

plaintiff seeks leave of court to amend and does not have a

right to amend.” Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 730 (4th

Cir. 2010). Because no responsive pleading had yet been filed.,

see Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d

1064, 1068 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993) (motion to dismiss is not

considered a responsive pleading), Hall had the right to amend

his complaint with or without leave of court. Galustian, 591

F.3d at 730. We therefore conclude that the district court

abused its discretion by denying Hall’s motion to amend.

For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the

claim against the Maxton Police Department, vacate the dismissal

of the claims against Burney and the Town of Maxton, vacate the

denial of Hall’s motion to amend, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

6
presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED